BEFORE THE NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF SOUTHWESTERN)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY'S)
APPLICATION FOR: (1) REVISION OF)
ITS RETAIL RATES UNDER ADVICE)
NOTICE NO. 292; (2) AUTHORIZATION) CASE NO. 20-00238-UT
AND APPROVAL TO ABANDON ITS)
PLANT X UNIT 3 GENERATING)
STATION; AND (3) OTHER)
ASSOCIATED RELIEF,)
)
SOUTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE)
COMPANY,)
)
APPLICANT.)
)
	<u> </u>

DIRECT TESTIMONY

of

DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS, CRRA, CVA

on behalf of

SOUTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY

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Appendix A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINED TERMS

Acronym/Defined Term Meaning

AGA American Gas Association

AGIF American Gas Index Fund

ARCH autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity

Beta coefficient

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts

Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v.

Public Service Comm'n of West Virginia, 262 U.S.

679 (1923)

CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model

CBOE Chicago Board Options Exchange

Commission or NMPRC New Mexico Public Regulation Commission

CoV Coefficient of Variation

DCF Discounted Cash Flow

D&P Duff & Phelps

D&P 2020 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to

Cost of Capital

DPS dividends per share

ECAPM Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model

EPS Earnings Per Share

FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

GARCH generalized autoregressive conditional

heteroscedasticity

Hope Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,

320 U.S. 591 (1944)

Moody's Investors Service

NACVA National Association of Certified Valuation

Analysts

NM DCF a specific form of the Constant Growth DCF

approach relied upon by the Commission

Non-Price Regulated Proxy

Group

a proxy group of publicly traded, domestic, nonprice regulated competitive firms comparable in

total risk to the Utility Proxy Group

PRPM Predictive Risk Premium Model

ROE return on common equity

RPM Risk Premium Model

S&P Standard and Poor's

SBBI Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation Yearbook

published by Duff & Phelps

SEC United States Securities and Exchange Commission

SPS Southwestern Public Service Company, a New

Mexico corporation

SURFA Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial

Analysts

Utility Proxy Group proxy group of publicly traded electric utility

companies comparable in risk to SPS

Value Line Investment Survey

VIX Volatility Index

XEL Stock symbol for Xcel Energy Inc.

Xcel Energy or Parent Xcel Energy Inc.

1 I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 2 0. Please state your name, affiliation, and business address. 3 A. My name is Dylan W. D'Ascendis. I am employed by ScottMadden, Inc. as Director. My business address is 3000 Atrium Way, Suite 241, Mount Laurel, New 4 5 Jersey 08054. 6 0. On whose behalf are you submitting this testimony? 7 A. I am submitting this direct testimony before the New Mexico Public Regulation 8 Commission ("Commission" or "NMPRC") on behalf of Southwestern Public 9 Service Company ("SPS), a New Mexico corporation and wholly-owned electric utility subsidiary of Xcel Energy Inc ("Xcel Energy" or the "Parent"). 10 11 Please summarize your professional experience and educational background. Q. 12 A. I have offered expert testimony on behalf of investor-owned utilities before over 20 13 state regulatory commissions in the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory 14 Commission ("FERC"), the Alberta Utility Commission, and one American 15 Arbitration Association panel on issues including, but not limited to, common 16 equity cost rate, rate of return, valuation, capital structure, class cost of service, and 17 rate design. On behalf of the American Gas Association ("AGA"), I calculate the AGA 18 19 Gas Index, which serves as the benchmark against which the performance of the

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are shown in Appendix A.

American Gas Index Fund ("AGIF") is measured on a monthly basis. The AGA Gas Index and AGIF are a market capitalization weighted index and mutual fund, respectively, comprised of the common stocks of the publicly traded corporate members of the AGA. I am a member of the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts ("SURFA"). In 2011, I was awarded the professional designation "Certified Rate of Return Analyst" by SURFA, which is based on education, experience, and the successful completion of a comprehensive written examination. I am also a member of the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts ("NACVA") and was awarded the professional designation "Certified Valuation Analyst" by the NACVA in 2015. I am a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, where I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economic History. I have also received a Master of Business Administration with high honors and concentrations in Finance and International Business from Rutgers University. The details of my educational background and expert witness appearances

Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?

