## Before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission State of Minnesota

In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in Minnesota

> Docket No. E002/GR-20-723 Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1)

> > Rate of Return

November 2, 2020

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1		I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
2		
3	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, AFFILIATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
4	Α.	My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am employed by ScottMadden, Inc. as
5		Director. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel,
6		NJ 08054.
7		
8	Q.	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU SUBMITTING THIS TESTIMONY?
9	Α.	I am submitting this direct testimony (referred to throughout as my Direct
10		Testimony) before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (Commission)
11		on behalf of Northern States Power, a Minnesota corporation (NSPM or the
12		Company).
13		
14	Q.	Please summarize your professional experience and educational
15		BACKGROUND.
16	Α.	I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before
17		over 20 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy
18		Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Alberta Utility Commission, and one
19		American Arbitration Association panel on issues including, but not limited
20		to, common equity cost rate, rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class
21		cost of service, and rate design.
22		
23		On behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA), I calculate the AGA Gas
24		Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the
25		American Gas Index Fund (AGIF) is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA
26		Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual

2		corporate members of the AGA.
3		
4		I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts
5		(SURFA). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate
6		of Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and
7		the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.
8		
9		I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation
10		Analysts (NACVA) and was awarded the professional designation "Certified
11		Valuation Analyst" by NACVA in 2015.
12		
13		I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor
14		of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business
15		Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and
16		International Business from Rutgers University.
17		
18		The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are
19		shown in Appendix A.
20		
21	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
22	Α.	The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence on behalf of the Company
23		and recommend the appropriate return on common equity (ROE) to be used
24		in setting rates in this proceeding. My testimony first provides a summary of
25		financial theory and regulatory principles pertinent to the development of the
26		recommended cost of capital. I then: (1) evaluate the Company's proposed

fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded

1		capital structure; and (2) present evidence and analysis on the appropriate
2		ROE on its Minnesota jurisdictional rate base. My testimony concludes with
3		a discussion of the current capital market environment and how it influences
4		cost of capital issues in this proceeding.
5		
6	Q.	HAVE YOU PREPARED SCHEDULES IN SUPPORT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?
7	Α.	Yes. I have prepared Exhibit(DWD-1), which contains Schedules 1
8		through 9, and were prepared by me or under my direction.
9		
10		II. SUMMARY
11		
12	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE.
13	Α.	My recommended ROE of 10.20% is summarized on page 2 of
14		Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 1. In determining my recommendation, I
15		assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of
16		relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to the Company. Using
17		companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the
18		principles of fair rate of return established in the Hope <sup>1</sup> and Bluefield <sup>2</sup> decisions,
19		which I discuss further in Section III, below. Of course, no proxy group can
20		be identical in risk to any single company. Consequently, there must be an
21		evaluation of relative risk between the Company and the proxy group to
22		determine if it is appropriate to adjust the proxy group's indicated rate of

23

return.

Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (Hope). Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) (Bluefield).

My recommendation results from applying and considering several cost of common equity models, specifically the Constant Growth and Two Growth forms of the Discounted Cash Flow model (DCF), the Risk Premium Model (RPM), and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), to the market data of the Utility Proxy Group whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. The results derived from these analyses are as follows:

Table 1
Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates<sup>3</sup>

Discounted Cash Flow Model	8.72%
Risk Premium Model	10.43%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	12.14%
Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies	<u>12.03%</u>
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments	9.77% - 10.83%
Size Adjustment	0.05%
Credit Risk Adjustment	-0.12%
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.15%
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	9.85% - 10.91%
Recommended Cost of Common Equity	10.20%

See Section VI for a detailed discussion regarding the application of my cost of common equity models.

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility
Proxy Group is between 9.77% and 10.83% before any Company-specific
adjustments.4 I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward
by 0.05% to reflect the Company's smaller relative size and downward by
0.12% to account for a less risky bond rating, as compared to the Utility Proxy
Group. I also adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by
0.15% to account for flotation costs. <sup>5</sup> These adjustments resulted in a
Company-specific indicated range of common equity cost rates between
9.85% and 10.91%. Given the Utility Proxy Group and Company-specific
ranges of common equity cost rates, my recommended ROE for the Company
is $10.20\%$ .

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- 13 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE.
- 14 A. The Company is proposing projected capital structures which include a
  15 52.50% common equity ratio. That common equity ratio is consistent with
  16 the Company's historical equity ratios, the equity ratios maintained by the
  17 Utility Proxy Group and their operating subsidiary companies.

- 19 Q. How is the remainder of your Direct Testimony organized?
- 20 A. The remainder of my Direct Testimony is organized as follows:
- Section III Provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles
   pertinent to the development of the Cost of Capital;
- Section IV Explains the proposed capital structure;

The 9.77% low end of the range is calculated by taking the average model result (10.83%), and averaging that with the lowest model result (8.72%). The 10.83% high end of the range is the approximate average of all model results.

<sup>5</sup> See Section VIII for a detailed discussion of my cost of common equity adjustments.

- Section V Explains my selection of the Utility Proxy Group used to develop
   my Cost of Common Equity analytical results;
- Section VI Describes the analyses on which my Cost of Common Equity
   recommendation is based;
- Section VII Summarizes my common equity cost rate before adjustments to
   reflect Company-specific factors;
- Section VIII Explains my adjustments to my common equity cost rate
   before to reflect Company-specific factors;
- Section IX Provides an overview of the current capital market environment;
   and
- Section X Presents my conclusions.

#### III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

14

- 15 Q. What principles have you considered in arriving at your 16 recommendations?
- In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal 17 Α. determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, 18 regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that 19 the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public, while providing safe and 20 reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain 21 22 the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must 23 24 compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of 25 return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited 26 Hope and Bluefield cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in *Hope*, when it stated:

The rate-making process under the Act, *i.e.*, the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that 'regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.' 315 U.S. at page 590, 62 S.Ct. at page 745. But such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 346 12 S.Ct. 400,402. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.<sup>6</sup>

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In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. The Commission's decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide the Company with the opportunity to earn a return that is: (1) adequate to attract capital at reasonable cost and terms; (2) sufficient to ensure their financial

<sup>6</sup> Hope, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), at 603.

1	integrity; and (3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises
2	having corresponding risks.
3	
4	Lastly, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a
5	stand-alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case.
6	Parent entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at
7	the attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment
8	alternative in their capital budgeting process. That is, utility holding
9	companies that own many utility operating companies have choices as to
10	where they will invest their capital within the holding company family.
11	Therefore, the opportunity cost concept applies regardless of the source of
12	the funding, public funding or corporate funding.
13	
14	When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient
15	to provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business
16	unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is,
17	the regulated subsidiary must compete for capital with all the parent
18	company's affiliates, and with other, similarly situated utility companies. In
19	that regard, investors value corporate entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and
20	expect each division within the parent company to provide an appropriate
21	risk-adjusted return.
22	
23	It therefore is important that the authorized ROE reflects the risks and
24	prospects of the utility's operations and supports the utility's financial integrity
25	from a stand-alone perspective as measured by their combined business and
26	financial risks. Consequently, the ROE authorized in this proceeding should

1		be sufficient to support the operational (i.e., business risk) and financing (i.e.
2		financial risk) of the Company's Minnesota utility operations on a stand-alone
3		basis.
4		
5	Q.	WITHIN THAT BROAD FRAMEWORK, HOW IS THE COST OF CAPITAL ESTIMATED
6		IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS?
7	Α.	Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance
8		their permanent property, plant, and equipment (i.e., rate base). The fair rate
9		of return for a regulated utility is based on its WACC, in which, as noted
10		earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital are weighted by their
11		respective book values.
12		
13		The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a
14		firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they expect
15		is equal to, or greater than, the return that they require to accept the risk of
16		providing funds to the firm.
17		
18		The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is
19		based on the economic principle of "opportunity costs." Investing in any
20		asset (whether debt or equity securities) represents a forgone opportunity to
21		invest in alternative assets. For any investment to be sensible, its expected
22		return must be at least equal to the return expected on alternative, comparable
23		risk investment opportunities. Because investments with like risks should
24		offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the
25		return available on an investment of comparable risk.

Whereas the cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed
as the interest rate or yield on debt securities, the cost of equity must be
estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the
cost of equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models used to determine
it are typically applied to a group of "comparable" or "proxy" companies.

In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the returns available on comparable investments.

- 11 Q. IN VIEW OF THE COMPARABLE RISK STANDARD, HAVE YOU REVIEWED

  12 AUTHORIZED RETURNS FOR OTHER VERTICALLY INTEGRATED ELECTRIC

  13 UTILITIES?
  - A. Yes, I have. An overarching principle in determining a fair rate of return is to ensure that the Company is allowed the ability to earn a return commensurate to that earned by other enterprises with similar risks. In that regard, the Commission should keep in mind that the Company competes for capital with all companies with comparable risk, including other operating subsidiaries of Xcel Energy's (XEI). Therefore, two high level checks on the reasonableness of a return on equity result are to examine the returns being allowed to the parent company utility operations in other jurisdictions and the returns being authorized to other utilities across the country. While such comparisons are admittedly imperfect and may reflect somewhat dated regulatory determinations, they can still inform the overall reasonableness of the Commission's consideration.

NSPM's 9.06% authorized return in Minnesota is the lowest among XEI's 1 regulated utility operating subsidiaries.<sup>7</sup> 2

3 4

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Table 2 Xcel Energy Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized Returns<sup>8</sup>

Company	Jurisdiction	Date	Authorized ROE
Southwestern Public Service Co.	Texas	8/27/2020	9.45%
Southwestern Public Service Co.	New Mexico	5/20/2020	9.45%
Public Service Co. of CO	Colorado	2/11/2020	9.30%
Northern States Power - MN	Minnesota	9/29/2019	9.06%
Northern States Power - WI	Wisconsin	9/4/2019	10.00%
Northern States Power - MN	North Dakota	2/26/2014	9.75%
Northern States Power - MN	South Dakota	6/19/2012	9.25%

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
In addition, As shown in Charts 1 and 2, below, recently authorized returns for vertically integrated electric utilities in Minnesota have been among the lowest in the country and in the Upper Midwest region.

<sup>7</sup> The Commission noted in Docket E002/M-17-797: "Continuing to use this ROE going forward will provide administrative efficiency, and the Commission will therefore require Xcel to use an ROE of 9.06% in all electric dockets filed by the Company that require an ROE until the Commission issues an order in the Company's next rate case authorizing a different ROE." In the Matter of the Petition of Northern States Power Company for Approval of the Transmission Cost Recovery Rider Revenue Requirements for 2017 and 2018, and Revised Adjustment Factor, Docket No. E002/M-17-797, September 29, 2019, at 8. See, also, In the Matter of the Petition of Northern States Power Company for Approval of the Renewable Energy Standards (RES) Rider Revenue Requirements for 2017 and 2018 and RES Adjustment Factors, Docket No. E002/M-17-818, September 30, 2019, at 3.

<sup>8</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

1 Chart 1

## U.S. Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized ROEs<sup>9</sup>



3


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4 Chart 2

# Upper Midwest Vertically Integrated Electric Authorized ROEs<sup>10</sup>



7

10 Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

1		Although I recognize that the Commission is not beholden to set the
2		authorized return for the Company based on returns available to utilities in
3		other jurisdictions, that data provides a relevant benchmark against which to
4		assess the Company's currently authorized return of 9.06%. For example,
5		NSPM is at a competitive disadvantage relative to XEI's other operating
6		subsidiaries because the Company's authorized return in Minnesota is lower
7		than that of XEI's other operating subsidiaries.
8		
9		A. Business Risk
10	Q.	Please define business risk and explain why it is important for
11		DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.
12	Α.	The investor-required return on common equity reflects investors' assessment
13		of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often
14		discussed in the context of business and financial risk.
15		
16		Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's
17		common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock
18		financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and
19		financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned
20		return on common equity, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.
21		
22		Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not
23		limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance
24		requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory
25		economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply,

operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, emerging

1	technologies including distributed energy resources, the vagaries of weather
2	and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings.
3	
4	Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks
5	individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly
6	distinct from one another. When determining an appropriate return or
7	common equity, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company
8	in relation to other similarly situated utility companies (i.e., the Utility Proxy
9	Group). To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher
10	risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.
11	
12	For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in
13	nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year
14	variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory
15	factors, long-term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of
16	investors to obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital
17	Moreover, because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate and
18	reliable service at all times (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn
19	a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to
20	delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are
21	capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising
22	external funds. The obligation to serve and the corresponding need to access
23	capital is even more acute during periods of capital market distress.
24	
25	Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of

paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the

return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently, those risks and their implications for the required return on equity tend to be difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required return on common equity.

#### B. Financial Risk

10 Q. Please define financial risk and explain why it is important in determining a fair rate of return.

A. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (*i.e.*, failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Therefore, consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors require higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.

Q. CAN BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS BE A PROXY FOR A FIRM'S COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS (I.E. INVESTMENT RISK)?

22 A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative 23 of, similar combined business and financial risks (*i.e.*, total risk) faced by bond 24 investors.<sup>11</sup> Although specific business or financial risks may differ between

Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, e.g., within the A category, an S&P rating can be an A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinction for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are
roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these
debtholder risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity

#### IV. NSPM AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

Α.

Q. Why is it necessary to develop a proxy group when estimating the
 ROE for the Company?

Because the Company is not publicly traded and does not have publicly traded equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded, comparable companies to serve as "proxies" for the Company. In addition to the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent with the *Hope*, and *Bluefield* comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have selected two proxy groups that, in my view, are fundamentally risk-comparable to the Company: A Utility Proxy Group and a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group.<sup>12</sup>

Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range, even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how to estimate the ROE from within that range. That determination will be best informed

<sup>12</sup> The development of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is explained in more detail in Section VI.

by employing a variety of sound analyses and necessarily must consider the
sort of quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my
Direct Testimony. Additionally, a relative risk analysis between the Company
and the Utility Proxy Group must be made to determine whether or not
explicit Company-specific adjustments need to be made to the Utility Proxy
Group indicated results.

My analyses are based on the Utility Proxy Group, containing U.S. electric utilities. As discussed earlier, utilities must compete for capital with other companies with commensurate risk (including non-utilities) and, to do so, must be provided the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the Utility Proxy Group's market data in determining the Company's ROE.

Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S OPERATIONS.

A. NSPM is a vertically integrated electric and natural gas utility that provides electric generation, transmission, and distribution service, as well as natural gas distribution service to approximately 1,500,000 retail electric customers and 525,000 natural gas customers in North Dakota, Minnesota, and South Dakota. The Company has long-term issuer ratings of A2 from Moody's Investor Services (Moody's) and A- from Standard and Poor (S&P). The Company is not publicly-traded as it is an operating subsidiary of Xcel Energy Inc. (XEI or the Parent). XEI is publicly-traded under ticker symbol XEL.

<sup>13</sup> See, Northern States Power Company, SEC Form 10-K at 4, 7 (Dec. 31, 2019).

<sup>14</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

1	Page 1 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative
2	capitalization and financial statistics for the Company for the years 2015 to
3	2019. <sup>15</sup> During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved
4	average earnings rate on book common equity for the Company averaged
5	8.29%. The average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital
6	(excluding short-term debt) was 52.59%, and the average dividend payout
7	ratio was 94.56%.
8	
9	Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
10	for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 3.16 and 3.97 times, with an average
11	of 3.53 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 20.69% to
12	28.13%, with an average of 25.72%.
10	

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- 14 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE COMPANIES IN THE UTILITY PROXY 15 GROUP.
- Because the Cost of Equity is a comparative exercise, my objective in 16 Α. developing a proxy group was to select companies that are comparable to the 17 18 Company. Because the Company is a 100% rate regulated vertically integrated 19 electric utility, I applied the following criteria to select my Utility Proxy Group:
  - They were included in the Eastern, Central, or Western Electric Utility (i) Group of Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition) (Value Line);
    - They have 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total operating income (ii)derived from, and 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total assets attributable to, regulated electric operations;

<sup>15</sup> Source: NSPM FERC Form 1. Reflects entire operations of the Company.

1	(111)	They are vertically integrated (i.e., utilities that own and operate						
2		regulated generation, transmission, and distribution assets);						
3	(iv)	At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly						
4		announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition						
5		activity (i.e., one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring						
6		another) or any other major development;						
7	(v)	They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five						
8		years ended 2019 or through the time of preparation of this testimony						
9	(vi)	They have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services						
10		(Bloomberg) adjusted Betas;						
11	(vii)	They have positive Value Line five-year dividends per share (DPS)						
12		growth rate projections; and						
13	(viii)	They have Value Line, Zacks, or Yahoo! Finance consensus five-year						
14		earnings per share (EPS) growth rate projections.						
15		The following 15 companies met these criteria:						

Company Name	Ticker Symbol
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT
Ameren Corporation	AEE
Duke Energy Corporation	DUK
Edison International	EIX
Entergy Corporation	ETR
Evergy, Inc.	EVRG
IDACORP, Inc.	IDA
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW
PNM Resources, Inc.	PNM
Portland General Electric Co.	POR
Xcel Energy, Inc.	XEL

- 4 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP'S HISTORICAL CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.
- 6 A. Page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative 7 capitalization and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group for the years 8 2015 to 2019.

9

During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged 8.54%, the average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 48.49%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 61.41%.

Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 4.02 and 5.28 times, with an average of 4.63 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 15.23% to 23.09%, with an average of 19.49%. Given those capitalization and financial statistics, I conclude the Utility Proxy Group is generally comparable to the Company.

#### V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

A.

## 10 Q. How does the capital structure affect the rate of return?

As discussed above, there are two general categories of risk: business risk and financial risk. The capital structure relates to a company's financial risk, which represents the risk that a company may not have adequate cash flows to meet its financial obligations, and is a function of the percentage of debt (or financial leverage) in its capital structure. In that regard, as the percentage of debt in the capital structure increases, so do the fixed obligations for the repayment of that debt. Consequently, as the degree of financial leverage increases, the risk of financial distress (*i.e.*, financial risk) also increases. In the essence, even if two firms face the same business risks, a company with meaningfully higher levels of debt in its capital structure is likely to have a higher cost of both debt and equity. Since the capital structure can affect the subject company's overall level of risk, it is an important consideration in establishing a just and reasonable rate of return.

Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, Public Utility Reports, Inc., 2006, at 45-46. (Morin)

1	Q.	IS THERE SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS A
2		KEY CONSIDERATION IN ESTABLISHING AN APPROPRIATE RATE OF RETURN?
3	Α.	Yes. The Supreme Court and various utility commissions have long
4		recognized the role of capital structure in the development of a just and
5		reasonable rate of return for a regulated utility. In particular, a utility's
6		leverage, or debt ratio, has been explicitly recognized as an important element
7		in determining a just and reasonable rate of return:
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16		Although the determination of whether bonds or stocks should be issued is for management, the matter of debt ratio is not exclusively within its province. Debt ratio substantially affects the manner and cost of obtaining new capital. It is therefore an important factor in the rate of return and must necessarily be considered by and come within the authority of the body charged by law with the duty of fixing a just and reasonable rate of return. <sup>17</sup>
17		Perhaps ultimate authority for balancing the issues of cost and financial
18		integrity is found in the Supreme Court's statement in Hope:
19		
20 21 22 23		The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of "just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. <sup>18</sup>
24		And as the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found in
25		Communications Satellite Corp. et. al. v. FCC:
26 27		The equity investor's stake is made less secure as the company's debt rises, but the consumer rate-payer's is

New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 98 N.H. 211, 97 A.2d 213, (1953), citing New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., (Mass.) 327 Mass. 81, 97 N.E. 2d 509, 514; Petitions of New England Tel. & Tel. Co. 116 Vt. 480, 80 A2d 671, at 6.

<sup>18</sup> Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S., at 603 (1944).

1 2		alleviated. <sup>19</sup>
3		That is, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit found that
4		because there is a relationship between the capital structure and the cost of
5		equity, investor and consumer interests must be balanced. Consequently, the
6		principles of fairness and reasonableness with respect to the allowed rate of
7		return and capital structure are considered at both the federal and state levels.
8		
9	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPONENTS OF THE COMPANY'S RECOMMENDED
10		CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND WACC.
11	Α.	The Company's proposed test year capital structure includes long-term debt,
12		short-term debt, and common equity. The Company's proposed revenue
13		requirement for the test year reflects a WACC of 7.35%. <sup>20</sup>
14		
15	Q.	Does the Company have a separate capital structure that is
16		RECOGNIZED BY INVESTORS?
17	Α.	Yes. The Company is a separate corporate entity that has its own capital
18		structure and issues its own debt with the Securities and Exchange
19		Commission.
20		
21	Q.	WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE COMPANY'S ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE BE
22		AUTHORIZED FOR THE COMPANY IN THIS PROCEEDING?
23	Α.	As a preliminary matter, the Company's actual capital structure is known and
24		measurable, and is within a reasonable range from the perspective of the

Communications Satellite Corp. et. al. v. FCC, 198 U.S. App. D.C. 60, 63-64611 F.2d 883. See, Direct Testimony of Sarah W. Soong. 19

<sup>20</sup> 

Utility Proxy Group companies. <sup>21</sup> The use of an operating subsidiary's actual
capital structure is consistent with the FERC's precedent, under which they
use the applicant's capital structure, where possible. <sup>22</sup> In particular, the FERC
will use the utility operating company's capital structure if it meets three
criteria: (1) it issues its own debt without guarantees; (2) it has its own bond
rating; and (3) it has a capital structure within the range of capital structures
approved by the commission. <sup>23</sup> The Company meets all of these criteria.

Importantly, in order to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service to its customers, the Company must meet the needs and serve the interests of its various stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, and bondholders. The interests of these stakeholder groups are aligned when the Company maintains a healthy balance sheet, strong credit ratings, and a supportive regulatory environment, ensuring it has access to capital on reasonable terms in order to make necessary investments.

Safe and reliable service cannot be maintained at a reasonable cost if utilities do not have the financial flexibility and strength to access competitive financing markets on reasonable terms. The authorization of a capital structure that understates the Company's actual common equity will weaken the financial condition of its operations and adversely impact the Company's ability to address expenses and investment, to the detriment of customers and shareholders. Safe and reliable service for customers cannot be sustained over

<sup>21</sup> See Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 2.

<sup>22</sup> See, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. 80 FERC ¶ 61,157, 61,657 (1997) (Opinion No. 414).

<sup>23 148</sup> FERC ¶ 61,049 Docket No. EL14-12-000, at 190.

2		such that the public interest is not optimized.
3		
4		Consequently, the Company's existing capital structure should be used to set
5		rates in this proceeding.
6		
7	Q.	How does the Company's requested test year capital structure
8		COMPARE WITH THE THEIR RECENT CAPITAL STRUCTURES?
9	A.	The requested test year capital structure is highly consistent with NSPM's
10		historical capital structures. As shown on Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 2,
11		page 1, the common equity ratios for years 2015 through 2019 range from
12		51.85% to 52.07%, averaging 51.98%.
13		
14	Q.	How does NSPM's actual common equity ratio of 52.50% compare
15		WITH THE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS MAINTAINED BY THE UTILITY PROXY
16		Group?
17	Α.	In order to assess the reasonableness of the Company's requested ratemaking
18		common equity ratio, I reviewed the actual common equity ratios maintained
19		by the comparable companies within the Utility Proxy Group. <sup>24</sup> The
20		Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio of 52.50% is
21		reasonable and consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained
22		by the Utility Proxy Group. As shown on pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit(DWD-
23		1), Schedule 2, common equity ratios of the utilities range from 35.73% to
24		58.04% for fiscal year 2019. The Company's actual capital structure
25		demonstrates both the reasonableness of using it to set rates and the

the long term if the interests of shareholders and bondholders are minimized

<sup>24</sup> The development of the Utility Proxy Group is described more fully in Section IV.

1		Company's relative financial health. Setting the capital structure as requested
2		by the Company will continue to support the long-term financial health of the
3		Company for the benefit of all of its stakeholders, including its customers.
4		
5		I also considered Value Line's projected capital structures for the Utility Proxy
6		Group for 2023-2025. That analysis shows a range of projected common
7		equity ratios between 39.00% and 59.00%.
8		
9		In addition to comparing the Company's ratemaking common equity ratio
10		with common equity ratios currently and expected to be maintained by the
11		Utility Proxy Group (i.e., at the holding company level), I also compared the
12		Company's ratemaking common equity ratio with the equity ratios maintained
13		by the operating subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group companies. As shown
14		on page 5 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 2, common equity ratios of the
15		operating utility subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group range from 45.23% to
16		65.22% for fiscal year 2019.
17		
18	Q.	Is the Company's proposed equity ratio of 52.50% appropriate for
19		RATEMAKING PURPOSES GIVEN THE RANGE OF THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
20	Α.	Yes, it is. The Company's proposed equity ratio of 52.50% is appropriate for
21		ratemaking purposes in the current proceeding because it is the actual equity
22		ratio of NSPM, and it is well within industry norms.

## VI. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

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- Q. IS IT IMPORTANT THAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS BE MARKET-BASED?
- Yes. As discussed previously, regulated public utilities, like the Company, must compete for equity in capital markets along with all other companies with commensurate risk, including non-utilities. The cost of common equity is thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those companies. If an individual investor is choosing to invest their capital among companies with comparable risk, they will choose the company providing a higher return over a company providing a lower return.

- 13 Q. Are the cost of common equity models you use market-based 14 Models?
- 15 Α. Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are used in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM and CAPM 16 17 are also market-based in that the bond/issuer ratings and expected bond 18 yields/risk-free rate used in the application of the RPM and CAPM reflect the 19 market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of the Beta 20 coefficient to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's 21 assessment of market/systematic risk, as Beta coefficients are derived from 22 regression analyses of market prices. Moreover, market prices are used in the 23 development of the monthly returns and equity risk premiums used in the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM). Selection criteria for the Non-Price 24 Regulated Proxy Group are based on regression analyses of market prices and 25 reflect the market's assessment of total risk. 26

1	Q.	What	ANALYTICAL	APPROACHES	DID	YOU	USE	ТО	DETERMINE	THE
2		Compai	NY'S ROE?							

A. As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this section.

I rely on these models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model. Moreover, the models on which I rely focus on different aspects of return requirements, and provide different insights to investors' views of risk and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (*i.e.*, the RPM and CAPM approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the Cost of Equity. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

#### A. Discounted Cash Flow Model

- Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL GENERALLY.
- 25 A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be

determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate, which is derived from the cash flows received from dividends and market price appreciation. Mathematically, the expected dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate; *i.e.*, the total common equity return rate expected by investors, as shown in Equation [1] below:

8  $K_e = (D_0 (1+g))/P + g$ 

9 where:

10  $K_e$  = the required Return on Equity;

11  $D_0$  = the annualized Dividend Per Share;

P =the current stock price; and

13 g =the growth rate.

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15 Q. WHICH VERSIONS OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?

16 A. I used the single-stage Constant Growth DCF model and the Two Growth

17 DCF model in my analyses.

18

19 Q. Please describe the dividend yield you used in applying the 20 constant growth DCF model.

- 21 A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends
- as of August 31, 2020, divided by the average closing market price for the 60
- trading days ended August 31, 2020.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> See, Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 3.

1 Q. PLEASE EXPLA	IN YOUR ADJ	USTMENT TO	THE DIVIDEND	YIELD
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A. Because dividends are paid periodically (e.g. quarterly), as opposed to continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.

DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or  $D_1$ , in calculating the model's dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a conservative assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate rather than the full growth rate in the dividend yield component, or  $D_{1/2}$ . Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, this adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 3 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 6.

- 18 Q. Please explain the basis for the growth rates you apply in your constant growth DCF model.
- 20 A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to
  21 rely on widely available financial information services, such as *Value Line*,
  22 Zacks, and Yahoo! Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant
  23 insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they
  24 analyze, as well as companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of
  25 changing laws and regulations, and ever-changing economic and market

1		conditions. For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS
2		growth in my DCF analysis.
3		
4		Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS.
5		Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on
6		market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using projected earnings
7		growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors'
8		market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the
9		DCF.
10		
11	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS.
12	Α.	As shown on page 1 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 3, the application of
13		the Constant Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group results in a wide
14		range of indicated ROEs from 5.96% to 10.75%. The mean of those results
15		is 8.58%, the median result is 8.66%, and the average of the two is 8.62%. In
16		arriving at a conclusion of the indicated common equity cost rate for the
17		Utility Proxy Group implied by the Constant Growth DCF model, I relied on
18		an average of the mean and the median results (i.e., 8.62%) of the DCF. By
19		doing so, I have considered the DCF results for each company without giving
20		undue weight to outliers on either the high or the low side.
21		

22 Q. DID YOU CONSIDER ANY OTHER CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS?

A. No, I did not. However, consistent with the Commission's past practice of considering proxy groups which exclude companies whose DCF results do not pass the test of reasonableness, <sup>26</sup> I calculated the average and median

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Docket No. E017/GR-15-1033, In the Matter of the Application of Otter Tail Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota, August 16, 2016, at

result of the Constant Growth DCF model excluding proxy companies with
results below 7.00%. <sup>27</sup> Because I did not include the DCF results excluding
proxy company results below 7.00% in my calculation of the indicated
common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group, the 8.62% average noted
above represents a conservative measure of the Utility Proxy Group's ROE.

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7 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR USE OF THE TWO GROWTH DCF APPROACH IN YOUR 8 ANALYSES.

I also considered the results of the Two Growth DCF approach. Whereas the Constant Growth DCF method assumes a single, Constant Growth rate in perpetuity, the Two Growth DCF approach allows for a near-term growth estimate (the first stage) followed by a long-term "terminal" period growth This Two Growth approach can moderate the effects of estimate. substantially high or low growth rate estimates that may be influenced by nearterm events and may not reflect the subject company's expected long-term growth rate. This approach is consistent with the method adopted by the Commission in several prior proceedings and may be applied when the mean growth rate of a particular company is considered unusually high or low relative to the proxy group. In this case, I applied the Two Growth DCF approach to four Utility Proxy Group companies with mean growth rates more than one standard deviation below the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate, and three Utility Proxy Group companies with mean growth rates more than one standard deviation above the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate. The remaining eight Utility Proxy Group companies' growth

<sup>11.</sup> 

<sup>27</sup> See, Column 8, page 1 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 3.

2		growth rate.
3		
4	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR THE GROWTH RATES YOUR APPLY TO THE
5		UTILITY PROXY GROUP IN YOUR TWO GROWTH DCF MODEL.
6	Α.	If the proxy group company's growth rate fell within the one standard
7		deviation of the mean growth rate of the Utility Proxy Group, that company
8		would have the same growth rate and same indicated ROE in both the
9		Constant Growth and Two Growth DCF models. If the company's growth
10		rate fell outside of one standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group mean
11		growth rate, I applied those growth rates only to the first five years of the Two
12		Growth DCF analysis. For the second stage (that is, the terminal period of
13		the Two Growth DCF analysis), I used the mean growth rate of all Utility
14		Proxy Group companies with growth rates within one standard deviation of
15		the overall mean growth rate.
16		
17	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE TWO GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS.
18	Α.	As shown on page 2 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 3, for the Utility Proxy
19		Group, the application of the Two Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy
20		Group resulted in indicated ROEs from 7.91% to 9.85%. The mean result of
21		applying the Two Growth DCF model is 8.86%, the median result is 8.76%,
22		and the average of the two is 8.81%. In arriving at a conclusion for the Two
23		Growth DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group,

rates were within one standard deviation of the mean Utility Proxy Group

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I relied on an average of the mean and the median results of the DCF.

1	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE INDICATED ROE USING THE DCF MOI	DEL.
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2 A. I averaged the results of the Constant Growth DCF model (8.62%) and Two

Growth DCF model (8.81%) to determine the indicated ROE using the DCF

4 model, which is 8.72%.

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#### B. The Risk Premium Model

7 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RPM.

8 A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return;

namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The

RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than

debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any

claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher

returns from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for

bearing the additional risk.

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While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed.

According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium

over bonds (either historically or prospectively), and use that premium to

derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the

expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that

cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being

unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and

earnings upon liquidation.

1	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR INDICATED COST OF COMMON
2		EQUITY BASED ON THE RPM.

A. To derive my indicated cost of common equity under the RPM, I used two risk premium methods. The first method was the Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) and the second method was a risk premium model using a total market approach. The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, while the total market approach indirectly derives a risk premium by using known metrics as a proxy for risk.

Α.

#### i. Predictive Risk Premium Model

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRPM.

The PRPM, published in the *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, <sup>28</sup> was developed from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility" or ARCH. <sup>29</sup> Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that volatility of prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums. That is, historical volatility can be used to predict future volatility, which then can be translated to a predicted equity risk premium.

The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an estimate of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of

Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011), 40:261-278.

<sup>29</sup> Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; See also, www.nobelprize.org.

the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

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The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each Utility Proxy Group company minus the historical monthly yield on longterm U.S. Treasury securities through August 2020. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium using Eviews<sup>©</sup> statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series<sup>30</sup> and a GARCH coefficient.<sup>31</sup> Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing it<sup>32</sup> produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield of 2.05% 33 to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield is a consensus forecast derived from Blue Chip Financial Services (Blue Chip). 34 The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is 10.15%, the median is 10.02%, and the average of the two is 10.09%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF models, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of 10.09%.

<sup>30</sup> Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2, page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

<sup>31</sup> Illustrated on Column 4, page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Annualized Return =  $(1 + Monthly Return)^12 - 1$ 

<sup>33</sup> See, Column 6, page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

<sup>34</sup> Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (Blue Chip), June 1, 2020 at page 14 and September 1, 2020 at page 2.

1	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.
2	Α.	As shown in Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedules 4 and 5, the risk-free rate
3		adopted for applications of the RPM and CAPM is 2.05%. This risk-free rate
4		is based on the average of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected
5		yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the
6		fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and long-term projections for the years 2022
7		to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.
8		
9	Q.	Why do you use the projected 30-year Treasury yield in your
10		ANALYSES?
11	Α.	The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term
12		is consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by
13		the yields on Moody's A-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment
14		horizon inherent in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the
15		jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of
16		capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more
17		volatile and largely a function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.
18		
19		More specifically, the term of the risk-free rate used for cost of capital
20		purposes should match the life (or duration) of the underlying investment (i.e.,
21		perpetuity). As noted by Morningstar:
22		The traditional thinking regarding the time horizon of the
23		chosen Treasury security is that it should match the time
24		horizon of whatever is being valued. When valuing a
25		business that is being treated as a going concern, the
26		appropriate Treasury yield should be that of a long-term
27		Treasury bond. Note that the horizon is a function of the
28		investment not the investor. If an investor plans to hold

1	stock in a company for only five years, the yield on a five-year
2	Treasury note would not be appropriate since the company
3	will continue to exist beyond those five years. <sup>35</sup>
4	Morin also confirms this when he states:
5	[b]ecause common stock is a long-term investment and
6	because the cash flows to investors in the form of dividends
7 8	last indefinitely, the yield on very long-term government bonds, namely, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds, is the
9	best measure of the risk-free rate for use in the CAPM
10	(footnote omitted) The expected common stock return is
11	based on long-term cash flows, regardless of an individual's
12	holding time period. <sup>36</sup>
13	
14	Pratt and Grabowski recommend a similar approach to selecting the risk-free
15	rate: "[i]n theory, when determining the risk-free rate and the matching ERF
16	you should be matching the risk-free security and the ERP with the period in
17	which the investment cash flows are expected."37 Similarly, a 2004 paper titled
18	Applying The Capital Asset Pricing Model by Robert Harris reviews current
19	practices for application of the CAPM and, when summarizing best current
20	practices, concludes "[t]he risk-free rate should match the tenor of the cash
21	flows being valued."38
22	
23	As a practical matter, equity securities represent a perpetual claim on cash
24	flows; 30-year Treasury bonds are the longest-maturity securities available to
25	approximate that perpetual claim. The average life of NSPM's utility plant is
26	28 years based on the composite depreciation rate of the components of its

<sup>35</sup> Morningstar, Inc., 2013 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook, at 44.

<sup>36</sup> Morin, at 151.

<sup>37</sup> Shannon Pratt and Roger Grabowski, <u>Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples</u>, 3rd Ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), at 92. "ERP" is the Equity Risk Premium.

