

Direct Testimony and Schedules

Dylan W. D'Ascendis

Before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission

State of Minnesota

In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company
for Authority to Increase Rates for Natural Gas Service in Minnesota

Docket No. G002/GR-21-678

Exhibit____(DWD-1)

Rate of Return

November 1, 2021

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Purpose	1
II.	Summary	3
III.	General Principles	6
	A. Business Risk	10
	B. Financial Risk	12
IV.	NSP and the Utility Proxy Group	13
V.	Capital Structure	18
VI.	Cost of Long-Term Debt	22
VII.	Common Equity Cost Rate Models	23
	A. Discounted Cash Flow Model	25
	B. The Risk Premium Model	30
	1. Predictive Risk Premium Model	31
	2. Total Market Approach Risk Premium Model	35
	C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model	48
	D. Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM	55
VIII.	Conclusion of Common Equity Cost Analytical Results before Adjustments	59
IX.	Adjustments to the Common Equity Cost Rate	60
	A. Business Risk Adjustment	60
	B. Credit Risk Adjustment	70
	C. Flotation Costs	71
	D. Revenue Decoupling Mechanism	73
X.	Conclusion	75

Schedules

Schedule 1:	Summary of Overall Cost of Capital and Return on Equity
Schedule 2:	Financial Profile of the Company
Schedule 3:	Financial Profile and Cost of Long-Term Debt of the Utility Proxy Group
Schedule 4:	Evaluation of the Company's Proposed Long-Term Debt Cost Rate
Schedule 5:	Application of the Discounted Cash Flow Model
Schedule 6:	Application of the Risk Premium Model
Schedule 7:	Application of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
Schedule 8:	Basis of Selection for the Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group
Schedule 9:	Application of Cost of Common Equity Models to the Non- Price Regulated Proxy Group
Schedule 10:	Derivation of Business Risk Adjustment
Schedule 11:	Company and Utility Proxy Group Capital Expenditures to Net Plant
Schedule 12:	Flotation Cost Adjustment
Schedule 13:	Summary of Adjustment Clauses & Alternative Regulation/Incentive Plans

1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE**

2

3 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND OCCUPATION.**

4 A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am employed by ScottMadden, Inc. as
5 Partner. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 200, Mount Laurel, NJ
6 08054.

7

8 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU SUBMITTING THIS TESTIMONY?**

9 A. I am submitting this direct testimony (referred to throughout as my Direct
10 Testimony) before the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (Commission)
11 on behalf of Northern States Power, a Minnesota corporation (NSP or the
12 Company).

13

14 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE.**

15 A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before
16 over 30 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy
17 Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Alberta Utility Commission, one
18 American Arbitration Association panel, and the Superior Court of Rhode
19 Island on issues including, but not limited to, common equity cost rate, rate of
20 return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and rate design.

21

22 On behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA), I calculate the AGA Gas
23 Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the
24 American Gas Index Fund (AGIF) is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA
25 Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual

1 fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded
2 corporate members of the AGA.

3
4 I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts
5 (SURFA). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation “Certified Rate
6 of Return Analyst” by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and
7 the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination.

8
9 I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts
10 (NACVA) and was awarded the professional designation “Certified Valuation
11 Analyst” by NACVA in 2015.

12
13 I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor
14 of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business
15 Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and
16 International Business from Rutgers University.

17
18 The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances are
19 shown in Appendix A.

20
21 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

22 A. The purpose of my testimony is to present evidence on behalf of the Company
23 and recommend an appropriate return on common equity (ROE) on the
24 Company’s Minnesota jurisdictional rate base.

1 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED AN EXHIBIT IN SUPPORT OF YOUR**
2 **RECOMMENDATION?**

3 A. Yes. I have prepared Exhibit__(DWD-1), which contains Schedules 1 through
4 12, and was prepared by me or under my direction.
5

6 **II. SUMMARY**
7

8 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE.**

9 A. My recommended ROE of 10.50% is summarized on Exhibit__(DWD-1),
10 Schedule 1. In determining my recommendation, I assessed the market-based
11 common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily
12 identical, risk to the Company. Using companies of relatively comparable risk
13 as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in
14 the *Hope*¹ and *Bluefield*² decisions, which I discuss further in Section III, below.
15 Of course, no proxy group can be identical in risk to any single company.
16 Consequently, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between the
17 Company and the proxy group to determine if it is appropriate to adjust the
18 proxy group's indicated rate of return.
19

20 My recommendation results from applying and considering several cost of
21 common equity models, specifically the Constant Growth Discounted Cash
22 Flow (DCF) model, the Risk Premium Model (RPM), and the Capital Asset
23 Pricing Model (CAPM), to the market data of the Utility Proxy Group whose
24 selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied these same

1 *Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (*Hope*).

2 *Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n*, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) (*Bluefield*).

models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. The results derived from these analyses are as follows:

Table 1
Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates³

Discounted Cash Flow Model	9.59%
Risk Premium Model	10.45%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	12.01%
Cost of Equity Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies	<u>12.81%</u>
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments	<u>10.20% - 12.20%</u>
Business Risk Adjustment	0.15%
Credit Risk Adjustment	-0.04%
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.12%
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	<u>10.43% - 12.43%</u>
Recommended Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.50%</u>

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between 10.20% and 12.20% before any Company-specific adjustments.⁴ I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by 0.15% to reflect the Company's greater relative business risk and downward by 0.04% to account for a less risky bond rating, as compared to the Utility Proxy Group. I also adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by 0.12%

³ See, Section VII for a detailed discussion regarding the application of my cost of common equity models.

⁴ The indicated range is equal to 100 basis points above and below the midpoint of my four model results.

1 to account for flotation costs.⁵ These adjustments resulted in a Company-
2 specific indicated range of common equity cost rates between 10.43% and
3 12.43%. I recommend an ROE for the Company toward the lower end of my
4 Company-specific range, specifically 10.50%.

5
6 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE.**

7 A. The Company is proposing a capital structure including 52.50% common
8 equity, 46.89% long-term debt, and 0.61% short-term debt. That capital
9 structure is consistent with the Company's historical capital structures, the
10 capital structures of the Utility Proxy Group, and the operating subsidiary
11 companies of the Utility Proxy Group.

12
13 **Q. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?**

14 A. The remainder of my Direct Testimony is organized as follows:

- 15 • *Section III* – Provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles
16 pertinent to the development of the Cost of Capital;
- 17 • *Section IV* – Explains my selection of the Utility Proxy Group used to develop
18 my analytical results;
- 19 • *Section V* – Explains the proposed capital structure;
- 20 • *Section VI* – Discusses the reasonability of the Company's proposed long-term
21 debt cost rate;
- 22 • *Section VII* – Describes the analyses on which my recommendation is based;
- 23 • *Section VIII* – Summarizes my common equity cost rate before adjustments to
24 reflect Company-specific factors;

5 ⁵ See, Section IX for a detailed discussion of my cost of common equity adjustments.

- *Section IX* – Explains my adjustments to my common equity cost rate to reflect the Company-specific factors; and
- *Section X* – Presents my conclusions.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Q. WHAT PRINCIPLES HAVE YOU CONSIDERED IN ARRIVING AT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS?

A. In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal determinant of the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times, requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the previously cited *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in *Hope*, when it stated:

The rate-making process under the Act, *i.e.*, the fixing of ‘just and reasonable’ rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that ‘regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.’

1 315 U.S. at page 590, 62 S.Ct. at page 745. But such considerations aside,
2 the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of
3 the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor or
4 company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not
5 only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.
6 These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago
7 & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 346 12 S.Ct.
8 400,402. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
9 commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having
10 corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
11 confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
12 credit and to attract capital.⁶

13 In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to
14 attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while
15 maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with
16 established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the
17 returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. The
18 Commission's decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide the
19 Company with the opportunity to earn a return that is: (1) adequate to attract
20 capital at reasonable cost and terms; (2) sufficient to ensure its financial integrity;
21 and (3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises having
22 corresponding risks.

6 *Hope*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), at 603.

1 Lastly, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a stand-
2 alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case. Parent
3 entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at the
4 attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment
5 alternative in their capital budgeting process. That is, utility holding companies
6 that own many utility operating companies have choices as to where they will
7 invest their capital within the holding company family. Therefore, the
8 opportunity cost concept applies regardless of whether the funding source is
9 public or corporate.

10
11 When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient
12 to provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business
13 unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the
14 regulated subsidiary must compete for capital with all the parent company's
15 affiliates, and with other similar risk companies, which may include non-utilities.
16 In that regard, investors value corporate entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and
17 expect each division within the parent company to provide an appropriate risk-
18 adjusted return.

19
20 It therefore is important that the authorized ROE for the Company reflects the
21 risks and prospects of its operations and supports its financial integrity from a
22 stand-alone perspective.

23
24 **Q. WITHIN THAT BROAD FRAMEWORK, HOW IS THE COST OF CAPITAL**
25 **ESTIMATED IN REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS?**

26 A. Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance

1 their permanent property, plant, and equipment (*i.e.*, rate base). The fair rate of
2 return for a regulated utility is based on its weighted average cost of capital
3 (WACC), in which, as noted earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital
4 are weighted by their respective book values.

5
6 The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a
7 firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they *expect* is
8 equal to, or greater than, the return that they *require* to accept the risk of
9 providing funds to the firm.

10
11 The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is
12 based on the economic principle of “opportunity costs.” The principle of
13 opportunity costs recognizes that investing in any asset (whether debt or equity
14 securities) represents a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For
15 any investment to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the
16 return expected on alternative investment opportunities with comparable risks.
17 Because investments with like risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity
18 cost of an investment should equal the return available on an investment of
19 comparable risk.

20
21 The cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed as the
22 interest rate or yield on debt securities. However, the cost of equity must be
23 estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the cost
24 of equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models used to determine it are
25 typically applied to a group of “comparable” or “proxy” companies.

1 In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors
2 require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the
3 returns available on comparable investments.

4
5 **A. Business Risk**

6 **Q. PLEASE DEFINE BUSINESS RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT FOR**
7 **DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.**

8 A. The investor-required return on common equity reflects investors' assessment
9 of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often
10 discussed in the context of business and financial risk.

11
12 Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's
13 common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock
14 financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and
15 financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned
16 return on common equity, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

17
18 Examples of business risks generally faced by utilities include, but are not
19 limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance
20 requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory
21 economic growth, market demand, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree
22 of operating leverage, emerging technologies including distributed energy
23 resources, the vagaries of weather, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing
24 on earnings.

1 Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks
2 individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly
3 distinct from one another. When determining an appropriate return on
4 common equity, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company
5 in relation to other similarly situated utility companies (i.e., the Utility Proxy
6 Group). To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher
7 risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

8
9 For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in nature.
10 Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in
11 earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-
12 term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to
13 obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital. Moreover,
14 because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate, and reliable
15 service at all times (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return
16 on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or
17 reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive,
18 utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds. The
19 obligation to serve and the corresponding need to access capital is even more
20 acute during periods of capital market distress.

21
22 Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of
23 paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the
24 return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature
25 of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently,
26 those risks and their implications for the required return on equity tend to be

difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required return on common equity.

B. Financial Risk

Q. PLEASE DEFINE FINANCIAL RISK AND EXPLAIN WHY IT IS IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING A FAIR RATE OF RETURN.

A. Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (*i.e.*, failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Therefore, consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors require higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.

Q. CAN BOND AND CREDIT RATINGS BE A PROXY FOR A FIRM'S COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS (I.E., TOTAL INVESTMENT RISK)?

A. Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar combined business and financial risks (*i.e.*, total investment risk) faced by bond investors.⁷ Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined

⁷ Risk distinctions within Standard and Poor's (S&P) bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, e.g., within the A category, an S&P rating can be an A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinction for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

1 risks are roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these
2 debtholder risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity.

4 IV. NSP AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

5
6 **Q. WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A PROXY GROUP WHEN ESTIMATING**
7 **THE ROE FOR THE COMPANY?**

8 A. Because the Company is not publicly traded and does not have publicly traded
9 equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded,
10 comparable companies to serve as “proxies” for the Company. In addition to
11 the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent
12 with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have
13 selected two proxy groups that, in my view, are fundamentally risk-comparable
14 to the Company: A Utility Proxy Group and a Non-Price Regulated Proxy
15 Group, which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group.⁸

16
17 Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical
18 results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure
19 comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations
20 regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It
21 therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range,
22 even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how to estimate
23 the ROE from within that range. That determination will be best informed by
24 employing a variety of sound analyses and necessarily must consider the sort of

8 The development of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is explained in more detail in Section VII.

1 quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my Direct
2 Testimony. Additionally, a relative risk analysis between the Company and the
3 Utility Proxy Group must be made to determine whether or not explicit
4 Company-specific adjustments need to be made to the Utility Proxy Group
5 indicated results.

6
7 My analyses are based on the Utility Proxy Group, containing U.S. natural gas
8 utilities. As discussed earlier, utilities must compete for capital with other
9 companies with commensurate risk (including non-utilities) and, to do so, must
10 be provided the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. Consequently,
11 it is appropriate to consider the Utility Proxy Group's market data in
12 determining the Company's ROE.

13
14 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S OPERATIONS.**

15 A. NSP is a vertically integrated electric and natural gas utility that provides electric
16 generation, transmission, and distribution service, as well as natural gas
17 distribution service to approximately 1,500,000 retail electric customers and
18 600,000 natural gas customers in North Dakota, Minnesota, and South Dakota.⁹
19 The operations that are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction provides
20 natural gas service to approximately 475,000 retail customers in Minnesota.¹⁰
21 The Company has long-term issuer ratings of A2 from Moody's Investor
22 Services (Moody's) and A- from Standard & Poor's (S&P).¹¹ The Company is

9 Xcel Energy, SEC Form 10-K at 9 (Dec. 31, 2021).

10 Company provided data.

11 Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

1 not publicly-traded as it is an operating subsidiary of Xcel Energy Inc. (XEI or
2 the Parent). XEI is publicly-traded under ticker symbol XEL.

3
4 Page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative capitalization
5 and financial statistics for the Company for the years 2016 to 2020.¹² During
6 the five-year period ending 2020, the historically achieved average earnings rate
7 on book common equity for the Company averaged 9.15%. The average
8 common equity ratio based on total capital (including short-term debt) was
9 52.36%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 86.42%.

10
11 Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for
12 the years 2016 to 2020 ranges between 3.09 and 3.69 times, with an average of
13 3.38 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 15.52% to 31.94%,
14 with an average of 22.67%.¹³

15
16 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CHOSE THE COMPANIES IN THE UTILITY**
17 **PROXY GROUP.**

18 A. Because the Cost of Equity is a comparative exercise, my objective in
19 developing a proxy group was to select companies that are comparable to the
20 Company. Because the Company is a 100% rate regulated natural gas utility, I
21 applied the following criteria to select my Utility Proxy Group:

- 22 (i) They were included in the Natural Gas Utility Group of *Value Line*
23 *Investment Survey* (Standard Edition)(*Value Line*);

12 Source: Company audited financial statements per the as-filed Form 10-Ks.

13 Source: Company audited financial statements per the as filed Form 10-Ks.

- (ii) They have 60% or greater of fiscal year 2020 total operating income derived from, and 60% or greater of fiscal year 2020 total assets attributable to, regulated natural gas distribution operations;
- (iii) At the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (*i.e.*, one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another) or any other major development;
- (iv) They have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years ending 2020 or through the time of preparation of this testimony;
- (v) They have *Value Line* and Bloomberg Professional Services (Bloomberg) adjusted Betas;
- (vi) They have positive *Value Line* five-year dividends per share (DPS) growth rate projections; and
- (vii) They have *Value Line*, Zacks, or Yahoo! Finance consensus five-year earnings per share (EPS) growth rate projections.

The following seven companies met these criteria:

TABLE 2
Utility Proxy Group Companies

Company Name	Ticker Symbol
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NJR
Northwest Natural Holding Company	NWN
ONE Gas, Inc.	OGS
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	SJI
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	SWX
Spire Inc.	SR

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP'S HISTORICAL**
2 **CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS.**

3 A. Page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 3 contains comparative capitalization
4 and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group for the years 2016 to 2020.

5
6 During the five-year period ending 2020, the historically achieved average
7 earnings rate on book common equity for the group averaged 8.97%, the
8 average common equity ratio based on total capital (including short-term debt)
9 was 47.69% , and the average dividend payout ratio was 64.57%.

10
11 Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization for
12 the years 2016 to 2020 ranges between 4.00 and 7.72 times, with an average of
13 5.61 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 13.18% to 23.75%,
14 with an average of 17.96%. Given that those capitalization and financial
15 statistics are generally consistent with the Company's, I conclude the Utility
16 Proxy Group is comparable in risk to the Company.

17
18 **Q. DO ANY OF THE COMPANIES IN YOUR UTILITY PROXY GROUP OPERATE IN**
19 **MINNESOTA?**

20 A. No, they do not. None of the natural gas distribution utilities that operate in
21 Minnesota met the screening criteria described above. In addition, investors are
22 not limited to investing in one state or one part of the country. As such,
23 although I did not specifically exclude companies with natural gas operations in
24 Minnesota, I did not include any in my Utility Proxy Group.

1 **V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

2

3 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPONENTS OF THE COMPANY’S**
4 **RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND WACC.**

5 A. The Company’s proposed 2022 test year capital structure includes long-term
6 debt, short-term debt, and common equity. The Company’s proposed revenue
7 requirement for the test year reflects a WACC of 7.46%.¹⁴

8

9 Q. DOES THE COMPANY HAVE A SEPARATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAT IS
10 RECOGNIZED BY INVESTORS?

11 A. Yes. The Company is a separate corporate entity that has its own capital
12 structure and issues its own debt with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
13 That being said, the Minnesota jurisdictional operations’ capital structure is an
14 allocated portion of the Company’s capital structure.

15

16 **Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE COMPANY’S RECOMMENDED CAPITAL**
17 **STRUCTURE BE AUTHORIZED IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

18 A. As a preliminary matter, the Company’s recommended capital structure is
19 comparable to its historical capital structure, and is within a reasonable range
20 from the perspective of the Utility Proxy Group companies.¹⁵ The use of an
21 operating subsidiary’s capital structure is consistent with the FERC’s precedent,
22 under which they use the applicant’s capital structure, where possible.¹⁶ In
23 particular, the FERC will use the utility operating company’s capital structure if

14 See, Direct Testimony of Paul A. Johnson.

15 Exhibit __ (DWD-1), Schedules 2 and 3, respectively.

16 See, *Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp*, 80 FERC ¶ 61,157, 61,657 (1997) (Opinion No. 414).

1 it meets three criteria: (1) it issues its own debt without guarantees; (2) it has its
2 own bond rating; and (3) it has a capital structure within the range of capital
3 structures approved by the commission.¹⁷ The Company meets all of these
4 criteria.

5
6 Importantly, in order to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service to its
7 customers, the Company must meet the needs and serve the interests of its
8 various stakeholders, including customers, shareholders, and bondholders. The
9 interests of these stakeholder groups are aligned when the Company maintains
10 a healthy balance sheet, strong credit ratings, and a supportive regulatory
11 environment, ensuring it has access to capital on reasonable terms in order to
12 make necessary investments.

13
14 Safe and reliable service cannot be maintained at a reasonable cost if utilities do
15 not have the financial flexibility and strength to access competitive financing
16 markets on reasonable terms. The authorization of a capital structure that
17 understates the Company's actual common equity will weaken the financial
18 condition of its operations and adversely impact the Company's ability to
19 address expenses and investment, to the detriment of customers and
20 shareholders. Safe and reliable service for customers cannot be sustained over
21 the long term if the interests of shareholders and bondholders are minimized
22 such that the public interest is not optimized.

17 148 FERC ¶ 61,049 Docket No. EL14-12-000, at 190.

1 Consequently, the Company's recommended capital structure should be used
2 to set rates in this proceeding.

3
4 Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY'S REQUESTED TEST YEAR CAPITAL STRUCTURE
5 COMPARE WITH ITS RECENT CAPITAL STRUCTURES?

6 A. The requested test year capital structure is highly consistent with NSP's
7 historical capital structures. As shown on Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 2, the
8 common equity ratios for years 2016 through 2020 range from 52.08% to
9 52.67%, averaging 52.36%.

10
11 **Q. HOW DOES NSP'S RECOMMENDED COMMON EQUITY RATIO OF 52.50%**
12 **COMPARE WITH THE COMMON EQUITY RATIOS MAINTAINED BY THE**
13 **UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

14 A. The Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio of 52.50% is
15 reasonable and consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained
16 by the Utility Proxy Group. In order to assess the reasonableness of the
17 Company's requested ratemaking common equity ratio, I reviewed the actual
18 common equity ratios maintained by the companies within the Utility Proxy
19 Group.¹⁸ As shown on page 2 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 3, common
20 equity ratios of the utilities range from 32.16% to 59.98% for fiscal year 2020.
21 The Company's recommended equity ratio of 52.50% falls within this range and
22 demonstrates both the reasonableness of using it to set rates and the Company's
23 relative financial health. Setting the WACC as requested by the Company will

18 The development of the Utility Proxy Group is described more fully in Section VI.

1 continue to support the long-term financial health of the Company for the
2 benefit of all of its stakeholders, including Minnesota customers.