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2 A. The purpose of my direct testimony is to present evidence on behalf of SPS and 3 recommend the appropriate return on common equity ("ROE") to be used in setting 4 rates in this proceeding. My testimony first provides a summary of financial theory 5 and regulatory principles pertinent to the development of the recommended cost of 6 capital. I then present evidence and analysis on: (1) the reasonableness of SPS's 7 requested capital structure and long- and short-term debt cost rates, and (2) the 8 appropriate ROE on its New Mexico jurisdictional rate base. My testimony 9 concludes with a discussion of the current capital market environment and how it 10 influences cost of capital issues in this proceeding.

11 Q. Have you prepared schedules in support of your recommendation?

12 A. Yes. I have prepared Attachment_(DWD-1), which contains Schedules 1
13 through 9, and were prepared by me or under my direction.

II. SUMMARY

Q. Please summarize your recommended ROE.

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My recommended ROE of 10.35% is summarized on page 1 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 1. In determining my recommendation, I assessed the market-based common equity cost rates of companies of relatively similar, but not necessarily identical, risk to SPS. Using companies of relatively comparable risk as proxies is consistent with the principles of fair rate of return established in the *Hope*¹ and *Bluefield*² decisions, which I discuss further in Section III, below. Of course, no proxy group can be identical in risk to any single company. Consequently, there must be an evaluation of relative risk between SPS and the proxy group to determine if it is appropriate to adjust the proxy group's indicated rate of return.

My recommendation results from applying and considering several cost of common equity models, specifically the Constant Growth form of the Discounted Cash Flow model ("DCF"), the Risk Premium Model ("RPM"), and the Capital

¹ Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("Hope").

 $^{^2}$ Bluefield Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1922) ("Bluefield").

Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), to the market data of the Utility Proxy Group whose selection criteria will be discussed below. In addition, I applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. The results derived from these analyses are as follows:

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Table 1: Summary of Common Equity Cost Rates³

Discounted Cash Flow Model	9.06%4
Risk Premium Model	10.40%
Capital Asset Pricing Model	12.10%
Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non- Price Regulated Companies	<u>12.48%</u>
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates Before Adjustments for Company-Specific Risk	9.92% - 10.96%
Size Risk Adjustment	0.15%
Credit Risk Adjustment	0.11%
Flotation Cost Adjustment	0.15%
Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	10.33% - 11.37%
Recommended Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.35%</u>

 $^{^3}$ See Section VI for a detailed discussion regarding the application of my cost of common equity models.

 $^{^4\,}$ Represents the Commission's preferred DCF approach. My traditional Constant Growth DCF indicated cost of common equity result is 8.70%. The average of these two DCF approaches is 8.88%.

The indicated range of common equity cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group is between 9.92% and 10.96% before any Company-specific adjustments.⁵ I then adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by 0.15% to reflect SPS's smaller relative size and by 0.11% to account for a riskier bond rating, as compared to the Utility Proxy Group. I also adjusted the indicated common equity cost rate upward by 0.15% to account for flotation costs.⁶ These adjustments resulted in a Company-specific indicated range of common equity cost rates between 10.33% and 11.37%. Given the Utility Proxy Group and Company-specific ranges of common equity cost rates, my recommended ROE for SPS is 10.35%.

Q. Please summarize SPS's proposed capital structure.

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A. SPS is proposing projected capital structures which include a 54.72% common equity ratio. That common equity ratio is consistent with SPS's historical equity ratios, the equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy Group, and their operating subsidiary companies.

⁵ The 9.92% low end of the range is calculated by averaging: (1) the average of the four model results, including the average of the two DCF approaches (10.96%); and (2) the average of my Constant Growth DCF results and the results of the Commission's preferred DCF approach (8.88%). The 10.96% high end of the range is the approximate average of all model results.

⁶ See Section VIII for a detailed discussion of my cost of common equity adjustments.

1 Q. How is the remainder of your direct testimony organized?

2 A. The remainder of my direct testimony is organized as follows: Section III – provides a summary of financial theory and regulatory principles 3 pertinent to the development of the Cost of Capital; 4 5 <u>Section IV</u> – explains the reasonableness of the proposed capital structure; Section V – explains my selection of the Utility Proxy Group used to develop 6 my Cost of Common Equity analytical results; 7 Section VI – describes the analyses on which my Cost of Common Equity 8 9 recommendation is based; Section VII – summarizes my common equity cost rate before adjustments to 10 11 reflect Company-specific factors; 12 <u>Section VIII</u> – explains my adjustments to my common equity cost rate to reflect Company-specific factors; 13 14 Section IX – provides an overview of the current capital market environment; and 15 <u>Section X</u> – presents my conclusions. 16