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1	utility plant. <sup>39</sup> Thus, the use of a 30-year Treasury bond yield is a more
2	appropriate risk-free rate as it more accurately reflects the life of the assets it
3	finances.

5

### ii. Total Market Approach Risk Premium Model

- 6 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.
- 7 A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a Beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium, 2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P Utilities Index, and 3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for electric utilities.

- Q. Please explain how you determined the expected bond yield, Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.
- The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the 15 Α. expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, 16 17 including the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. Because I am unaware of 18 19 any publication that provides forecasted public utility bond yields, I relied on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-20 21 rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and Blue Chip's long-term projections for 2022 to 22 23 2026, and 2027 to 2031. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Exhibit\_\_\_\_(DWD-1), 24 Schedule 4, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 2.98%. 25

<sup>39</sup> Average depreciation rate 2021-2023: 3.52%. 1/3.52% = 28 years.

Because that 2.98% estimate represents a corporate bond yield, and not a
utility specific bond yield, I adjusted the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond
yield to an equivalent A2-rated public utility bond yield. That resulted in an
upward adjustment of 0.58%, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-
rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds. 40 Adding that recent
0.58% spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 2.98% results
in an expected A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.56%.

I then reviewed the average credit rating for the Utility Proxy Group from Moody's to determine if an adjustment to the estimated A2-rated public utility bond was necessary. Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of 0.12%, which represents one-third of a recent spread between A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2 prospective bond yield applicable to an A3-rated public utility bond.<sup>41</sup> Adding the 0.12% to the 3.56% prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield results in a 3.68% expected bond yield applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

-

<sup>40</sup> As shown on line 2 and explained in note 2, page 3 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

Table 4

Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected
Bond Yield<sup>42</sup>

Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds (Blue Chip)	2.98%
Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds	0.58%
Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3	0.12%
Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	3.68%

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To develop the total market approach RPM estimate of the appropriate return on equity, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums, which I now discuss, in turn.

8

9

# a. Beta Coefficient Derived Equity Risk Premium

- 10 Q. Please explain how the Beta-Derived equity risk premium is determined.
- 12 A. The components of the Beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected
- market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) the Beta coefficient.
- 14 The derivation of the Beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the
- Utility Proxy Group is shown on lines 1 through 9, page 8 of
- Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. The total Beta-derived equity risk premium
- I applied is based on an average of three historical market data-based equity
- risk premiums, two Value Line-based equity risk premiums, and a Bloomberg-
- based equity risk premium. Each of these is described below.

<sup>42</sup> As shown on page 3 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1	Q.	HOW DID YOUR DERIVE A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON LONG-
2		TERM HISTORICAL DATA?
3	Α.	To derive an historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent
4		holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks,
5		Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) Yearbook 2020 (SBBI - 2020) <sup>43</sup> less the
6		average historical yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the
7		period 1928 to 2019. Using holding period returns over a very long time is
8		appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon
9		presumed by investing in a going concern, i.e., a company expected to operate
10		in perpetuity.
11		
12		SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company
13		common stocks was 11.83% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield
14		on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was 6.05%.44 As shown on line 1,
15		page 8 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 4, subtracting the mean monthly
16		bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-
17		term historical equity risk premium of 5.78%.
18		
19		I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company
20		stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa corporate bonds,
21		because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital

23

as noted in SBBI - 2020.45 Using the arithmetic mean return rates and yields

is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums

<sup>43</sup> See, SBBI-2020 Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, & Inflation 1926-2019.

As explained in note 1, page 9 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

<sup>45</sup> See, <u>SBBI - 2020</u>, at page 10-22.

provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns, because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a <u>constant</u> rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.

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- 9 Q. Please explain the derivation of the regression-based market 10 equity risk premium.
- 11 To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of 9.39% shown Α. on line 2, page 8 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4, I used the same monthly 12 annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the 13 monthly annualized yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as 14 mentioned above. I modeled the relationship between interest rates and the 15 market equity risk premium using the observed monthly market equity risk 16 17 premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I then used a 18 linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity 19 risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated 20 21 corporate bonds yield:

$$RP = \alpha + \beta (R_{Aaa/Aa})$$

- 23 Q. Please explain the derivation of the PRPM equity risk premium.
- A. I used the same PRPM approach described above to the PRPM equity risk premium. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large

1	company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated
2	corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through August 2020.46
3	Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH, known as
4	GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews®
5	statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted a market equity risk
6	premium of 9.62%. <sup>47</sup>

Q. Please explain the derivation of a projected equity risk premium
 Based on Value Line data for your RPM analysis.

10 As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are 11 prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be 12 found in note 4, page 9 of Exhibit\_\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Consistent with 13 my calculation of the dividend yield component in my DCF analysis, this 14 prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an average of the 15 three- to five-year median market price appreciation potential by Value Line 16 17 for the 13 weeks ended September 4, 2020, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in 18 Value Line. 48 19

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The average median expected price appreciation is 58%, which translates to a 12.12% annual appreciation, and, when added to the average of *Value Line's* median expected dividend yields of 2.33%, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market of 14.45%. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated

Data from January 1926 to December 2019 is from <u>SBBI - 2020</u>. Data from January 2020 to August 2020 is from Bloomberg.

<sup>47</sup> Shown on line 3, page 8 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

<sup>48</sup> As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1		corporate bond yield of 2.98% is deducted from the total market return of
2		14.45%, resulting in an equity risk premium of 11.47%, as shown on line 4,
3		page 8 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
4		
5	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON
6		THE S&P 500 COMPANIES.
7	A.	Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P
8		500 companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates
9		as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500
10		is 13.83%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate
11		bonds of 2.98% results in a 10.85% projected equity risk premium.
12		
13	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON
14		BLOOMBERG DATA.
15	A.	Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P
16		500 using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy
17		for capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The
18		expected total return for the S&P 500 is 13.78%. Subtracting the prospective
19		yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 2.98% results in a 10.80%
20		projected equity risk premium.
21		
22	Q.	What is your conclusion of a Beta-derived equity risk premium for
23		USE IN YOUR RPM ANALYSIS?
24	A.	I gave equal weight to all six equity risk premiums based on each source -
25		historical, Value Line, and Bloomberg - in arriving at a 9.65% equity risk
26		premium.

Table 5

Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using Total

Market Returns<sup>49</sup>

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa-Rated Corporate Bond Yields (1928 – 2019)	5.78%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	9.39%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	9.62%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from Value Line Summary & Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	11.47%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	10.85%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	10.80%
Average	<u>9.65%</u>

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 9.65%, I adjusted it by the Beta coefficient to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, the Beta coefficient is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole, and is a logical way to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5, the average of the mean and median Beta coefficient for the Utility Proxy Group is 0.94. Multiplying the 0.94 average

As shown on page 8 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1		Beta coefficient by the market equity risk premium of 9.65% results in a Beta-
2		adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group of 9.07%.
3		
4		b. S&P Utility Index Derived Equity Risk Premium
5	Q.	How did your derive the equity risk premium based on the S&P
6		UTILITY INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS?
7	Α.	I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding
8		period returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns
9		of the S&P Utilities Index, using Value Line and Bloomberg data, respectively.
10		Turning first to the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-
11		term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility
12		Index total returns of 10.74% and monthly Moody's A-rated public utility
13		bond yields of 6.53% from 1928 to 2019 to arrive at an equity risk premium
14		of 4.21%. <sup>50</sup> I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk
15		premium of 6.83% based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums.
16		The final S&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved
17		applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from
18		January 1928 to August 2020 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium
19		of 5.53% for the S&P Utility Index.
20		
21		I then derived expected total returns on the S&P Utilities Index of 10.36%
22		and 11.45% using data from Value Line and Bloomberg, respectively, and
23		subtracted the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of
24		3.56% <sup>51</sup> , which resulted in equity risk premiums of 6.80% and 7.89%,

respectively. As with the market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk

As shown on line 1, page 12 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Derived on line 3, page 3 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. 50

<sup>51</sup> 

premium based on each source (*i.e.*, historical, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg) to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of 6.25%.

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Table 6

Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using S&P

Utility Index Holding Returns<sup>52</sup>

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields (1928 – 2019)	4.21%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	6.83%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	5.53%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index Less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	6.80%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities Index Less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	7.89%
Average	<u>6.25%</u>

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# c. Authorized Return Derived Equity Risk Premium

- 9 Q. How do you derive an equity risk premium of 5.92% based on authorized ROEs for electric utilities?
- 11 A. The equity risk premium of 5.92% shown on line 3, page 7 of
  12 Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4 is the result of a regression analysis based
  13 on regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A-rated public
- utility bonds. That analysis is shown on page 13 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1),

As shown on page 12 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Schedule 4. Page 13 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 4 contains the
graphical results of a regression analysis of 1,168 rate cases for electric utilities
which were fully litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through
August 31, 2020. It shows the implicit equity risk premium relative to the
yields on A2-rated public utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of
each regulatory decision. That is, the analysis considers the relationship
between authorized returns and prevailing public utility bond yields at the time
of the decision

It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield on A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result consistent with financial literature on the subject.<sup>53</sup> I used the regression results to estimate the equity risk premium applicable to the projected yield on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds. Given the expected A2-rated utility bond yield of 3.56%, it can be calculated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond yield is 5.80%, which is shown on line 3, page 7 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

- Q. What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your
   Total market approach RPM analysis?
- A. The equity risk premium I apply to the Utility Proxy Group is 7.08%, which is the average of the Beta-adjusted equity risk premiums for the Utility Proxy

<sup>53</sup> See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity, Financial Management, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

Group, the S&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk 1 premiums of 9.07%, 6.25%, and 5.92%, respectively.<sup>54</sup> 2 3 4 WHAT IS THE INDICATED RPM COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BASED ON THE Q. 5 TOTAL MARKET APPROACH? As shown on line 7, page 3 of Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 4 and shown 6 Α. on Table 7, below, I calculated a common equity cost rate of 10.76% for the 7 8 Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach RPM.

9

Table 7

Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model<sup>55</sup>

Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	3.68%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium	<u>7.08%</u>
Indicated Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.76%</u>

- Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE PRPM AND THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?
- 15 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4, the indicated RPM-16 derived common equity cost rate is 10.43%, which gives equal weight to the 17 PRPM (10.09%) and the adjusted-market approach results (10.76%).

As shown on page 7 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

As shown on page 3 of Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

## C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model

- 2 Q. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.
- A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the
   market's returns as measured by the Beta coefficient (β). A Beta coefficient
   less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a
   Beta coefficient greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all non-market or unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors only require compensation for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by the Beta coefficient. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

 $R_s \quad = \quad R_f + \beta \; (R_m \text{ - } R_f)$ 

Where:

 $R_s$  = Return rate on the common stock

 $R_f$  = Risk-free rate of return

 $R_m$  = Return rate on the market as a whole

β = Adjusted Beta coefficient (volatility of the security relative to the market as a whole)

Numerous tests of the traditional CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and Beta coefficients are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM (ECAPM) reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that the Beta coefficient is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line (SML)

described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML.<sup>56</sup>

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
2

In their work on the CAPM, Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2, below, that "[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low."<sup>57</sup>

Figure 2 http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios

Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



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In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that Beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

12

13

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... lowbeta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM

<sup>56</sup> Morin, at 175.

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, *The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence*, <u>Journal of Economic Perspectives</u>, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama & French").

1 2	would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. <sup>58</sup>
3	* * *
4	Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected
5 6	return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:
7	$K = R_F + x (R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$
8	where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value
9	of x that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return
10	= $0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25,
11	the equation becomes:
12	$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{59}$
13	Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:
14	The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the
15	CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average
16	return, but it is too 'flat.' The regressions consistently find
17	that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate
18	and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess
19	market return This is true in the early tests as well as in
20	more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and
21	French (1992).60
22	Finally, Fama and French further note:
23	Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and
24	average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the
	Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta
25 26 27	portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta
27	portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on

the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the

<sup>58</sup> Morin, at 175.

<sup>59</sup> Morin, at 190.

Fama & French, at 32.

1 2 3		actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the t beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent. <sup>61</sup>
4 5		Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French, along with their
6		reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the
7		ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the
8		traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy
9		Group and averaged the results.
10		
11	Q.	WHAT BETA COEFFICIENTS DID YOU USE IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?
12	Α.	For the Beta coefficients in my CAPM analysis, I considered two sources:
13		Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services
14		adjust their calculated (or "raw") Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency of
15		the Beta coefficient to regress to the market mean of 1.00, Value Line
16		calculates the Beta coefficient over a five-year period, while Bloomberg
17		calculates it over a two-year period.
18		
19	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.
20	Α.	As discussed previously, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the
21		CAPM is 2.05%. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the Blue Chip
22		consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for
23		the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2021, and long-
24		term projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.
25		

*Ibid.*, at 33.

1	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED RISK PREMIUM FOR THE
2		MARKET USED IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSES.

A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5. As discussed above, the market risk premium is derived from an average of three historical data-based market risk premiums, two *Value Line* data-based market risk premiums, and one Bloomberg data-based market risk premium.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government securities of 5.09% was deducted from the <u>SBBI - 2020</u> monthly historical total market return of 12.10%, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of 7.01%. 62 I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government securities from <u>SBBI - 2020</u>. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of 10.24%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 10.73%, and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through August 2020.

The Value Line-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 2.05%, discussed above, from the Value Line projected total annual market return of 14.45%, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of 12.40%. The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Value Line data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.05% from the projected total

<sup>62 &</sup>lt;u>SBBI - 2020</u>, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21).

1	return of the S&P 500 of 13.83%. The resulting market equity risk premium
2	is 11.78%.
3	
4	The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is
5	derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of $2.05\%$ from the projected
6	total return of the S&P 500 of 13.78%. The resulting market equity risk
7	premium is 11.73%. These six measures, when averaged, result in an average
8	total market equity risk premium of 10.65%.

Table 8

# Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for Use in the CAPM<sup>63</sup>

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of	
Large Stocks and Long-Term Government	7.01%
Bond Yields (1926 – 2019)	
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	10.24%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	10.73%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using Total	
Market Returns from Value Line Summary &	12.40%
Index Less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond	12.4070
Yields	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium Using	
Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income	11.78%
Returns from Value Line for the S&P 500 Less	11./0/0
Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using	
Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income	
Returns from Bloomberg Professional	<u>11.73%</u>
Services for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-	
Year Treasury Bond Yields	
Average	<u>10.65%</u>

- Q. What are the results of your application of the traditional and
   Empirical CAPM to the Utility Proxy Group?
- A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5, the mean result of my CAPM/ECAPM analyses is 12.32%, the median is 11.95%, and the average of the two is 12.14%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median DCF results discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the CAPM/ECAPM is 12.14%.

As shown on page 2 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.

1	D.	Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic,
2		Non-Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and
3		CAPM

- 4 Q. WHY DO YOU ALSO CONSIDER A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE regulated companies?
- Although I am not an attorney, my interpretation of the Hope and Bluefield 6 Α. 7 cases is that they did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for 8 utilities. marketplace competition, non-price regulated firms operating in the 9 10 competitive marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in 11 total risk to the Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. The selection of such domestic, non-price regulated 12 13 competitive firms theoretically and empirically results in a proxy group which 14 is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, since all of these companies compete for capital in the exact same markets. 15

- 17 Q. HOW DID YOU SELECT NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT ARE
  18 COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
- In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies 19 Α. 20 similar in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the Beta coefficients 21 and related statistics derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly 22 market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five years). These selection 23 criteria resulted in a proxy group of 47 domestic, non-price regulated firms 24 comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The 25 26 criteria used in selecting the domestic, non-price regulated firms was:
  - (i) They must be covered by Value Line (Standard Edition);

2			utilities;
3		(iii)	Their Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard
4			deviations of the average unadjusted Beta coefficients of the Utility
5			Proxy Group; and
6		(iv)	The residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave
7			rise to the unadjusted Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus
8			two standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the
9			Utility Proxy Group.
10			
11		Beta	coefficients measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not
12		divers	sifiable. The residual standard errors of the regressions measure each
13		firm's	s company-specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar Beta
14		coeff	icients and similar residual standard errors resulting from the same
15		regres	ssion analyses have similar total investment risk.
16			
17	Q.	HAVI	E YOU PREPARED A SCHEDULE WHICH SHOWS THE DATA FROM WHICH
18		YOU S	SELECTED THE 47 DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT
19		ARE C	COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
20	A.	Yes, t	the basis of my selection and both proxy groups' regression statistics are
21		show	n in Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
22			
23	Q.	Did	YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES USING THE DCF MODEL,
24		RPM	, AND CAPM FOR THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY GROUP?
25	Α.	Yes.	Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an
26		identi	ical manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the

They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., not

(ii)

1	rationale and application of each model. One exception is in the application
2	of the RPM, where I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums,
3	nor did I apply the PRPM to the individual non-price regulated companies.
4	
5	Pages 2 and 3 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 7 applies the Constant
6	Growth and Two Growth DCF models to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy
7	Group. As shown, the indicated common equity cost rates are 11.95% and
8	11.87%, respectively, averaging 11.91%.
9	
10	Pages 4 through 6 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 7 contain the data and
11	calculations that support the 12.68% RPM common equity cost rate. As
12	shown on line 1, page 3 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the consensus
13	prospective yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters
14	ending in the fourth quarter of 2021, and for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027
15	to 2031, is 4.10%.64 Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group has an
16	average Moody's long-term issuer rating of Baa1, a downward adjustment of
17	0.20% to the projected Baa2 rated corporate bond yield is necessary to reflect
18	the difference in ratings which results in a projected Baa1-rated corporate
19	bond yield of 3.90%.
20	
21	When the Beta-adjusted risk premium of 8.78%65 relative to the Non-Price
22	Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective A3-rated corporate bond
23	yield of 3.90%, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is 12.68%.