3
4 I also considered *Value Line's* projected capital structures for the Utility Proxy
5 Group for 2024-2026. That analysis shows a range of projected common equity
6 ratios between 38.50% and 60.00%.¹⁹

7
8 In addition to comparing the Company's ratemaking common equity ratio with
9 common equity ratios currently and expected to be maintained by the Utility
10 Proxy Group (*i.e.*, at the holding company level), I also compared the
11 Company's ratemaking common equity ratio with the equity ratios maintained
12 by the operating subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group companies. As shown
13 on page 3 of Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 3, common equity ratios of the
14 operating utility subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group range from 40.43% to
15 58.75% for fiscal year 2020.

16
17 Q. Is the Company's proposed equity ratio of 52.50% appropriate for ratemaking
18 purposes given the range of the Utility Proxy Group?

19 A. Yes, it is. The Company's proposed equity ratio of 52.50% is appropriate for
20 ratemaking purposes in the current proceeding because it aligns with its
21 historical capital structure and it is well within industry norms.

19 Exhibit__(DWD-1), Schedule 5, at 3-9.

1 **VI. COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT**

2

3 **Q. HOW IS THE COMPANY PROPOSING TO SET ITS COST OF LONG-TERM**
4 **DEBT?**

5 A. The Company is proposing to use its expected cost of long-term debt for the
6 test year.

7

8 **Q. HOW WAS THE PROPOSED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT DETERMINED?**

9 A. The overall 4.13% cost of long-term debt for the test year includes the actual
10 and forecasted coupon rate on all bonds expected to be outstanding for each
11 month of the test year. In addition to the interest expense, the cost of long-
12 term debt also includes actual amortization expense for debt issuance costs,
13 discounts or premiums, losses on reacquired debt, gains and losses from
14 hedging transactions, and the annual amortization of the upfront fees associated
15 with the Company's multi-year credit agreement.²⁰

16

17 **Q. HAVE YOU ANALYZED THE COMPANY'S COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT FOR**
18 **REASONABLENESS?**

19 A. Yes, I have. To test the reasonableness of the Company's proposed long-term
20 debt cost, I reviewed the yield on equivalent debt at the time of issuance. As
21 shown in Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 4, I compared the cost of each
22 individual issuance to the Bloomberg Fair Value Curves for A-rated and BBB-
23 rated utility debt at the time of the issuance. The expected cost of long-term
24 debt based on the Bloomberg Fair Value Curves for A-rated and BBB-rated

20 See Direct Testimony of Paul A. Johnson.

1 utility debt ranges from 4.20% to 4.58%, respectively, indicating that the
2 Company's 4.13% proposed cost of long-term debt is reasonable.

3 4 **VII. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS**

5 **Q. IS IT IMPORTANT THAT COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS BE MARKET-**
6 **BASED?**

7 A. Yes. As discussed previously, regulated public utilities, like the Company, must
8 compete for equity in capital markets along with all other companies with
9 commensurate risk, including non-utilities. The cost of common equity is thus
10 determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those
11 companies. If an individual investor is choosing to invest their capital among
12 companies with comparable risk, they will choose the company providing a
13 higher return over a company providing a lower return.

14
15 **Q. ARE THE COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS YOU USE MARKET-BASED**
16 **MODELS?**

17 A. Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are used in
18 developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM and CAPM
19 are also market-based in that the bond/issuer ratings and expected bond
20 yields/risk-free rate used in the application of the RPM and CAPM reflect the
21 market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of the Beta
22 coefficient to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's
23 assessment of market/systematic risk, as Beta coefficients are derived from
24 regression analyses of market prices. Moreover, market prices are used in the
25 development of the monthly returns and equity risk premiums used in the

1 Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM). Selection criteria for the Non-Price
2 Regulated Proxy Group are based on regression analyses of market prices and
3 reflect the market's assessment of total risk.
4

5 **Q. WHAT ANALYTICAL APPROACHES DID YOU USE TO DETERMINE THE**
6 **COMPANY'S ROE?**

7 A. As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM,
8 which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these
9 same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this
10 section.
11

12 I rely on multiple models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and
13 do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model.
14 Moreover, the specific models on which I rely focus on different aspects of
15 return requirements, and provide different insights into investors' views of risk
16 and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required
17 return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in
18 perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (*i.e.*, the RPM and CAPM
19 approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market
20 returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the Cost of Equity. Just
21 as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability
22 necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common
23 equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate
24 models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended
25 common equity cost rate.

1 **A. Discounted Cash Flow Model**

2 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL GENERALLY.**

3 A. The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected
4 future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be
5 determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the
6 investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock
7 for an expected total return rate, which is derived from the cash flows received
8 from dividends and market price appreciation. Mathematically, the expected
9 dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate;
10 *i.e.*, the total common equity return rate expected by investors, as shown in
11 Equation [1] below:

12
13
$$K_e = (D_0 (1+g))/P + g$$

14 where:

15 K_e = the required Return on Equity;

16 D_0 = the annualized Dividend Per Share;

17 P = the current stock price; and

18 g = the growth rate.
19

20 **Q. WHICH VERSION OF THE DCF MODEL DID YOU USE?**

21 A. I used the single-stage constant growth DCF model and the two growth DCF
22 model in my analyses.

1 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DIVIDEND YIELD YOU USED IN APPLYING THE**
2 **CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

3 A. The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as
4 of August 31, 2021 divided by the average closing market price for the 60
5 trading days ended August 31, 2021.²¹

6
7 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ADJUSTMENT TO THE DIVIDEND YIELD.**

8 A. Because dividends are paid periodically (*e.g.* quarterly), as opposed to
9 continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is
10 often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF
11 model.

12
13 DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or D_1 , in calculating the model's
14 dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group
15 increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a conservative
16 assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate rather than
17 the full growth rate in the dividend yield component, or $D_{1/2}$. Because the
18 dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, this adjustment
19 is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore,
20 the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1),
21 Schedule 5 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected
22 growth rate shown in Column 6.

21 ²¹ See, Column 1, page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 5.

1 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR THE GROWTH RATES YOU APPLY IN YOUR**
2 **CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

3 A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to
4 rely on widely available financial information services, such as *Value Line*, Zacks,
5 and Yahoo! Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into
6 the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as
7 companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and
8 regulations, and ever-changing economic and market conditions. For these
9 reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis.

10
11 Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS.
12 Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on
13 market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using projected earnings
14 growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors'
15 market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the
16 DCF.

17
18 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS.**

19 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 5, the application of the
20 Constant Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group results in a wide range
21 of indicated ROEs from 8.46% to 12.09%. The mean of those results is 9.87%,
22 the median result is 9.39%, and the average of the mean and median results is
23 9.63%. In arriving at a conclusion of the indicated common equity cost rate for
24 the Utility Proxy Group implied by the Constant Growth DCF model, I relied
25 on an average of the mean and the median results (*i.e.*, 9.63%) of the DCF. By

1 doing so, I have considered the DCF results for each company without giving
2 undue weight to outliers on either the high or the low side.

3
4 **Q. DID YOU CONSIDER ANY OTHER CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL**
5 **RESULTS?**

6 A. No, I did not. However, consistent with the Department's past practice of
7 considering proxy groups which exclude companies whose DCF results do not
8 pass the test of reasonableness,²² I attempted to calculate the average and
9 median result of the constant growth DCF model excluding proxy companies
10 with results below 7.00%.²³ Based on the results presented in
11 Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 5, there were no results below 7.00%.

12
13 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR USE OF THE TWO GROWTH DCF APPROACH IN**
14 **YOUR ANALYSES.**

15 A. I also considered the results of the two growth DCF approach, which moderates
16 the effects of substantially high or low growth rate estimates that may be
17 influenced by near-term events and may not reflect the subject company's
18 expected long-term growth rate. The two growth DCF approach therefore may
19 be applied when the mean growth rate of a particular company is considered
20 unusually high or low relative to the proxy group. Whereas the constant growth
21 DCF method assumes a single, constant growth rate in perpetuity, the two
22 growth DCF approach allows for a near-term growth estimate (the first stage)
23 followed by a long-term "terminal" period growth estimate. This approach is

22 See, for example, Docket No. E017/GR-15-1033, In the Matter of the Application of Otter Tail
Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota,
August 16, 2016, at 11.

23 See, Column 8, page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 5.

1 consistent with the method adopted by the Commission in several prior
2 proceedings. In this case, I applied the two growth DCF approach to two Utility
3 Proxy Group companies with mean growth rates greater than one standard
4 deviation from the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate.

5
6 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF THE GROWTH RATES YOU APPLY IN YOUR**
7 **TWO GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

8 A. If the proxy group company's growth rate fell within the one standard deviation
9 of the mean growth rate of the Utility Proxy Group, that company would have
10 the same growth rate and same indicated ROE in both the constant growth and
11 two growth DCF models. If the company's growth rate fell outside of one
12 standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate, I applied those
13 growth rates only to the first five years of the two growth DCF analysis. For
14 the second stage (that is, the terminal period of the two growth DCF analysis),
15 I used the mean growth rate of all Utility Proxy Group companies with growth
16 rates within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate.

17
18 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE TWO GROWTH DCF MODEL RESULTS.**

19 A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 5, for the Utility Proxy
20 Group, the mean result of applying the two growth DCF model is 9.77%, the
21 median result is 9.32%, and the average of the two is 9.55%. In arriving at a
22 conclusion for the two growth DCF-indicated common equity cost rate for the
23 Utility Proxy Group, I relied on an average of the mean and the median results
24 of the DCF.

1 **B. The Risk Premium Model**

2 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE RPM.**

3 A. The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return;
4 namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM
5 recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt
6 capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on
7 a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns
8 from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for bearing the
9 additional risk.

10
11 While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors'
12 required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed.
13 According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium
14 over bonds (either historically or prospectively), and use that premium to derive
15 a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected
16 cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to
17 compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and
18 last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings upon
19 liquidation.

20
21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DERIVED YOUR INDICATED COST OF COMMON**
22 **EQUITY BASED ON THE RPM.**

23 A. To derive my indicated cost of common equity under the RPM, I used two risk
24 premium methods. The first method was the PRPM and the second method
25 was a risk premium model using a total market approach. The PRPM estimates

1 the risk-return relationship directly, while the total market approach indirectly
2 derives a risk premium by using known metrics as a proxy for risk.

3
4 ***1. Predictive Risk Premium Model***

5 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PRPM.**

6 A. The PRPM, published in the *Journal of Regulatory Economics*,²⁴ was developed from
7 the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2003
8 “for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility” or
9 ARCH.²⁵ Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one
10 period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that
11 volatility of prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly
12 predictable and can be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums.
13 That is, historical volatility can be used to predict future volatility, which then
14 can be translated to a predicted equity risk premium.

15
16 The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity
17 risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not
18 based on an estimate of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of the
19 results of that behavior (*i.e.*, the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

20
21 The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of
22 each Utility Proxy Group company minus the historical monthly yield on long-
23 term U.S. Treasury securities through August 2021. Using a generalized form

24 Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. *A New Approach for Estimating
the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities*, The Journal of Regulatory Economics (December 2011),
40:261-278.

25 Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; *See also*, www.nobelprize.org.

1 of ARCH, known as GARCH, I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's
2 projected equity risk premium using Eviews[®] statistical software. When the
3 GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted
4 GARCH variance series²⁶ and a GARCH coefficient.²⁷ Multiplying the
5 predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing it²⁸
6 produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted
7 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield of 2.70%²⁹ to each company's PRPM-derived
8 equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30-
9 year U.S. Treasury bond yield is a consensus forecast derived from *Blue Chip*
10 *Financial Services (Blue Chip)*.³⁰ The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost
11 rate for the Utility Proxy Group is 10.44%, the median is 10.48%, and the
12 average of the two is 10.46%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of
13 the median and mean results of the DCF models, I relied on the average of the
14 mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost
15 of common equity rate of 10.46%.

16
17 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.**

18 A. As shown in Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedules 6 and 7, the risk-free rate adopted
19 for applications of the RPM and CAPM is 2.70%. This risk-free rate is based
20 on the average of the *Blue Chip* consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-
21 year U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar

26 Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2, page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

27 Illustrated on Column 4, page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

28 Annualized Return = $(1 + \text{Monthly Return})^{12} - 1$

29 See, Column 6, page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

30 *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (Blue Chip)*, September 1, 2021 at 2, and June 1, 2021 at 14.

1 quarter of 2022, and long-term projections for the years 2023 to 2027 and 2028
2 to 2023.

3
4 **Q. WHY DO YOU USE THE PROJECTED 30-YEAR TREASURY YIELD IN YOUR**
5 **ANALYSES?**

6 A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term is
7 consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the
8 yields on Moody's A-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment
9 horizon inherent in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the
10 jurisdictional rate base to which the allowed fair rate of return (*i.e.*, cost of
11 capital) will be applied. In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more
12 volatile and largely a function of Federal Reserve monetary policy.

13
14 More specifically, the term of the risk-free rate used for cost of capital purposes
15 should match the life (or duration) of the underlying investment (*i.e.*, perpetuity).
16 As noted by Morningstar:

17
18 The traditional thinking regarding the time horizon of the chosen
19 Treasury security is that it should match the time horizon of whatever is
20 being valued. When valuing a business that is being treated as a going
21 concern, the appropriate Treasury yield should be that of a long-term
22 Treasury bond. Note that the horizon is a function of the investment,
23 not the investor. If an investor plans to hold stock in a company for only

1 five years, the yield on a five-year Treasury note would not be appropriate
2 since the company will continue to exist beyond those five years.³¹

3
4 Morin also confirms this when he states:

5
6 [b]ecause common stock is a long-term investment and because the cash
7 flows to investors in the form of dividends last indefinitely, the yield on
8 very long-term government bonds, namely, the yield on 30-year Treasury
9 bonds, is the best measure of the risk-free rate for use in the CAPM
10 (footnote omitted)... The expected common stock return is based on
11 long-term cash flows, regardless of an individual's holding time period.³²

12
13 Pratt and Grabowski recommend a similar approach to selecting the risk-free
14 rate: “[i]n theory, when determining the risk-free rate and the matching ERP
15 you should be matching the risk-free security and the ERP with the period in
16 which the investment cash flows are expected.”³³

17
18 As a practical matter, equity securities represent a perpetual claim on cash flows;
19 30-year Treasury bonds are the longest-maturity securities available to
20 approximate that perpetual claim. Thus, the use of a 30-year Treasury bond
21 yield is a more appropriate risk-free rate as it more accurately reflects the life of
22 the assets it finances.

31 Morningstar, Inc., 2013 Ibbotson Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook, at 44.

32 Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, at 151. (Morin)

33 Shannon Pratt and Roger Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples, 3rd Ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), at 92. “ERP” is the Equity Risk Premium.

1 2. *Total Market Approach Risk Premium Model*

2 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM.**

3 A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to
4 an average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a Beta-adjusted
5 total market equity risk premium, 2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P
6 Utilities Index, and 3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for
7 natural gas utilities.

8
9 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DETERMINED THE EXPECTED BOND YIELD,**
10 **APPLICABLE TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP.**

11 A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the
12 expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including
13 the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on
14 similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. Because I am unaware of any
15 publication that provides forecasted public utility bond yields, I relied on a
16 consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-rated
17 corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the fourth calendar
18 quarter of 2022, and *Blue Chip's* long-term projections for 2023 to 2027, and
19 2028 to 2032. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6,
20 the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 3.41%.

21
22 Because that 3.41% estimate represents a corporate bond yield and not a utility
23 specific bond yield, I adjusted the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to
24 an equivalent A2-rated public utility bond yield. That resulted in an upward
25 adjustment of 0.38%, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-rated

1 corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds.³⁴ Adding that recent 0.38%
2 spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 3.41% results in an
3 expected A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.79%.

4
5 I then reviewed the average credit rating for the Utility Proxy Group from
6 Moody's to determine if an adjustment to the estimated A2-rated public utility
7 bond was necessary. Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-
8 term issuer rating is A2/A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public
9 utility bond is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward
10 adjustment of 0.04%, which represents one-sixth of a recent spread between
11 A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2
12 prospective bond yield applicable to an A2/A3-rated public utility bond.³⁵
13 Adding the 0.04% to the 3.79% prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield
14 results in a 3.83% expected bond yield applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

34 As shown on line 2 and explained in note 2, page 3 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

35 As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A2/A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-sixth of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

Table 3
Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group
Projected Bond Yield³⁶

Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds (<i>Blue Chip</i>)	3.41%
Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds	0.38%
Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A2/A3	<u>0.04%</u>
Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	<u>3.83%</u>

To develop the total market approach RPM estimate of the appropriate return on equity, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums, which I now discuss, in turn.

a. Beta Coefficient Derived Equity Risk Premium

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE BETA-DERIVED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM IS DETERMINED.

A. The components of the Beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) the Beta coefficient. The derivation of the Beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is shown on lines 1 through 9, page 8 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6. The total Beta-derived equity risk premium I applied is based

³⁶ As shown on page 3 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

on an average of three historical market data-based equity risk premiums, two *Value Line*-based equity risk premiums and a Bloomberg-based equity risk premium. Each of these is described below.

Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE A MARKET EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON LONG-TERM HISTORICAL DATA?

A. To derive a historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI) Yearbook 2021 (SBBI - 2021)³⁷ less the average historical yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2020. Using holding period returns over a very long time is appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going concern, *i.e.*, a company expected to operate in perpetuity.

SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large company common stocks was 11.94% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds was 6.02%.³⁸ As shown on line 1, page 8 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6, subtracting the mean monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 5.92%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa corporate bonds,

³⁷ See, SBBI-2021 Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, & Inflation 1926-2020.
³⁸ As explained in note 1, page 9 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as
2 noted in SBBI-2021.³⁹ Using the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is
3 appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide
4 insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors
5 in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied
6 on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no
7 insight into the potential variance of future returns, because the geometric mean
8 relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby
9 obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk
10 analysis.

11
12 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE REGRESSION-BASED MARKET**
13 **EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.**

14 A. To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of 8.87% shown on
15 line 2, page 8 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6, I used the same monthly
16 annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the
17 monthly annualized yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds as
18 mentioned above. I modeled the relationship between interest rates and the
19 market equity risk premium using the observed monthly market equity risk
20 premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa-
21 rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I then used a linear Ordinary
22 Least Squares (OLS) regression, in which the market equity risk premium is

39 *See, SBBI-2021*, at page 10-22, 10-23.

expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bond yield:

$$RP = \alpha + \beta (R_{Aaa/Aa})$$

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF THE PRPM EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

A. I used the same PRPM approach described above to the PRPM equity risk premium. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa-rated corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through August 2021.⁴⁰ Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews[®] statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted a market equity risk premium of 7.88%.⁴¹

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF A PROJECTED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON *VALUE LINE* DATA FOR YOUR RPM ANALYSIS.

A. As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4, page 9 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component in my DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an average of the three-to five-year median market price appreciation potential by *Value Line* for the 13

40 Data from January 1926 to December 2020 is from SBBI - 2021. Data from January 2021 to August 2021 is from Bloomberg.

41 Shown on line 3, page 8 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 weeks ended August 31, 2021, plus an average of the median estimated dividend
2 yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in *Value Line* (Standard
3 Edition).⁴²

4
5 The average median expected price appreciation is 32%, which translates to a
6 7.19% annual appreciation, and, when added to the average of *Value Line's*
7 median expected dividend yields of 1.76%, equates to a forecasted annual total
8 return rate on the market of 8.95%. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated
9 corporate bond yield of 3.41% is deducted from the total market return of
10 8.95%, resulting in an equity risk premium of 5.54%, as shown on line 4, page
11 8 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

12
13 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED**
14 **ON THE S&P 500 COMPANIES.**

15 A. Using data from *Value Line*, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P
16 500 companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates
17 as a proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500
18 is 15.05%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate
19 bonds of 3.41% results in a 11.64% projected equity risk premium.

20
21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DERIVATION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED**
22 **ON BLOOMBERG DATA.**

23 A. Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P
24 500 using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy

42 As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 7.

1 for capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected
2 total return for the S&P 500 is 18.17%. Subtracting the prospective yield on
3 Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 3.41% results in a 14.76% projected
4 equity risk premium.

5 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF A BETA-DERIVED EQUITY RISK PREMIUM**
6 **FOR USE IN YOUR RPM ANALYSIS?**

7 A. I gave equal weight to all six equity risk premiums based on each source -
8 historical, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg - in arriving at an 9.10% equity risk
9 premium.

Table 4
Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium
Using Total Market Returns⁴³

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa-Rated Corporate Bond Yields (1928 – 2020)	5.92%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	8.87%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	7.88%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from <i>Value Line</i> Summary & Index less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	5.54%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	11.64%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields	<u>14.76%</u>
Average	<u><u>9.10%</u></u>

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 9.10%, I adjusted it by the Beta coefficient to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, the Beta coefficient is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole, and is a logical way to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the average of the mean and median Beta coefficient for the Utility Proxy

⁴³ As shown on page 8 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 Group is 0.93. Multiplying the 0.93 average Beta coefficient by the market
2 equity risk premium of 9.10% results in a Beta-adjusted equity risk premium for
3 the Utility Proxy Group of 8.46%.