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES

Q.	What principles have you considered in arriving at your recommendations?
A.	In unregulated industries, marketplace competition is the principal determinant of
	the price of products or services. For regulated public utilities, regulation must act
	as a substitute for marketplace competition. Assuring that the utility can fulfill its
	obligations to the public, while providing safe and reliable service at all times,
	requires a level of earnings sufficient to maintain the integrity of presently invested
	capital. Sufficient earnings also permit the attraction of needed new capital at a
	reasonable cost, for which the utility must compete with other firms of comparable
	risk, consistent with the fair rate of return standards established by the U.S.
	Supreme Court in the previously cited <i>Hope</i> and <i>Bluefield</i> cases.
	The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the fair rate of return standards in Hope,
	when it stated:
	The rate-making process under the Act, <i>i.e.</i> , the fixing of 'just and reasonable' rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests. Thus we stated in the Natural Gas Pipeline Co. case that 'regulation does not insure that the business shall produce net revenues.' 315 U.S. at page 590, 62 S.Ct. at page 745. But such considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated. From the investor

or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital

costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock. Cf. Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345, 346 12 S.Ct. 400,402. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.⁷

In summary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found a return that is adequate to attract capital at reasonable terms enables the utility to provide service while maintaining its financial integrity. As discussed above, and in keeping with established regulatory standards, that return should be commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. The Commission's decision in this proceeding, therefore, should provide SPS with the opportunity to earn a return that is: (1) adequate to attract capital at reasonable cost and terms; (2) sufficient to ensure their financial integrity; and (3) commensurate with returns on investments in enterprises having corresponding risks.

Lastly, the required return for a regulated public utility is established on a stand-alone basis, i.e., for the utility operating company at issue in a rate case. Parent entities, like other investors, have capital constraints and must look at the

⁷ Hope, 320 U.S. 591 (1944), at 603.

attractiveness of the expected risk-adjusted return of each investment alternative in their capital budgeting process. That is, utility holding companies that own many utility operating companies have choices as to where they will invest their capital within the holding company family. Therefore, the opportunity cost concept applies regardless of the source of the funding, public funding or corporate funding.

When funding is provided by a parent entity, the return still must be sufficient to provide an incentive to allocate equity capital to the subsidiary or business unit rather than other internal or external investment opportunities. That is, the regulated subsidiary must compete for capital with all the parent company's affiliates and with other, similarly situated utility companies. In that regard, investors value corporate entities on a sum-of-the-parts basis and expect each division within the parent company to provide an appropriate risk-adjusted return.

It therefore is important that the authorized ROE reflects the risks and prospects of the utility's operations and supports the utility's financial integrity from a stand-alone perspective as measured by their combined business and financial risks. Consequently, the ROE authorized in this proceeding should be sufficient to support the operational (i.e., business risk) and financing (i.e., financial risk) of SPS's New Mexico utility operations on a stand-alone basis.

Q. Within that broad framework, how is the cost of capital estimated in regulatory proceedings?

A.

Regulated utilities primarily use common stock and long-term debt to finance their permanent property, plant, and equipment (i.e., rate base). The fair rate of return for a regulated utility is based on its Weighted Average Cost of Capital, in which, as noted earlier, the costs of the individual sources of capital are weighted by their respective book values.

The cost of capital is the return investors require to make an investment in a firm. Investors will provide funds to a firm only if the return that they *expect* is equal to, or greater than, the return that they *require* to accept the risk of providing funds to the firm.

The cost of capital (that is, the combination of the costs of debt and equity) is based on the economic principle of "opportunity costs." Investing in any asset (whether debt or equity securities) represents a forgone opportunity to invest in alternative assets. For any investment to be sensible, its expected return must be at least equal to the return expected on alternative, comparable risk investment opportunities. Because investments with like risks should offer similar returns, the opportunity cost of an investment should equal the return available on an investment of comparable risk.

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Whereas the cost of debt is contractually defined and can be directly observed as the interest rate or yield on debt securities, the cost of common equity must be estimated based on market data and various financial models. Because the cost of common equity is premised on opportunity costs, the models used to determine it are typically applied to a group of "comparable" or "proxy" companies.

In the end, the estimated cost of capital should reflect the return that investors require in light of the subject company's business and financial risks, and the returns available on comparable investments.