Blue Chip, June 1, 2020, at page 14 and September 1, 2020, at page 2. Derived on page 5 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 7. 64

<sup>65</sup> 

2		calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost
3		rate of 11.83%.
4		
5	Q.	How is the cost rate of common equity based on the Non-Price
6		REGULATED PROXY GROUP COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY
7		Proxy Group?
8	Α.	As shown on page 1 of Exhibit(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the results of the
9		common equity models applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group
10		which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group are as follows:
11		11.91% (DCF), 12.68% (RPM), and 11.83% (CAPM). The average of the
12		mean and median of these models is 12.03%, which I used as the indicated
13		common equity cost rates for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.
14		
15	VII	. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST ANALYTICAL
16		RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS
16 17		RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS
	Q.	RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS  BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST
17	Q.	·
17 18	Q.	BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST
17 18 19		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?
17 18 19 20		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy
17 18 19 20 21		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of
17 18 19 20 21		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any
17 18 19 20 21 22 23		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is between 9.73% and 10.83%. I used multiple cost
117 118 119 220 221 222 223 224		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is between 9.73% and 10.83%. I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended
117 118 119 220 221 222 23 224 225		BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?  By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is between 9.73% and 10.83%. I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because each of these models is theoretically sound

Page 6 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 7 contains the inputs and

1		Using multiple models adds reliability to the estimated common equity cost
2		rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models
3		supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent.
4		
5		Based on these common equity cost results, I conclude that a range of
6		common equity cost rates between 9.77% and 10.83% is reasonable and
7		appropriate before any adjustments for relative risk differences between the
8		Company and the Utility Proxy Group are made. The bottom of the indicated
9		range (i.e., 9.77%) was calculated by averaging the average of all model results
10		(10.83%) with the lowest model result (8.72%), and the top of the indicated
11		range is the approximate average of all model results. I have chosen this
12		indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy
13		Group as a conservative estimate of the required return on equity.
14		
15	Q.	WHY DID YOU USE THE MIDPOINT BETWEEN YOUR AVERAGE MODEL RESULT
16		AND YOUR LOWEST MODEL RESULT AS THE BOTTOM OF YOUR INDICATED
17		REASONABLE RANGE BEFORE ADJUSTMENT?
18	A.	As explained in detail in Section IX below, the COVID-19 pandemic has
19		created turmoil in the markets. Key takeaways include:
20 21 22		• The full impact and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic are unknown, and outcomes are still highly uncertain;
23 24 25 26 27		• This uncertainty increases volatility. Volatility increases the chances of investment losses. As a result, investors flee to bonds to limit their investment losses, which is known as "the flight to safety." Increased levels of bond purchases increase their price, and drive down their yields, <i>i.e.</i> , interest rates. Because of this,

the current low-interest rate environment is due to increased

1 2 3		volatility in the market, and not a steady lowering of the cost of debt over time; and
4 5 6 7 8 9		• The same increased market volatility that caused investors' "flight to safety" also created a situation where utilities are traded similar to the S&P 500. These correlated returns of utility stocks and market indices increase Beta coefficients (a measure of risk), and by extension, investor-required returns.
10		While the current volatility and uncertainty could justify a higher return or
11		equity, my recommendation to use the lower end of the range of my results
12		for my Utility Proxy Group reasonable range is designed to provide a
13		conservative estimate of the Company's required return.
14		
15	VII	I. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE
16		
17		A. Size Adjustment
18	Q.	Does the Company's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy
19		GROUP COMPANIES INCREASE ITS BUSINESS RISK?
20	Α.	Yes. As a preliminary matter, because I have developed my cost of common
21		equity recommendation for the Company's Minnesota operations based or
22		market data applied to the Utility Proxy Group of risk-comparable companies
23		in order to assess the Company's risk associated with its relative small size of
24		its Minnesota operations, it is necessary to compare the Company's
25		Minnesota-jurisdictional size relative to the Utility Proxy Group. The
26		Company's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies
27		indicates greater relative business risk for the Company because, all else being
28		equal, size has a material bearing on risk.

Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to
cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For
example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and
economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of
revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small
company than on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer
base. This is true for utilities, as well as for non-regulated companies.

As further evidence that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally demand greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and liquidity of their securities. Duff & Phelps' 2020 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital (D&P - 2020) discusses the nature of the small-size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium based on several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity Returns," D&P - 2020 states:

The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a company is one of the most important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a *predictor* of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns - as size *decreases*, returns tend to *increase*, and vice versa. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, Wiley 2020, at 4-1.

1	Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence,"
2	Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected
3	when estimating the cost of common equity. On page 14, they note:
4 5 6 7 8 9	the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. <sup>67</sup>
10	Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model
11	which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost
12	of common equity.
13	
14	Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not the
15	source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. <sup>68</sup> Eugene
16	Brigham, a well-known authority, states:
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect." On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm
25	effect means is that the capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on otherwise

similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added)<sup>69</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Fama & French, at 25-43.

Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, <u>Principles of Corporate Finance</u> (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

<sup>69</sup> Eugene F. Brigham, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, <u>Fifth Edition</u> (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

1		Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above,
2		increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate
3		of return on common equity. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of
4		a cost rate of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the
5		unique risks of the Company, including its small relative size to the Utility
6		Proxy Group, which is justified and supported above by evidence in the
7		financial literature.
8		
9	Q.	EARLIER YOU EXPLAINED THAT CREDIT RATINGS CAN ACT AS A PROXY FOR A
10		FIRM'S COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS. DO
11		RATING AGENCIES ACCOUNT FOR COMPANY SIZE IN THEIR BOND RATINGS?
12	Α.	No. Neither S&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements
13		for any given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis
14		must be conducted for equity investments in companies with similar bond
15		ratings.
16		
17	Q.	IS THERE A WAY TO QUANTIFY A RELATIVE RISK ADJUSTMENT DUE TO THE
18		COMPANY'S SMALL SIZE WHEN COMPARED TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?
19	Α.	Yes. The Company has greater relative risk than the average utility in the
20		Utility Proxy Group because of its smaller size, as measured by an estimated
21		market capitalization of common equity for the Company's Minnesota

operations.

Table 9

Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for NSPM's

Electric Operations and the Utility Proxy Group

	Market	Times
	Capitalization*	Greater than
	(\$ Millions)	The
	,	Company
NSPM MN Jurisdictional	\$10,362	
Utility Proxy Group	\$14,144	1.4x
*From page 1 of Exhibit(DWI	D-1), Schedule 8.	

The Company's estimated market capitalization for its Minnesota operations was \$10,362 million as of August 31, 2020, compared with the market capitalization of the average company in the Utility Proxy Group of \$14,144 million as of August 31, 2020. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group has a market capitalization 1.4 times the size of the Company's estimated Minnesota-based market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group to reflect the Company's greater risk due to their smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2019 period. The average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of \$14,144 million falls in the 2<sup>nd</sup> decile, while the Company's estimated market capitalization of \$10,362 million places it in the 3<sup>rd</sup> decile. The size premium spread between the 2<sup>nd</sup> decile and the

<sup>70</sup> Source: Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator.

1		3 <sup>rd</sup> decile is 0.23%. <sup>71</sup> Even though a 0.23% upward size adjustment is
2		indicated, I applied a size premium of 0.05% to the Company's indicated
3		common equity cost rate in order to be conservative.
1		
4 5	Q.	SINCE THE COMPANY IS PART OF A LARGER COMPANY, WHY IS THE SIZE OF
6		XEI NOT MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE WHEN DETERMINING THE SIZE
7		ADJUSTMENT?
8	Α.	The return derived in this proceeding will not apply to XEI's operations as a
9		whole, but only to the Company's Minnesota operations. XEI is the sum of
10		its constituent parts, including those constituent parts' ROEs. Potential
11		investors in the Parent are aware that it is a combination of operations in each
12		state, and that each state's operations experience the operating risks specific
13		to their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of XEI's return is
14		commensurate with the realities of the Company's composite operations in
15		each of the states in which it operates.
16		
17	Q.	SHOULD THE COMPANY BE COMPARED WITH OTHER OPERATING ELECTRIC
18		UTILITIES IN MINNESOTA TO DETERMINE ANY ADJUSTMENT TO THE PROXY
19		GROUP-DERIVED ROE?
20	Α.	No, it shouldn't. Since the indicated ROE is determined using the market data
21		of the Utility Proxy Group, any type of adjustment to the indicated ROE must
22		reflect relative differences between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group.
23		Since this is the case, the relative size of other Minnesota utilities is not

71 *Ibid.*, See also, Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 8.

24

relevant to determining the ROE for the Company.

#### B. Credit Risk Adjustment

- 2 Q. Please discuss your proposed credit risk adjustment.
- 3 A. NSPM's long-term issuer ratings are A2 and A- from Moody's Investors
- 4 Services and S&P, respectively, which are slightly less risky than the average
- 5 long-term issuer ratings for the Utility Proxy Group of A3 and BBB+,
- 6 respectively.<sup>72</sup> Hence, a downward credit risk adjustment is necessary to
- 7 reflect the higher credit rating, i.e., A2, of the Company relative to the A3
- 8 average Moody's bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group.<sup>73</sup>

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10 An indication of the magnitude of the necessary downward adjustment to

11 reflect the lower credit risk inherent in an A2 bond rating is one-third of a

recent three-month average spread between Moody's Baa and A-rated public

utility bond yields of 0.35%, shown on page 4 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1),

Schedule 4, or 0.12%.<sup>74</sup>

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#### C. Flotation Costs

- 17 Q. WHAT ARE FLOTATION COSTS?
- 18 A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of
- 19 common stock. They include market pressure and the mandatory unavoidable
- 20 costs of issuance (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing,
- 21 legal, registration, etc.). For every dollar raised through debt or equity
- offerings, the Company receives less than one full dollar in financing.

<sup>72</sup> Source of Information: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

As shown on page 5 of Exhibit\_\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

<sup>74 0.17% = 0.50% \* (1/3).</sup> Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

1	Q.	WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE FLOTATION COSTS IN THE ALLOWED
2		COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?

A. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm through which such costs can be recognized and recovered.

Because these costs are real, necessary, and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As noted by Dr. Roger Morin:

The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment.<sup>75</sup>

Q. Do the common equity cost rate models you have used already reflect investors' anticipation of flotation costs?

No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear that these costs are not reflected in the market prices paid for common stocks. For example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment.<sup>76</sup> In addition, Morin confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent.<sup>77</sup> Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

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Α.

<sup>75</sup> Morin, at p. 321.

Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, <u>Intermediate Financial Management</u>, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern, at p. 342.

<sup>77</sup> Morin, at pp. 327-30.

1	Q.	HOW DID YOUR CALCULATE THE FLOTATION COST ALLOWANCE?
---	----	--

Α. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would 2 3 reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by Brigham and Daves, as well as by Morin. The flotation cost 4 adjustment recognizes the actual costs of issuing equity that were incurred by 5 XEI in its equity issuances during fiscal years 2010, 2018, and 2019. Based on 6 7 the issuance costs shown in Schedule 21 of Ms. Sarah W. Soong's direct testimony, an adjustment of 0.15% is required to reflect the flotation costs 8 applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.<sup>78</sup> 9

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11 Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY AFTER YOUR COMPANY12 SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS?

A. Applying the 0.05% size adjustment, the -0.12% credit risk adjustment, and the 0.15% flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of common equity cost rates between 9.77% and 10.83% results in a Company-specific range of common equity rates between 9.85% and 10.91%. In consideration of both of these indicated ranges, I recommend an ROE of 10.20% for NSPM in this proceeding.

19

### IX. CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS

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- Q. DO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS INFLUENCE THE REQUIRED COST OF CAPITAL

  AND REQUIRED RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY?
- 24 A. Yes. The models used to estimate the Cost of Equity are meant to reflect, and 25 therefore are influenced by, current and expected capital market conditions.

<sup>78</sup> Exhibit\_\_(DWD-1), Schedule 9.

2		results in the context of observable market data.
3		
4	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RECENT CAPITAL MARKET ENVIRONMENT.
5	Α.	It is well recognized that there have been dramatic shifts in the capital markets
6		brought about by COVID-19. The Federal Reserve and the U.S. government
7		have implemented multiple policies to address the financial market and
8		economic instability.
9		
10		Although government and central bank actions have stabilized the capital
11		markets somewhat, as explained in more detail below, volatility (and,
12		therefore, risk) remains elevated for the utility sector, which has important
13		implications on the ROE.
14		
15	Q.	How do significant and abrupt increases in volatility affect
16		INTEREST RATES?
17	Α.	Significant and abrupt increases in volatility tend to be associated with declines
18		in Treasury yields. That relationship makes intuitive sense; as volatility (i.e.,
19		risk) increases, investors will seek to avoid a capital loss by investing in
20		Treasury securities in a "flight to safety." Because Treasury yields are inversely
21		related to Treasury bond prices, as investors bid up the prices of bonds, they
22		bid down the yields. As Chart 3 below demonstrates, decreases in the 30-year
23		Treasury yield are coincident with significant increases in the VIX. <sup>79</sup> In those
24		instances, the fall in yields does not reflect a reduction in required returns, it


Therefore, it is important to assess the reasonableness of any financial model's

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The VIX is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500 Index call and put options. Source: www.cboe.com/vix.

reflects an increase in risk aversion and, therefore, an increase in required equity returns.

Chart 3
30-Year Treasury Yields vs. VIX<sup>80</sup>



Α.

## Q. HAS MARKET VOLATILITY INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS?

Yes, it has. A visible and widely reported measure of expected volatility is the VIX. Because volatility is a measure of risk, increases in the VIX, or in its volatility, are a broad indicator of expected increases in market risk. That is, if the level of the VIX was 15.00, it would be interpreted as an expected standard deviation in annual market returns of 15.00% over the coming 30 days. Since 1990, the VIX has averaged about 19.39, which is consistent with the long-term standard deviation on annual market returns as reported by Duff & Phelps.<sup>81</sup> From February 1, 2020 to August 31, 2020, the VIX

<sup>80</sup> Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.

<sup>81 &</sup>lt;u>SBBI-2020</u>, at 6-17.

1		averaged 33.24, or more than 71.00% above its long term average.82 In other
2		words, since the COVID-19 pandemic began, market volatility has been, on
3		average, 71.00% higher than the market's long-term average volatility.
4		
5	Q.	IS MARKET VOLATILITY EXPECTED TO REMAIN ELEVATED IN THE NEAR TERM?
6	Α.	Yes. One means of assessing market expectations regarding the future level
7		of volatility is to review CBOE's "Term Structure of Volatility", which is
8		described by CBOE as:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15		The implied volatility term structure observed in SPX options markets is analogous to the term structure of interest rates observed in fixed income markets. Similar to the calculation of forward rates of interest, it is possible to observe the option market's expectation of future market volatility through use of the SPX implied volatility term structure. <sup>83</sup>
16		As shown in Table 10, the implied volatility is expected to remain
17		approximately 50% above historical volatility <sup>84</sup> until at least December 2021.

<sup>82</sup> Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.

<sup>83</sup> Source: www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data.

The long-term average price of VIX is approximately 19.00, which is similar to the long-term standard deviation of market returns.

Table 10

CBOE Term Structure of Volatility<sup>85</sup>

Date	Projected VIX
September 2020	24.43
October 2020	27.66
November 2020	31.38
December 2020	32.29
January 2021	32.40
February 2021	31.41
March 2021	33.04
June 2021	32.88
September 2021	34.58
December 2021	30.93

3

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
As discussed above, investors reacted to the increase in market uncertainty associated with COVID-19 by moving away from equity securities (including utilities) to Treasury securities, pushing down long-term Treasury yields. Both long-term Treasury and utility bond yields have been extremely volatile, as shown on Charts 4 and 5, below, as seen in its Coefficient of Variation (CoV):<sup>86</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Source: <a href="http://www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data">http://www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data</a>, as of August 31, 2020.

The coefficient of variation is used by investors and economists to determine volatility.

1 Chart 4

## Coefficient of Variation in 30-Year Treasury Yields<sup>87</sup>



3


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2

Chart 5

## Coefficient of Variation in A-Rated Public Utility Bonds<sup>88</sup>



7

<sup>87</sup> Source: Bloomberg Professional. Data through August 31, 2020.

<sup>88</sup> Source: Bloomberg Professional. Data through August 31, 2020.

1		In view of all of the above, current levels of interest rates are the result of a
2		volatility-driven "flight to safety" on the part of investors, which indicates
3		increased risk aversion, and thus, an increased investor-required return.
4		
5	Q.	IN ADDITION TO AFFECTING TREASURY BONDS, HOW ELSE DOES INCREASED
6		MARKET VOLATILITY AFFECT A UTILITY INVESTOR'S REQUIRED RETURN?
7	Α.	Increased market volatility increases both utility stock volatility and those
8		stocks' correlation to the overall market. Increases in both measures would
9		likewise increase the required return for utility investors.
10		
11	Q.	HAVE THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN UTILITIES AND MARKET INDICES
12		CHANGED DUE TO THE CURRENT VOLATILE MARKET CONDITIONS?
13	Α.	Yes, they have. To determine the relationships between utilities and market
14		indices, I have calculated the correlation coefficients of the price changes of
15		several groups of utilities relative to the S&P 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial
16		Average ("DJIA") from February 1, 2020 to August 31, 2020. Specifically, I
17		calculated correlation coefficients for the following relationships:
18		• The price changes of the S&P 500 relative to the price changes
19		of the Utility Proxy Group;
20		• The price changes of the S&P 500 relative to the price changes
21		of the Dow Jones Utility Average ("DJU");
22		• The price changes of the S&P 500 relative to the price changes
23		of the Utilities Select SPDR ("XLU");
24		• The price changes of the DJIA relative to the price changes of
25		Utility Proxy Group;
26		The price changes of the DIIA relative to the price changes of

the DJU; and

- The price changes of the DJIA relative to the price changes of the XLU.
- 4 Table 11 provides the results of the calculations:

# Table 11 Calculation of Correlation Coefficients for Utility Groups Relative to Market Indices from February 2020 through August 2020<sup>89</sup>

Group	S&P 500	DJIA
Utility Proxy Group	84.90%	84.08%
DJU	84.42%	83.45%
XLU	84.74%	83.39%

As shown on Table 11, utility stocks have been trading in tandem with market indices during the current market dislocation. The behavior of utility stocks to move in tandem with the market during periods of extreme volatility is not limited to the current period. During the Great Recession (December 2007 to June 2009), correlations between these same groups were similar, as shown on Table 12, below:

Table 12

Calculation of Correlation Coefficients for Utility Groups Relative to Market Indices from December 2007 to June 200990

Group	S&P 500	DJIA
Utility Proxy Group	80.31%	81.56%
DJU	81.57%	82.13%
XLU	78.36%	78.59%

<sup>89</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; S&P Capital IQ.