4
5 **b. S&P Utility Index Derived Equity Risk Premium**

6 **Q. HOW DID YOU DERIVE THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM BASED ON THE S&P**
7 **UTILITY INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED PUBLIC UTILITY BONDS?**

8 A. I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding
9 period returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of
10 the S&P Utilities Index, using *Value Line* and Bloomberg data, respectively.
11 Turning first to the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-
12 term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility
13 Index total returns of 10.65% and monthly Moody's A-rated public utility bond
14 yields of 6.49% from 1928 to 2020 to arrive at an equity risk premium of
15 4.16%.⁴⁴ I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium
16 of 6.51% based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final
17 S&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the
18 PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to
19 August 2021 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of 4.94% for the
20 S&P Utility Index.

21
22 I then derived expected total returns on the S&P Utilities Index of 10.94% and
23 9.11% using data from *Value Line* and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted
24 the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.9%⁴⁵, which

44 As shown on line 1, page 12 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

45 Derived on line 3, page 3 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 resulted in equity risk premiums of 7.15% and 5.32%, respectively. As with the
2 market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk premium based on each
3 source (*i.e.*, historical, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg) to arrive at my utility-specific
4 equity risk premium of 5.62%.

5
6 **Table 5**
7 **Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium**
8 **Using S&P Utility Index Holding Returns⁴⁶**

9

10 Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields (1928 – 2020)	4.16%
11 Regression Analysis on Historical Data	6.51%
12 PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	4.94%
13 Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P Utilities Index Less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	7.15%
14 Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities Index Less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	<u>5.32%</u>
15 Average	<u>5.62%</u>

16
17
18
19

46 As shown on page 12 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 c. **Authorized Return Derived Equity Risk Premium**

2 **Q. HOW DO YOU DERIVE AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM OF 5.73% BASED ON**
3 **AUTHORIZED ROEs FOR NATURAL GAS UTILITIES?**

4 A. The equity risk premium of 5.73% shown on line 3, page 7 of
5 Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6 is the result of a regression analysis based on
6 regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A-rated public utility
7 bonds. That analysis is shown on page 13 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
8 Page 13 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6 contains the graphical results of a
9 regression analysis of 803 rate cases for natural gas utilities which were fully
10 litigated during the period from January 1, 1980 through August 31, 2021. It
11 shows the implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A2-rated public
12 utility bonds immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. That
13 is, the analysis considers the relationship between authorized returns and
14 prevailing public utility bond yields at the time of the decision.

15
16 It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield on
17 A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as
18 interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result
19 consistent with financial literature on the subject.⁴⁷ I used the regression results
20 to estimate the equity risk premium applicable to the projected yield on Moody's
21 A2-rated public utility bonds. Given the expected A2-rated utility bond yield
22 of 3.79%, it can be calculated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable

47 See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts*, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity*, Financial Management, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

to that bond yield is 5.73%, which is shown on line 3, page 7 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION OF AN EQUITY RISK PREMIUM FOR USE IN YOUR TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM ANALYSIS?

A. The equity risk premium I apply to the Utility Proxy Group is 6.60%, which is the average of the Beta-adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group, the S&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk premiums of 8.46%, 5.62%, and 5.73%, respectively.⁴⁸

Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED RPM COMMON EQUITY COST RATE BASED ON THE TOTAL MARKET APPROACH?

A. As shown on line 7, page 3 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6 and shown on Table 6, below, I calculated a common equity cost rate of 10.43% for the Utility Proxy Group based on the total market approach RPM.

Table 6
Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model⁴⁹

Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	3.83%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium	<u>6.60%</u>
Indicated Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.43%</u>

⁴⁸ As shown on page 7 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

⁴⁹ As shown on page 3 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE PRPM AND THE**
2 **TOTAL MARKET APPROACH RPM?**

3 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 6, the indicated RPM-
4 derived common equity cost rate is 10.45%, which gives equal weight to the
5 PRPM (10.46%) and the adjusted-market approach results (10.43%).
6

7 **C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model**

8 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE CAPM.**

9 A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the
10 market's returns as measured by the Beta coefficient (β). A Beta coefficient less
11 than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a Beta
12 coefficient greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.
13

14 The CAPM assumes that all non-market or unsystematic risk can be eliminated
15 through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through
16 diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM
17 presumes that investors only require compensation for systematic risk, which is
18 the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all
19 assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk
20 premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the
21 individual security relative to the total market as measured by the Beta
22 coefficient. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

1 $R_s = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$

2 Where: R_s = Return rate on the common stock

3 R_f = Risk-free rate of return

4 R_m = Return rate on the market as a whole

5 β = Adjusted Beta coefficient (volatility of the
6 security relative to the market as a whole)


7
8 Numerous tests of the traditional CAPM have measured the extent to which
9 security returns and Beta coefficients are related as predicted by the CAPM,
10 confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM (ECAPM) reflects the reality that
11 while the results of these tests support the notion that the Beta coefficient is
12 related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line (SML) described
13 by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML.⁵⁰

14
15 In their work on the CAPM, Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2,
16 below, that “[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns
17 on the high beta portfolios are too low.”⁵¹

50 Morin, at 175.

51 Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, *The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence*, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 (Fama & French).

Figure 2 <http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430>
Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios
Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that Beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.⁵²

* * *

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x (R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$$

52 Morin, at 175.

1 where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x
2 that best explains the observed relationship [is] $\text{Return} = 0.0829$
3 $+ 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If $x = 0.25$, the equation
4 becomes:

$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{53}$$

6 Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:

7 The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the
8 CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average
9 return, but it is too 'flat.'... The regressions consistently find that
10 the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate... and the
11 coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return...
12 This is true in the early tests... as well as in more recent cross-
13 section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992).⁵⁴

14 Finally, Fama and French further note:

15 Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average
16 return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter
17 CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high,
18 and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For
19 example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta
20 is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The

53 *Ibid.*, at 190.

54 Fama & French, at 32.

1 predicted return on the portfolio with the t beta is 16.8 percent
2 per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.⁵⁵

3
4 Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French, along with their
5 reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the
6 ECAPM. In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the
7 traditional CAPM and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Group
8 and averaged the results.

9
10 **Q. WHAT BETA COEFFICIENTS DID YOU USE IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?**

11 A. For the Beta coefficients in my CAPM analysis, I considered two sources: *Value*
12 *Line* and Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services adjust
13 their calculated (or “raw”) Beta coefficients to reflect the tendency of the Beta
14 coefficient to regress to the market mean of 1.00, *Value Line* calculates the Beta
15 coefficient over a five-year period, while Bloomberg calculates it over a two-
16 year period.

17
18 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR SELECTION OF A RISK-FREE RATE OF RETURN.**

19 A. As discussed previously, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the
20 CAPM is 2.70%. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the *Blue Chip*
21 consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for
22 the six quarters ending with the fourth calendar quarter of 2022, and long-term
23 projections for the years 2023 to 2027 and 2028 to 2032.

55 *Ibid.*, at 33.

1 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE ESTIMATION OF THE EXPECTED RISK PREMIUM FOR**
2 **THE MARKET USED IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSES.**

3 A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on
4 Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 7. As discussed above, the market risk premium
5 is derived from an average of three historical data-based market risk premiums,
6 two *Value Line* data-based market risk premiums, and one Bloomberg data-
7 based market risk premium.

8 The long-term income return on U.S. Government securities of 5.05% was
9 deducted from the SBBI – 2021 monthly historical total market return of
10 12.20%, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of 7.15%.⁵⁶ I
11 applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on
12 the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government
13 securities from SBBI - 2021. That regression analysis yielded a market equity
14 risk premium of 9.57%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 8.77%, and
15 is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury
16 securities from January 1926 through August 2021.

17
18 The *Value Line*-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived
19 by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 2.70%, discussed above, from the
20 *Value Line* projected total annual market return of 8.95%, resulting in a
21 forecasted total market equity risk premium of 6.25%. The S&P 500 projected
22 market equity risk premium using *Value Line* data is derived by subtracting the
23 projected risk-free rate of 2.70% from the projected total return of the S&P 500
24 of 15.05%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 12.35%.

56 SBBI - 2021, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21).

The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.70% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 18.17%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 15.47%. These six measures, when averaged, result in an average total market equity risk premium of 9.93%.

Table 7
Summary of the Calculation of the
Market Risk Premium for Use in the CAPM⁵⁷

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Long-Term Government Bond Yields (1926 – 2019)	7.15%
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	9.57%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	8.77%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total Market Returns from <i>Value Line</i> Summary & Index less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	6.25%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	12.35%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	<u>15.47%</u>
Average	<u>9.93%</u>

⁵⁷ As shown on page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 7.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL**
2 **AND EMPIRICAL CAPM TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

3 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit___(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the mean result of my
4 CAPM/ECAPM analyses is 12.09%, the median is 11.93%, and the average of
5 the two is 12.01%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and
6 median DCF results discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate
7 using the CAPM/ECAPM is 12.01%.

8
9 **D. Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-**
10 **Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM**

11 **Q. WHY DO YOU ALSO CONSIDER A PROXY GROUP OF DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE**
12 **REGULATED COMPANIES?**

13 A. Although I am not an attorney, my interpretation of the *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases
14 is that they did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be utilities.
15 Since the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for marketplace
16 competition, non-price regulated firms operating in the competitive
17 marketplace make an excellent proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the
18 Utility Proxy Group being used to estimate the cost of common equity. The
19 selection of such domestic, non-price regulated competitive firms theoretically
20 and empirically results in a proxy group which is comparable in total risk to the
21 Utility Proxy Group, since all of these companies compete for capital in the
22 exact same markets.

23
24 **Q. HOW DID YOU SELECT NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES THAT ARE**
25 **COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

26 A. In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies

1 similar in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the Beta coefficients
2 and related statistics derived from *Value Line* regression analyses of weekly
3 market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (*i.e.*, five years). These selection
4 criteria resulted in a proxy group of 41 domestic, non-price regulated firms
5 comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of
6 non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The
7 criteria used in selecting the domestic, non-price regulated firms was:

- 8 (i) They must be covered by *Value Line* (Standard Edition);
- 9 (ii) They must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, *i.e.*, not
10 utilities;
- 11 (iii) Their Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two standard
12 deviations of the average unadjusted Beta coefficients of the Utility Proxy
13 Group; and
- 14 (iv) The residual standard errors of the *Value Line* regressions which gave rise
15 to the unadjusted Beta coefficients must lie within plus or minus two
16 standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the Utility
17 Proxy Group.

18
19 Beta coefficients measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not diversifiable.
20 The residual standard errors of the regressions measure each firm's company-
21 specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar Beta coefficients and
22 similar residual standard errors resulting from the same regression analyses have
23 similar total investment risk.

1 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED A SCHEDULE WHICH SHOWS THE DATA FROM WHICH**
2 **YOU SELECTED THE 41 DOMESTIC, NON-PRICE REGULATED COMPANIES**
3 **THAT ARE COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

4 A. Yes, the basis of my selection and both proxy groups' regression statistics are
5 shown in Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 8.
6

7 **Q. DID YOU CALCULATE COMMON EQUITY COST RATES USING THE DCF**
8 **MODEL, RPM, AND CAPM FOR THE NON-PRICE REGULATED PROXY**
9 **GROUP?**

10 A. Yes. Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an
11 identical manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale
12 and application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM,
13 where I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums, nor did I apply
14 the PRPM to the individual non-price regulated companies.
15

16 Page 2 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9 derives the Constant Growth DCF
17 model common equity cost rate, and page 3 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule
18 9 derives the two growth DCF model common equity cost rate. As shown, the
19 indicated common equity cost rate, using an average of the constant growth
20 DCF and the two growth DCF for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group
21 comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, is 13.39%.
22

23 Pages 4 through 6 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9 contain the data and
24 calculations that support the 12.85% RPM common equity cost rate. As shown
25 on line 1, page 4 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9, the consensus prospective
26 yield on Moody's Baa-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending in the

1 third quarter of 2022, and for the years 2023 to 2027 and 2028 to 2032, is
2 4.30%.⁵⁸

3
4 When the Beta-adjusted risk premium of 8.55%⁵⁹ relative to the Non-Price
5 Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective Baa2-rated corporate bond
6 yield of 4.30%, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is 12.85%.

7
8 Page 7 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9 contains the inputs and calculations
9 that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost rate of 12.06%.

10
11 **Q. HOW IS THE COST RATE OF COMMON EQUITY BASED ON THE NON-PRICE**
12 **REGULATED PROXY GROUP COMPARABLE IN TOTAL RISK TO THE UTILITY**
13 **PROXY GROUP?**

14 A. As shown on page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9, the results of the
15 common equity models applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group --
16 which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group -- are as follows:
17 13.39% (DCF), 12.85% (RPM), and 12.06% (CAPM). The average of the mean
18 and median of these models is 12.81%, which I used as the indicated common
19 equity cost rates for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

58 *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, August 1, 2021, at 2, June 1, 2021, at 14.

59 Derived on page 6 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 9.

1 **VIII. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST ANALYTICAL**
2 **RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS**

3 **Q. BASED ON YOUR ANALYSES, WHAT IS THE INDICATED COMMON EQUITY**
4 **COST RATE BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS?**

5 A. By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group
6 and the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common
7 equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk
8 adjustments is between 10.20% and 12.20%. I used multiple cost of common
9 equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity
10 cost rate, because each of these models is theoretically sound and available to
11 investors and because no single model is so inherently precise that it can be
12 relied on to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models. Using multiple
13 models adds reliability to the estimated common equity cost rate, with the
14 prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models supported in both
15 the financial literature and regulatory precedent.

16
17 Based on these common equity cost results, I conclude that a range of common
18 equity cost rates between 10.20% and 12.20% is reasonable and appropriate
19 before any adjustments for relative risk differences between the Company and
20 the Utility Proxy Group are made.

IX. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE

A. Business Risk Adjustment

Q. WHAT COMPANY-SPECIFIC BUSINESS RISKS DID YOU CONSIDER IN YOUR RELATIVE RISK ANALYSIS?

A. As detailed below I considered NSP's small size and its high levels of customer growth and capital expenditures relative to the Utility Proxy Group.

Q. PLEASE COMPARE NSP'S SIZE WITH THAT OF THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP.

A. As shown on Table 8, below, NSP is smaller than the median utility in the Utility Proxy Group, as measured by market capitalization.

Table 8
Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for NSPM's
Electric Operations and the Utility Proxy Group

	Market Capitalization* (\$ Millions)	Times Greater than The Company
NSP MN Jurisdictional	\$822.711	
Utility Proxy Group	\$4,458.458	5.4x
*From page 1 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 10.		

The Company's estimated market capitalization for its Minnesota operations was \$822.711 million as of August 31, 2021, compared with the market capitalization of the average company in the Utility Proxy Group of \$4,458.458 million as of August 31, 2021. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group

1 has a market capitalization 5.4 times the size of the Company's estimated
2 Minnesota-based market capitalization.

3
4 **Q. SINCE NSP IS PART OF A LARGER COMPANY, WHY IS THE SIZE OF XEI NOT**
5 **MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE WHEN DETERMINING THE SIZE ADJUSTMENT?**

6 A. The return derived in this proceeding will not apply to XEI's operations as a
7 whole, but only to the Company's gas operations in Minnesota. XEI is the sum
8 of its constituent parts, including those constituent parts' ROEs. Potential
9 investors in the Parent are aware that it is a combination of operations in each
10 state, and that each state's operations experience the operating risks specific to
11 their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of XEI's return is commensurate
12 with the realities of the Company's composite operations in each of the states
13 in which it operates. That said, I recognize that NSP's Minnesota natural gas
14 operations are a portion of NSP's overall operations.

15
16 **Q. SHOULD THE COMPANY BE COMPARED WITH OTHER OPERATING**
17 **NATURAL GAS UTILITIES IN MINNESOTA TO DETERMINE ANY**
18 **ADJUSTMENT TO THE PROXY GROUP-DERIVED ROE?**

19 A. No, it shouldn't. Since the indicated ROE is determined using the market data
20 of the Utility Proxy Group, any type of adjustment to the indicated ROE must
21 reflect relative differences between the Company and the Utility Proxy Group.
22 Since this is the case, the relative size or other risks of other Minnesota utilities
23 is not relevant to determining the ROE for the Company.

1 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY'S SMALLER SIZE RELATIVE TO THE UTILITY PROXY**
2 **GROUP COMPANIES INCREASE ITS BUSINESS RISK?**

3 A. Yes. As a preliminary matter, because I have developed my cost of common
4 equity recommendation for the Company's Minnesota operations based on
5 market data applied to the Utility Proxy Group of risk-comparable companies,
6 in order to assess the Company's risk associated with its relative small size of its
7 Minnesota gas operations, it is necessary to compare the Company's Minnesota
8 gas operation's size relative to the Utility Proxy Group. The Company's smaller
9 size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies indicates greater relative
10 business risk for the Company because, all else being equal, size has a material
11 bearing on risk.

12
13 Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to
14 cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues, and earnings. For
15 example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and
16 economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of
17 revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small
18 company than on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base.
19 This is true for utilities, as well as for non-regulated companies.

20
21 As further evidence that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally demand
22 greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and
23 liquidity of their securities. Duff & Phelps' 2020 Valuation Handbook – U.S.
24 Guide to Cost of Capital (D&P - 2020) discusses the nature of the small-size
25 phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium

1 based on several measures of size. In discussing “Size as a Predictor of Equity
2 Returns,” D&P - 2020 states:

3
4 The size effect is based on the empirical observation that companies of
5 smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater
6 cost of capital [sic]. The “size” of a company is one of the most
7 important risk elements to consider when developing cost of equity
8 capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has
9 been shown to be a *predictor* of equity returns. In other words, there is a
10 significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity
11 returns - as size *decreases*, returns tend to *increase*, and vice versa. (footnote
12 omitted) (emphasis in original)⁶⁰

13
14 Furthermore, in “The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence,”
15 Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when
16 estimating the cost of common equity. On page 37, they note:

17
18 . . . the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market
19 stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable
20 risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are
21 priced separately from market betas.⁶¹

60 Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, Wiley 2020, at 4-1.

61 Fama & French, at 25-43.

1 Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model
2 which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of
3 common equity.

4
5 Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not the
6 source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment.⁶² Eugene
7 Brigham, a well-known authority, states:

8
9 A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-firms
10 (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than those of large-
11 firm stocks; this is called the “small-firm effect.” On the surface, it would
12 seem to be advantageous to the small firms to provide average returns in
13 a stock market that are higher than those of larger firms. In reality, it is
14 bad news for the small firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the
15 capital market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms than on
16 otherwise similar stocks of the large firms. (emphasis added)⁶³

17
18 Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above,
19 increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate
20 of return on common equity. Therefore, the Commission’s authorization of a
21 cost rate of common equity in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the
22 unique risks of the Company, including its small relative size to the Utility Proxy

62 Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

63 Eugene F. Brigham, Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

1 Group, which is justified and supported above by evidence in the financial
2 literature.

3
4 **Q. EARLIER YOU EXPLAINED THAT CREDIT RATINGS CAN ACT AS A PROXY FOR**
5 **A FIRM'S COMBINED BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL RISKS TO EQUITY OWNERS.**
6 **DO RATING AGENCIES ACCOUNT FOR COMPANY SIZE IN THEIR BOND**
7 **RATINGS?**

8 A. No. Neither S&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for
9 any given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis must be
10 conducted for equity investments in companies with similar bond ratings.

11
12 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY'S HIGH CUSTOMER GROWTH.**

13 A. NSP's total number of retail customers is expected to increase by approximately
14 24,900 (*i.e.*, 5.2%) over the past five years.⁶⁴ The increased customer growth in
15 NSP's service territory necessitates increased capital investment.

16
17 **Q. PLEASE BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL INVESTMENT**
18 **PLANS.**

19 A. NSP currently plans to invest approximately \$778 million of additional capital
20 over the 2021-2024 period,⁶⁵ which represents approximately 78% of its 2021
21 year-end net utility plant.⁶⁶ That amount includes investments required to
22 support growth, continue on the path of carbon reduction, and to maintain safe,
23 sufficient, and reliable service in both its transmission and distribution facilities.

64 Company provided data (2021-2026).

65 Company provided data.

66 *Ibid.*, at G-3.

1 The Company will require continued access to the capital markets, at reasonable
2 terms, to finance its capital spending plan. As the Company moves forward
3 with its capital spending plan, timely recovery of its capital costs is critical to
4 mitigate the delay of capital recovery and execute its capital spending program.
5

6 **Q. DO SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL EXPENDITURES DIRECTLY RELATE TO A**
7 **UTILITY BEING ALLOWED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EARN A RETURN**
8 **ADEQUATE TO ATTRACT CAPITAL AT REASONABLE TERMS?**

9 A. Yes, they do. The allowed ROE should enable the subject utility to finance
10 capital expenditures and working capital requirements at reasonable rates, and
11 to maintain its financial integrity in a variety of economic and capital market
12 conditions. As discussed throughout my direct testimony, a return adequate to
13 attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide safe, reliable
14 service while maintaining its financial soundness. To the extent a utility is
15 provided the opportunity to earn its market-based cost of capital, neither
16 customers nor shareholders should be disadvantaged. These requirements are
17 of particular importance to a utility when it is engaged in a substantial capital
18 expenditure program.
19

20 The ratemaking process is predicated on the principle that, for investors and
21 companies to commit the capital needed to provide safe and reliable utility
22 services, the utility must have the opportunity to recover the return of, and the
23 market-required return on, invested capital. Regulatory commissions recognize
24 that since utility operations are capital intensive, regulatory decisions should
25 enable the utility to attract capital at reasonable terms; doing so balances the
26 long-term interests of the utility and its ratepayers.