Q. Is the authorized return set in regulatory proceedings guaranteed?

No, it is not. The *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards, and the regulatory compact upon which the ratemaking process is based, only require that the utility be afforded a reasonable *opportunity* to recover its return of, and return on, its prudently incurred investments. It does not guarantee that return. While a utility may have control over some factors that affect the ability to earn its authorized return (e.g., management performance, operating and maintenance expenses, etc.), there are several factors beyond a utility's control that affect its ability to earn its authorized return. Those may include factors such as weather, the economy, and the prevalence and magnitude of regulatory lag.

A. Business Risk

A.

Q. Please define business risk and explain why it is important for determining a fair rate of return.

The investor-required ROE reflects investors' assessment of the total investment risk of the subject firm. Total investment risk is often discussed in the context of business and financial risk.

Business risk reflects the uncertainty associated with owning a company's common stock without the company's use of debt and/or preferred stock financing. One way of considering the distinction between business and financial risk is to view the former as the uncertainty of the expected earned ROE, assuming the firm is financed with no debt.

Examples of business risks faced generally by utilities include, but are not limited to, the regulatory environment, mandatory environmental compliance requirements, customer mix and concentration of customers, service territory economic growth, market demand, risks and uncertainties of supply, operations, capital intensity, size, the degree of operating leverage, emerging technologies including distributed energy resources, the vagaries of weather, and the like, all of which have a direct bearing on earnings.

Although analysts, including rating agencies, may categorize business risks individually, as a practical matter, such risks are interrelated and not wholly distinct from one another. When determining an appropriate ROE, the relevant issue is where investors see the subject company in relation to other similarly situated utility companies (i.e., the Utility Proxy Group). To the extent investors view a company as being exposed to higher risk, the required return will increase, and vice versa.

For regulated utilities, business risks are both long-term and near-term in nature. Whereas near-term business risks are reflected in year-to-year variability in earnings and cash flow brought about by economic or regulatory factors, long-term business risks reflect the prospect of an impaired ability of investors to obtain both a fair rate of return on, and return of, their capital. Moreover, because utilities accept the obligation to provide safe, adequate, and reliable service at all times (in exchange for a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investment), they generally do not have the option to delay, defer, or reject capital investments. Because those investments are capital-intensive, utilities generally do not have the option to avoid raising external funds. The obligation to serve and the corresponding need to access capital is even more acute during periods of capital market distress.

Because utilities invest in long-lived assets, long-term business risks are of paramount concern to equity investors. That is, the risk of not recovering the return on their investment extends far into the future. The timing and nature of events that may lead to losses, however, also are uncertain and, consequently, those risks and their implications for the required ROE tend to be difficult to quantify. Regulatory commissions (like investors who commit their capital) must review a variety of quantitative and qualitative data and apply their reasoned judgment to determine how long-term risks weigh in their assessment of the market-required ROE.

Q. Does SPS have unique business risks relative to the proxy group?

Yes. SPS's degree of customer concentration, which is highly skewed towards commercial and industrial customers, poses an incremental element of business risk because those customer classes generally are the least stable sources of throughput, exposing SPS to increased earnings and cash flow volatility relative to the proxy group.

Approximately 80.00% of SPS's 2019 retail electric sales (megawatthours), and 67.00% of its retail electric revenues, were derived from commercial and industrial customers, 8 a large portion from oil and gas companies. Further,

A.

⁸ Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

approximately 29.50% of SPS's total electric sales and 19.50% of its total electric revenues are attributable to sales for resale in the wholesale electric market. SPS's retail sales volume to commercial and industrial customers as a percentage of total retail volume (80.00%) is the second highest of the proxy companies. In fact, SPS's degree of customer concentration is approximately 15.00 percentage points higher than the proxy group average (65.00%).

Q. Is the investor-required ROE for SPS in this proceeding comparable to the expected ROE of a public pension fund?

No, it is not. Expected returns on pension funds are not comparable to SPS's required ROE because expected returns are not equal to required returns. Simply put, expected returns are what investors expect assets to return, and required returns are the returns that investors require to invest their capital in said asset.

While I do not agree that expected returns on pension funds are equivalent to SPS's required ROE, if a comparison were going to be made to a utility's return, the Weighted Average Cost of Capital is more akin to a pension's expected return, because the Weighted Average Cost of Capital incorporates the debt component of capital, and pension funds' investments are allocated not only to equity in public companies, but also to lower-return fixed income (debt).