<sup>90</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence; S&P Capital IQ.

1	That increasing correlation is not surprising. As Morningstar recently
2	explained, during volatile markets there often is little distinction in returns
3	across assets or portfolios. That is, "correlations go to 1."91 When that
4	happens, utility stocks lose their "defensive" quality.

5

Q. What do stronger correlations between utility stocks and the
 MARKET IMPLY FOR THE INVESTOR-REQUIRED RETURN?

8 A direct consequence of stronger correlations is higher Beta coefficients. As Α. shown in Chart 6 below, as the Coronavirus threat became apparent, the two-9 year<sup>92</sup> and five-year<sup>93</sup> correlation coefficients between the price changes in the 10 11 S&P 500 and price changes in the Utility Proxy Group from February 2020 through August 2020 increased dramatically. As shown on Chart 6, the 12 13 correlation coefficients increased from approximately 0.15 to approximately 0.70 (two-year horizon) and from approximately 0.19 to approximately 0.52 14 (five-year horizon). 15


<sup>91</sup> Morningstar, Correlations Going to 1: Amid Market Collapse, U.S. Stock Fund Factors Show Little Differentiation, March 6, 2020.

Onsistent with the calculation horizon of Bloomberg's Beta coefficients.

<sup>93</sup> Consistent with the calculation horizon of Value Line's Beta coefficients.

1 Chart 6

# Two-Year and Five-Year Correlation Coefficients for the Utility Proxy Group Relative to the S&P 500<sup>94</sup>



The increase in volatility (*i.e.*, risk), as explained above, in combination with the increased correlation between the Utility Proxy Group and market indices ultimately leads to higher Beta coefficients. In short, during a period of heightened and possibly prolonged market uncertainty, observable market information makes clear that utility investors now face greater risks and require higher returns.

### X. CONCLUSION

- Q. WHAT IS YOU RECOMMENDED ROE FOR THE COMPANY?
- A. Given the discussion above and the results from the analyses, I recommend that an ROE of 10.20% is appropriate for the Company at this time.

<sup>94</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

- 1 Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS YOUR PROPOSED ROE OF 10.20% FAIR AND
- 2 REASONABLE TO NSPM AND ITS CUSTOMERS?
- 3 A. Yes, it is.

4

- 5 Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS NSPM'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE FAIR AND
- 6 REASONABLE?
- 7 A. Yes, it is.

8

- 9 Q. Does this concludes your Direct Testimony?
- 10 A. Yes, it does.



### Appendix A - Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Director

### Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 12 years. Dylan has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, class cost of service, rate design, and valuation for regulated public utilities. He has testified as an expert witness in the subjects of rate of return, cost of service, rate design, and valuation before 23 regulatory commissions in the U.S., one Canadian province, and an American Arbitration Association panel.

He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured.

### Areas of Specialization

Regulation and Rates

Utilities

Mutual Fund Benchmarking

Capital Market Risk

Financial Modeling

Valuation

Regulatory Strategy

Rate Case Support

Rate of Return

Cost of Service

Rate Design

### Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearances

#### Jurisdiction

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Hawaii Public Utilities Commission

South Carolina Public Service Commission

American Arbitration Association

### **Topic**

Rate of Return Rate of Return

Cost of Service, Rate Design

Return on Common Equity

Valuation

### Recent Assignments

- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base

### Recent Publications and Speeches

- Co-Author of: "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020.
- Co-Author of: "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319.
- "Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA.
- "Past is Prologue: Future Test Year", Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.
- Co-author of: "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model™, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013.
- "Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.



# Appendix A – Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Director

Sponsor	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT
Regulatory Commission of Al	aska			
		Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake	Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521;	
Alaska Power Company	09/20	Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc.	TA4-573	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	07/16	Alaska Power Company	Docket No. TA857-2	Rate of Return
Alberta Utilities Commission				
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR				
Distribution & Transmission,		AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR	2021 Generic Cost of Capital,	
Inc.	01/20	Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	Proceeding ID. 24110	Rate of Return
<b>Arizona Corporation Commis</b>	sion			
50000 W / A /	00/00		Docket No. WS-01303A-20-	
EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	06/20	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	0177	Rate of Return
A : 14/ L O	40/40	Arizona Water Company – Western	Docket No. W-01445A-19-	D . (D .
Arizona Water Company	12/19	Group	0278	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	00/10	Arizona Water Company – Northern	Docket No. W-01445A-18-	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	08/18	Group	0164	Rate of Return
Colorado Public Utilities Com	mission			
Summit Utilities, Inc.	04/18	Colorado Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 18AL-0305G	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/17	Atmos Energy Corporation	Docket No. 17AL-0429G	Rate of Return
<b>Delaware Public Service Com</b>	mission			
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	11/13	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 13-466	Capital Structure
<b>Public Service Commission o</b>	f the Distr	rict of Columbia		
Washington Gas Light				
Company	09/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Formal Case No. 1162	Rate of Return
Florida Public Service Comm	ission			
Peoples Gas System	09/20	Peoples Gas System	Docket No. 20200051-GU	Rate of Return
Utilities, Inc. of Florida	06/20	Utilities, Inc. of Florida	Docket No. 20200139-WS	Rate of Return
Hawaii Public Utilities Commi	ssion			
				Cost of Service / Rate
Lanai Water Company, Inc.	12/19	Lanai Water Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2019-0386	Design
Manele Water Resources,				Cost of Service / Rate
LLC	08/19	Manele Water Resources, LLC	Docket No. 2019-0311	Design
Kaupulehu Water Company	02/18	Kaupulehu Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0363	Rate of Return
				Cost of Service / Rate
Aqua Engineers, LLC	05/17	Puhi Sewer & Water Company	Docket No. 2017-0118	Design
				Cost of Service / Rate
Hawaii Resources, Inc.	09/16	Laie Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0229	Design
Illinois Commerce Commission	on			
Ameren Illinois Company	07/00	Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a	D           00 0000	D
d/b/a Ameren Illinois	07/20	Ameren Illinois	Docket No. 20-0308	Return on Equity
LIEUE Cominge of III.	44/47	Likilik, Caminas of Illinois Inc.	Dealest No. 47 4400	Cost of Service / Rate
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	11/17	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-1106	Design
AUTIS IIIINOIS INC	04/17	Agua Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-0259	Rate of Return
Aqua Illinois, Inc. Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	04/15	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 14-0741	Rate of Return



# Appendix A – Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Director

SPONSOR	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET No.	SUBJECT
		Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite		
Aqua Indiana, Inc.	03/16	Wastewater Division	Docket No. 44752	Rate of Return
Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	08/13	Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 44388	Rate of Return
Kansas Corporation Commis	1			
Atmos Energy	07/19	Atmos Energy	19-ATMG-525-RTS	Rate of Return
Louisiana Public Service Cor	nmission	,		1
Atmos Energy	04/20	Atmos Energy	Docket No. U-35535	Rate of Return
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	06/13	Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. U-32848	Rate of Return
<b>Maryland Public Service Con</b>	nmission			
Washington Gas Light Company	08/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Case No. 9651	Rate of Return
FirstEnergy, Inc.	08/18	Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 9490	Rate of Return
Massachusetts Department of	of Public U	tilities		
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Elec.)	D.P.U. 19-130	Rate of Return
Officer Corporation	12/13	Thomburg das & Electric do. (Elec.)	D.I .O. 13-100	Trate of retain
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Gas)	D.P.U. 19-131	Rate of Return
·		Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England		
Liberty Utilities	07/15	Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 15-75	Rate of Return
Mississippi Public Service Co	ommission			<u> </u>
Atmos Energy	03/19	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Atmos Energy	07/18	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Missouri Public Service Com	mission			
Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc.	10/17	Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc.	Case No. SR-2017-0259	Rate of Return
Raccoon Creek Utility	10/11	Raccoon Creek Utility Operating	0000110.0112011 0200	Tidlo of Florani
Operating Company, Inc.	09/16	Company, Inc.	Docket No. SR-2016-0202	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission	of Nevada	,		-
Southwest Gas Corporation	08/20	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 20-02023	Return on Equity
New Jersey Board of Public I	<b>Jtilities</b>			<u> </u>
FirstEnergy	02/20	Jersey Central Power & Light Co.	Docket No. ER20020146	Rate of Return
Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	12/18	Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	Docket No. WR18121351	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	10/17	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR17101049	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	03/15	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR15030391	Rate of Return
The Atlantic City Sewerage		The Atlantic City Sewerage		Cost of Service / Rate
Company	10/14	Company	Docket No. WR14101263	Design
Middlesex Water Company	11/13	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR1311059	Capital Structure
North Carolina Utilities Comr	nission			
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214	Return on Equity
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Progress, LLC	Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219	Return on Equity
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	12/19	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 526	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/19	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 364	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	09/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 360	Rate of Return
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	07/18	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 497	Rate of Return



# Appendix A – Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Director

Sponsor	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT					
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio									
Aqua Ohio, Inc.	05/16	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Docket No. 16-0907-WW-AIR	Rate of Return					
Pennsylvania Public Utility Co	ommissio	1							
Valley Energy, Inc.	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008209	Rate of Return					
Wellsboro Electric Company	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008208	Rate of Return					
Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008212	Rate of Return					
Steelton Borough Authority	01/19	Steelton Borough Authority	Docket No. A-2019-3006880	Valuation					
Mahoning Township, PA	08/18	Mahoning Township, PA	Docket No. A-2018-3003519	Valuation					
SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	04/18	SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	Docket No. R-2018-000834	Rate of Return					
Columbia Water Company	09/17	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2017-2598203	Rate of Return					
Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	06/17	Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2017-2593142	Rate of Return					
Emporium Water Company	07/14	Emporium Water Company	Docket No. R-2014-2402324	Rate of Return					
Columbia Water Company	07/13	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2013-2360798	Rate of Return					
Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.	12/11	Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. R-2011-2255159	Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost Rate					
South Carolina Public Service	Commis	sion							
Blue Granite Water Co.	12/19	Blue Granite Water Company	Docket No. 2019-292-WS	Rate of Return					
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	02/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2017-292-WS	Rate of Return					
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/15	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2015-199-WS	Rate of Return					
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	11/13	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-275-WS	Rate of Return					
United Utility Companies, Inc.	09/13	United Utility Companies, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-199-WS	Rate of Return					
Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.	09/13	Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-201-WS	Rate of Return					
Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	11/12	Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	Docket No. 2012-177-WS	Capital Structure					
Tennessee Public Utility Com	mission								
Piedmont Natural Gas Company	07/20	Piedmont Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 20-00086	Return on Equity					
Virginia State Corporation Co	mmission								
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/20	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2020-00106	Rate of Return					
WGL Holdings, Inc.	07/18	Washington Gas Light Company	PUR-2018-00080	Rate of Return					
Atmos Energy Corporation	05/18	Atmos Energy Corporation	PUR-2018-00014	Rate of Return					
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/17	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2017-00082	Rate of Return					
Massanutten Public Service Corp.	08/14	Massanutten Public Service Corp.	PUE-2014-00035	Rate of Return / Rate Design					

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Table of Contents to Exhibit\_(DWD-1)

	Schedule
Summary of the Recommended Return on Common Equity	1
Financial Profiles of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation and the Utility Proxy Group	2
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model	3
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Risk Premium Model	4
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model	5
Basis of selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group	6
Cost of Common Equity Models Applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group	7
Estimated Market Capitalization for the Minnesota Electric Operations of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation and	
the Utility Proxy Group	8
Calculation of Flotation Costs	9

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

Line No.	Principal Methods	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	8.72%
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.43%
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	12.14%
4.	Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	12.03%
5.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates before Adjustment for Company-Specific Risk	9.77% - 10.83%
6.	Size Risk Adjustment (5)	0.05%
7.	Credit Risk Adjustment (6)	-0.12%
8.	Flotation Cost Adjustment (7)	0.15%
9.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	9.85% - 10.91%
10.	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	10.20%

Notes: (1) Average of results from the Constant Growth DCF Model and Two Growth DCF Model from Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 3.

- (2) From page 1 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (3) From page 1 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
- (4) From page 1 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 7.
- (5) Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk due to its smaller size realtive to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (6) Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect NSP's lower risk due to a higher long-term issuer rating relative to the average Utility Proxy Group Company as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (7) From Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 9

### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

	2019	2018	2017 MILLIONS OF DOLLARS	2016	2015	
CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS		(11)	HILLIONS OF DOLLARS	,		
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL SHORT-TERM DEBT TOTAL-CAPITAL EMPLOYED	\$ 11,650.861 31.450 \$ 11,682.311	\$ 10,552.523 151.450 \$ 10,703.973	\$ 10,453.835	\$ 10,238.640 86.450 \$ 10,325.090	\$ 9,701.187 224.450 \$ 9,925.637	
INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) TOTAL DEBT	4.24 %	4.34 %	6 4.50 %	4.55 %	4.51 %	
CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL: LONG-TERM DEBT PREFERRED STOCK	47.80 %	47.19 %	6 47.62 %	47.69 %	46.74 %	5 YEAR AVERAGE 47.41 %
COMMON EQUITY TOTAL	52.20 100.00 %	52.81	52.38 100.00 %	52.31 100.00 %	53.26 100.00 %	52.59 100.00 %
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL: TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY	47.94 % - 52.06	47.93 % - 52.07	48.15 % - 51.85	48.13 % - 51.87	47.94 % - 52.06	48.02 % - 51.98
TOTAL	100.00 %			100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	88.13 %	89.41 %	6 105.25 %	84.26 %	105.77 %	94.56 %
RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY	9.31 %	8.91 %	9.05 %	9.29 %	4.88 %	8.29 %
TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)	3.65 x	3.67 x	3.21 x	3.16 x	3.97 x	3.53 x
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)	20.69 %	28.12 %	6 26.00 %	25.68 %	28.13 %	25.72 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	47.94 %	47.93 %	48.15 %	48.13 %	47.94 %	48.02 %

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less

Source of Information: Company audited financial statements

## Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS	<u>2019</u>		2018 (M	IILLI	<u>2017</u> ONS OF DOLLAR	RS)	<u>2016</u>		<u>2015</u>		
<u>GALTITIDIZATION STATISTICS</u>											
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED											
TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL	\$19,170.073		\$17,563.380		\$16,026.006		\$15,844.640		\$14,799.184		
SHORT-TERM DEBT	\$554.853		\$638.869		\$601.956		\$462.079		\$479.850		
TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED	\$19,724.926		\$18,202.249		\$16,627.962	_	\$16,306.719		\$15,279.034	-	
INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2)											
TOTAL DEBT	4.40	%	4.62	%	4.60	%	4.85	%	4.65	%	
PREFERRED STOCK	5.44		5.22		5.28		5.42		5.39		
CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS											<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL:											
LONG-TERM DEBT	52.09	%	50.93	%	50.34	%	50.28	%	49.69	%	50.67 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.67		0.80		0.84		0.94		0.96		0.84
COMMON EQUITY	47.24	—	48.27		48.82		48.78		49.35		48.49
TOTAL	100.00	%	100.00	%	100.00	%_	100.00	%	100.00	%_	100.00 %
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL:											
TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM	52.95	%	52.07	%	52.19	%	51.75	%	50.98	%	51.99 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.65		0.77		0.79		0.90		0.94		0.81
COMMON EQUITY	46.40		47.16	_	47.02		47.36	_	48.08	_	47.20
TOTAL	100.00	%	100.00	%	100.00	%_	100.00	%	100.00	%	100.00 %
FINANCIAL STATISTICS											
FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED											
EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO	4.84	%	4.91	%	4.57	%	4.58	%	4.70	%	4.72 %
MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO	203.29		194.96		204.20		167.90		161.63		186.40
DIVIDEND YIELD	3.14		3.44		3.21		3.49		3.61		3.38
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	66.31		51.18		76.23		53.36		59.95		61.41
RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY	9.68	%	8.52	%	8.78	%	7.97	%	7.77	%	8.54 %
TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)	4.52	x	5.01	x	4.02	х	5.28	x	4.33	x	4.63 x
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)	15.23	%	20.10	%	20.06	%	18.97	%	23.09	%	19.49 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	52.95	%	52.07	%	52.19	%	51.75	%	50.98	%	51.99 %

#### Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: Company Annual Forms 10-K

# <u>Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the</u> <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies</u> <u>2015 - 2019, Inclusive</u>

	2010	2010	2017	2016	2015	5 YEAR
	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>
ALLETE, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	41.96 %	40.80 %	42.09 %	45.15 %	46.86 %	43.37 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	58.04	59.20	57.91	54.85	53.14	56.63
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Total Suprai	70	70	70	70	70	70
Alliant Energy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	53.39 %	53.49 %	52.62 %	50.34 %	49.43 %	51.85 %
Preferred Stock	1.72	1.94	2.16	2.33	2.58	2.15
Common Equity	44.89	44.57	45.22	47.33	47.99	46.00
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
•						
Ameren Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	53.29 %	52.05 %	51.52 %	50.11 %	50.65 %	51.52 %
Preferred Stock	0.81	0.88	0.92	0.98	0.99	0.92
Common Equity	45.90	47.07	47.56	48.91	48.36	47.56
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Duke Energy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	55.39 %	55.45 %	55.61 %	53.85 %	49.87 %	54.03 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	44.61	44.55	44.39	46.15	50.13	45.97
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
				<u> </u>		
Edison International						
Long-Term Debt	54.21 %	53.76 %	46.65 %	44.02 %	45.68 %	48.86 %
Preferred Stock	6.48	8.02	8.44	8.65	8.20	7.96
Common Equity	39.31	38.22	44.91	47.33	46.12	43.18
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Entergy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	63.12 %	64.08 %	64.80 %	64.16 %	58.19 %	62.87 %
Preferred Stock	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.88	1.39	0.95
Common Equity	36.10	35.05	34.35	34.96	40.42	36.18
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Evergy, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	51.77 %	42.70 %	49.60 %	NA %	NA %	48.02 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	NA	NA	0.00
Common Equity	48.23	57.30	50.40	NA	NA	51.98
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	NA %	NA %	100.00 %
IDACORP, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	42.70 %	43.63 %	43.68 %	44.77 %	45.62 %	44.08 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	57.30	56.37	56.32	55.23	54.38	55.92
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %

# <u>Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the</u> <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies</u> <u>2015 - 2019, Inclusive</u>