1 Further, the financial community carefully monitors the current and expected
2 financial conditions of utility companies, as well as the regulatory environment
3 in which those companies operate. In that respect, the regulatory environment
4 is one of the most important factors considered in both debt and equity
5 investors' assessments of risk. That is especially important during periods in
6 which the utility expects to make significant capital investments and, therefore,
7 may require access to capital markets.

8
9 **Q. DO CREDIT RATING AGENCIES RECOGNIZE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH**
10 **INCREASED CAPITAL EXPENDITURES?**

11 A. Yes, they do. From a credit perspective, the additional pressure on cash flows
12 associated with high levels of capital expenditures exerts corresponding
13 pressure on credit metrics and, therefore, credit ratings. S&P has noted several
14 long-term challenges for utilities' financial health including: heavy construction
15 programs to address demand growth; declining capacity margins; and aging
16 infrastructure and regulatory responsiveness to mounting requests for rate
17 increases.⁶⁷ More recently, S&P noted:

18 We assume that capital spending will remain a focus of most utility
19 managements and strain credit metrics. It provides growth when sales are
20 diminished by ongoing demanded efficiency from regulators and other
21 trends, and it is welcomed by policymakers that appreciate the economic
22 stimulus and the benefits of safer, more reliable service. The speed with
23 which the regulatory process turns the new spending into higher rates to

67 Standard & Poor's, Industry Report Card: Utility Sectors in the Americas Remain Stable, While Challenges Beset European, Australian, and New Zealand Counterparts, RatingsDirect, June 27, 2008, at 4.

1 begin to pay for it is an important factor in our assumptions and the
2 forecast. Any extended lag between spending and recovery can exacerbate
3 the negative effect on credit metrics and therefore ratings.⁶⁸
4

5 The rating agency views noted above also are consistent with certain
6 observations discussed in my direct testimony: (1) the benefits of maintaining a
7 strong financial profile are significant when capital access is required and
8 become particularly acute during periods of market instability; and (2) the
9 Commission's decision in this proceeding will have a direct bearing on the
10 company's credit profile and its ability to access the capital needed to fund its
11 investments.
12

13 **Q. HOW DO THE COMPANY'S EXPECTED CAPITAL EXPENDITURES COMPARE**
14 **TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

15 A. To reasonably make that comparison, I calculated the ratio of expected capital
16 expenditures to net plant for each company in the Utility Proxy Group. I
17 performed that calculation using NSP's projected capital expenditures during
18 the period 2021 through 2024 relative to its net plant for the year ended
19 December 31, 2021. As shown in Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 11, NSP has
20 the highest ratio of projected capital expenditures to net plant relative to the
21 Utility Proxy Group, approximately 64% higher than the Utility Proxy Group
22 median.

68 Standard & Poor's, *Industry Top Trends 2017: Utilities*, RatingsDirect, February 16, 2017, at 4.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE YOUR CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE EFFECT OF NSP'S**
2 **CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLAN ON ITS RISK PROFILE AND COST OF CAPITAL?**

3 A. It is clear that NSP's capital investment plan relative to net plant is larger than
4 the median of the Utility Proxy Group companies. It also is clear that equity
5 investors and credit rating agencies recognize the additional risks associated
6 with substantial capital expenditures.

7
8 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR CONCLUSION REGARDING THE COMPANY'S RELATIVE RISK**
9 **AS COMPARED TO THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

10 A. In view of the above, the Company is smaller and faces a higher level of
11 expected capital expenditures than the Utility Proxy Group. Since the cost of
12 capital is a comparative exercise, the Company faces relatively higher risk than
13 the Utility Proxy Group.

14
15 **Q. CAN A RELATIVE RISK ADJUSTMENT BE QUANTIFIED FOR THE COMPANY?**

16 A. Yes. As discussed above, NSP has greater relative risk than the Utility Proxy
17 Group. As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of
18 common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group to reflect the
19 Company's greater risk due to its greater business risk. As a proxy for the
20 business risk adjustment, I will use the SBBI-2021 size study. The determination
21 of the business risk adjustment is based on the size premiums for portfolios of
22 the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ
23 listed companies, ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2020 period.⁶⁹ The average
24 size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of

69 Source: Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator.

1 \$4,458.458 million falls in the 4th decile, while the Company's estimated market
2 capitalization of \$822.711 million places it in the 8th decile. The size premium
3 spread between the 4th decile and the 8th decile is 0.71%.⁷⁰ Even though a 0.71%
4 upward risk adjustment to the common cost of equity is indicated, I only applied
5 a risk premium of 0.15% to the Company's indicated common equity cost rate
6 to reflect that the Company's Minnesota natural gas operations are a portion of
7 NSP's overall operations and benefit from that relationship. I believe 0.15% is
8 a conservative adjustment due to the Company's higher relative risk.

9
10 **B. Credit Risk Adjustment**

11 Q. Please discuss your proposed credit risk adjustment.

12 A. NSP's long-term issuer ratings are A2 and A- from Moody's and S&P,
13 respectively, which are slightly less risky than the average long-term issuer
14 ratings for the Utility Proxy Group of A2/A3 and A-/BBB+, respectively.⁷¹
15 Hence, a downward credit risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the higher
16 credit rating, *i.e.*, A2, of the Company relative to the A2/A3 average Moody's
17 bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group.⁷²

18
19 An indication of the magnitude of the necessary downward adjustment to
20 reflect the lower credit risk inherent in an A2 bond rating is one-sixth of a recent
21 three-month average spread between Moody's Baa and A-rated public utility
22 bond yields of 0.25%, shown on page 4 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6, or
23 negative 0.04%.⁷³

70 *Ibid.*, See also, Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 10.

71 Source of Information: Moody's Investor Services and S&P Global Market Intelligence.

72 As shown on page 5 of Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

73 $0.04\% = 0.25\% * (1/6)$. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds.

1 **C. Flotation Costs**

2 **Q. WHAT ARE FLOTATION COSTS?**

3 A. Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of
4 common stock. They include market pressure and the mandatory unavoidable
5 costs of issuance (*e.g.*, underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing,
6 legal, registration, etc.). For every dollar raised through debt or equity offerings,
7 the Company receives less than one full dollar in financing.

8
9 **Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE FLOTATION COSTS IN THE**
10 **ALLOWED COMMON EQUITY COST RATE?**

11 A. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm
12 through which such costs can be recognized and recovered. Because these costs
13 are real, necessary, and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted.
14 As noted by Morin:

15
16 The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and
17 maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair
18 regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs....

19
20 The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not
21 free....[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return
22 adjustment.⁷⁴

As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-sixth of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate to reflect the proxy group's average rating of A2/A3.

74 Morin, at p. 321.

1 **Q. DO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS YOU HAVE USED ALREADY**
2 **REFLECT INVESTORS' ANTICIPATION OF FLOTATION COSTS?**

3 A. No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite
4 clear that these costs are not reflected in the market prices paid for common
5 stocks. For example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the
6 methodology utilized to calculate the flotation adjustment.⁷⁵ In addition, Morin
7 confirms the need for such an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is
8 imminent.⁷⁶ Consequently, it is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment
9 when using cost of common equity models to estimate the common equity cost
10 rate.

11
12 **Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE FLOTATION COST ALLOWANCE?**

13 A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would
14 reimburse investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in
15 literature by Brigham and Daves, as well as by Morin. The flotation cost
16 adjustment recognizes the actual costs of issuing equity that were incurred by
17 XEI. Based on the issuance costs shown on page 1 of Exhibit__(DWD-1),
18 Schedule 12, an adjustment of 0.12% is required to reflect the flotation costs
19 applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

20
21 **Q. WHAT IS THE INDICATED COST OF COMMON EQUITY AFTER YOUR**
22 **COMPANY-SPECIFIC ADJUSTMENTS?**

23 A. Applying the 0.15% business risk adjustment, the negative 0.04% credit risk

75 Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, Intermediate Financial Management, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern, at p. 342.

76 Morin, at pp. 327-30.

1 adjustment, and the 0.12% flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of
2 common equity cost rates between 10.20% and 12.20% results in a Company-
3 specific range of common equity rates between 10.43% and 12.43%. From this
4 range, I recommend an ROE for the Company toward the lower end of my
5 Company-specific range, specifically 10.50%.

6
7 **Q. IN THE COMPANY’S RECENTLY FILED ELECTRIC GENERAL RATE CASE,**
8 **YOU RECOMMENDED AN ROE THAT WAS 0.51% HIGHER THAN THE LOW**
9 **END OF YOUR INDICATED RANGE OF COMMON EQUITY RATES. WHY ARE**
10 **YOU RECOMMENDING AN ROE THAT IS ONLY 0.07% HIGHER THAN THE**
11 **LOW END OF YOUR INDICATED RANGE OF COMMON EQUITY RATES IN THIS**
12 **CASE?**

13 A. Because the indicated range is higher in this case than the indicated range in the
14 Company’s electric rate case, I recommended a higher ROE in this case. In the
15 interest of incrementalism, however, I recommend an ROE at the very bottom
16 of the indicated range.

17
18 **D. Revenue Decoupling Mechanism**

19 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY’S REVENUE DECOUPLING**
20 **MECHANISM (“RDM”) PROPOSAL.**

21 A. The Company is proposing a full decoupling RDM which includes the effects
22 of weather in the calculation of deferrals. The RDM measures sales revenues
23 against a baseline revenue-per-customer by class, with over- or under-
24 recoveries calculated and deferred each month. The annual result is credited or
25 charged to customers through a \$ per therm factor applied to each individual

1 customer's usage each month for twelve months as a separate line item on their
2 bill.

3
4 **Q. ARE DECOUPLING AND OTHER REVENUE STABILIZATION MECHANISMS**
5 **COMMON IN THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP?**

6 A. Yes, they are. It is important to remember that the cost of capital is a
7 comparative exercise, so if a mechanism is common throughout the companies
8 on which one bases their analyses, the comparative risk is zero, because any
9 impact of the perceived reduced risk (if any) of the mechanism(s) by investors
10 would be reflected in the market data of the proxy group. As shown on
11 Exhibit____(DWD-1), Schedule 13, every single one of the proxy companies has
12 some form of decoupling in at least one of its jurisdictions. As such, the
13 proposed RDM makes the Company more similar to the Utility Proxy Group.

1 **X. CONCLUSION**

2 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE FOR THE COMPANY?**

3 A. Given the discussion above and the results from the analyses, I recommend that
4 an ROE of 10.50% is appropriate for the Company at this time.
5

6 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS YOUR PROPOSED ROE OF 10.50% FAIR AND**
7 **REASONABLE TO NSP AND ITS CUSTOMERS?**

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS NSP'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE CONSISTING**
10 **OF 52.50% COMMON EQUITY, 0.61% SHORT-TERM DEBT, AND 46.89%**
11 **LONG-TERM DEBT FAIR AND REASONABLE?**

12 A. Yes, it is.
13

14 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS NSP'S PROPOSED COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT OF**
15 **4.13% FAIR AND REASONABLE?**

16 A. Yes, it is.
17

18 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

19 A. Yes, it does.

Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). Dylan joined ScottMadden in 2016 and has become a leading expert witness with respect to cost of capital and capital structure. He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 13 years. Dylan has testified as an expert witness on over 100 occasions regarding rate of return, cost of service, rate design, and valuation before more than 30 regulatory jurisdictions in the United States and Canada, an American Arbitration Association panel, and the Superior Court of Rhode Island. He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured. Dylan holds a B.A. in economic history from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.B.A. with concentrations in finance and international business from Rutgers University.

Areas of Specialization

- Regulation and Rates
- Rate of Return
- Valuation
- Mutual Fund Benchmarking
- Capital Market Risk
- Cost of Service

Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearance

- Regulatory Commission of Alaska – Capital Structure
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission – Rate of Return
- Public Utility Commission of Texas – Return on Equity
- Hawaii Public Utilities Commission – Cost of Service / Rate Design
- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission - Valuation

Recent Assignments

- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base

Recent Articles and Speeches

- Co-Author of: “Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital”, co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020
- Co-Author of: “Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment”, co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319
- “Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups”, before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA
- “Past is Prologue: Future Test Year”, Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.
- Co-author of: “Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium Model™, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model”, co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley, The Electricity Journal, May, 2013
- “Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks”, before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN

Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Regulatory Commission of Alaska				
Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC	07/21	Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC	Docket No. TA45-733	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	09/20	Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc.	Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521; TA4-573	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	07/16	Alaska Power Company	Docket No. TA857-2	Rate of Return
Alberta Utilities Commission				
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	01/20	AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	2021 Generic Cost of Capital, Proceeding ID. 24110	Rate of Return
Arizona Corporation Commission				
EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	06/20	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	Docket No. WS-01303A-20-0177	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	12/19	Arizona Water Company – Western Group	Docket No. W-01445A-19-0278	Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	08/18	Arizona Water Company – Northern Group	Docket No. W-01445A-18-0164	Rate of Return
Arkansas Public Service Commission				
Southwestern Electric Power Co.	07/21	Southwestern Electric Power Co.	Docket No. 21-070-U	Return on Equity
CenterPoint Energy Resources Corp.	05/21	CenterPoint Arkansas Gas	Docket No. 21-004-U	Return on Equity
Colorado Public Utilities Commission				
Summit Utilities, Inc.	04/18	Colorado Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 18AL-0305G	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/17	Atmos Energy Corporation	Docket No. 17AL-0429G	Rate of Return
Delaware Public Service Commission				
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	11/20	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 20-0149 (Electric)	Return on Equity
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	10/20	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 20-0150 (Gas)	Return on Equity
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	11/13	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 13-466	Capital Structure
Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia				
Washington Gas Light Company	09/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Formal Case No. 1162	Rate of Return
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission				
LS Power Grid California, LLC	10/20	LS Power Grid California, LLC	Docket No. ER21-195-000	Rate of Return
Florida Public Service Commission				
Tampa Electric Company	04/21	Tampa Electric Company	Docket No. 20210034-EI	Return on Equity
Peoples Gas System	09/20	Peoples Gas System	Docket No. 20200051-GU	Rate of Return
Utilities, Inc. of Florida	06/20	Utilities, Inc. of Florida	Docket No. 20200139-WS	Rate of Return
Hawaii Public Utilities Commission				
Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc.	12/20	Launiupoko Irrigation Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2020-0217 / Transferred to 2020-0089	Capital Structure
Lanai Water Company, Inc.	12/19	Lanai Water Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2019-0386	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Manele Water Resources, LLC	08/19	Manele Water Resources, LLC	Docket No. 2019-0311	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Kaupulehu Water Company	02/18	Kaupulehu Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0363	Rate of Return
Aqua Engineers, LLC	05/17	Puhi Sewer & Water Company	Docket No. 2017-0118	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Hawaii Resources, Inc.	09/16	Laie Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0229	Cost of Service / Rate Design

Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Illinois Commerce Commission				
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	02/21	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 21-0198	Rate of Return
Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois	07/20	Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a Ameren Illinois	Docket No. 20-0308	Return on Equity
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	11/17	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-1106	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Aqua Illinois, Inc.	04/17	Aqua Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-0259	Rate of Return
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	04/15	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 14-0741	Rate of Return
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission				
Aqua Indiana, Inc.	03/16	Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite Wastewater Division	Docket No. 44752	Rate of Return
Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	08/13	Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 44388	Rate of Return
Kansas Corporation Commission				
Atmos Energy	07/19	Atmos Energy	19-ATMG-525-RTS	Rate of Return
Kentucky Public Service Commission				
Atmos Energy Corporation	07/21	Atmos Energy Corporation	2021-00304	PRP Rider Rate
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/21	Atmos Energy Corporation	2021-00214	Rate of Return
Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	06/21	Duke Energy Kentucky, Inc.	2021-00190	Return on Equity
Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company	10/20	Bluegrass Water Utility Operating Company	2020-00290	Return on Equity
Louisiana Public Service Commission				
Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana	05/21	Utilities, Inc. of Louisiana	Docket No. U-36003	Rate of Return
Southwestern Electric Power Company	12/20	Southwestern Electric Power Company	Docket No. U-35441	Return on Equity
Atmos Energy	04/20	Atmos Energy	Docket No. U-35535	Rate of Return
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	06/13	Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. U-32848	Rate of Return
Maine Public Utilities Commission				
The Maine Water Company	09/21	The Maine Water Company	Docket No. 2021-00053	Rate of Return
Maryland Public Service Commission				
Washington Gas Light Company	08/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Case No. 9651	Rate of Return
FirstEnergy, Inc.	08/18	Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 9490	Rate of Return
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities				
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Elec.)	D.P.U. 19-130	Rate of Return
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Gas)	D.P.U. 19-131	Rate of Return
Liberty Utilities	07/15	Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 15-75	Rate of Return
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission				
Northern States Power Company	11/20	Northern States Power Company	Docket No. E002/GR-20-723	Rate of Return
Mississippi Public Service Commission				
Atmos Energy	03/19	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Atmos Energy	07/18	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure
Missouri Public Service Commission				
Spire Missouri, Inc.	12/20	Spire Missouri, Inc.	Case No. GR-2021-0108	Return on Equity
Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc.	10/17	Indian Hills Utility Operating Company, Inc.	Case No. SR-2017-0259	Rate of Return

Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc.	09/16	Raccoon Creek Utility Operating Company, Inc.	Docket No. SR-2016-0202	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission of Nevada				
Southwest Gas Corporation	09/21	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 21-09001	Return on Equity
Southwest Gas Corporation	08/20	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 20-02023	Return on Equity
New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission				
Aquarion Water Company of New Hampshire, Inc.	12/20	Aquarion Water Company of New Hampshire, Inc.	Docket No. DW 20-184	Rate of Return
New Jersey Board of Public Utilities				
Middlesex Water Company	05/21	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR21050813	Rate of Return
Atlantic City Electric Company	12/20	Atlantic City Electric Company	Docket No. ER20120746	Return on Equity
FirstEnergy	02/20	Jersey Central Power & Light Co.	Docket No. ER20020146	Rate of Return
Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	12/18	Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	Docket No. WR18121351	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	10/17	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR17101049	Rate of Return
Middlesex Water Company	03/15	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR15030391	Rate of Return
The Atlantic City Sewerage Company	10/14	The Atlantic City Sewerage Company	Docket No. WR14101263	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Middlesex Water Company	11/13	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR1311059	Capital Structure
New Mexico Public Regulation Commission				
Southwestern Public Service Company	01/21	Southwestern Public Service Company	Case No. 20-00238-UT	Return on Equity
North Carolina Utilities Commission				
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	07/21	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 384	Rate of Return
Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc.	03/21	Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc.	Docket No. G-9, Sub 781	Return on Equity
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214	Return on Equity
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Progress, LLC	Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219	Return on Equity
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	12/19	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 526	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/19	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 364	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	09/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 360	Rate of Return
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	07/18	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 497	Rate of Return
North Dakota Public Service Commission				
Northern States Power Company	09/21	Northern States Power Company	Case No. PU-21-381	Rate of Return
Northern States Power Company	11/20	Northern States Power Company	Case No. PU-20-441	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio				
Aqua Ohio, Inc.	07/21	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Docket No. 21-0595-WW-AIR	Rate of Return
Aqua Ohio, Inc.	05/16	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Docket No. 16-0907-WW-AIR	Rate of Return
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission				
Community Utilities of Pennsylvania, Inc.	04/21	Community Utilities of Pennsylvania, Inc.	Docket No. R-2021-3025207	Rate of Return
Vicinity Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	04/21	Vicinity Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2021-3024060	Rate of Return
Delaware County Regional Water Control Authority	02/20	Delaware County Regional Water Control Authority	Docket No. A-2019-3015173	Valuation
Valley Energy, Inc.	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008209	Rate of Return
Wellsboro Electric Company	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008208	Rate of Return
Citizens' Electric Company of Lewisburg	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008212	Rate of Return
Steelton Borough Authority	01/19	Steelton Borough Authority	Docket No. A-2019-3006880	Valuation

Sponsor	Date	Case/Applicant	Docket No.	Subject
Mahoning Township, PA	08/18	Mahoning Township, PA	Docket No. A-2018-3003519	Valuation
SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	04/18	SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	Docket No. R-2018-000834	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	09/17	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2017-2598203	Rate of Return
Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	06/17	Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2017-2593142	Rate of Return
Emporium Water Company	07/14	Emporium Water Company	Docket No. R-2014-2402324	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	07/13	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2013-2360798	Rate of Return
Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.	12/11	Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. R-2011-2255159	Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost Rate
South Carolina Public Service Commission				
Blue Granite Water Co.	12/19	Blue Granite Water Company	Docket No. 2019-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	02/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2017-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/15	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2015-199-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	11/13	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-275-WS	Rate of Return
United Utility Companies, Inc.	09/13	United Utility Companies, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-199-WS	Rate of Return
Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.	09/13	Utility Services of South Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-201-WS	Rate of Return
Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	11/12	Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	Docket No. 2012-177-WS	Capital Structure
Tennessee Public Utility Commission				
Piedmont Natural Gas Company	07/20	Piedmont Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 20-00086	Return on Equity
Public Utility Commission of Texas				
Southwestern Public Service Company	02/21	Southwestern Public Service Company	Docket No. 51802	Return on Equity
Southwestern Electric Power Company	10/20	Southwestern Electric Power Company	Docket No. 51415	Rate of Return
Virginia State Corporation Commission				
Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.	04/21	Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.	PUR-2020-00095	Return on Equity
Massanutten Public Service Corporation	12/20	Massanutten Public Service Corporation	PUE-2020-00039	Return on Equity
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/20	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2020-00106	Rate of Return
WGL Holdings, Inc.	07/18	Washington Gas Light Company	PUR-2018-00080	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	05/18	Atmos Energy Corporation	PUR-2018-00014	Rate of Return
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/17	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2017-00082	Rate of Return
Massanutten Public Service Corp.	08/14	Massanutten Public Service Corp.	PUE-2014-00035	Rate of Return / Rate Design

Northern States Power Company
Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Principal Methods</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	9.59%
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.45%
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	12.01%
4.	Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	<u>12.81%</u>
5.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates before Adjustment for Size Risk	10.20% - 12.20%
6.	Business Risk Adjustment (5)	0.15%
7.	Credit Risk Adjustment (6)	-0.04%
8.	Flotation Cost Adjustment (7)	<u>0.12%</u>
9.	Recommended Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment for Size Risk	<u>10.43% - 12.43%</u>
10.	Recommended Cost of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment for Size Risk	<u>10.50%</u>

- Notes: (1) Average of results from the Constant Growth DCF Model and Two Growth DCF Model from Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
- (2) From page 1 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (3) From page 1 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 7.
- (4) From page 1 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 9.
- (5) Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk relative to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (6) Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect NSP's lower risk due to a higher long-term issuer rating relative to the proxy group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (7) From Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 12.