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⁹ Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

For example, the New Mexico Public Employees' Retirement Association's expected return is 7.25% and the New Mexico Educational Retirement Board's expected return is 7.00%. SPS's proposed authorized Weighted Average Cost of Capital in this case is 7.61%, which is relatively comparable to those expected by pension funds.

B. <u>Financial Risk</u>

A.

- Q. Please define financial risk and explain why it is important in determining a
 fair rate of return.
 - Financial risk is the additional risk created by the introduction of debt and preferred stock into the capital structure. The higher the proportion of debt and preferred stock in the capital structure, the higher the financial risk to common equity owners (i.e., failure to receive dividends due to default or other covenants). Consequently, as the degree of financial leverage increases, the risk of financial distress (i.e., financial risk) also increases. In essence, even if two firms face the same business risks, a company with meaningfully higher levels of debt in its capital structure is likely to have a higher cost of both debt and equity. Therefore, consistent with the basic financial principle of risk and return, common equity investors require higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.

1 Q. Can bond and credit ratings be a proxy for a firm's combined business and

2 financial risks to equity owners (i.e., investment risk)?

Yes, similar bond ratings/issuer credit ratings reflect, and are representative of, similar combined business and financial risks (i.e., total risk) faced by bond investors. Although specific business or financial risks may differ between companies, the same bond/credit rating indicates that the combined risks are roughly similar from a debtholder perspective. The caveat is that these debtholder risk measures do not translate directly to risks for common equity.

¹⁰ Risk distinctions within S&P's bond rating categories are recognized by a plus or minus, e.g., within the A category, an S&P rating can be an A+, A, or A-. Similarly, risk distinction for Moody's ratings are distinguished by numerical rating gradations, e.g., within the A category, a Moody's rating can be A1, A2 and A3.

1		IV. <u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE</u>
2	Q.	What is SPS's requested capital structure?
3	A.	SPS's requested capital structure consists of 45.28% long-term debt and 54.72%
4		common equity. SPS's requested capital structure is its actual capital structure at
5		September 30, 2020, as testified to by SPS witness Patricia L. Martin.
6	Q.	Does SPS have a separate capital structure that is recognized by investors?
7	A.	Yes. SPS is a separate corporate entity that has its own capital structure and issues
8		its own debt. SPS's actual capital structure is reflected in registrations of its debt
9		with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
10	Q.	What are the typical sources of capital commonly considered in establishing a
11		utility's capital structure?
12	A.	Common equity and long-term debt are commonly considered in establishing a
13		utility's capital structure because they are the typical sources of capital financing
14		for a utility's rate base.
15	Q.	Please explain.
16	A.	Long-lived assets are typically financed with long-lived securities, so that the
17		overall term structure of the utility's long-term liabilities (both debt and equity)

closely match the life of the assets being financed. As stated by Brigham and Houston:

In practice, firms don't finance each specific asset with a type of capital that has a maturity equal to the asset's life. However, academic studies do show that most firms tend to finance short-term assets from short-term sources and long-term assets from long-term sources.¹¹

Whereas short-term debt has a maturity of one year or less, long-term debt may have maturities of 30 years or longer. Although there are practical financing constraints, such as the need to "stagger" long-term debt maturities, the general objective is to extend the average life of long-term debt. Still, long-term debt has a finite life, which is likely to be less than the life of the assets included in rate base. Common equity, on the other hand, is outstanding into perpetuity. Thus, common equity more accurately matches the life of the going concern of the utility, which is also assumed to operate in perpetuity. Consequently, it is both typical and important for utilities to have significant proportions of common equity in their capital structures.

¹¹ Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management</u>, Concise 4th Ed., Thomson South-Western, 2004, at 574.

1 Q. Why is it important that SPS's actual capital structure, consisting of 45.28% 2 long-term debt and 54.72% common equity, be authorized in this proceeding? 3 In order to provide safe, reliable, and affordable service to its customers, SPS must A. 4 meet the needs and serve the interests of its various stakeholders, including 5 customers, shareholders, and bondholders. The interests of these stakeholder groups are aligned with maintaining a healthy balance sheet, strong credit ratings, 6 7 and a supportive regulatory environment, so that SPS has access to capital on 8 reasonable terms in order to make necessary investments.