	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	2017	<u>2016</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
NorthWestern Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	52.27 %	51.98 %	50.26 %	52.05 %	53.08 %	51.93 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	47.73	48.02	49.74	47.95	46.92	48.07
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
OGE Energy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	43.56 %	44.00 %	43.78 %	43.31 %	45.31 %	43.99 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	56.44	56.00	56.22	56.69	54.69	56.01
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Ou. This is						
Otter Tail Corporation	46.00 0/	4474 0/	41.21 0/	4456 0/	45 17 0/	44.52.0/
Long-Term Debt	46.88 %	44.74 %	41.31 %	44.56 %	45.17 %	44.53 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	53.12	55.26	58.69	55.44	54.83	55.47
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.						
Long-Term Debt	50.91 %	49.59 %	48.68 %	46.33 %	45.45 %	48.19 %
Preferred Stock	_	-	_	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	49.09	50.41	51.32	53.67	54.55	51.81
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
DAMA D						
PNM Resources, Inc.	(4.02.0/	(1.10 0/	<b>57.00</b> 0/	FO.(4 0/	TT (( )/	E0.46.0/
Long-Term Debt	64.02 %	61.10 %	57.89 %	58.64 %	55.66 %	59.46 %
Preferred Stock	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.28
Common Equity	35.73	38.64	41.83	41.08	44.03	40.26
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Portland General Electric Co.						
Long-Term Debt	50.06 %	49.72 %	50.10 %	50.06 %	49.39 %	49.87 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	0.01	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	49.94	50.28	49.90	49.94	50.61	50.13
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.01 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Vari François Inc						
Xcel Energy, Inc. Long-Term Debt	57.77 %	57.01 %	56.66 %	56.73 %	55.36 %	56.71 %
Preferred Stock	37.77 %	57.01 %	36.66 %	30.73 %	55.50 %	0.00
	42.22	42.00	42.24	42.27	44.64	
Common Equity Total Capital	42.23 100.00 %	42.99 100.00 %	43.34 100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	43.29
i otai capitai	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies						
Long-Term Debt	52.09 %	50.94 %	50.35 %	50.29 %	49.70 %	50.62 %
Preferred Stock	0.67	0.80	0.84	0.94	0.96	0.82
Common Equity	47.24	48.26	48.81	48.77	49.34	48.56
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
-						

Source of Information Annual Forms 10-K

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Operating Subsidiary Company Capital Structures of the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

			2019	
	Parent			
	Company	Common	Long-Term	Total
Company Name	Ticker	Equity	Debt	Capital
ALLETE (Minnesota Power)	ALE	59.59%	40.41%	100.00%
Superior Water, Light and Power Company	ALE	58.08%	41.92%	100.00%
Interstate Power and Light Company	LNT	50.23%	49.77%	100.00%
Wisconsin Power and Light Company	LNT	53.78%	46.22%	100.00%
Ameren Illinois Company	AEE	53.00%	47.00%	100.00%
Union Electric Company	AEE	51.90%	48.10%	100.00%
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	DUK	52.11%	47.89%	100.00%
Duke Energy Florida, LLC	DUK	49.91%	50.09%	100.00%
Duke Energy Indiana, LLC	DUK	52.84%	47.16%	100.00%
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	DUK	49.37%	50.63%	100.00%
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.	DUK	65.22%	34.78%	100.00%
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	DUK	51.29%	48.71%	100.00%
Southern California Edison Company	EIX	50.43%	49.57%	100.00%
Entergy Arkansas, LLC	ETR	47.90%	52.10%	100.00%
Entergy Louisiana, LLC	ETR	47.47%	52.53%	100.00%
Entergy Mississippi, LLC	ETR	48.60%	51.40%	100.00%
Entergy New Orleans, LLC	ETR	49.26%	50.74%	100.00%
Entergy Texas, Inc.	ETR	50.43%	49.57%	100.00%
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	EVRG	57.97%	42.03%	100.00%
Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	EVRG	50.34%	49.66%	100.00%
Evergy Metro, Inc.	EVRG	50.31%	49.69%	100.00%
Idaho Power Company	IDA	55.14%	44.86%	100.00%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	47.59%	52.41%	100.00%
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company	OGE	55.15%	44.85%	100.00%
Otter Tail Power Company	OTTR	51.12%	48.88%	100.00%
Public Service Company of New Mexico	PNM	45.23%	54.77%	100.00%
Texas-New Mexico Power Company	PNM	52.74%	47.26%	100.00%
Arizona Public Service Company	PNW	52.80%	47.20%	100.00%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	49.85%	50.15%	100.00%
Northern States Power Company - MN	XEL	52.20%	47.80%	100.00%
Northern States Power Company - WI	XEL	54.23%	45.77%	100.00%
Public Service Company of Colorado	XEL	56.32%	43.68%	100.00%
Southwestern Public Service Company	XEL	54.14%	45.86%	100.00%
	Mean	52.32%	47.68%	100.00%
	Median	51.90%	48.10%	100.00%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	Average Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
ALLETE, Inc.	4.31 %	5.50 %	NA %	6.40 %	7.00 %	6.30 %	4.45 %	10.75 %
Alliant Energy Corporation	2.96	6.50	5.50	5.59	5.30	5.72	3.04	8.76
Ameren Corporation	2.58	6.00	6.80	7.02	5.85	6.42	2.66	9.08
Duke Energy Corporation	4.65	5.00	4.30	4.39	2.75	4.11	4.75	8.86
Edison International	4.62	NMF	3.30	4.38	1.40	3.03	4.69	7.72
Entergy Corporation	3.75	3.00	5.80	4.85	5.95	4.90	3.84	8.74
Evergy, Inc.	3.44	3.00	6.40	6.41	6.80	5.65	3.54	9.19
IDACORP, Inc.	2.99	3.50	2.60	3.00	2.60	2.93	3.03	5.96
NorthWestern Corporation	4.36	1.50	3.40	4.00	3.80	3.18	4.43	7.61
OGE Energy Corporation	4.87	3.00	3.70	3.59	2.40	3.17	4.95	8.12
Otter Tail Corporation	3.76	3.50	NA	6.00	9.00	6.17	3.88	10.05
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	4.03	4.00	4.70	4.57	3.75	4.25	4.12	8.37
PNM Resources, Inc.	2.99	6.00	4.90	5.46	4.95	5.33	3.07	8.40
Portland General Electric Co.	3.83	4.00	5.00	4.90	4.30	4.55	3.92	8.47
Xcel Energy, Inc.	2.57	6.00	5.90	6.02	6.10	6.01	2.65	8.66
							Average	8.58 %
							Median	8.66 %
						Average of M	ean and Median	8.62 %
						E	Excl. 7% or less:	8.73 %

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

### Notes:

- (1) Indicated dividend at 08/31/2020 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 08/31/2020 for each company.

- (2) From pages 3 through 17 of this Schedule.
  (3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
  (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, Inc., 4.31% x (1+(1/2 x 6.30%)) = 4.45%.
- (5) Column 6 + column 7.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Two Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model for the <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies</u>

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	Stock Price	Annualized Dividend	Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
ALLETE, Inc.	\$ 57.25	\$ 2.47	4.31 %	5.50 %	NA %	6.40 %	7.00 %	6.30 %	4.45 %	9.85 % (6)
Alliant Energy Corporation	51.31	1.52	2.96	6.50	5.50	5.59	5.30	5.72	3.04	8.76
Ameren Corporation	76.77	1.98	2.58	6.00	6.80	7.02	5.85	6.42	2.66	7.94 (6)
Duke Energy Corporation	82.93	3.86	4.65	5.00	4.30	4.39	2.75	4.11	4.75	8.86
Edison International	55.14	2.55	4.62	NMF	3.30	4.38	1.40	3.03	4.69	9.51 (6)
Entergy Corporation	99.12	3.72	3.75	3.00	5.80	4.85	5.95	4.90	3.84	8.74
Evergy, Inc.	58.73	2.02	3.44	3.00	6.40	6.41	6.80	5.65	3.54	9.19
IDACORP, Inc.	89.69	2.68	2.99	3.50	2.60	3.00	2.60	2.93	3.03	7.91 (6)
NorthWestern Corporation	55.01	2.40	4.36	1.50	3.40	4.00	3.80	3.18	4.43	9.28 (6)
OGE Energy Corporation	31.86	1.55	4.87	3.00	3.70	3.59	2.40	3.17	4.95	9.77 (6)
Otter Tail Corporation	39.32	1.48	3.76	3.50	NA	6.00	9.00	6.17	3.88	9.22 (6)
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	77.64	3.13	4.03	4.00	4.70	4.57	3.75	4.25	4.12	8.37
PNM Resources, Inc.	41.09	1.23	2.99	6.00	4.90	5.46	4.95	5.33	3.07	8.40
Portland General Electric Co.	42.58	1.63	3.83	4.00	5.00	4.90	4.30	4.55	3.92	8.47
Xcel Energy, Inc.	66.86	1.72	2.57	6.00	5.90	6.02	6.10	6.01	2.65	8.66
							Average	4.78	Average	8.86 %
					1 Standa	rd Deviation Belo		3.55		
						rd Deviation Abo		6.01	Median	8.76 %
					1 Stanta	a Deviadon ribo	re mean	0.01		
								Average of Mean	and Median	8.81 %


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
#### Notes:


- (1) Indicated dividend at 08/31/2020 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 08/31/2020 for each company.
- (2) From pages 3 through 17 of this Schedule.
  (3) Average of columns 4 through 7 excluding negative growth rates.
- (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 8) x column 3 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, Inc., 4.31% x (1+(1/2 x 6.30%)) = 4.45%.
- (5) Column 8 + column 9.
- (6) The Two Growth Method was applied to Companies with short-term EPS growth rates greater than one standard deviation from the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate. The mean of all Utility Proxy Group Companies with growth rates are within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate was applied as the long-term growth rate for these Companies.


Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services














Earnings Predictability 90






















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
**Earnings Predictability** 



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# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Summary of Risk Premium Models for the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

	_	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies		
Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1)		10.09	%	
Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2)	_	10.76	_%	
	Average	10.43	<u></u> %	

#### Notes:

- (1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated ROE Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	LT Average Predicted Variance	Spot Predicted Variance	Recommended Variance (2)	GARCH Coefficient	Predicted Risk Premium (3)	Risk-Free Rate (4)	Indicated ROE (5)
ALLETE, Inc.	0.28%	0.46%	0.28%	2.0821	7.36%	2.05%	9.41%
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.27%	0.46%	0.27%	2.6438	8.81%	2.05%	10.86%
Ameren Corporation	0.23%	0.38%	0.23%	1.9611	5.52%	2.05%	7.57%
Duke Energy Corporation	0.31%	0.34%	0.31%	1.7362	6.70%	2.05%	8.75%
Edison International	0.43%	0.76%	0.43%	1.4573	7.82%	2.05%	9.87%
Entergy Corporation	0.40%	0.75%	0.40%	2.2188	11.20%	2.05%	13.25%
Evergy, Inc.	0.33%	1.02%	0.33%	(0.1779)	-0.71%	2.05%	NMF
IDACORP, Inc.	0.28%	0.35%	0.28%	2.1635	7.64%	2.05%	9.69%
NorthWestern Corporation	0.34%	0.33%	0.34%	2.3171	9.79%	2.05%	11.84%
OGE Energy Corporation	0.31%	0.54%	0.31%	2.1119	8.12%	2.05%	10.17%
Otter Tail Corporation	0.37%	0.35%	0.37%	1.5742	7.28%	2.05%	9.33%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	0.60%	0.87%	0.60%	1.2237	9.20%	2.05%	11.25%
PNM Resources, Inc.	0.53%	0.71%	0.53%	1.2936	8.55%	2.05%	10.60%
Portland General Electric Co.	0.27%	0.44%	0.27%	1.7368	5.72%	2.05%	7.77%
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.27%	0.36%	0.27%	2.8114	9.65%	2.05%	11.70%
						Average	10.15%
						Median	10.02%
					Average of Mean	n and Median	10.09%

#### Notes:

- (1) The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service.
- (2) Given current market conditions, I recommend using the long-term average predicted variance.
- (3) (1+(Column [3] \* Column [4])<sup>^12</sup>) 1.
- (4) From note 2 on page 2 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
- (5) Column [5] + Column [6].

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>			Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies
1.		Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	2.98 %
2.		Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate	
		Bonds and A Rated Public Utility Bonds	0.58 (2)
3.		Adjusted Prospective Yield on A Rated	
		Public Utility Bonds	3.56 %
4.		Adjustment to Reflect Bond	
		Rating Difference of Proxy Group	0.12 (3)
5.		Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	3.68 %
6.		Equity Risk Premium (4)	7.08
7.		Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	10.76 %
Notes:	(1)	Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corpor Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10-11 of	
	(2)	The average yield spread of A rated public utility rated corporate bonds of 0.58% from page 4 of t	
	(3)	Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer of Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds (1/3 * 0.35% = from page 4 of this Schedule.	rating of the Utility e. The 0.12% he spread between
	(4)	From page 7 of this Schedule.	

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

#### Selected Bond Yields

[1]	[2]	[3]
L 3	L 3	

	Aaa Rated Corporate Bond	A Rated Public Utility Bond	Baa Rated Public Utility Bond
Aug-2020 Jul-2020	2.25 % 2.14	2.73 % 2.74	3.06 % 3.09
Jun-2020	2.41	3.07	3.44
Average	2.27 %	2.85 %	3.20 %

#### **Selected Bond Spreads**

A Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

0.58 % (1)

Baa Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.35 % (2)

#### Notes:

- (1) Column [2] Column [1].
- (2) Column [3] Column [2].

Source of Information:

**Bloomberg Professional Service** 

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies</u>

Moody's	Standard & Poor's
Long-Term Issuer Rating	Long-Term Issuer Rating
August 2020	August 2020

Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)
ALLETE, Inc.	А3	7.0	NR	
Alliant Energy Corporation	A3/Baa1	7.5	A/A-	6.5
Ameren Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Duke Energy Corporation	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Edison International	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Entergy Corporation	Baa1/Baa2	8.5	A-	7.0
Evergy, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
IDACORP, Inc.	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
NorthWestern Corporation	NR		NR	
OGE Energy Corporation	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Otter Tail Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	A2	6.0	A-	7.0
PNM Resources, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB+/BBB	8.5
Portland General Electric Co.	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Xcel Energy, Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Average	A3	7.4	BBB+	7.6

#### Notes:

- (1) Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.
- (2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service

Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

#### Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
А3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ва2	12	ВВ
Ba3	13	BB-
DdS	15	DD-
B1	14	B+
B2	15	В
В3	16	В-

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

Line No.		Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	9.07 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2)	6.25
3.	Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 1168 Fully-Litigated Electric Utility Rate Cases	5.92
4.	Average equity risk premium	7.08 %

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.

- (2) From page 12 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 13 of this Schedule.

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies
	Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:	
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	9.39
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.62
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	11.47
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.85
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	10.80
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.65 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.94
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	9.07 %

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

#### Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2020 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1926-2019.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in Note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through August 2020.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 2.98% (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 14.45% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 13.83% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 2.98% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.85%.
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 13.78% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 2.98% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.80%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.

#### Sources of Information:


**Bloomberg Professional Service** 

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020

#### Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

	History					Cons	ensus l	Foreca	sts-Qua	arterly	Avg.			
		erage For						Latest Qtr	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	<b>4Q</b>
Interest Rates	Aug 21	Aug 14	<u>Aug 7</u>	<u>Jul 31</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>2Q 2020</u>	<u>2020</u>	<u>2020</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>
Federal Funds Rate	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
LIBOR, 3-mo.	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.31	0.40	0.60	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.24	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.17	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
Treasury note, 5 yr.	0.28	0.28	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.34	0.34	0.36	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7
Treasury note, 10 yr.	0.67	0.67	0.55	0.58	0.62	0.73	0.67	0.69	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.1
Treasury note, 30 yr.	1.40	1.36	1.21	1.22	1.31	1.49	1.38	1.38	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8
Corporate Aaa bond	2.53	2.46	2.32	2.32	2.43	2.73	2.85	2.81	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.8
Corporate Baa bond	3.14	3.06	2.95	2.98	3.12	3.44	3.69	3.67	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.8
State & Local bonds	2.87	2.85	2.89	2.91	2.99	3.10	3.33	3.28	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6
Home mortgage rate	2.99	2.96	2.88	2.99	3.02	3.16	3.23	3.23	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2
				Histor	ry	V			Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly			rly		
	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q
Key Assumptions	2018	2018	2019	2019	2019	2019	2020	2020	2020	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021
Fed's AFE \$ Index	107.8	109.4	109.4	110.3	110.5	110.3	111.2	112.4	108.0	<del>107.7</del>	107.5	107.4	<b>107.0</b>	106.8
Real GDP	2.1	1.3	2.9	1.5	2.6	2.4	-5.0	-31.7	21.5	5.7	5.0	4.4	3.8	3.5
GDP Price Index	1.8	1.8	1.2	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	-2.0	1.9	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6
Consumer Price Index	2.1	1.3	0.9	3.0	1.8	2.4	1.2	-3.5	3.2	1.8	1.9	1.7	2.0	2.0

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).



#### **Long-Range Survey:**

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2021 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.