Northern States Power Company
CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1)
2015 - 2020, Inclusive

	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)						
CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS						
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED						
TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL	\$ 12,673.000	\$ 11,603.100	\$ 10,510.300	\$ 10,408.588	\$ 10,198.734	
SHORT-TERM DEBT	179.000	30.000	150.000	20.000	85.000	
TOTAL-CAPITAL EMPLOYED	<u>\$ 12,852.000</u>	<u>\$ 11,633.100</u>	<u>\$ 10,660.300</u>	<u>\$ 10,428.588</u>	<u>\$ 10,283.734</u>	
INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2)						
TOTAL DEBT	4.28 %	4.38 %	4.51 %	4.61 %	4.69 %	
CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS						
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL:						5 YEAR AVERAGE
LONG-TERM DEBT	46.59 %	47.58 %	46.97 %	47.39 %	47.49 %	47.20 %
PREFERRED STOCK	-	-	-	-	-	-
COMMON EQUITY	53.41	52.42	53.03	52.61	52.51	52.80
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL:						
TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM	47.33 %	47.72 %	47.72 %	47.49 %	47.92 %	47.64 %
PREFERRED STOCK	-	-	-	-	-	-
COMMON EQUITY	52.67	52.28	52.28	52.51	52.08	52.36
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	69.04 %	85.99 %	92.69 %	103.36 %	81.00 %	86.42 %
RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY	9.20 %	9.31 %	8.91 %	9.05 %	9.29 %	9.15 %
TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)	3.69 x	3.46 x	3.45 x	3.09 x	3.23 x	3.38 x
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)	15.52 %	17.70 %	31.94 %	22.53 %	25.64 %	22.67 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	47.33 %	47.72 %	47.72 %	47.49 %	47.92 %	47.64 %

Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less

Source of Information: Company audited financial statements

Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies
CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1)
2016 - 2020, Inclusive

	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	
	(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)					
<u>CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS</u>						
<u>AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED</u>						
TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL	\$5,167.601	\$4,449.970	\$4,008.781	\$3,441.727	\$3,183.771	
SHORT-TERM DEBT	\$314.214	\$422.695	\$317.279	\$309.051	\$263.516	
TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED	<u>\$5,481.815</u>	<u>\$4,872.665</u>	<u>\$4,326.060</u>	<u>\$3,750.778</u>	<u>\$3,447.287</u>	
<u>INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2)</u>						
TOTAL DEBT	3.34 %	3.66 %	3.70 %	3.79 %	3.57 %	
PREFERRED STOCK	6.12	2.81				
<u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS</u>						
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL:						5 YEAR AVERAGE
LONG-TERM DEBT	50.44 %	47.91 %	48.37 %	47.45 %	46.11 %	48.06 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.69	0.74	-	-	-	0.28
COMMON EQUITY	<u>48.87</u>	<u>51.35</u>	<u>51.63</u>	<u>52.55</u>	<u>53.89</u>	<u>51.66</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL:						
TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM	53.98 %	52.38 %	52.43 %	51.86 %	49.66 %	52.06 %
PREFERRED STOCK	0.61	0.64	-	-	-	0.25
COMMON EQUITY	<u>45.41</u>	<u>46.98</u>	<u>47.57</u>	<u>48.14</u>	<u>50.34</u>	<u>47.69</u>
TOTAL	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>FINANCIAL STATISTICS</u>						
<u>FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED</u>						
EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO	4.85 %	3.92 %	4.60 %	3.82 %	4.73 %	4.38 %
MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO	179.50	218.48	211.77	218.10	196.09	204.79
DIVIDEND YIELD	3.34	2.74	2.86	2.75	2.94	2.93
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	77.37	73.87	54.17	55.23	62.20	64.57
<u>RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY</u>	8.77 %	8.62 %	9.88 %	8.28 %	9.29 %	8.97 %
<u>TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)</u>	5.48 x	5.35 x	5.49 x	7.72 x	4.00 x	5.61 x
<u>FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)</u>	14.20 %	13.18 %	23.75 %	16.76 %	21.91 %	17.96 %
<u>TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL</u>	53.98 %	52.38 %	52.43 %	51.86 %	49.66 %	52.06 %

Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: Company Annual Forms 10-K

Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies
2016 - 2020, Inclusive

	<u>2020</u>	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>5 YEAR AVERAGE</u>
<u>Atmos Energy Corporation</u>						
Long-Term Debt	40.02 %	36.22 %	36.47 %	41.37 %	36.23 %	38.06 %
Short-Term Debt	-	4.77	6.84	6.04	12.33	6.00
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	59.98	59.01	56.69	52.59	51.44	55.94
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>New Jersey Resources Corporation</u>						
Long-Term Debt	53.72 %	49.70 %	45.36 %	43.62 %	46.62 %	47.80 %
Short-Term Debt	2.94	0.81	5.29	9.98	5.04	4.81
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	43.34	49.48	49.35	46.40	48.34	47.38
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>Northwest Natural Holding Company</u>						
Long-Term Debt	44.47 %	46.47 %	42.89 %	49.46 %	44.32 %	45.52 %
Short-Term Debt	14.17	7.86	12.68	3.44	3.28	8.29
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	41.36	45.67	44.43	47.10	52.40	46.19
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>ONE Gas, Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	37.65 %	32.71 %	35.44 %	33.99 %	36.97 %	35.35 %
Short-Term Debt	9.83	13.14	8.26	10.18	4.50	9.18
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	52.51	54.16	56.31	55.84	58.54	55.47
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>South Jersey Industries, Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	56.33 %	52.76 %	64.88 %	43.54 %	39.61 %	51.42 %
Short-Term Debt	11.51	17.64	6.18	12.71	11.28	11.86
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	32.16	29.60	28.94	43.75	49.11	36.71
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	49.91 %	47.56 %	47.10 %	46.66 %	49.06 %	48.06 %
Short-Term Debt	1.93	4.07	3.35	5.65	-	3.00
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	0.00
Common Equity	48.16	48.37	49.55	47.69	50.94	48.94
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>Spire Inc.</u>						
Long-Term Debt	43.93 %	39.24 %	40.57 %	45.91 %	49.02 %	43.73 %
Short-Term Debt	11.46	13.74	11.71	10.46	9.38	11.35
Preferred Stock	4.28	4.47	-	-	-	1.75
Common Equity	40.33	42.54	47.72	43.63	41.60	43.16
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>
<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>						
Long-Term Debt	46.57 %	43.52 %	44.67 %	43.51 %	43.12 %	44.28 %
Short-Term Debt	7.41	8.86	7.76	8.35	6.54	7.78
Preferred Stock	0.61	0.64	-	-	-	0.25
Common Equity	45.41	46.98	47.57	48.14	50.34	47.68
Total Capital	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>	<u>100.00 %</u>

Source of Information
Annual Forms 10-K

Northern States Power Company
Operating Subsidiary Company Capital Structures of the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

2020					
Company Name	Parent Company Ticker	Common Equity	Long-Term Debt	Short-Term Debt	Total Capital
Atmos Energy Corporation	ATO	58.75%	41.25%	0.00%	100.00%
New Jersey Natural Gas Company	NJR	53.09%	46.91%	0.00%	100.00%
Northwest Natural Gas Company	NWN	40.43%	48.36%	11.21%	100.00%
ONE Gas, Inc.	OGS	52.28%	37.93%	9.79%	100.00%
Elizabethtown Gas Company	SJI	NA	NA	NA	NA
South Jersey Gas Company	SJI	53.87%	44.17%	1.96%	100.00%
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	47.21%	51.59%	1.20%	100.00%
Missouri Gas Energy	SR	NA	NA	NA	NA
Spire Alabama Inc.	SR	58.68%	32.96%	8.36%	100.00%
Spire Gulf Inc.	SR	NA	NA	NA	NA
Spire Mississippi Inc.	SR	NA	NA	NA	NA
Spire Missouri Inc.	SR	50.71%	38.65%	10.64%	100.00%
	Mean	<u>51.88%</u>	<u>42.73%</u>	<u>5.40%</u>	<u>100.00%</u>

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence

Northern States Power Company
Cost of Long-Term Debt Comparison

Bloomberg Fair Value Curve																
Issue	Initial Offering	Date of Offering	Date of Maturity	Years to Maturity	Coupon	Net Issuance		Net Proceeds	Annual Interest		Annual Net Amortization	Total Expense	Yield	BFV		
						Costs			Expense					Term	Utility A-Rated	Utility BBB-Rated
Series due July 1, 2025 (FMB)	\$ 250,000	7/7/1995	7/1/2025	30	7.125%	\$	417	\$ 249,583	\$ 17,813	\$	141	\$ 17,953	7.19%	30	7.42%	7.50%
Series due March 1, 2028 (FMB)	\$ 150,000	3/11/1998	3/1/2028	30	6.500%	\$	607	\$ 149,393	\$ 9,750	\$	108	\$ 9,858	6.60%	30	6.86%	7.07%
Series Due July 15, 2035 (FMB)	\$ 250,000	7/21/2005	7/15/2035	30	5.250%	\$	1,525	\$ 248,475	\$ 13,125	\$	117	\$ 13,242	5.33%	30	5.18%	5.55%
Series Due June 1, 2036 (FMB)	\$ 400,000	5/25/2006	6/1/2036	30	6.250%	\$	(4,657)	\$ 404,657	\$ 25,000	\$	(335)	\$ 24,665	6.10%	30	6.27%	6.59%
Series Due July 1, 2037 (FMB)	\$ 350,000	6/1/2007	7/1/2037	30	6.200%	\$	3,152	\$ 346,848	\$ 21,700	\$	211	\$ 21,911	6.32%	30	6.09%	6.24%
Series Due November 1, 2039 (FMB)	\$ 300,000	11/17/2009	11/1/2039	30	5.350%	\$	4,579	\$ 295,421	\$ 16,050	\$	265	\$ 16,315	5.52%	30	5.57%	6.23%
Series Due August 15, 2040 (FMB)	\$ 250,000	8/11/2010	8/15/2040	30	4.850%	\$	2,246	\$ 247,754	\$ 12,125	\$	124	\$ 12,249	4.94%	30	5.25%	5.76%
Series Due August 15, 2022 (FMB) (2)	\$ 100,000	8/13/2012	8/15/2022	10	2.150%	\$	60	\$ 99,940	\$ 2,150	\$	220	\$ 2,370	2.37%	10	2.78%	3.53%
Series Due August 15, 2042 (FMB)	\$ 500,000	8/13/2012	8/15/2042	30	3.400%	\$	36,826	\$ 463,174	\$ 17,000	\$	1,833	\$ 18,833	4.07%	30	3.74%	4.19%
Series Due May 15, 2023 (FMB)	\$ 400,000	5/20/2013	5/15/2023	10	2.600%	\$	436	\$ 399,564	\$ 10,400	\$	527	\$ 10,927	2.73%	10	2.81%	3.38%
Series Due May 15, 2044 (FMB)	\$ 300,000	5/13/2014	5/15/2044	30	4.125%	\$	3,417	\$ 296,583	\$ 12,375	\$	156	\$ 12,531	4.23%	30	4.35%	4.72%
Series Due Aug 15, 2045 (FMB)	\$ 300,000	8/11/2015	8/15/2045	30	4.000%	\$	6,767	\$ 293,233	\$ 12,000	\$	293	\$ 12,293	4.19%	30	4.37%	4.77%
Series Due May 15, 2046 (FMB)	\$ 350,000	5/31/2016	5/15/2046	30	3.600%	\$	5,967	\$ 344,033	\$ 12,600	\$	250	\$ 12,850	3.74%	30	3.95%	4.42%
Series Due Sep 15, 2047 (FMB)	\$ 600,000	9/13/2017	9/15/2047	30	3.700%	\$	19,421	\$ 580,579	\$ 22,200	\$	771	\$ 22,971	3.96%	30	3.85%	4.17%
Series Due Mar 1, 2050 (FMB)	\$ 600,000	9/10/2019	3/1/2050	30	2.900%	\$	18,408	\$ 581,592	\$ 17,400	\$	666	\$ 18,066	3.11%	30	3.29%	3.66%
Series Due Jun 1, 2051 (FMB)	\$ 700,000	6/15/2020	6/1/2051	31	2.600%	\$	21,418	\$ 678,582	\$ 18,200	\$	741	\$ 18,941	2.79%	31	3.12%	3.55%
Series Due Apr 1, 2031 (FMB)	\$ 425,000	3/30/2021	4/1/2031	10	2.250%	\$	5,885	\$ 419,115	\$ 9,563	\$	675	\$ 10,238	2.44%	10	2.33%	2.54%
Series Due Apr 1, 2052 (FMB)	\$ 425,000	3/30/2021	4/1/2052	31	3.200%	\$	7,203	\$ 417,797	\$ 13,600	\$	242	\$ 13,842	3.31%	31	3.36%	3.66%
Series Due May 1, 2052 (FMB) (1)	\$ 366,667	5/1/2022	5/1/2052	30	3.300%	\$	5,431	\$ 361,236	\$ 12,100	\$	184	\$ 12,284	3.40%	30	N/A	N/A
TOTAL	\$ 6,650,000			Weighted Averages:	3.96%										Bloomberg Fair Value Curve	
															A-Rated	Utility BBB-Rated
															4.20%	4.58%

Notes:

Sources: Company provided data and Bloomberg Professional.
Fair Value Curve yields are 30-day averages from Bloomberg Professional.

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
	Average Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies							
Atmos Energy Corporation	2.52 %	7.00 %	7.40 %	7.80 %	7.40 %	2.61 %	10.01 %
New Jersey Resources Corporation	3.35	2.00	7.10	6.00	5.03	3.43	8.46
Northwest Natural Holding Company	3.64	5.50	4.90	5.50	5.30	3.74	9.04
ONE Gas, Inc.	3.13	6.50	5.00	5.00	5.50	3.22	8.72
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	4.69	11.50	5.40	4.80	7.23	4.86	12.09
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	3.46	8.00	5.50	4.00	5.83	3.56	9.39
Spire Inc.	3.62	10.00	5.50	7.31	7.60	3.76	11.36
						Average	9.87 %
						Median	9.39 %
						Average of Mean and Median	9.63 %

NA= Not Available
NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes:

- (1) Indicated dividend at 08/31/2021 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 08/31/2021 for each company.
- (2) From pages 3 through 9 of this Schedule.
- (3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
- (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for Atmos Energy Corporation, $2.52\% \times (1 + (1/2 \times 7.40\%)) = 2.61\%$.
- (5) Column 5 + column 6.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Two Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies	Stock Price	Annualized Dividend	Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (5)
Atmos Energy Corporation	\$ 97.51	2.50	2.56 %	7.00 %	7.40 %	7.80 %	7.40 %	2.65 %	8.86 % (6)
New Jersey Resources Corporation	37.34	1.33	3.56	2.00	7.10	6.00	5.03	3.65	9.59 (6)
Northwest Natural Holding Company	51.45	1.92	3.73	5.50	4.90	5.50	5.30	3.83	9.13
ONE Gas, Inc.	71.82	2.32	3.23	6.50	5.00	5.00	5.50	3.32	8.82
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	24.81	1.21	4.88	11.50	5.40	4.80	7.23	5.06	12.29
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	70.31	2.38	3.39	8.00	5.50	4.00	5.83	3.49	9.32
Spire Inc.	66.70	2.60	3.90	10.00	5.50	7.31	7.60	4.05	10.40 (6)
						Average	6.27	Average	9.77 %
						1 Standard Deviation Below Mean	5.25		
						1 Standard Deviation Above Mean	7.29	Median	9.32 %
							Average of Mean and Median		9.55 %

NA= Not Available
NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes:

- (1) Indicated dividend at 08/31/2021 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 08/31/2021 for each company.
- (2) From pages 3 through 9 of this Schedule.
- (3) Average of columns 4 through 7 excluding negative growth rates.
- (4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 8) x column 3 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for Atmos Energy Corporation, $2.56\% \times (1 + (1/2 \times 7.40\%)) = 2.65\%$.
- (5) Column 8 + column 9.
- (6) The Two Growth Method was applied to Companies with short-term EPS growth rates greater than one standard deviation from the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate. The mean of all Utility Proxy Group Companies with growth rates are within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate was applied as the long-term growth rate for these Companies.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021

ATMOS ENERGY CORP. NYSE-ATO

RECENT PRICE 101.07

P/E RATIO 19.4 (Trailing: 19.0) (Median: 19.0)

RELATIVE P/E RATIO 1.01

DIV YLD 2.7%

VALUE LINE

TIMELINESS 4 Lowered 8/20/21

SAFETY 1 Raised 6/6/14

TECHNICAL 3 Raised 8/27/21

BETA .80 (1.00 = Market)

18-Month Target Price Range

Low-High Midpoint (% to Mid)

\$75-\$160 \$118 (15%)

2024-26 PROJECTIONS

Price Gain Ann'l Total

High Low 160 130 (+60%) (+30%) 14% 9%

Institutional Decisions

3Q2020 4Q2020 1Q2021

to Buy 256 280 256

to Sell 23 228 258

Hid (\$'000) 108898 107949 107920

Percent shares traded 24 16 8

LEGENDS

0.50 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate

Relative Price Strength

Options: Yes

Shaded area indicates recession

% TOT. RETURN 7/21

THIS STOCK VL ARITH. INDEX

1 yr. -4.6 55.5

3 yr. 14.2 48.6

5 yr. 37.6 95.5

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

61.75 75.27 66.03 79.52 53.69 53.12 48.15 38.10 42.88 49.22 40.82 32.23 26.01 28.00 24.32 22.41 24.60 25.05

3.90 4.26 4.14 4.19 4.29 4.64 4.72 4.76 5.14 5.42 5.81 6.19 6.62 7.24 7.57 8.03 8.55 9.10

1.72 2.00 1.94 2.00 1.97 2.16 2.26 2.10 2.50 2.96 3.09 3.38 3.60 4.00 4.35 4.72 5.10 5.45

1.24 1.26 1.28 1.30 1.32 1.34 1.36 1.38 1.40 1.48 1.56 1.68 1.80 1.94 2.10 2.30 2.50 2.70

4.14 5.20 4.39 5.20 5.51 6.02 6.90 8.12 9.32 8.32 9.61 10.46 10.72 13.19 14.19 15.38 15.80 15.75

19.90 20.16 22.01 22.60 23.52 24.16 24.98 26.14 28.47 30.74 31.48 33.32 36.74 42.87 48.18 53.95 60.20 68.25

80.54 81.74 89.33 90.81 92.55 90.16 90.30 90.24 90.64 100.39 101.48 103.93 106.10 111.27 119.34 125.88 133.00 137.00

16.1 13.5 15.9 13.6 12.5 13.2 14.4 15.9 16.1 17.5 20.8 22.0 21.7 23.2 22.3

.86 .73 .84 .82 .83 .84 .90 1.01 .89 .85 .88 1.09 1.11 1.17 1.24 1.13

4.5% 4.7% 4.2% 4.8% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 4.1% 3.5% 3.1% 2.9% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2%

CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 6/30/21

Total Debt \$7328.9 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$410.0 mill.

LT Debt \$7128.5 mill. LT Interest \$370.0 mill.

(LT interest earned: 9.5x; total interest coverage: 9.5x)

Leases, Uncapitalized Annual rentals \$20.4 mill.

Pfd Stock None

Pension Assets-9/20 \$528.9 mill. Oblig. \$604.2 mill.

Common Stock 130,790,813 shs. as of 7/30/21

MARKET CAP: \$13.2 billion (Large Cap)

CURRENT POSITION (SMILL.)