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Safe and reliable service cannot be maintained at a reasonable cost if utilities do not have the financial flexibility and strength to access competitive financing markets on reasonable terms. As Ms. Martin explains, an appropriate capital structure is important not only to ensure long-term financial integrity, it also is critical to enabling access to capital during constrained markets, or when near-term liquidity is needed to fund extraordinary requirements. In that important respect, the capital structure, and the financial strength it engenders, must support both normal circumstances and periods of market uncertainty. The authorization of a capital structure that understates SPS's actual common equity will weaken the financial condition of its operations and adversely impact SPS's ability to address

1 expenses and investments, to the detriment of customers and shareholders. Safe 2 and reliable service for customers cannot be sustained over the long term if the 3 interests of shareholders and bondholders are minimized such that the public interest is not optimized. 4 5 Q. How does SPS's actual common equity ratio of 54.72% compare with the 6 common equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy Group? 7 A. SPS's requested ratemaking common equity ratio of 54.72% is reasonable and 8 consistent with the range of common equity ratios maintained by the Utility Proxy 9 Group. As shown on pages 1 and 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 2, 10 common equity ratios of the utilities range from 36.10% to 58.04% for fiscal year 11 2019. 12 I also considered Value Line projected capital structures for the Utility Proxy Group for 2023-2025. That analysis shows a range of projected common 13 equity ratios between 36.50% and 59.00%. 12 14 15 In addition to comparing SPS's actual common equity ratio with common 16 equity ratios currently and expected to be maintained by the Utility Proxy Group, I 17 also compared SPS's actual common equity ratio with the equity ratios maintained

¹² See, pages 3 through 15 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 3.

1		by the operating subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group companies. As shown on
2		page 3 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 2, common equity ratios of the
3		operating utility subsidiaries of the Utility Proxy Group range from 47.47% to
4		59.59% for fiscal year 2019.
5	Q.	Is SPS's actual equity ratio of 54.72% appropriate for ratemaking purposes
6		given the range of the Utility Proxy Group?
7	A.	Yes, it is. SPS's actual equity ratio of 54.72% is appropriate for ratemaking
8		purposes in the current proceeding because it is within the range of the common
9		equity ratios currently maintained and expected to be maintained, by the Utility
10		Proxy Group and their operating subsidiaries.

V. SPS AND THE UTILITY PROXY GROUP

Why is it necessary to develop a proxy group when estimating the ROE for

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Q.

SPS?

Utility Proxy Group. 13

A. Because SPS is not publicly traded and does not have publicly-traded equity securities, it is necessary to develop groups of publicly traded, comparable companies to serve as "proxies" for SPS. In addition to the analytical necessity of doing so, the use of proxy companies is consistent with the *Hope*, and *Bluefield* comparable risk standards, as discussed above. I have selected two proxy groups that, in my view, are fundamentally risk-comparable to SPS: a Utility Proxy Group and a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, which is comparable in total risk to the

Even when proxy groups are carefully selected, it is common for analytical results to vary from company to company. Despite the care taken to ensure comparability, because no two companies are identical, market expectations regarding future risks and prospects will vary within the proxy group. It therefore is common for analytical results to reflect a seemingly wide range, even for a group of similarly situated companies. At issue is how to estimate the ROE from within

 $^{^{13}}$ The development of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group is explained in more detail in Section VI.

that range. That determination will be best informed by employing a variety of sound analyses and necessarily must consider the sort of quantitative and qualitative information discussed throughout my direct testimony. Additionally, a relative risk analysis between SPS and the Utility Proxy Group must be made to determine whether or not explicit Company-specific adjustments need to be made to the Utility Proxy Group indicated results.

My analyses are based on the Utility Proxy Group, containing U.S. electric utilities. As discussed earlier, utilities must compete for capital with other companies with commensurate risk (including non-utilities) and, to do so, must be provided the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return. Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the Utility Proxy Group's market data in determining SPS's ROE.

13 Q. Please summarize SPS's operations.

A. SPS is a vertically-integrated electric utility that provides electric generation, transmission, and distribution service to approximately 400,000 retail electric customers in Texas and New Mexico.¹⁴ SPS has long-term issuer ratings of Baa2

¹⁴ See, Xcel Energy, Inc., SEC Form 10-K at 8, 7 (Dec. 31, 2019).

from Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") and A- from Standard & Poor's ("S&P"). SPS is not publicly-traded as it is an operating subsidiary of Xcel 2 3 Energy. Xcel Energy is publicly-traded under ticker symbol "XEL". 4 Page 4 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative capitalization and financial statistics for SPS for the years 2015 to 2019.¹⁶ During 5 6 the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on 7 book common equity for SPS averaged 8.48%. The average common equity ratio 8 based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 53.92%, and the 9 average dividend payout ratio was 79.50%. Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 10 11 for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 3.54 times and 4.17 times, with an 12 average of 3.85 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 17.33% to 13 25.33%, with an average of 20.78%. 14 Please explain how you chose the companies in the Utility Proxy Group. Q. 15 Because the cost of common equity is a comparative exercise, my objective in A.