			Average For The Year				Five-Year Averages		
		2021	2022	Average Fo 2023	or the Year 2024	2025	 2026	2022-2026	2027-2031
1. Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.3
1. I ederal I dilds ivate	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.8	1.6	2.2	2.5	2.7	1.9	2.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.7
2. Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.0	5.2	4.5	5.4
2. I Time Rate	Top 10 Average	3.5	3.9	4.6	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.0	5.9
	Bottom 10 Average	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.1	4.9
3. LIBOR, 3-Mo.	CONSENSUS	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.3	2.4	1.8	2.6
3. Elbord, 3 Mo.	Top 10 Average	0.8	1.3	1.9	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.3	3.1
	Bottom 10 Average	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.1
4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	1.7	2.6
4. Commercial Laper, 1-10	Top 10 Average	0.7	1.2	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.1	3.0
	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	0.5	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.2
5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.3	0.5	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.3
5. Heastiny Bill Tield, 5-Wio	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.9	1.6	2.2	2.4	2.6	1.9	2.8
								0.9	
6 Transport Bill Viold 6 Mo	Bottom 10 Average	0.1 <b>0.3</b>	0.2	0.5	1.1	1.4	1.6		1.8 <b>2.5</b>
6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.3	<b>0.6</b> 0.9	<b>1.1</b> 1.7	1.7	2.0	2.2	1.5 2.0	3.0
	Top 10 Average				2.3	2.6	2.7		
7 Transper Bill Viold 1 Vr	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.2	0.6	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.1	1.9
7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.4	0.7	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.7	2.6
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.1	1.8	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.2	3.1
0 T	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.1	2.0
8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.5	0.9	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5	1.8	2.7
	Top 10 Average	0.8	1.3	2.0	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.4	3.3
0 T N . X 11 5 X	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.4	1.7	2.0	1.3	2.2
9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.7	1.1	1.7	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.0	2.9
	Top 10 Average	1.1	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.3	2.6	3.5
10 7	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	0.7	1.2	1.6	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.3
10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr		1.2	1.5	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.3	3.1
	Top 10 Average	1.5	2.0	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.2	1.8	2.5
11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr		1.8	2.2	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.0	3.8
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.1	3.5	4.4
	Bottom 10 Average	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.4	3.1
12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	2.8	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.3	3.9	4.6
	Top 10 Average	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.4	5.1
	Bottom 10 Average	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.4	4.2
13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	4.1	4.5	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.0	5.7
	Top 10 Average	4.6	5.0	5.4	5.7	5.8	6.0	5.6	6.2
	Bottom 10 Average	3.6	3.9	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.4	5.2
14. State & Local Bonds Yield	CONSENSUS	2.6	3.0	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.6	4.1
	Top 10 Average	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.0	4.6
	Bottom 10 Average	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.7
<ol><li>Home Mortgage Rate</li></ol>	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.6	4.0	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.2	4.9
	Top 10 Average	3.8	4.0	4.5	4.8	5.0	5.2	4.7	5.5
	Bottom 10 Average	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.1	3.7	4.4
A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	CONSENSUS	112.8	112.6	112.5	111.8	111.4	111.0	111.9	110.6
	Top 10 Average	114.1	114.5	114.1	113.8	113.5	113.4	113.9	113.9
	Bottom 10 Average	111.7	110.7	110.7	110.2	109.5	108.7	110.0	107.6
					ar, % Change				Averages
D. D. J. CDD		2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2022-2026	2027-2031
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	3.2	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.1
	Top 10 Average	5.7	4.3	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8
C. GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.1	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.0
	Top 10 Average	1.8	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
<b>.</b>	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.9
D. Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.3	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	0.4	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.0

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies Using Holding Period Returns and Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

<u>Line No.</u>		Implied Equity Risk Premium		
	Equity Risk Premium based on S&P Utility Index Holding Period Returns (1):			
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	4.21 %		
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	6.83		
3.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	5.53		
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4)	6.80		
5.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)	7.89		
6.	Average Equity Risk Premium (6)	6.25 %		

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2019. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
  - (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A rated public utility bond yields from 1928 2019 referenced in note 1 above.
  - (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A rated public utility bonds from January 1928 August 2020.
  - (4) Using data from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.36% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of 3.56%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 6.80%. (10.36% 3.56% = 6.80%)
  - (5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 11.45% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A rated public utility bond yield of 3.56%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 7.89%. (11.45% 3.56% = 7.89%)
  - (6) Average of lines 1 through 5.

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to Moody's A Rated Utility Bond Yields



		Prospective A	Prospective
		Rated Utility	<b>Equity Risk</b>
Constant	Slope	Bond (1)	Premium
7.644759 %	-0.48471	3.56 %	5.92 %

Notes:

(1) From line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates

of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM) Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use

[8]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)	11.95 % 11.39 11.39 11.86 12.33 12.89 13.07 11.77 13.16 13.72 11.95 11.95 11.95 11.95 11.95 11.95 11.95 11.95	
[2]	ECAPM Cost Rate	12.06 % 11.90 11.58 11.98 12.38 12.06 13.44 12.06 12.30 13.34 12.06 12.30 12.30 12.30 12.30 12.30 12.30	
[9]	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	11.85 % 11.63 11.21 11.74 12.27 12.91 13.12 11.85 12.17 13.55 11.10 12.27 % 11.85 11.18 11.85 11.18	
[5]	Risk-Free Rate (2)	2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05	
[4]	Market Risk Premium (1)	10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65 10.65	
[3]	Average Beta	0.92 0.90 0.96 0.91 0.96 1.02 1.04 0.90 1.05 1.08 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92	
[2]	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	0.99 1.00 0.92 0.96 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.17 0.99 1.26 0.99 0.99	
[1]	Value Line Adjusted Beta	0.85 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.95 1.05 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.95 0.90	
	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	ALLETE, Inc. Alliant Energy Corporation Ameren Corporation Duke Energy Corporation Edison International Entergy Corporation Evergy, Inc. IDACORP, Inc. NorthWestern Corporation OGE Energy Corporation OGE Energy Corporation Otter Tail Corporation Pinnacle West Capital Corp. PNM Resources, Inc. Portland General Electric Co. Xcel Energy, Inc. Mean Median	

Notes on page 2 of this Schedule.

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

#### Notes:

(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

#### **Historical Data MRP Estimates:**

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2019: Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds: MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:	12.10 % 5.09 7.01 %
Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data (1926-2019)	10.24 %
Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data: (January 1926 - August 2020)	10.73 %
Value Line MRP Estimates:	
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending September 04, 2020)	
Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*: Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index: *Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield	14.45 % 2.05 12.40 %
Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500	
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500: Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2): MRP based on Value Line data	13.83 % 2.05 11.78 %
Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP	
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500: Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):  MRP based on Bloomberg data	13.78 % 2.05 11.73 %
Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP:	10.65 %

(2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 10-11 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1) Schedule 4.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

Third Quarter 2020	1.40 %
Fourth Quarter 2020	1.50
First Quarter 2021	1.60
Second Quarter 2021	1.60
Third Quarter 2021	1.70
Fourth Quarter 2021	1.80
2022-2026	3.00
2027-2031	3.80
	2.05 %

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

#### Sources of Information:

Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020 Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Bloomberg Professional Services

Docket No. E002/GR-20-273

Exhibit\_\_(DWD-1)

Schedule 6

Page 1 of 3

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in <u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group companies were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.64 – 0.92 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.5047 – 2.9871 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Gas Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1206. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. = Standard Error of the Regression 
$$\sqrt{2N}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

Thus, 
$$0.1206 = \frac{2.7459}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{2.7459}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., June 2020

<u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition)

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
ALLETE, Inc.	0.85	0.72	2.5517	0.0644
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.80	0.69	2.7475	0.0694
Ameren Corporation	0.80	0.66	2.7473	0.0694
Duke Energy Corporation	0.85	0.66	2.7615	0.0669
Edison International	0.90	0.73	3.2630	0.0097
Entergy Corporation	0.95	0.86	2.6168	0.0624
Evergy, Inc.	1.05	1.02	3.0695	0.0001
IDACORP, Inc.	0.80	0.64	2.5630	0.0647
NorthWestern Corporation	0.90	0.79	2.7647	0.0698
OGE Energy Corporation	1.05	1.05	2.6291	0.0664
Otter Tail Corporation	0.85	0.75	2.4932	0.0630
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	0.85	0.75	2.6801	0.0677
PNM Resources, Inc.	0.90	0.84	3.0989	0.0782
Portland General Electric Co.	0.85	0.75	2.6422	0.0667
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.75	0.61	2.6583	0.0671
Average	0.88	0.78	2.7459	0.0703
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta)	0.64	0.92		
2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.14	0.72		
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.5047	2.9871		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1206			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2412			

Source of Information: Valueline Proprietary Database, June 2020

## Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

[1] [2] [3] [4]

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	VL Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
Apple Inc.	0.95	0.89	2.8953	0.0731
Analog Devices	0.95	0.90	2.7284	0.0689
Assurant Inc.	0.90	0.79	2.7586	0.0697
Amgen	0.95	0.74	2.6870	0.0678
Amer. Tower 'A'	0.90	0.85	2.8552	0.0721
ANSYS, Inc.	0.90	0.79	2.7316	0.0690
Smith (A.O.)	0.95	0.86	2.7319	0.0690
Becton, Dickinson	0.80	0.68	2.6431	0.0667
Brown-Forman 'B'	0.90	0.79	2.6084	0.0659
Bio-Rad Labs. 'A'	0.80	0.67	2.8493	0.0719
Black Knight, Inc.	0.85	0.73	2.6526	0.0670
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.73	2.7938	0.0705
Cadence Design Sys.	0.95	0.88	2.8991	0.0732
CDW Corp.	0.95	0.92	2.7232	0.0688
Cerner Corp.	0.90	0.84	2.8660	0.0724
Chemed Corp.	0.85	0.77	2.5217	0.0637
Cooper Cos.	0.95	0.89	2.6587	0.0671
Dolby Labs.	0.95	0.85	2.6147	0.0660
Lauder (Estee)	0.90	0.82	2.6597	0.0672
ESCO Technologies	0.95	0.88	2.5170	0.0636
Exponent, Inc.	0.85	0.75	2.8247	0.0713
Forward Air	0.95	0.89	2.7021	0.0682
Gentex Corp.	0.95	0.92	2.7002	0.0682
Alphabet Inc.	0.90	0.83	2.7286	0.0689
Hershey Co.	0.85	0.73	2.6704	0.0674
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.78	2.8600	0.0722
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.89	2.7263	0.0688
J&J Snack Foods	0.85	0.76	2.7347	0.0691
St. Joe Corp.	0.80	0.65	2.9722	0.0751
ManTech Int'l 'A'	0.85	0.75	2.9683	0.0750
McCormick & Co.	0.85	0.76	2.6762	0.0676
Altria Group	0.85	0.72	2.9098	0.0735
Motorola Solutions	0.85	0.75	2.6058	0.0658
Vail Resorts	0.90	0.78	2.9711	0.0750
NewMarket Corp.	0.85	0.70	2.5462	0.0643
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.71	2.8334	0.0715
PerkinElmer Inc.	1.00	0.92	2.5564	0.0646
Pool Corp.	0.90	0.82	2.5263	0.0638
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.72	2.8610	0.0722
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.70	2.6898	0.0679
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	0.87	2.5986	0.0656
Bio-Techne Corp.	0.85	0.72	2.8139	0.0711
Tetra Tech	0.90	0.78	2.8216	0.0712
Texas Instruments	0.85	0.75	2.6653	0.0673
AMERCO	0.90	0.80	2.6496	0.0669
VeriSign Inc.	0.95	0.90	2.5465	0.0643
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.70	2.8223	0.0713
Average	0.89	0.79	2.7300	0.0700
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric				
Companies	0.88	0.78	2.7459	0.0703

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

	Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-
Principal Methods	Price Regulated Companies
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	11.91 %
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	12.68
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	11.83_
	<u>12.14</u> %
	11.91 %
	12.03 %

#### Notes:

- (1) Average of resutls from the Constant Growth DCF Model and Two Growth DCF Model from pages 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 4 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 7 of this Schedule.

11.95 %

12.24 %

Average of Mean and Median

Excl. 7% or less

#### $\frac{Northern\ States\ Power\ Company,\ a\ Minnesota\ Corporation}{DCF\ Results\ for\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Non-Price-Regulated\ Companies\ Comparable\ in\ Total\ Risk\ to\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Fifteen\ Electric\ Companies$

	[1]	[2]	[3]		[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)
Apple Inc.	0.81 %	14.00 %	10.70 %	8.33 %	12.46 %	11.37 %	0.86 %	12.23 %
Analog Devices	2.09	7.00	13.30	12.15	8.44	10.22	2.20	12.42
Assurant Inc.	2.28	6.50	NA	36.60	19.40	20.83	2.52	23.35
Amgen	2.64	6.50	7.50	7.67	6.87	7.14	2.73	9.87
Amer. Tower 'A'	1.71	7.50	14.40	15.32	14.75	12.99	1.82	14.81
ANSYS, Inc.	-	10.00	NA	10.90	7.10	9.33	-	NA
Smith (A.O.)	1.97	5.00	8.00	NA	8.00	7.00	2.04	9.04
Becton, Dickinson	1.24	9.00	8.00	8.73	6.40	8.03	1.29	9.32
Brown-Forman 'B'	1.03	11.00	NA	NA	5.33	8.17	1.07	9.24
Bio-Rad Labs. 'A'	-	11.50	NA	21.75	17.80	17.02	-	NA
Black Knight, Inc.	-	9.50	6.00	8.00	9.30	8.20	-	NA
Broadridge Fin'l	1.76	9.00	NA	7.40	10.00	8.80	1.84	10.64
Cadence Design Sys.	-	10.00	13.70	10.89	13.70	12.07	-	NA
CDW Corp.	1.32	11.00	13.10	13.10	9.10	11.58	1.40	12.98
Cerner Corp.	1.02	9.00	11.90	11.76	11.63	11.07	1.08	12.15
Chemed Corp.	0.28	11.50	9.60	9.64	9.65	10.10	0.29	10.39
Cooper Cos.	0.02	14.50	11.00	8.45	10.00	10.99	0.02	11.01
Dolby Labs.	1.30	9.50	13.00	13.00	16.00	12.88	1.38	14.26
Lauder (Estee)	0.97	14.00	12.70	23.54	13.31	15.89	1.05	16.94
ESCO Technologies	0.37 0.95	11.00 11.50	NA NA	15.50 15.00	15.00 15.00	13.83 13.83	0.40 1.02	14.23 14.85
Exponent, Inc. Forward Air	1.37	12.00	NA NA	15.00 NA	13.16	12.58	1.46	14.04
Gentex Corp.	1.80	7.00	NA NA	5.34	15.00	9.11	1.88	10.99
Alphabet Inc.	-	14.50	16.20	15.77	6.09	13.14	1.00	NA
Hershey Co.	2.33	5.00	7.70	7.40	6.78	6.72	2.41	9.13
Ingredion Inc.	3.04	6.00	NA	8.60	1.90	5.50	3.12	8.62
Hunt (J.B.)	0.84	6.50	15.00	13.30	10.09	11.22	0.89	12.11
J&I Snack Foods	1.79	6.00	NA	NA	6.00	6.00	1.84	7.84
St. Joe Corp.	-	16.50	NA	NA	(28.10)	16.50	-	NA
ManTech Int'l 'A'	1.83	12.00	7.40	7.36	7.02	8.45	1.91	10.36
McCormick & Co.	1.31	6.50	5.80	10.13	5.00	6.86	1.35	8.21
Altria Group	8.30	6.00	5.00	4.45	6.10	5.39	8.52	13.91
Motorola Solutions	1.80	9.50	9.00	8.50	10.32	9.33	1.88	11.21
Vail Resorts	-	18.00	NA	0.24	(10.76)	9.12	-	NA
NewMarket Corp.	1.93	2.00	NA	NA	7.70	4.85	1.98	6.83
Northrop Grumman	1.81	10.50	NA	19.56	8.62	12.89	1.93	14.82
PerkinElmer Inc.	0.26	12.00	17.40	10.58	16.95	14.23	0.28	14.51
Pool Corp.	0.78	9.00	NA	17.00	17.00	14.33	0.84	15.17
Rollins, Inc.	0.66	12.00	NA	NA	8.20	10.10	0.69	10.79
Selective Ins. Group	1.68	6.50	NA	NA	(2.19)	6.50	1.73	8.23
Sirius XM Holdings	0.90	24.50	15.90	12.87	16.25	17.38	0.98	18.36
Bio-Techne Corp.	0.49	14.00	7.00	10.45	7.00	9.61	0.51	10.12
Tetra Tech	0.80	11.00	15.00	15.50	15.00	14.13	0.86	14.99
Texas Instruments	2.73	2.50	9.30	10.00	10.00	7.95	2.84	10.79
AMERCO	-	7.50	NA NA	NA 10.20	15.00	11.25	-	NA NA
VeriSign Inc. West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.26	9.50 16.00	NA 17.40	10.30 14.94	8.00 15.00	9.27 15.83	0.28	NA 16.11
west Filatiliac. Svcs.	0.20	10.00	17.40	14.94	15.00	15.05	0.40	16.11
							Mean	12.23 %
							Median	11.66 %

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

<sup>(1)</sup> The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group.

The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of August 31, 2020. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, Bloomberg

Professional Services, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.