Cash Assets 24.5 20.8 524.6

Other 433.5 450.5 590.8

Current Assets 458.0 471.3 1115.4

Accts Payable 265.0 235.8 280.4

Debt Due 464.9 2 200.4

Other 479.5 546.4 581.7

Current Liab. 1209.4 782.4 1062.5

Fix. Chg. Cov. 990% 1306% 1315%

ANNUAL RATES

Past 10 Yrs. Past 5 Yrs. Est'd '18-'20 to '24-'26

Revenues -8.5% -11.0% 6.0%

"Cash Flow" 5.5% 7.0% 5.0%

Earnings 8.0% 9.0% 7.0%

Dividends 5.0% 7.5% 7.5%

Book Value 7.5% 10.0% 10.5%

Fiscal Year Ends

QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$ mill.) A

Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Full Fiscal Year

2018 889.2 1219.4 562.2 444.7 3115.5

2019 877.8 1094.6 485.7 443.7 2901.8

2020 875.6 977.6 493.0 474.9 2821.1

2021 914.5 1319.1 605.6 435.8 3275

2022 960 1405 580 485 3470

Fiscal Year Ends

EARNINGS PER SHARE A B E

Dec.31 Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Full Fiscal Year

2018 1.40 1.57 .64 .41 4.00

2019 1.38 1.82 .68 .49 4.35

2020 1.47 1.95 .79 .53 4.72

2021 1.71 2.30 .78 .31 5.10

2022 1.84 2.29 .82 .50 5.45

Cal-endar

QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID C

Mar.31 Jun.30 Sep.30 Dec.31 Full Year

2017 .45 .45 .45 .485 1.84

2018 .485 .485 .485 .525 1.98

2019 .525 .525 .525 .575 2.15

2020 .575 .575 .575 .625 2.35

2021 .625 .625 .625

(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Diluted shares. Excl. nonrec. gains (loss): '10, 5c; '11, (1c); '18, \$1.43; '20, 17c. Excludes discontinued operations: '11, 10c; '12, 27c; '13, 14c; '17, 13c. Next egs. rpt. due early Nov.

(C) Dividends historically paid in early March, June, Sept., and Dec. Div. reinvestment plan. Direct stock purchase plan avail.

(D) In millions.

(E) Qtrs may not add due to change in shrs outstanding.

BUSINESS: Atmos Energy Corporation is engaged primarily in the distribution and sale of natural gas to over three million customers through six regulated natural gas utility operations: Louisiana Division, West Texas Division, Mid-Tex Division, Mississippi Division, Colorado-Kansas Division, and Kentucky/Mid-States Division. Gas sales breakdown for fiscal 2020: 68.6%, residential; 26.2%, commercial; 3.6%, industrial; and 1.6% other. The company sold Atmos Energy Marketing, 1/17. Officers and directors own approximately 1.2% of common stock (12/20 Proxy). President and Chief Executive Officer: Kevin Akers. Incorporated: Texas. Address: Three Lincoln Centre, Suite 1800, 5430 LBJ Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75240. Telephone: 972-934-9227. Internet: www.atmosenergy.com.

Atmos Energy appears to be en route to a solid fiscal 2021 (ends September 30th). Through the first nine months, share net of \$4.79 was about 14% above the year-ago figure of \$4.21. That was made possible partly by the natural gas distribution division, which benefited from higher rates, mainly in the Mid-Tex, Mississippi, Louisiana, and West Texas units. Customer growth, primarily in the Mid-Tex unit, also helped. Elsewhere, results of the pipeline and storage business received a boost from GRIP filings approved in May, 2020 and May, 2021. Though uncertainties surrounding the coronavirus persist, we expect full-year earnings to rise around 8%, to \$5.10 a share, versus fiscal 2020's \$4.72 tally. Concerning next year, share net stands to increase at a similar percentage rate, to \$5.45, as operating margins expand further. There's sufficient liquidity to meet various obligations for some time. When June ended, cash and equivalents were \$524.6 million. Too, long-term debt was manageable, at 48% of total capital, and short-term commitments did not seem to be a major hurdle. What's more, \$4 billion in common stock and/or debt securities remained available for issuance (out of \$5 billion) under a shelf registration statement that expires in June, 2024. Lastly, Atmos can tap into four revolving credit facilities totaling \$2.5 billion plus a \$1.5 billion commercial paper program. Business prospects out to mid-decade look encouraging. The company ranks as one of the country's biggest natural gas-only distributors, with more than three million customers across several states, including Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Furthermore, we believe the pipeline and storage unit has promising overall growth opportunities, given that it operates in one of the most-active drilling regions in the world. Healthy corporate finances are another plus. So, in Atmos' current configuration, annual bottom-line advances may be between 6% and 8% over the 2024-2026 horizon. These shares, though untimely, possess decent, risk-adjusted total return potential. Long-term capital gains possibilities are worthwhile. Dividend growth prospects appear promising, as well. Frederick L. Harris, III August 27, 2021

Company's Financial Strength A+ Stock's Price Stability 95 Price Growth Persistence 80 Earnings Predictability 100

NEW JERSEY RES. NYSE-NJR				RECENT PRICE	37.88	P/E RATIO	16.3 (Trailing: 14.3 Median: 17.0)	RELATIVE P/E RATIO	0.85	DIV'D YLD	3.5%	VALUE LINE	Target Price Range													
TIMELINESS	4	Lowered 8/20/21	High: 22.0 25.2 25.1 23.8 32.1 34.1 38.9 45.4 51.8 51.2 44.7 44.4	Low: 16.7 19.8 19.3 19.5 21.9 26.8 30.5 33.7 35.6 40.3 21.1 33.3											2024	2025	2026									
SAFETY	2	Lowered 4/17/20	LEGENDS																							
TECHNICAL	2	Lowered 8/13/21	0.40 x Dividends p sh divided by Interest Rate																							
BETA	1.00	(1.00 = Market) Relative Price Strength																							
18-Month Target Price Range			3-for-2 split 3/08																							
Low-High			2-for-1 split 3/15																							
Midpoint (% to Mid)			Options: Yes																							
\$16-\$51			\$34 (-10%)																							
2024-26 PROJECTIONS			Shaded area indicates recession																							
High	Price	Gain	Ann'l Total												% TOT. RETURN 7/21											
Low	50	(+30%)	Return												THIS STOCK VL ARITH.											
	35	(-10%)	10%												1 yr. 28.7 55.5											
			2%											3 yr. -8.3 48.6												
														5 yr. 20.2 95.5												
Institutional Decisions														© VALUE LINE PUB. LLC 24-26												
	3Q2020	4Q2020	1Q2021																							
to Buy	129	132	105																							
to Sell	105	118	139																							
Hld's(000)	69155	71013	68468																							
2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022									
38.10	39.81	36.31	45.37	31.17	32.05	36.30	27.08	38.38	44.40	32.09	21.90	26.28	33.24	29.01	20.39	20.90	26.55	Revenues per sh ^A								
1.31	1.37	1.22	1.81	1.58	1.63	1.70	1.86	1.93	2.73	2.52	2.46	2.68	3.72	2.99	3.30	3.50	3.75	"Cash Flow" per sh								
.88	.93	.78	1.35	1.20	1.23	1.29	1.36	1.37	2.08	1.78	1.61	1.73	2.72	1.96	2.07	2.20	2.40	Earnings per sh ^B								
.45	.48	.51	.56	.62	.68	.72	.77	.81	.86	.93	.98	1.04	1.11	1.19	1.27	1.34	1.42	Div'ds Decl'd per sh ^C								
.64	.64	.73	.86	.90	1.05	1.13	1.26	1.33	1.52	3.76	4.15	3.80	4.39	5.83	4.65	4.10	4.10	Cap'l Spending per sh								
5.30	7.50	7.75	8.64	8.29	8.81	9.36	9.80	10.65	11.48	12.99	13.58	14.33	16.18	17.37	19.26	20.35	21.55	Book Value per sh ^D								
82.64	82.88	83.22	84.12	83.17	82.35	82.89	83.05	83.32	84.20	85.19	85.88	86.32	87.69	89.34	95.80	97.00	98.00	Common Shs Outst'g ^E								
16.8	16.1	21.6	12.3	14.9	15.0	16.8	16.8	16.0	11.7	16.6	21.3	22.4	15.6	24.3	17.7			Avg Ann'l P/E Ratio								
.89	.87	1.15	.74	.99	.95	1.05	1.07	.90	.62	.84	1.12	1.13	.84	1.29	.91			Relative P/E Ratio								
3.1%	3.2%	3.0%	3.3%	3.5%	3.7%	3.3%	3.4%	3.7%	3.5%	3.1%	2.9%	2.7%	2.6%	2.5%	3.5%			Avg Ann'l Div'd Yield								
CAPITAL STRUCTURE as of 6/30/21																										
Total Debt \$2420.9 mill. Due in 5 Yrs \$420.5 mill.				3009.2	2248.9	3198.1	3738.1	2734.0	1880.9	2268.6	2915.1	2592.0	1953.7	2025	2600	Revenues (\$mill) ^A										
LT Debt \$2221.6 mill. LT Interest \$47.1 mill.				106.5	112.4	113.7	176.9	153.7	138.1	149.4	240.5	175.0	196.2	215	235	Net Profit (\$mill)										
Incl. \$54.9 mill. capitalized leases.				30.2%	7.1%	25.4%	30.2%	26.3%	15.5%	17.2%	--	NMF	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	Income Tax Rate										
(LT interest earned: 5.0x; total interest coverage: 5.0x)				3.5%	5.0%	3.6%	4.7%	5.6%	7.3%	6.6%	8.2%	6.7%	10.0%	10.6%	9.1%	Net Profit Margin										
Pension Assets-9/20 \$404.4 mill.				35.5%	39.2%	36.6%	38.2%	43.2%	47.7%	44.6%	45.4%	49.8%	55.1%	54.0%	54.0%	Long-Term Debt Ratio										
Oblig. \$643.0 mill.				64.5%	60.8%	63.4%	61.8%	56.8%	52.3%	55.4%	54.6%	50.2%	44.9%	46.0%	46.0%	Common Equity Ratio										
Pfd Stock None				1203.1	1339.0	1400.3	1564.4	1950.6	2230.1	2233.7	2599.6	3088.9	4104.2	4275	4610	Total Capital (\$mill)										
Common Stock 96,433,901 shs.				1295.9	1484.9	1643.1	1884.1	2128.3	2407.7	2609.7	2651.0	3041.2	3983.0	4065	4145	Net Plant (\$mill)										
as of 8/2/21				9.7%	9.2%	9.0%	12.1%	8.6%	6.9%	7.7%	10.1%	6.4%	5.6%	6.0%	6.0%	Return on Total Cap'l										
MARKET CAP: \$3.7 billion (Mid Cap)				13.7%	13.8%	12.8%	18.3%	13.9%	11.8%	12.1%	16.9%	11.3%	10.6%	11.0%	11.0%	Return on Shr. Equity										
CURRENT POSITION				13.7%	13.8%	12.8%	18.3%	13.9%	11.8%	12.1%	16.9%	11.3%	10.6%	11.0%	11.0%	Return on Com Equity										
2019				6.2%	6.2%	5.2%	11.0%	7.0%	4.8%	5.0%	10.2%	4.6%	4.3%	4.5%	4.5%	Retained to Com Eq										
2020				55%	55%	59%	40%	50%	60%	59%	40%	59%	60%	61%	59%	All Div'ds to Net Prof										
6/30/21				55%	55%	59%	40%	50%	60%	59%	40%	59%	60%	61%	59%											
(SMILL.)																										
Cash Assets				2.7	117.0	4.7																				
Other				508.9	505.3	513.6																				
Current Assets				511.6	622.3	518.3																				
Accts Payable				295.9	270.1	310.8																				
Debt Due				46.9	152.6	199.3																				
Other				103.6	111.0	103.5																				
Current Liab.				446.4	533.7	613.6																				
Fix. Chg. Cov.				545%	545%	550%																				
ANNUAL RATES																										
of change (per sh)																										
Past 10 Yrs.																										
Past 5 Yrs.																										
Est'd '18-'20 to '24-'26																										
Revenues				-2.5%	-6.5%	-5%																				
"Cash Flow"				7.0%	7.0%	3.0%																				
Earnings				6.0%	5.5%	2.0%																				
Dividends				7.0%	6.5%	5.5%																				
Book Value				7.5%	8.5%	6.0%																				
Fiscal Year Ends	QUARTERLY REVENUES (\$mill.) ^A					Full Fiscal Year																				
Dec.31	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30																							
2018	705.3	1019.1	543.4	647.3	2915.1																					
2019	811.8	866.2	434.9	479.1	2592.0																					
2020	615.0	639.6	299.0	400.1	1953.7																					
2021	454.3	802.2	367.6	400.9	2025																					
2022	600	945	505	550	2600																					
Fiscal Year Ends	EARNINGS PER SHARE ^{A B}					Full Fiscal Year																				
Dec.31	Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30																							
2018	1.53	1.61	d.09	d.33	2.72																					
2019	.61	1.27	d.20	.29	1.96																					
2020	.44	1.12	d.06	.57	2.07																					
2021	.46	1.77	d.15	.12	2.20																					
2022	.50	1.85	d.13	.18	2.40																					
Cal-endar	QUARTERLY DIVIDENDS PAID ^C					Full Year																				
Mar.31	Jun.30	Sep.30	Dec.31																							
2017	.255	.255	.255	.273	1.04																					
2018	.273	.273	.273	.2925	1.11																					
2019	.2925	.2925	.2925	.3125	1.19																					
2020	.3125	.3125	.3125	.3325	1.27																					
2021	.3325	.3325	.3325																							

SINCE OUR MAY REVIEW, SHARES OF NEW JERSEY RESOURCES HAVE CORRECTED MODERATELY. In fact, over that time frame, the stock's price has receded approximately 9.5%. This likely reflects the challenging operating environment that has persisted for some time.

THE COMPANY RECENTLY POSTED SOMEWHAT MIXED JUNE-PERIOD FINANCIAL RESULTS. For the second quarter, revenues increased nearly 23%, to \$367.6 million, thanks to a more-than-40% rise in non-utility volumes, partially offset by a low single-digit decline in regulated utility volumes. On the profitability front, total operating expenses increased 180 basis points as a function of the top line. After accounting for a sizable increase in interest expense and taxes, NJR's bottom line loss fell 2.5 times deeper into the red, to a deficit of \$0.15. That said, this was still markedly better than our estimate for a loss of \$0.20.

AS A RESULT, WE HAVE ADDED A NICKEL TO OUR 2021 SHARE-NET ESTIMATE, BRINGING THAT FIGURE TO \$2.20. Our revised figure would represent an annual earnings advance of nearly 6.5%. This ought to be sup-

ported by an estimated top-line increase of about 3.5%, to roughly \$2.1 billion. A primary driver this year will likely be the incremental contributions from the non-utility operations, particularly the Energy Services arm, which has been performing quite well, of late. Meanwhile, the New Jersey Natural Gas regulated utility business added 5,448 new customers over the first nine months of this fiscal year. However, that unit has been experiencing an uptick in bad-debt accounts, likely stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and the loss of associated jobs. Elsewhere, other developments like the Southern Reliability Link project, which is anticipated to go into service this month, and a pending base-rate increase of about \$165 million at the NJNG division should also be nicely additive.

THESE UNTIMELY SHARES APPEAR RICHLY VALUED AT THIS TIME. NJR's stock price already reflects the bulk of the earnings growth potential we project for the pull to 2024-2026. Alternatively, the equity does offer attractive dividend growth potential and an above-average yield.

Bryan J. Fong

August 27, 2021

(A) Diluted earnings. Excl. nonrec. gains (losses): '05, (\$11c); '06, 7c. Next egs. report due early November. (B) Dividends historically paid early March, June, September, and December. ■† Div'd reinvestment and stock purchase plan avail. (C) In millions.		Company's Financial Strength	A
(D) Totals may not sum due to rounding.		Stock's Price Stability	80
		Price Growth Persistence	65
		Earnings Predictability	95

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(A) Fiscal year ends Sept. 30th. (B) Based on diluted shares outstanding. Excludes nonrecurring loss: '06, 7c. Excludes gain from discontinued operations: '08, '94c. Next earnings report		due late Oct. (C) Dividends paid in early January, April, July, and October. ■ Dividend reinvestment plan available. (D) Incl. deferred charges. In '20: \$1,171.6 mill., \$22.71/sh.	(E) In millions. (F) Qtly. egs. may not sum due to rounding or change in shares outstanding.	<table><tr><td>Company's Financial Strength</td><td>B++</td></tr><tr><td>Stock's Price Stability</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Price Growth Persistence</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Earnings Predictability</td><td>50</td></tr></table>	Company's Financial Strength	B++	Stock's Price Stability	90	Price Growth Persistence	60	Earnings Predictability	50
Company's Financial Strength	B++											
Stock's Price Stability	90											
Price Growth Persistence	60											
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Northern States Power Company
Summary of Risk Premium Models for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>
Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1)	10.46 %
Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2)	<u>10.43 %</u>
Average	<u><u>10.45 %</u></u>

Notes:

(1) From page 2 of this Schedule.

(2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company

Indicated ROE

Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1).

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies	L/T Average Predicted Variance	Spot Predicted Variance	Recommended Variance (2)	GARCH Coefficient	Predicted Risk Premium (3)	Risk-Free Rate (4)	Indicated ROE (5)
Atmos Energy Corporation	0.33%	0.37%	0.35%	2.2456	9.89%	2.70%	12.59%
New Jersey Resources Corporation	0.38%	0.33%	0.36%	2.0122	8.94%	2.70%	11.64%
Northwest Natural Holding Company	0.32%	0.26%	0.29%	1.5386	5.49%	2.70%	8.19%
ONE Gas, Inc.	0.29%	0.32%	0.30%	3.6705	14.27%	2.70%	NMF
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	0.38%	0.49%	0.44%	1.6281	8.89%	2.70%	11.59%
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	0.43%	0.34%	0.39%	1.3903	6.67%	2.70%	9.37%
Spire Inc.	0.71%	0.42%	0.56%	0.9400	6.56%	2.70%	9.26%
						Average	<u>10.44%</u>
						Median	<u>10.48%</u>
						Average of Mean and Median	<u>10.46%</u>

Notes:

(1) The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient.

The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service.

(2) Average of Columns [1] and [2].

(3) $(1 + (\text{Column [3]} * \text{Column [4]})^{12}) - 1$.

(4) From note 2 on page 2 of Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 7.

(5) Column [5] + Column [6].

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	3.41 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	<u>0.38 (2)</u>
3.	Adjusted Prospective Yield on A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	3.79 %
4.	Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group(4)	<u>0.04</u>
5.	Adjusted Bond Yield	3.83 %
6.	Equity Risk Premium (5)	<u>6.60</u>
7.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>10.43 %</u></u>

- Notes:
- (1) Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corporate bonds from Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10 and 11 of this Schedule).
 - (2) The average yield spread of A2 rated public utility bonds over Aaa rated corporate bonds of 0.38% from page 4 of this Schedule.
 - (3) Source of Information: Bloomberg Professional Services.
 - (4) Adjustment to reflect the A2/A3 Moody's LT issuer rating of the Utility Proxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule. The 0.04% upward adjustment is derived by taking 1/6 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 Public Utility Bonds ($1/3 * 0.25\% = 0.04\%$) as derived from page 4 of this Schedule.
 - (5) From page 7 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for
Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields - Moody's

	[1]	[2]	[3]
	<u>Aaa Rated Corporate Bond</u>	<u>A2 Rated Public Utility Bond</u>	<u>Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bond</u>
Aug-2021	2.55 %	2.95 %	3.19 %
Jul-2021	2.57	2.95	3.20
Jun-2021	<u>2.79</u>	<u>3.16</u>	<u>3.41</u>
Average	<u><u>2.64 %</u></u>	<u><u>3.02 %</u></u>	<u><u>3.27 %</u></u>

Selected Bond Spreads

A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:
0.38 % (1)

Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds:
0.25 % (2)

Notes:

(1) Column [2] - Column [1].

(2) Column [3] - Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Service

Northern States Power Company
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	Moody's		Standard & Poor's	
	Long-Term Issuer Rating		Long-Term Issuer Rating	
	August 2021		August 2021	
<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>	<u>Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)</u>	<u>Numerical Weighting (2)</u>	<u>Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)</u>	<u>Numerical Weighting (2)</u>
Atmos Energy Corporation	A1	5.0	A-	7.0
New Jersey Resources Corporation	A1	5.0	NR	- -
Northwest Natural Holding Company	Baa1	8.0	A+	5.0
ONE Gas, Inc.	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Spire Inc.	A1/A2	5.5	A-	7.0
Average	<u>A2/A3</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>A-/BBB+</u>	<u>7.5</u>

Notes:

(1)

Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.