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developing a proxy group was to select companies that are comparable to SPS.

¹⁵ Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

¹⁶ Source: SPS FERC Form 1. Reflects entire operations of SPS.

1	Becaus	se SPS is a 100% rate regulated vertically-integrated electric utility, I applied
2	the foll	lowing criteria to select my Utility Proxy Group:
3 4	(i)	they were included in the Eastern, Central, or Western Electric Utility Group of Value Line (Standard Edition);
5 6 7	(ii)	they have 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total operating income derived from, and 70% or greater of fiscal year 2019 total assets attributable to, regulated electric operations;
8 9	(iii)	they are vertically integrated (i.e., utilities that own and operate regulated generation, transmission, and distribution assets);
10 11 12 13	(iv)	at the time of preparation of this testimony, they had not publicly announced that they were involved in any major merger or acquisition activity (i.e., one publicly-traded utility merging with or acquiring another) or any other major development;
14 15	(v)	they have not cut or omitted their common dividends during the five years ended 2019 or through the time of preparation of this testimony;
16 17	(vi)	they have Value Line and Bloomberg Professional Services ("Bloomberg") adjusted betas coefficients ("beta");
18 19	(vii)	they have positive Value Line five-year dividends per share ("DPS") growth rate projections; and
20 21	(viii)	they have <i>Value Line</i> , Zacks, Bloomberg, or Yahoo! Finance consensus five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth rate projections.

1 The following 13 companies met these criteria:

financial statistics.

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Table 2: Utility Proxy Group Companies

Company Name	Ticker Symbol
ALLETE, Inc.	ALE
Alliant Energy Corporation	LNT
Ameren Corporation	AEE
Edison International	EIX
Entergy Corporation	ETR
Evergy, Inc.	EVRG
IDACORP, Inc.	IDA
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE
OGE Energy Corporation	OGE
Otter Tail Corporation	OTTR
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	PNW
Portland General Electric Co.	POR
Xcel Energy, Inc.	XEL

3 Q. Please summarize the Utility Proxy Group's historical capitalization and

- 5 A. Page 5 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 2 contains comparative capitalization
 6 and financial statistics for the Utility Proxy Group for the years 2015 to 2019.
 - During the five-year period ending 2019, the historically achieved average earnings rate on book common equity for the Utility Proxy Group averaged 9.01%, the average common equity ratio based on total permanent capital (excluding short-term debt) was 49.33%, and the average dividend payout ratio was 51.55%.

1	Total debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
2	for the years 2015 to 2019 ranges between 3.83 and 5.25 times, with an average of
3	4.45 times. Funds from operations to total debt range from 15.35% to 24.13%, with
4	an average of 20.25%. Given those capitalization and financial statistics, I conclude
5	the Utility Proxy Group is generally comparable to SPS.

VI. COMMON EQUITY COST RATE MODELS

2 Q. Is it important that cost of common equity models be market-based?

A.

A. Yes. As discussed previously, regulated public utilities, like SPS, must compete for equity in capital markets along with all other companies with commensurate risk, including non-utilities. The cost of common equity is thus determined based on equity market expectations for the returns of those companies. If an individual investor is choosing to invest their capital among companies with comparable risk, they will choose the company providing a higher return over a company providing a lower return.

Q. Are the cost of common equity models you use market-based models?

Yes. The DCF model is market-based in that market prices are used in developing the dividend yield component of the model. The RPM and CAPM are also market-based in that the bond/issuer ratings and expected bond yields/risk-free rate used in the application of the RPM and CAPM reflect the market's assessment of bond/credit risk. In addition, the use of beta to determine the equity risk premium also reflects the market's assessment of market/systematic risk, as betas are derived from regression analyses of market prices. Moreover, market prices are used in the development of the monthly returns and equity risk premiums used in the Predictive Risk Premium Model ("PRPM"). Selection criteria for the Non-Price Regulated

Proxy Group are based on regression analyses of market prices and reflect the market's assessment of total risk.

Q. What analytical approaches did you use to determine SPS's ROE?

A.

As discussed earlier, I have relied on the DCF model, the RPM, and the CAPM, which I apply to the Utility Proxy Group described above. I also applied these same models to a Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group described later in this section.