11.87 %

Average of Mean and Median

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Two Growth DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	Stock Price	Annualized Dividend	Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)
companies	StockTrice	Dividend	Dividend Field	LIS	LIS	LIS	LIS	LIS	Dividend Field	cost rate (1)
Apple Inc.	\$ 101.03	\$ 0.82	0.81 %	14.00 %	10.70 %	8.33 %	12.46 %	11.37 %	0.86 %	12.23 %
Analog Devices	118.66	2.48	2.09	7.00	13.30	12.15	8.44	10.22	2.20	12.42
Assurant Inc.	110.63	2.52	2.28	6.50	NA	36.60	19.40	20.83	2.52	14.23 (2)
Amgen	242.80	6.40	2.64	6.50	7.50	7.67	6.87	7.14	2.73	9.87
Amer. Tower 'A'	257.45	4.40	1.71	7.50	14.40	15.32	14.75	12.99	1.82	14.81
ANSYS, Inc.	302.91	NA		10.00	NA	10.90	7.10	9.33		NA
Smith (A.O.)	48.82	0.96	1.97	5.00	8.00	NA o mo	8.00	7.00	2.04	9.04
Becton, Dickinson Brown-Forman 'B'	254.56	3.16 0.70	1.24 1.03	9.00 11.00	8.00 NA	8.73 NA	6.40 5.33	8.03	1.29 1.07	9.32 9.24
Bio-Rad Labs. 'A'	67.84 490.07	0.70 NA	1.03	11.50	NA NA	21.75	17.80	8.17 17.02	1.07	9.24 NA
Black Knight, Inc.	75.28	NA NA		9.50	6.00	8.00	9.30	8.20		NA NA
Broadridge Fin'l	130.92	2.30	1.76	9.00	NA	7.40	10.00	8.80	1.84	10.64
Cadence Design Sys.	101.91	NA	1.70	10.00	13.70	10.89	13.70	12.07	1.04	NA
CDW Corp.	115.42	1.52	1.32	11.00	13.10	13.10	9.10	11.58	1.40	12.98
Cerner Corp.	70.86	0.72	1.02	9.00	11.90	11.76	11.63	11.07	1.08	12.15
Chemed Corp.	478.46	1.36	0.28	11.50	9.60	9.64	9.65	10.10	0.29	10.39
Cooper Cos.	294.50	0.06	0.02	14.50	11.00	8.45	10.00	10.99	0.02	11.01
Dolby Labs.	67.65	0.88	1.30	9.50	13.00	13.00	16.00	12.88	1.38	14.26
Lauder (Estee)	198.71	1.92	0.97	14.00	12.70	23.54	13.31	15.89	1.05	11.74 (2)
ESCO Technologies	86.09	0.32	0.37	11.00	NA	15.50	15.00	13.83	0.40	14.23
Exponent, Inc.	80.33	0.76	0.95	11.50	NA	15.00	15.00	13.83	1.02	14.85
Forward Air	52.48	0.72	1.37	12.00	NA	NA	13.16	12.58	1.46	14.04
Gentex Corp.	26.66	0.48	1.80	7.00	NA	5.34	15.00	9.11	1.88	10.99
Alphabet Inc.	1,501.48	NA	-	14.50	16.20	15.77	6.09	13.14	-	NA
Hershey Co.	138.24	3.22	2.33	5.00	7.70	7.40	6.78	6.72	2.41	12.57 (2)
Ingredion Inc.	82.79	2.52	3.04	6.00	NA	8.60	1.90	5.50	3.12	13.09 (2)
Hunt (J.B.)	128.78	1.08	0.84	6.50	15.00	13.30	10.09	11.22	0.89	12.11
J&J Snack Foods	128.22	2.30	1.79	6.00	NA	NA	6.00	6.00	1.84	12.01 (2)
St. Joe Corp.	20.51	NA		16.50	NA	NA	(28.10)	16.50		NA
ManTech Int'l 'A'	69.86	1.28	1.83	12.00	7.40	7.36	7.02	8.45	1.91	10.36
McCormick & Co.	189.08	2.48 3.44	1.31 8.30	6.50	5.80	10.13	5.00	6.86	1.35 8.52	11.62 (2)
Altria Group	41.43			6.00	5.00	4.45	6.10	5.39		17.87 (2)
Motorola Solutions Vail Resorts	141.83 195.21	2.56 NA	1.80	9.50 18.00	9.00 NA	8.50 0.24	10.32	9.33 9.12	1.88	11.21 NA
NewMarket Corp.	394.74	7.60	1.93	2.00	NA NA	NA	(10.76) 7.70	4.85	1.98	12.04 (2)
Northrop Grumman	320.76	5.80	1.93	10.50	NA NA	19.56	8.62	12.89	1.93	14.82
PerkinElmer Inc.	109.02	0.28	0.26	12.00	17.40	10.58	16.95	14.23	0.28	10.72 (2)
Pool Corp.	295.69	2.32	0.78	9.00	NA	17.00	17.00	14.33	0.84	11.41 (2)
Rollins, Inc.	48.35	0.32	0.66	12.00	NA	NA NA	8.20	10.10	0.69	10.79
Selective Ins. Group	54.78	0.92	1.68	6.50	NA NA	NA	(2.19)	6.50	1.73	11.94 (2)
Sirius XM Holdings	5.91	0.05	0.90	24.50	15.90	12.87	16.25	17.38	0.98	11.73 (2)
Bio-Techne Corp.	263.79	1.28	0.49	14.00	7.00	10.45	7.00	9.61	0.51	10.12
Tetra Tech	84.54	0.68	0.80	11.00	15.00	15.50	15.00	14.13	0.86	11.43 (2)
Texas Instruments	131.89	3.60	2.73	2.50	9.30	10.00	10.00	7.95	2.84	10.79
AMERCO	323.09	NA	-	7.50	NA	NA	15.00	11.25	-	NA
VeriSign Inc.	207.51	NA	-	9.50	NA	10.30	8.00	9.27	-	NA
West Pharmac. Svcs.	246.96	0.64	0.26	16.00	17.40	14.94	15.00	15.83	0.28	10.75 (2)
					Average Ex	cl. Non-Dividend Payi	ng Companies	10.48	Mean	12.00 %
						d. Non-Dividend Payir		6.91		
1 Standard Deviation Above Mean Excl. Non-Dividend Paying Companies							ng Companies	14.05	Median	11.73 %

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

- (1) The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group. The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of August 31, 2020. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.xacks.com, Bloomberg Professional Services, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.
- (2) The Two Growth Method was applied to Companies with short-term EPS growth rates greater than one standard deviation from the overall non-price regulated comparable risk companies' mean growth rate. The mean of all non-price regulated comparable risk companies with growth rates are within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate was applied as the long-term growth rate for these Companies.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

5.00

5.70

4.10 %

# Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.		Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	4.10 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Proxy Group Bond Rating (2)	(0.20)
3.	Prospective Bond Rating	3.90
4.	Equity Risk Premium (3)	8.78
5	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	12.68 %
Notes:	(1) Average forecast of Baa corporate bonds based upon the consensus of n reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2020 and Septer pages 10-11 of Exhibit_(DWD-1) Schedule 4). The estimates are detailed	nber 1, 2020 (see
	Third Quarter 2020 Fourth Quarter 2020 First Quarter 2021 Second Quarter 2021 Third Quarter 2021 Fourth Quarter 2021	3.50 % 3.60 3.70 3.70 3.80 3.80

(2) To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the non-utility proxy group, the prosepctive yield on Baa corporate bonds must be adjusted downward by 1/3 of the spread between A and Baa corporate bond yields as shown below:

2022-2026

2027-2031

Average

	A Corp.		Baa Corp.			
	<b>Bond Yield</b>		<b>Bond Yield</b>		Spread	
Aug-2020	2.68	%	3.27	%	0.59	%
Jul-2020	2.69		3.31		0.62	
Jun-2020	3.02		3.65		0.63	
	Aver	age y	yield spread		0.61	%
						=
		1,	/3 of spread		0.20	%

(3) From page 6 of this Schedule.

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the
Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the
Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating August 2020

Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating August 2020

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
		2.0		2.0
Apple Inc.	Aa1	2.0	AA+	2.0
Analog Devices	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Assurant Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Amgen	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
Amer. Tower 'A'	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
ANSYS, Inc.	NR		NR	
Smith (A.O.)	NR		NR	
Becton, Dickinson	Ba1	11.0	BBB	9.0
Brown-Forman 'B'	A1	5.0	A-	7.0
Bio-Rad Labs. 'A'	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Black Knight, Inc.	Ba3	13.0	BB	12.0
Broadridge Fin'l	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Cadence Design Sys.	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
CDW Corp.	WR		BB+	11.0
Cerner Corp.	NR		NR	
Chemed Corp.	WR		NR	
Cooper Cos.	WR		NR	
Dolby Labs.	NR		NR	
Lauder (Estee)	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
ESCO Technologies	NR		NR	
Exponent, Inc.	NR		NR	
Forward Air	NR		NR	
Gentex Corp.	NR		NR	
Alphabet Inc.	Aa2	3.0	AA+	2.0
Hershey Co.	A1	5.0	A	6.0
Ingredion Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Hunt (J.B.)	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
J&J Snack Foods	NR		NR	
St. Joe Corp.	NR		NR	
ManTech Int'l 'A'	WR		BB+	11.0
McCormick & Co.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Altria Group	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
Motorola Solutions	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
Vail Resorts	B2	15.0	BB	12.0
NewMarket Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Northrop Grumman	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
PerkinElmer Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Pool Corp.	NR		NR	
Rollins, Inc.	NR		NR NR	
Selective Ins. Group	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Sirius XM Holdings	NR	J.0 	NR	J.U 
Bio-Techne Corp.	NR NR		NR NR	
Tetra Tech	NR NR		NR NR	
Texas Instruments	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
AMERCO	WR	3.0 	NR	3.0 
VeriSign Inc.	Ba1	11.0	BBB-	10.0
West Pharmac. Svcs.	NR		NR	
Average	Baa1	8.3	BBB+	8.3

Notes:

(1) From page 6 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Source of Information:

**Bloomberg Professional Services** 

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

#### Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies</u>

<u>Line No.</u>	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated Companies
I	bbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:	
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	9.39
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.62
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index (4)	11.47
5	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.85
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	10.80
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.65 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.91
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	8.78 %
<b>37</b> .		

#### Notes:

- (1) From note 1 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (2) From note 2 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (3) From note 3 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (4) From note 4 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (5) From note 5 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (6) From note 6 of page 9 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 7 of this Schedule.

#### Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and September 1, 2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

#### Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

[1] [2] [3] [5] [7] [8]

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
Apple Inc.	0.95	1.00	0.98	10.65 %	2.05 %	12.49 %	12.54 %	12.51 %
Analog Devices	0.95	1.03	0.99	10.65	2.05	12.59	12.62	12.61
Assurant Inc.	0.90	1.06	0.98	10.65	2.05	12.49	12.54	12.51
Amgen	0.85	0.80	0.82	10.65	2.05	10.78	11.26	11.02
Amer. Tower 'A'	0.90	0.89	0.89	10.65	2.05	11.53	11.82	11.67
ANSYS, Inc.	0.90	0.96	0.93	10.65	2.05	11.95	12.14	12.05
Smith (A.O.)	0.95	1.02	0.98	10.65	2.05	12.49	12.54	12.51
Becton, Dickinson	0.80	0.68	0.74	10.65	2.05	9.93	10.62	10.28
Brown-Forman 'B'	0.90	0.93	0.92	10.65	2.05	11.85	12.06	11.95
Bio-Rad Labs. 'A'	0.80	0.72	0.76	10.65	2.05	10.14	10.78	10.46
Black Knight, Inc.	0.85	0.86	0.86	10.65	2.05	11.21	11.58	11.39
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.83	0.84	10.65	2.05	10.99	11.42	11.21
Cadence Design Sys.	0.95	0.94	0.94	10.65	2.05	12.06	12.22	12.14
CDW Corp.	0.95	1.29	1.12	10.65	2.05	13.98	13.66	13.82
Cerner Corp.	0.90	0.96	0.93	10.65	2.05	11.95	12.14	12.05
Chemed Corp.	0.85	0.96	0.91	10.65	2.05	11.74	11.98	11.86
Cooper Cos.	0.95	0.94	0.95	10.65	2.05	12.17	12.30	12.23
Dolby Labs.	0.95	0.95	0.95	10.65	2.05	12.17	12.30	12.23
Lauder (Estee)	0.90	0.96	0.93	10.65	2.05	11.95	12.14	12.05
ESCO Technologies	0.95	0.94	0.95	10.65	2.05	12.17	12.30	12.23
Exponent, Inc.	0.85	0.89	0.87	10.65	2.05	11.31	11.66	11.49
Forward Air	0.95	1.11	1.03	10.65	2.05	13.02	12.94	12.98
Gentex Corp.	0.95	0.99	0.97	10.65	2.05	12.38	12.46	12.42
Alphabet Inc.	0.90	0.88	0.89	10.65	2.05	11.53	11.82	11.67
Hershey Co.	0.85	0.77	0.81	10.65	2.05	10.68	11.18	10.93
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.94	0.92	10.65	2.05	11.85	12.06	11.95
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.92	0.94	10.65	2.05	12.06	12.22	12.14
J&J Snack Foods	0.85	0.77	0.81	10.65	2.05	10.68	11.18	10.93
St. Joe Corp.	0.80	0.96	0.88	10.65	2.05	11.42	11.74	11.58
ManTech Int'l 'A'	0.85	1.10	0.98	10.65	2.05	12.49	12.54	12.51
McCormick & Co.	0.85	0.69	0.77	10.65	2.05	10.25	10.86	10.56
Altria Group	0.85	0.84	0.85	10.65	2.05	11.10	11.50	11.30
Motorola Solutions	0.85	0.95	0.90	10.65	2.05	11.63	11.90	11.77
Vail Resorts	0.90	1.16	1.03	10.65	2.05	13.02	12.94	12.98
NewMarket Corp.	0.85	0.59	0.72	10.65	2.05	9.72	10.46	10.09
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.84	0.84	10.65	2.05	10.99	11.42	11.21
PerkinElmer Inc.	1.00	0.92	0.96	10.65	2.05	12.27	12.38	12.33
Pool Corp.	0.90	0.93	0.91	10.65	2.05	11.74	11.98	11.86
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.70	0.77	10.65	2.05	10.25	10.86	10.56
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.93	0.89	10.65	2.05	11.53	11.82	11.67
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	1.13	1.04	10.65	2.05	13.12	13.02	13.07
Bio-Techne Corp.	0.85	0.81	0.83	10.65	2.05	10.89	11.34	11.11
Tetra Tech	0.90	1.01	0.95	10.65	2.05	12.17	12.30	12.23
Texas Instruments	0.85	0.90	0.88	10.65	2.05	11.42	11.74	11.58
AMERCO	0.90	1.03	0.97	10.65	2.05	12.38	12.46	12.42
VeriSign Inc.	0.95	0.84	0.90	10.65	2.05	11.63	11.90	11.77
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.82	0.81	10.65	2.05	10.68	11.18	10.93
Mean			0.90			11.68 %	11.93 %	11.80 %
Median			0.91			11.74 %	11.98 %	11.86 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.91			11.71 %	11.96 %	11.83 %

- otes:
  (1) From note 1 of page 2 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
  (2) From note 2 of page 2 of Exhibit\_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
  (3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

# Ibbotson Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon

[4]	Spread from Applicable Size Premium (4)		0.23%	[0]	Size Premium (Return in	Excess of CAPM)*		-0.28%	0.50%	0.73%	0.79%	1.10%	1.34%	1.47%	1.59%	2.22%	4.99%	
[3]	Applicable Size Premium (3)	0.73%	0.50%	[C]	Market	Capitalization of Largest Company	(millions)	\$ 1,061,355.011	30,542.936	13,100.225	6,614.962	4,311.252	2,685.865	1,668.282	993.847	515.603	229.748	t of Capital Navigator
[2]	Applicable Decile of the NYSE/AMEX/ NASDAQ (2)	8	2	[B]	Market	Capitalization of Smallest Company	( millions )	\$ 31,090.379	13,142.606	6,618.604	4,312.546	2,688.889	1,669.856	993.855	515.621	230.024	1.973	*From 2020 Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator
	on on August 31, (1) (times larger)		1.4 x	[A]		Decile		1	2	3	4	52	9	7	8	6	10	*FI
[1]	Market Capitalization on August 31, 2020 (1) (millions) (times larger)	\$ 10,361.958	\$ 14,143.763					Largest									Smallest	
		Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies															

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5.

Line No.

### Notes:

- From page 2 of this Schedule.
   Gleaned from Columns [B] and [C] on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column [A]) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column [1].
  - (3) Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided in Column [D] on the bottom of this page.
- (4) Line No. 1 Column [3] Line No. 2 Column [3]. For example, the 0.23% in Column [4], Line No. 2 is derived as follows 0.23% = 0.73% 0.50%.

# Market Capitalization of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation and the <u>Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies.</u>

[9]	Market Capitalization on August 31, 2020 (3)		\$ 10,361.958 (6)		\$ 2,789.543	13,267.985	19,479.391	58,915.087	18,996.980	19,800.909	12,061.858	4,531.850	2,788.518	6,377.651	1,560.122	8,254.818	3,479.270	3,410.119	36,442.347		\$ 14,143.763
[2]	Market-to-Book Ratio ( on August ( 31, 2020 (2)		177.7 (5)		125.0 % \$	254.9	241.7	125.8	142.8	193.7	140.7	183.9	136.8	154.1	199.6	152.0	207.3	131.6	275.3		177.7 %
[4]	Glosing Stock Market Price on August 31, 2020	t) NA	Ü		\$ 53.960	54.150	79.110	80.340	52.480	99.140	53.220	89.900	51.640	31.860	38.850	73.350	43.680	38.150	69.475		\$ 60.620
[3]	Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2019 (millions)	5,831.152 (4)			\$ 2,231.900	5,205.100	8,059.000	46,822.000	13,303.000	10,223.675	8,571.900	2,464.628	2,039.094	4,139.500	781.482	5,430.648	1,678.698	2,591.000	13,239.000		8,452.042
[2]	Share at Fiscal Year End 2019 E. (1)	NA			\$ 43.173 \$	21.243	32.729	63.849	36.750	51.188	37.821	48.892	37.762	20.679	19.460	48.255	21.075	28.986	25.239	1	\$ 35.807 \$
[1]	Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2019 (millions)	NA			51.696	245.023	246.232	733.322	361.985	199.727	226.641	50.410	53.999	200.177	40.158	112.540	79.654	89.387	524.539		214.366
	S Exchange	II			NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ		I
	Company	Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation	Based upon Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies	ALLETE, Inc.	Alliant Energy Corporation	Ameren Corporation	Duke Energy Corporation	Edison International	Entergy Corporation	Evergy, Inc.	IDACORP, Inc.	NorthWestern Corporation	OGE Energy Corporation	Otter Tail Corporation	Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	PNM Resources, Inc.	Portland General Electric Co.	Xcel Energy, Inc.		Average

NA= Not Available

Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 2.
(2) Column 4 / Column 2.
(3) Column 1 \* Column 4.
(4) Average rate base for the period 2021 - 2023 multiplied by the requested common equity ratio.
(5) The market-to-book ratio of Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation on August 31, 2020 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies on August 31, 2020 as appropriate.

(6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

Source of Information: 2019 Annual Forms 10K Bloomberg Professional yahoo.finance.com

# Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity Northern States Power Company, a Minnesota Corporation

# Flotation Cost Adjustment

[Column 7]	Flotation Cost Adjustment (7)	0.15 %
[Column 6]	DCF Cost Rate Adjusted for Flotation (6)	8.73 %
[Column 5]	Flotation Cost Percentage (5)	3.76 %
[Column 4]	Average DCF Cost Rate Unadjusted for Flotation (4)	8.58 %
[Column 3]	Adjusted Dividend Yield (3)	3.80 %
[Column 2]	Average Projected EPS Growth Rate (2)	4.78 %
[Column 1]	Average Dividend Yield (1)	3.71 %
		Proxy Group of Fifteen Electric Companies

Notes: (1) Exhibit\_(DWD-1). Schedule 3.
(2) Exhibit\_(DWD-1). Schedule 3.
(3) Column 1 x (1 + 0.5 x Column 2).
(4) Column 2 + Column 3.
(5) Exhibit\_(SWS-1), Schedule 21.
(6) (Column 3 / (1 - Column 5)) + Colurn (7) Column 6 - Column 4.

(Column 3 / (1 - Column 5)) + Column 2.