(2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service
Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for
Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
A3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ba2	12	BB
Ba3	13	BB-
B1	14	B+
B2	15	B
B3	16	B-

Northern States Power Company
Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	8.46 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A rated bonds (2)	5.62
3.	Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 803 Fully-Litigated Natural Gas Utility Rate Cases (3)	<u>5.73</u>
4.	Average equity risk premium	<u><u>6.60 %</u></u>

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.
(2) From page 12 of this Schedule.
(3) From page 13 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Equity Risk Premium Measure</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>
<u>Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:</u>		
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.92 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data	8.87 (2)
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	7.88
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index	5.54 (4)
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies	11.64 (5)
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies	<u>14.76 (6)</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.10 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	<u>0.93</u>
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u><u>8.46 %</u></u>

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2021 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa corporate bonds from 1928-2020.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2020 referenced in Note 1 above. Using the equation generated from the regression, an expected equity risk premium is calculated using the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.41% (from page 12 of this Schedule).
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through August 2021.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.41% (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 8.95% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 7).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 15.05% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.41% results in an expected equity risk premium of 11.64%.
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 18.17% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.41% results in an expected equity risk premium of 14.76%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 7.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons,
Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, September 1, 2021 and June 1, 2021
Bloomberg Professional Service

2 ■ BLUE CHIP FINANCIAL FORECASTS ■ SEPTEMBER 1, 2021

Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions


Interest Rates	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly Avg.					
	Average For Week Ending				Average For Month			Latest Qtr	3Q 2021	4Q 2021	1Q 2022	2Q 2022	3Q 2022	4Q 2022
	Aug 27	Aug 20	Aug 13	Aug 6	Jul	Jun	May	2Q 2021	2021	2021	2022	2022	2022	2022
Federal Funds Rate	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
LIBOR, 3-mo.	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.16	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.10	0.06	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.19	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6
Treasury note, 5 yr.	0.81	0.78	0.81	0.69	0.76	0.84	0.82	0.84	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4
Treasury note, 10 yr.	1.31	1.26	1.34	1.22	1.32	1.52	1.62	1.59	1.4	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Treasury note, 30 yr.	1.92	1.90	1.98	1.87	1.94	2.16	2.32	2.26	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6
Corporate Aaa bond	2.72	2.70	2.79	2.67	2.72	2.91	3.06	3.00	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3
Corporate Baa bond	3.17	3.15	3.23	3.11	3.17	3.35	3.52	3.46	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2
State & Local bonds	2.64	2.65	2.65	2.63	2.60	2.64	2.64	2.65	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7
Home mortgage rate	2.87	2.86	2.87	2.77	2.87	2.98	2.96	3.00	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.5	3.5

Key Assumptions	History								Consensus Forecasts-Quarterly					
	3Q 2019	4Q 2019	1Q 2020	2Q 2020	3Q 2020	4Q 2020	1Q 2021	2Q 2021	3Q 2021	4Q 2021	1Q 2022	2Q 2022	3Q 2022	4Q 2022
	2019	2019	2020	2020	2020	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021	2022	2022	2022	2022
Fed's AFE \$ Index	110.6	110.5	111.4	112.4	107.3	105.2	103.4	102.9	105.0	105.2	105.0	104.7	104.5	104.3
Real GDP	2.8	1.9	-5.1	-31.2	33.8	4.5	6.3	6.6	6.4	5.4	4.1	3.4	2.9	2.4
GDP Price Index	1.4	1.5	1.6	-1.5	3.6	2.2	4.3	6.1	4.2	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3
Consumer Price Index	1.3	2.6	1.0	-3.1	4.7	2.4	3.7	8.4	5.5	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.2
PCE Price Index	1.1	1.7	1.3	-1.6	3.7	1.5	3.8	6.5	4.3	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index, PCE Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and PCE Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).


U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

Week ended August 27, 2021 & Year Ago v.s.
3Q 2021 & 4Q 2022
Consensus Forecasts




U.S. 3-Mo. T-Bills & 10-Yr. T-Note Yield

(Quarterly Average) Forecast




Corporate Bond Spreads

As of week ended August 27, 2021



U.S. Treasury Yield Curve

As of week ended August 27, 2021




		Average For The Year						Five-Year Averages	
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2023-2027	2028-2032
1. Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.2
	Top 10 Average	0.2	0.7	1.6	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.0	2.7
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.9	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.6
2. Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	3.3	3.5	4.2	4.7	5.0	5.2	4.5	5.2
	Top 10 Average	3.4	3.8	4.7	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.1	5.8
	Bottom 10 Average	3.2	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.4	4.6	4.0	4.7
3. LIBOR, 3-Mo.	CONSENSUS	0.4	0.6	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.6	2.4
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.0	1.8	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.2	3.0
	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.4	0.8	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.8
4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.6	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.6	2.4
	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.9	1.6	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.0	2.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.3	0.9	1.3	1.8	1.9	1.2	2.0
5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.5	1.0	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.2
	Top 10 Average	0.3	0.8	1.6	2.2	2.5	2.7	1.9	2.7
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.9	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.6
6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.2	0.5	1.1	1.6	2.0	2.2	1.5	2.3
	Top 10 Average	0.3	0.8	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.7	2.0	2.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.3	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.6	1.0	1.7
7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.6	2.4
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.0	1.8	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.2	3.0
	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.1	1.8
8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.5	0.9	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5	1.8	2.6
	Top 10 Average	0.7	1.3	2.1	2.7	3.0	3.1	2.5	3.3
	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.2	1.9
9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	1.2	1.6	2.1	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.4	3.0
	Top 10 Average	1.5	2.0	2.8	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.6
	Bottom 10 Average	0.9	1.2	1.5	1.8	2.0	2.2	1.7	2.3
10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr	CONSENSUS	2.0	2.4	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.3	2.9	3.3
	Top 10 Average	2.3	2.8	3.4	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.6	4.0
	Bottom 10 Average	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.3	2.7
11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr	CONSENSUS	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.9
	Top 10 Average	3.0	3.5	4.0	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.6
	Bottom 10 Average	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.9	3.1	2.7	3.2
12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.8
	Top 10 Average	3.6	4.2	4.7	5.2	5.4	5.4	5.0	5.4
	Bottom 10 Average	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.9	4.1	3.7	4.2
13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.3	5.8
	Top 10 Average	4.6	5.1	5.6	6.1	6.3	6.2	5.9	6.4
	Bottom 10 Average	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.7	4.9	5.2	4.7	5.2
14. State & Local Bonds Yield	CONSENSUS	2.9	3.2	3.6	3.9	4.1	4.2	3.8	4.2
	Top 10 Average	3.2	3.5	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.3	4.8
	Bottom 10 Average	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.8
15. Home Mortgage Rate	CONSENSUS	3.6	4.0	4.4	4.7	4.9	5.0	4.6	5.0
	Top 10 Average	4.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.2	5.7
	Bottom 10 Average	3.2	3.6	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.0	4.4
A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	CONSENSUS	103.7	103.7	104.0	103.7	103.6	103.3	103.7	103.1
	Top 10 Average	105.3	106.0	106.8	107.0	107.3	107.5	106.9	107.9
	Bottom 10 Average	102.0	101.5	101.4	100.8	100.4	100.0	100.8	99.4
		Year-Over-Year, % Change						Five-Year Averages	
		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2023-2027	2028-2032
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	4.2	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.1
	Top 10 Average	5.3	3.3	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.5
	Bottom 10 Average	2.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.7
C. GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3
	Bottom 10 Average	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9
D. Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
	Top 10 Average	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9
E. PCE Price Index	CONSENSUS	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1
	Top 10 Average	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3
	Bottom 10 Average	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9

Northern States Power Company
Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies
Using Holding Period Returns and
Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Implied Equity Risk Premium</u>
	<u>Equity Risk Premium based on S&P Utility Index Holding Period Returns (1):</u>	
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	4.16 %
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	6.51
3.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	4.94
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4)	7.15
5.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)	<u>5.32</u>
6.	Average Equity Risk Premium (6)	<u><u>5.62 %</u></u>

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2020. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A2 rated public utility bond yields from 1928 - 2020 referenced in note 1 above. Using the equation generated from the regression, an expected equity risk premium is calculated using the prospective A2 rated public utility bond yield of 3.79% (from line 3, page 3 of this Schedule).
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A2 rated public utility bonds from January 1928 - August 2021.
- (4) Using data from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.94% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 3.79%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 7.15%. (10.94% - 3.79% = 7.15%)
- (5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 9.11% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 3.79%, calculated on line 3 of page 12 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 5.32%. (9.11% - 3.79% = 5.32%)
- (6) Average of lines 1 through 5.

Northern States Power Company
Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to
Moody's A2 Rated Utility Bond Yields



		Prospective A2 Rated Utility Bond (1)	Prospective Equity Risk Premium
<u>Constant</u>	<u>Slope</u>		
7.573 %	-0.4865	3.79 %	5.73 %

Notes:

(1) From line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)
Atmos Energy Corporation	0.80	0.93	0.86	9.93 %	2.70 %	11.24 %	11.59 %	11.41 %
New Jersey Resources Corporation	1.00	0.97	0.99	9.93	2.70	12.53	12.55	12.54
Northwest Natural Holding Company	0.85	0.86	0.86	9.93	2.70	11.24	11.59	11.41
ONE Gas, Inc.	0.80	1.01	0.90	9.93	2.70	11.64	11.88	11.76
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	1.05	0.99	1.02	9.93	2.70	12.83	12.78	12.80
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	0.95	1.09	1.02	9.93	2.70	12.83	12.78	12.80
Spire Inc.	0.85	0.99	0.92	9.93	2.70	11.83	12.03	11.93
Mean			0.94			12.02 %	12.17 %	12.09 %
Median			0.92			11.83 %	12.03 %	11.93 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.93			11.93 %	12.10 %	12.01 %

Notes on page 2 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

- (1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Historical Data MRP Estimates:

Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2020)

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2020:	12.20 %
Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds:	5.05
MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:	<u>7.15 %</u>

Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data (1926-2020)

9.57 %

Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data: (January 1926 - August 2021)

8.77 %

Value Line MRP Estimates:

Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending September 03, 2021)

Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*:	8.95 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.70
MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index:	<u>6.25 %</u>
*Forecasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield	

Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500

Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	15.05 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.70
MRP based on Value Line data	<u>12.35 %</u>

Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP

Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	18.17 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.70
MRP based on Bloomberg data	<u>15.47 %</u>

Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP: 9.93 %

- (2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit __ (DWD-1), Schedule 6. The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

Third Quarter 2021	2.10 %
Fourth Quarter 2021	2.20
First Quarter 2022	2.30
Second Quarter 2022	2.50
Third Quarter 2022	2.50
Fourth Quarter 2022	2.60
2023-2027	3.50
2028-2032	3.90
	<u>2.70 %</u>

- (3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:

Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, September 1, 2021 and June 1, 2021
Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021 S&P Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Bloomberg Professional Services

Northern States Power Company
Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the proxy group of forty-one non-price regulated companies was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.65 – 0.95 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.8123 – 3.3543 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1355. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

$$\text{Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr.} = \frac{\text{Standard Error of the Regression}}{\sqrt{2N}}$$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

$$\text{Thus, } 0.1355 = \frac{3.0833}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{3.0833}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., June 2021
Value Line Investment Survey (Standard Edition)

Northern States Power Company
Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk
Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
<u>Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies</u>	<u>Value Line Adjusted Beta</u>	<u>Unadjusted Beta</u>	<u>Residual Standard Error of the Regression</u>	<u>Standard Deviation of Beta</u>
Atmos Energy Corporation	0.80	0.67	2.7774	0.0693
New Jersey Resources Corporation	1.00	0.93	3.0337	0.0757
Northwest Natural Holding Company	0.85	0.70	3.2144	0.0802
ONE Gas, Inc.	0.80	0.68	2.7447	0.0685
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	1.05	1.01	3.7945	0.0947
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	0.95	0.86	3.1572	0.0788
Spire Inc.	0.85	0.73	2.8613	0.0714
Average	<u>0.90</u>	<u>0.80</u>	<u>3.0833</u>	<u>0.0769</u>
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta)	0.65	0.95		
2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.15			
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.8123	3.3543		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1355			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2710			

Source of Information: Valueline Proprietary Database, June 2021

Northern States Power Company
Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies	VL Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
Apple Inc.	0.90	0.83	3.2843	0.0819
Assurant Inc.	0.90	0.84	2.8245	0.0705
ANSYS, Inc.	0.85	0.77	3.1971	0.0798
Booz Allen Hamilton	0.90	0.84	3.1767	0.0793
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.85	0.75	3.3304	0.0831
Brady Corp.	1.00	0.94	2.9465	0.0735
CACI Int'l	0.95	0.89	2.9930	0.0747
Casey's Gen'l Stores	0.90	0.81	3.2028	0.0799
Quest Diagnostics	0.80	0.69	2.9288	0.0731
Lauder (Estee)	0.95	0.91	2.8562	0.0713
Exponent, Inc.	0.90	0.81	2.9605	0.0739
Fastenal Co.	0.95	0.88	3.2005	0.0799
FirstCash, Inc.	0.90	0.79	3.2437	0.0809
Franklin Electric	0.95	0.89	3.2374	0.0808
GATX Corp.	1.00	0.92	3.1223	0.0779
Int'l Flavors & Frag	0.95	0.85	3.3168	0.0828
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.84	2.8771	0.0718
Iron Mountain	0.90	0.78	3.1699	0.0791
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.87	2.8702	0.0716
J&J Snack Foods	0.95	0.86	2.9559	0.0738
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	0.85	0.71	2.8328	0.0707
ManTech Int'l 'A'	0.85	0.77	3.1011	0.0774
Monster Beverage	0.85	0.76	3.0195	0.0753
Altria Group	0.95	0.86	2.9525	0.0737
MSA Safety	1.00	0.94	3.0342	0.0757
MSCI Inc.	0.95	0.87	2.9742	0.0742
Vail Resorts	0.95	0.88	3.2995	0.0823
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.72	2.8865	0.0720
Old Dominion Freight	0.95	0.86	2.9913	0.0746
Packaging Corp.	1.00	0.92	2.8690	0.0716
PerkinElmer Inc.	0.90	0.82	3.0422	0.0759
Philip Morris Int'l	0.95	0.91	3.2461	0.0810
Pool Corp.	0.85	0.74	3.2969	0.0823
Post Holdings	0.95	0.87	2.9481	0.0736
RLI Corp.	0.80	0.67	3.0423	0.0759
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.73	2.9580	0.0738
Selective Ins. Group	0.90	0.80	2.9918	0.0746
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	0.88	2.8551	0.0712
Synopsys, Inc.	0.95	0.91	2.8936	0.0722
Tetra Tech	0.95	0.88	3.2523	0.0811
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.69	3.2862	0.0820
Average	0.91	0.83	3.0602	0.0764
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies	0.90	0.80	3.0833	0.0769

Source of Information:

Valueline Proprietary Database, June 2021

Northern States Power Company
Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies
Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

<u>Principal Methods</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Forty-One Non- Price Regulated Companies</u>
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	13.39 %
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	12.85
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	<u>12.06</u>
	Mean <u>12.77</u> %
	Median <u>12.85</u> %
	Average of Mean and Median <u>12.81</u> %

Notes:

- (1) From pages 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 4 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 7 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)
Apple Inc.	0.62 %	14.50 %	12.70 %	19.61 %	15.60 %	0.67 %	16.27 %
Assurant Inc.	1.66	11.50	17.90	17.90	15.77	1.79	17.56
ANSYS, Inc.	-	8.00	12.30	12.14	10.81	-	NA
Booz Allen Hamilton	1.73	8.50	8.30	8.89	8.56	1.80	10.36
Bristol-Myers Squibb	2.91	12.50	7.00	7.37	8.96	3.04	12.00
Brady Corp.	1.61	7.50	7.00	7.00	7.17	1.67	8.84
CACI Int'l	-	13.50	5.40	1.44	6.78	-	NA
Casey's Gen'l Stores	0.69	10.50	NA	7.50	9.00	0.72	9.72
Quest Diagnostics	1.78	7.00	26.50	(8.60)	16.75	1.93	18.68
Lauder (Estee)	0.66	11.00	11.30	18.71	13.67	0.71	14.38
Exponent, Inc.	0.80	12.00	NA	15.00	13.50	0.85	14.35
Fastenal Co.	2.08	9.00	9.00	6.33	8.11	2.16	10.27
FirstCash, Inc.	1.49	9.50	NA	23.00	16.25	1.61	17.86
Franklin Electric	0.86	10.00	NA	13.40	11.70	0.91	12.61
GATX Corp.	2.21	6.00	NA	12.00	9.00	2.31	11.31
Int'l Flavors & Frag	2.12	7.50	10.50	8.10	8.70	2.21	10.91
Ingredion Inc.	2.87	7.50	NA	1.90	4.70	2.94	7.64
Iron Mountain	5.55	8.00	3.80	6.41	6.07	5.72	11.79
Hunt (J.B.)	0.72	8.00	15.00	20.50	14.50	0.77	15.27
J&J Snack Foods	1.50	10.00	NA	6.00	8.00	1.56	9.56
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	1.08	9.50	11.00	9.64	10.05	1.13	11.18
ManTech Int'l 'A'	1.78	9.00	5.10	5.38	6.49	1.84	8.33
Monster Beverage	-	11.50	14.70	14.85	13.68	-	NA
Altria Group	7.52	6.00	4.00	4.67	4.89	7.70	12.59
MSA Safety	1.08	6.50	NA	18.00	12.25	1.15	13.40
MSCI Inc.	0.73	16.00	NA	17.79	16.90	0.79	17.69
Vail Resorts	-	7.50	NA	56.46	31.98	-	NA
Northrop Grumman	1.72	7.00	9.00	6.66	7.55	1.78	9.33
Old Dominion Freight	0.30	9.50	22.70	22.70	18.30	0.33	18.63
Packaging Corp.	2.86	5.00	5.00	16.86	8.95	2.99	11.94
PerkinElmer Inc.	0.17	11.00	37.90	37.90	28.93	0.19	29.12
Philip Morris Int'l	4.82	7.00	8.80	12.63	9.48	5.05	14.53
Pool Corp.	0.69	15.00	NA	17.00	16.00	0.75	16.75
Post Holdings	-	9.50	NA	28.20	18.85	-	NA
RLI Corp.	0.94	12.00	NA	9.80	10.90	0.99	11.89
Rollins, Inc.	0.88	11.50	NA	8.20	9.85	0.92	10.77
Selective Ins. Group	1.25	9.50	12.40	10.00	10.63	1.32	11.95
Sirius XM Holdings	0.91	31.50	12.20	10.05	17.92	0.99	18.91
Synopsys, Inc.	-	13.00	16.00	16.00	15.00	-	NA
Tetra Tech	0.62	13.50	15.00	15.00	14.50	0.66	15.16
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.17	17.00	28.40	25.80	23.73	0.19	23.92
						Mean	13.87 %
						Median	12.59 %
						Average of Mean and Median	13.23 %

NA= Not Available
NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

- (1) The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regulated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group. The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of August 31, 2021. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.

Source of Information: Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Two Growth Discounted Cash Flow Model for the
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies	Stock Price	Annualized Dividend	Dividend Yield (1)	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	Adjusted Dividend Yield (3)	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (4)
Apple Inc.	\$ 151.83	\$ 0.88	0.58 %	14.50 %	12.70 %	19.61 %	15.60 %	0.63 %	16.23 %
Assurant Inc.	170.11	2.64	1.55	11.50	17.90	17.90	15.77	1.67	17.44
ANSYS, Inc.	365.36	-	-	8.00	12.30	12.14	10.81	0.00	NA
Booz Allen Hamilton	81.91	1.48	1.81	8.50	8.30	8.89	8.56	1.89	10.45
Bristol-Myers Squibb	66.86	1.96	2.93	12.50	7.00	7.37	8.96	3.06	12.02
Brady Corp.	53.33	0.88	1.65	7.50	7.00	7.00	7.17	1.71	8.88
CACI Int'l	257.54	-	-	13.50	5.40	1.44	6.78	0.00	NA
Casey's Gen'l Stores	204.56	1.36	0.66	10.50	NA	7.50	9.00	0.69	9.69
Quest Diagnostics	152.83	2.48	1.62	7.00	26.50	(8.60)	16.75	1.76	18.51
Lauder (Estee)	340.49	2.12	0.62	11.00	11.30	18.71	13.67	0.66	14.33
Exponent, Inc.	116.90	0.80	0.68	12.00	NA	15.00	13.50	0.73	14.23
Fastenal Co.	55.85	1.12	2.01	9.00	9.00	6.33	8.11	2.09	10.20
FirstCash, Inc.	85.69	1.20	1.40	9.50	NA	23.00	16.25	1.51	17.76
Franklin Electric	84.98	0.70	0.82	10.00	NA	13.40	11.70	0.87	12.57
GATX Corp.	91.68	2.00	2.18	6.00	NA	12.00	9.00	2.28	11.28
Int'l Flavors & Frag	151.50	3.16	2.09	7.50	10.50	8.10	8.70	2.18	10.88
Ingredion Inc.	87.86	2.56	2.91	7.50	NA	1.90	4.70	2.98	14.48 (5)
Iron Mountain	47.75	2.47	5.18	8.00	3.80	6.41	6.07	5.34	16.63 (5)
Hunt (J.B.)	177.40	1.20	0.68	8.00	15.00	20.50	14.50	0.73	15.23
J&J Snack Foods	163.76	2.53	1.55	10.00	NA	6.00	8.00	1.61	9.61
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	176.38	1.84	1.04	9.50	11.00	9.64	10.05	1.09	11.14
ManTech Int'l 'A'	79.17	1.52	1.92	9.00	5.10	5.38	6.49	1.98	13.80 (5)
Monster Beverage	97.57	-	-	11.50	14.70	14.85	13.68	0.00	NA
Altria Group	50.23	3.60	7.17	6.00	4.00	4.67	4.89	7.35	18.09 (5)
MSA Safety	162.84	1.76	1.08	6.50	NA	18.00	12.25	1.15	13.40
MSCI Inc.	634.58	4.16	0.66	16.00	NA	17.79	16.90	0.72	17.62
Vail Resorts	304.85	-	-	7.50	NA	56.46	31.98	0.00	NA
Northrop Grumman	367.70	6.28	1.71	7.00	9.00	6.66	7.55	1.77	9.32
Old Dominion Freight	288.72	0.80	0.28	9.50	22.70	22.70	18.30	0.31	18.61
Packaging Corp.	151.70	4.00	2.64	5.00	5.00	16.86	8.95	2.76	11.71
PerkinElmer Inc.	184.80	0.28	0.15	11.00	37.90	37.90	28.93	0.17	12.47 (5)
Philip Morris Int'l	103.00	4.80	4.66	7.00	8.80	12.63	9.48	4.88	14.36
Pool Corp.	494.30	3.20	0.65	15.00	NA	17.00	16.00	0.70	16.70
Post Holdings	111.91	-	-	9.50	NA	28.20	18.85	0.00	NA
RLI Corp.	109.23	1.00	0.92	12.00	NA	9.80	10.90	0.97	11.87
Rollins, Inc.	38.92	0.32	0.82	11.50	NA	8.20	9.85	0.86	10.71
Selective Ins. Group	83.57	1.00	1.20	9.50	12.40	10.00	10.63	1.26	11.89
Sirius XM Holdings	6.27	0.06	0.93	31.50	12.20	10.05	17.92	1.01	18.93
Synopsys, Inc.	332.24	-	-	13.00	16.00	16.00	15.00	0.00	NA
Tetra Tech	143.84	0.80	0.56	13.50	15.00	15.00	14.50	0.60	15.10
West Pharmac. Svcs.	451.62	0.68	0.15	17.00	28.40	25.80	23.73	0.17	12.40 (5)
Average							12.69	Average	13.67 %
1 Standard Deviation Below Mean							6.82		
1 Standard Deviation Above Mean							18.56	Median	13.40 %
							Average of Mean and Median		13.54 %

NA= Not Available
NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes:

- (1) Indicated dividend at 08/31/2021 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 08/31/2021 for each company.
- (2) Average of columns 4 through 7 excluding negative growth rates.
- (3) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 8) x column 3 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for Apple Inc., $0.58\% \times (1 + (1/2 \times 15.60\%)) = 0.63\%$.
- (4) Column 8 + column 9.
- (5) The Two Growth Method was applied to Companies with short-term EPS growth rates greater than one standard deviation from the overall Utility Proxy Group mean growth rate. The mean of all Utility Proxy Group Companies with growth rates are within one standard deviation of the overall mean growth rate was applied as the long-term growth rate for these Companies.

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey
www.zacks.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021
www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 08/31/2021

Northern States Power Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate
Through Use of a Risk Premium Model
Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

<u>Line No.</u>		<u>Proxy Group of Forty- One Non-Price Regulated Companies</u>
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa2 Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	4.30 %
2.	Equity Risk Premium (2)	<u>8.55</u>
3.	Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	<u><u>12.85 %</u></u>

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa2 corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated September 1, 2021 and June 1, 2021 (see pages 10 and 11 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6. The estimates are detailed below.

Third Quarter 2021	3.40 %
Fourth Quarter 2021	3.70
First Quarter 2022	3.90
Second Quarter 2022	4.00
Third Quarter 2022	4.10
Fourth Quarter 2022	4.20
2023-2027	5.30
2028-2032	<u>5.80</u>
Average	<u><u>4.30 %</u></u>

(2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Northern States Power Company
Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating August 2021		Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating August 2021	
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
Apple Inc.	Aa1	2.0	AA+	2.0
Assurant Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
ANSYS, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Booz Allen Hamilton	NA	--	NA	--
Bristol-Myers Squibb	A2	6.0	A+	5.0
Brady Corp.	NA	--	NA	--
CACI Int'l	NA	--	BB+	11.0
Casey's Gen'l Stores	NA	--	NA	--
Quest Diagnostics	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Lauder (Estee)	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
Exponent, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Fastenal Co.	NA	--	NA	--
FirstCash, Inc.	Ba1	11.0	BB	12.0
Franklin Electric	NA	--	NA	--
GATX Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Int'l Flavors & Frag	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Ingredion Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Iron Mountain	Ba3	13.0	BB-	13.0
Hunt (J.B.)	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
J&J Snack Foods	NA	--	NA	--
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	NA	--	NA	--
ManTech Int'l 'A'	WR	--	BB+	11.0
Monster Beverage	NA	--	NA	--
Altria Group	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
MSA Safety	NA	--	NA	--
MSCI Inc.	Ba1	11.0	BB+	11.0
Vail Resorts	B2	15.0	BB	12.0
Northrop Grumman	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Old Dominion Freight	NA	--	NA	--
Packaging Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
PerkinElmer Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Philip Morris Int'l	A2	6.0	A	6.0
Pool Corp.	NA	--	NA	--
Post Holdings	B2	15.0	B+	14.0
RLI Corp.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Rollins, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Selective Ins. Group	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Sirius XM Holdings	NA	--	BB	12.0
Synopsys, Inc.	NA	--	NA	--
Tetra Tech	NA	--	NA	--
West Pharmac. Svcs.	NA	--	NA	--
Average	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.1

Notes:

(1) From page 6 of Exhibit No.__(DWD-1), Schedule 6.

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services

Northern States Power Company
Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach
Using the Beta for
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Equity Risk Premium Measure</u>	<u>Proxy Group of Forty-One Non- Price Regulated Companies</u>
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.92 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	8.87
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	7.88
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index (4)	5.54
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> S&P 500 Companies (5)	11.64
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	<u>14.76</u>
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.10 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	<u>0.94</u>
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	<u><u>8.55 %</u></u>

Notes:

- (1) From note 1, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (2) From note 2, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (3) From note 3, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (4) From note 4, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (5) From note 5, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (6) From note 6, page 9 of Exhibit_(DWD-1), Schedule 6.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from page 7 of this Schedule.

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2021
SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, September 1, 2021 and June 1, 2021
Bloomberg Professional Services

Northern States Power Company
Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
Proxy Group of Forty-One Non-Price Regulated Companies	Value Line Adjusted Beta	Bloomberg Beta	Average Beta	Market Risk Premium (1)	Risk-Free Rate (2)	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (4)
Apple Inc.	0.90	1.00	0.95	9.93 %	2.70 %	12.13 %	12.26 %	12.19 %
Assurant Inc.	0.90	1.01	0.95	9.93	2.70	12.13	12.26	12.19
ANSYS, Inc.	0.85	0.96	0.91	9.93	2.70	11.73	11.96	11.85
Booz Allen Hamilton	0.90	0.91	0.91	9.93	2.70	11.73	11.96	11.85
Bristol-Myers Squibb	0.85	0.79	0.82	9.93	2.70	10.84	11.29	11.06
Brady Corp.	1.00	1.07	1.04	9.93	2.70	13.03	12.93	12.98
CACI Int'l	0.95	1.00	0.98	9.93	2.70	12.43	12.48	12.45
Casey's Gen'l Stores	0.90	0.93	0.92	9.93	2.70	11.83	12.03	11.93
Quest Diagnostics	0.80	0.97	0.88	9.93	2.70	11.44	11.74	11.59
Lauder (Estee)	0.95	1.01	0.98	9.93	2.70	12.43	12.48	12.45
Exponent, Inc.	0.90	0.96	0.93	9.93	2.70	11.93	12.11	12.02
Fastenal Co.	0.95	0.94	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
FirstCash, Inc.	0.90	0.94	0.92	9.93	2.70	11.83	12.03	11.93
Franklin Electric	0.95	0.98	0.97	9.93	2.70	12.33	12.41	12.37
GATX Corp.	0.95	1.00	0.98	9.93	2.70	12.43	12.48	12.45
Int'l Flavors & Frag	0.90	1.06	0.98	9.93	2.70	12.43	12.48	12.45
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.93	0.91	9.93	2.70	11.73	11.96	11.85
Iron Mountain	0.90	1.05	0.97	9.93	2.70	12.33	12.41	12.37
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.94	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
J&J Snack Foods	0.95	0.81	0.88	9.93	2.70	11.44	11.74	11.59
Henry (Jack) & Assoc	0.85	0.88	0.87	9.93	2.70	11.34	11.66	11.50
ManTech Int'l 'A'	0.85	1.13	0.99	9.93	2.70	12.53	12.55	12.54
Monster Beverage	0.85	0.97	0.91	9.93	2.70	11.73	11.96	11.85
Altria Group	0.95	0.91	0.93	9.93	2.70	11.93	12.11	12.02
MSA Safety	1.00	1.00	1.00	9.93	2.70	12.63	12.63	12.63
MSCI Inc.	0.95	0.93	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
Vail Resorts	0.95	1.14	1.05	9.93	2.70	13.12	13.00	13.06
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.79	0.82	9.93	2.70	10.84	11.29	11.06
Old Dominion Freight	0.90	0.98	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
Packaging Corp.	1.00	0.79	0.90	9.93	2.70	11.64	11.88	11.76
PerkinElmer Inc.	0.90	0.80	0.85	9.93	2.70	11.14	11.51	11.33
Philip Morris Int'l	0.95	0.94	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
Pool Corp.	0.85	0.95	0.90	9.93	2.70	11.64	11.88	11.76
Post Holdings	0.95	0.90	0.92	9.93	2.70	11.83	12.03	11.93
RLI Corp.	0.80	0.91	0.85	9.93	2.70	11.14	11.51	11.33
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.69	0.77	9.93	2.70	10.34	10.92	10.63
Selective Ins. Group	0.90	0.99	0.94	9.93	2.70	12.03	12.18	12.11
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	1.12	1.04	9.93	2.70	13.03	12.93	12.98
Synopsys, Inc.	0.95	1.02	0.98	9.93	2.70	12.43	12.48	12.45
Tetra Tech	0.95	1.06	1.01	9.93	2.70	12.73	12.70	12.72
West Pharmac. Svcs.	0.80	0.74	0.77	9.93	2.70	10.34	10.92	10.63
		Mean	0.93			11.92 %	12.10 %	12.01 %
		Median	0.94			12.03 %	12.18 %	12.11 %
		Average of Mean and Median	0.94			11.98 %	12.14 %	12.06 %

Notes:

- (1) From Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 7, page 2, note 1.
- (2) From Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 7, page 2, note 2.
- (3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

Notes:

- (1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
- (2) Gleaned from Columns [B] and [C] on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column [A]) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column [1].
- (3) Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided in Column [D] on the bottom of this page.
- (4) Line No. 1 Column [3] – Line No. 2 Column [3]. For example, the 0.71% in Column [4], Line No. 2 is derived as follows $0.71\% = 1.46\% - 0.75\%$.

Northern States Power Company
Market Capitalization of Northern States Power Company and the
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies


Company	Exchange	[1] Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2020 (millions)	[2] Book Value per Share at Fiscal Year End 2020 (1)	[3] Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2020 (millions)	[4] Closing Stock Market Price on August 31, 2021	[5] Market-to- Book Ratio on August 31, 2021 (2)	[6] Market Capitalization on August 31, 2021 (3) (millions)
Northern States Power Company		NA	NA	490,585 (4)	NA		
Based upon Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies					167.7	(5)	\$ 822,711 (6)
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies							
Atmos Energy Corporation	NYSE	125,882	\$ 53.949	\$ 6,791,203	\$ 97.510	180.7 %	\$ 12,274,800
New Jersey Resources Corporation	NYSE	95,949	19,226	1,844,692	37,340	194.2	3,582,742
Northwest Natural Holding Company	NYSE	30,589	29,054	888,733	51,450	177.1	1,573,804
ONE Gas, Inc.	NYSE	53,167	42,006	2,233,311	71,820	171.0	3,818,435
South Jersey Industries, Inc.	NYSE	100,592	16,571	1,666,876	24,810	149.7	2,495,686
Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.	NYSE	57,193	46,771	2,674,953	70,310	150.3	4,021,235
Spire Inc.	NYSE	51,612	44,182	2,280,300	66,700	151.0	3,442,506
Average		73,569	\$ 35.966	\$ 2,625,724	\$ 59,991	167.7 %	\$ 4,458,458

NA= Not Available

- Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1.
(2) Column 4 / Column 2.
(3) Column 1 * Column 4.
(4) Requested rate base multiplied by the requested common equity ratio.
(5) The market-to-book ratio of Northern States Power Company on August 31, 2021 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies on August 31, 2021 as appropriate.
(6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

Source of Information: 2020 Annual Forms 10K
yahoo.finance.com
Bloomberg Professional

Northern States Power Company
Comparison of Projected Capital Expenditures Relative to Net Plant



Sources of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey
Company provided data

Northern States Power Company
Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

Equity Issuances

Date	[Column 1] Issuing Company	[Column 2] Market Price per Share (1)	[Column 3] Average Offering Price per Share (1)	[Column 4] Underwriting Discount (1)	[Column 5] Total Offering Expense per Share (1)	[Column 6] Net Proceeds per Share (2)	[Column 7] Total Flotation Costs (3)	[Column 8] Gross Equity Issue before Costs (4)	[Column 9] Net Proceeds (5)	[Column 10] Flotation Cost Percentage (6)
11/16/1949	Northern States Power	\$ 1,584,238	\$ 10.75	\$ 0.12	\$ 0.137	\$ 9,989	\$ 1,205,605	\$ 17,030,559	\$ 15,824,953	7.079%
6/4/1952	Northern States Power	\$ 1,108,966	\$ 10.50	\$ 0.10	\$ 0.162	\$ 10,240	\$ 288,331	\$ 11,644,143	\$ 11,355,812	2.476%
4/14/1954	Northern States Power	\$ 1,219,856	\$ 15.25	\$ 0.06	\$ 0.124	\$ 13,816	\$ 1,749,274	\$ 18,602,804	\$ 16,853,530	9.403%
2/29/1956	Northern States Power	\$ 670,920	\$ 17.83	\$ 0.05	\$ 0.221	\$ 16,479	\$ 903,058	\$ 11,959,149	\$ 11,056,091	7.551%
7/22/1959	Northern States Power	\$ 952,033	\$ 23.38	\$ 0.07	\$ 0.191	\$ 21,740	\$ 1,556,574	\$ 22,253,771	\$ 20,697,197	6.995%
7/28/1965	Northern States Power	\$ 772,008	\$ 35.25	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.225	\$ 32,683	\$ 1,981,745	\$ 27,213,282	\$ 25,231,537	7.282%
1/22/1969	Northern States Power	\$ 1,080,811	\$ 29.00	\$ 0.12	\$ 0.187	\$ 26,694	\$ 2,492,350	\$ 31,343,519	\$ 28,851,169	7.952%
10/21/1970	Northern States Power	\$ 1,729,298	\$ 23.13	\$ 0.18	\$ 0.149	\$ 21,176	\$ 3,370,402	\$ 39,990,016	\$ 36,619,614	8.428%
7/26/1972	Northern States Power	\$ 1,902,228	\$ 25.00	\$ 0.13	\$ 0.166	\$ 23,205	\$ 3,414,499	\$ 47,555,700	\$ 44,141,201	7.180%
10/10/1973	Northern States Power	\$ 2,092,451	\$ 25.83	\$ 0.13	\$ 0.153	\$ 24,219	\$ 3,360,476	\$ 54,037,547	\$ 50,677,071	6.219%
11/20/1974	Northern States Power	\$ 2,300,000	\$ 17.63	\$ 0.91	\$ 0.069	\$ 16,521	\$ 2,539,200	\$ 40,537,500	\$ 37,998,300	6.264%
8/14/1975	Northern States Power	\$ 1,750,000	\$ 23.00	\$ 0.74	\$ 0.077	\$ 22,183	\$ 1,429,750	\$ 40,250,000	\$ 38,820,250	3.552%
6/3/1976	Northern States Power	\$ 2,000,000	\$ 24.00	\$ 0.72	\$ 0.064	\$ 23,216	\$ 1,568,000	\$ 48,000,000	\$ 46,432,000	3.267%
5/31/1993	Northern States Power	\$ 3,041,955	\$ 44.13	\$ 1.20	\$ 0.048	\$ 42,377	\$ 5,317,337	\$ 134,226,264	\$ 128,908,927	3.961%
9/23/1997	Northern States Power	\$ 4,500,000	\$ 49.94	\$ 1.23	\$ 0.133	\$ 48,200	\$ 7,821,000	\$ 224,721,000	\$ 216,900,000	3.480%
9/29/1997	Northern States Power	\$ 400,000	\$ 50.50	\$ 1.23	\$ 0.133	\$ 48,200	\$ 920,000	\$ 20,200,000	\$ 19,280,000	4.554%
2/25/2002	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 20,000,000	\$ 22.95	\$ 0.73	\$ 0.015	\$ 21,755	\$ 23,900,000	\$ 459,000,000	\$ 435,100,000	5.207%
9/9/2008	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 17,250,000	\$ 20.86	\$ 0.10	\$ 0.006	\$ 20,094	\$ 13,218,352	\$ 359,835,000	\$ 346,616,648	3.673%
8/3/2010	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 21,850,000	\$ 22.10	\$ 0.65	\$ 0.013	\$ 20,571	\$ 33,407,927	\$ 482,885,000	\$ 449,477,073	6.918%
March 2013	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 7,757,449	\$ 29.06	\$ 0.29	\$ 0.052	\$ 28,714	\$ 2,657,558	\$ 225,407,642	\$ 222,750,085	1.179%
June 2014	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 5,693,946	\$ 30.66	\$ 0.31	\$ 0.030	\$ 30,326	\$ 1,915,210	\$ 174,592,340	\$ 172,677,130	1.097%
September 2018	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 4,733,435	\$ 47.89	\$ 0.41	\$ 0.073	\$ 47,405	\$ 2,271,040	\$ 226,661,287	\$ 224,390,247	1.002%
8/29/2019	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 9,359,103	\$ 48.42	\$ 0.16	\$ 0.041	\$ 48,215	\$ 1,886,029	\$ 453,132,797	\$ 451,246,767	0.416%
11/30/2020	Xcel Energy, Inc.	\$ 11,845,000	\$ 60.86	\$ 0.66	\$ 0.02	\$ 60,175	\$ 8,168,737	\$ 720,941,187	\$ 712,772,450	1.133%
Total Public Issuances						\$ 127,342,454	\$ 3,892,020,508	\$ 3,764,678,054		3.272%

Flotation Cost Adjustment

[Column 11] Average Dividend Yield (7)	[Column 12] Average Projected EPS Growth Rate (7)	[Column 13] Adjusted Dividend Yield (8)	[Column 14] Average DCF Cost Rate Unadjusted for Flotation (9)	[Column 15] DCF Cost Rate Adjusted for Flotation (10)	[Column 16] Flotation Cost Adjustment (11)
3.49 %	3.60 %	3.55 %	7.15 %	7.27 %	0.12 %

Notes:

- (1) Company provided
- (2) Col. 3 - Col. 4 - Col. 5
- (3) (Col. 2 - Col. 6) x Col. 1
- (4) Col. 1 x Col. 2
- (5) Col. 1 x Col. 6
- (6) Col. 7 / Col. 8
- (7) Exhibit (DWD-1), Schedule 5, page 1
- (8) Col. 11 x (1 + 0.5 x Col. 12)
- (9) Col. 12 + Col. 13
- (10) (Col. 13 / (1 - Col. 10)) + Col. 12
- (11) Col. 15 - Col. 14

Proxy Group of Seven
Natural Gas
Distribution
Companies

Northern States Power Company
Summary of Adjustment Clauses & Alternative Regulation / Incentive Plans
Proxy Group of Seven Natural Gas Distribution Companies

			Adjustment Clauses				Alternative Regulation / Incentive Plans			
Company	Parent	State	Gas Commodity	Decoupling (F/P) [1]	Capital Investment [2]	Energy Efficiency [3]	Other [4]	Formula-Based Rates	Earnings Sharing/PBR	Forward Test Year Allowed in Jurisdiction [5]
Atmos Energy	ATO	Colorado	✓		✓	✓	✓			
Atmos Energy	ATO	Kansas	✓	P	✓		✓		✓	✓
Atmos Energy	ATO	Kentucky	✓	P	✓	✓	✓			K
Atmos Energy	ATO	Louisiana	✓	P	✓			✓		✓
Atmos Energy	ATO	Mississippi	✓	P	✓	✓		✓		✓
Atmos Energy	ATO	Tennessee	✓	P	✓			✓		✓
Atmos Energy	ATO	Texas	✓	P	✓	✓	✓	✓		K
Atmos Energy	ATO	Virginia	✓	P	✓		✓			K
Atmos Energy	ATO	Washington	✓			✓	✓			K
New Jersey Natural Gas	NJR	New Jersey	✓	F	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Northwest Natural Gas	NWN	Oregon	✓	P		✓	✓			K
Northwest Natural Gas	NWN	Washington	✓			✓	✓			K
Kansas Gas Service	OGS	Kansas	✓	P	✓		✓			K
Oklahoma Natural Gas	OGS	Oklahoma	✓	P	✓	✓	✓	✓		K
Texas Gas Service	OGS	Texas	✓	P	✓	✓	✓		✓	K
Elizabethtown Gas	SJI	New Jersey	✓	P	✓	✓	✓			K
South Jersey Gas	SJI	New Jersey	✓	F	✓	✓	✓			K
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	Arizona	✓	F	✓	✓	✓			K
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	California	✓	F	✓	✓	✓			✓
Southwest Gas Corporation	SWX	Nevada	✓	F	✓	✓	✓			K
Spire Alabama Inc.	SR	Alabama	✓	P	✓		✓	✓		K
Spire Gulf Inc.	SR	Alabama	✓	P	✓		✓	✓		K
Spire Mississippi Inc.	SR	Mississippi	✓	P	✓		✓	✓		✓
Spire Missouri East	SR	Missouri	✓	P	✓		✓	✓		K
Spire Missouri West	SR	Missouri	✓	P	✓		✓			K

Notes:

Note: A mechanism may cover one or more cost categories; therefore, designations may not indicate separate mechanisms for each category.

[1] Full or partial decoupling (such as Fixed Variable rate design, weather normalization clauses, and recovery of lost revenues as a result of Energy Efficiency programs). All full or partial decoupling mechanisms include weather normalization adjustments.

[2] Includes recovery of costs related to infrastructure replacement, system integrity/hardening, and other capital expenditures.

[3] Utility-sponsored conservation, energy efficiency, or other demand side management programs.

[4] Pension expenses, bad debt costs, storm costs, transmission/transportation costs, environmental, regulatory fee, government & franchise fees and taxes, economic development, and low income programs.

[5] K = Known and Measurable or similar language, partially forecasted test years are included.

Sources: Company SEC Form 10-Ks; Operating company tariffs; Regulatory Research Associates.