I rely on these models because reasonable investors use a variety of tools and do not rely exclusively on a single source of information or single model. Moreover, the models on which I rely focus on different aspects of return requirements, and provide different insights to investors' views of risk and return. The DCF model, for example, estimates the investor-required return assuming a constant expected dividend yield and growth rate in perpetuity, while Risk Premium-based methods (i.e., the RPM and CAPM approaches) provide the ability to reflect investors' views of risk, future market returns, and the relationship between interest rates and the cost of common equity. Just as the use of market data for the Utility Proxy Group adds the reliability necessary to inform expert judgment in arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate, the use of multiple generally accepted common equity cost rate models also adds reliability and accuracy when arriving at a recommended common equity cost rate.

1 Q. Has the Constant Growth DCF model recently produced estimates consistent 2 with authorized returns?

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
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A. Since 2014, the Constant Growth DCF model has produced results (*i.e.*, mean results) below authorized returns (*see* Chart 1, below). That data suggests state regulatory commissions have not necessarily relied exclusively on the DCF model, and that other methods should be given meaningful weight in determining the ROE.

Chart 1: Mean DCF Results vs. Authorized ROE Over Time¹⁷



¹⁷ DCF results based on quarterly average stock prices, Earnings Per Share growth rates from Value Line, Zacks, First Call, and Bloomberg. Authorized ROEs are quarterly averages for vertically integrated electric utilities. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. Please note that 2017 Q3 and 2016 Q2 included only one ROE decision.

I	Q.	Has New Mexico noted the importance of reviewing multiple methods in prior				
2		utility proceedings?				
3	A.	Yes. Although I am not an attorney, I understand that in prior cases, the Supreme				
4		Court of New Mexico (the "Court") found that the Commission is not bound to a				
5		single method. As the Court noted in Hobbs Gas:				
6 7 8 9 10		Neither New Mexico case law nor the Public Utility Act imposes any one particular method of valuation upon the Commission in ascertaining the rate base of a utility. <i>Mountain States Tel. v. New Mexico State Corp.</i> , 90 N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977). Nor does the spirit of the statute tie the Commission down to the consideration of a single factor in establishing rates. ¹⁸				
2		Citing to its decision in Mountain States Telephone, the Court further noted				
3		that:				
14 15 16 17		The Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates. The ratemaking function involves the making of pragmatic adjustments. It is the result reached, not the method employed, which is controlling. (Citations omitted.) ¹⁹				
9		In PNM Gas Services, the Court likewise found that because of the				
20		complexity and number of variables at issue in rate proceedings, the Commission				
21		is not bound to a single formula. Again, the Court found that "the rate-making				

¹⁸ Hobbs Gas Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 94 N.M. 731 (1980), at 4.

¹⁹ Hobbs Gas Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 94 N.M. 731 (1980), at 4.

1		function involves the making of pragmatic adjustments" and that in the end, "[i]t is
2		the result reached, not the method employed, which is controlling."20
3		Lastly, I understand that in Zia Natural Gas, the Court again cited back to
4		Mountain States, noting the importance of the "immediate economic situation":
5 6 7 8 9		[t]his Court can see no reason why it should adopt as the law of this state any single formula which has been evolved out of this history of litigation [T]he regulatory authorities seek a formula which will adjust rates to the <i>immediate economic situation</i> " (emphasis added). ²¹
10		My plain reading of those decisions suggests that although the Commission
11		historically has put emphasis on the Constant Growth DCF approach, it is not bound
12		to do so. Equally important, the Court found that the immediate economic situation
13		may call for "pragmatic adjustments" to the method used to establish the ROE, and
14		that it is the reasonableness of the ROE itself, rather than the methodology used in
15		its determination, that controls.
16	Q.	Would sole reliance on the DCF model likely produce a reasonable ROE for
17		SPS in this case?
18	A.	No. As the New Mexico Supreme Court has consistently recognized, it is the
19		current economic situation, not adherence to a single formula, that is likely to

²⁰ In re Petition of PNM Gas Services, 129 N.M. 1 (2000), at 11.

²¹ In re Zia Natural Gas Co., 128 N.M. 728 (2000), at 8.

produce a reasonable return. As discussed above, a reasonable ROE is one that is commensurate with the returns expected elsewhere for investments of equivalent risk. As Chart 1 demonstrates, average authorized returns (which may themselves be below the required return for a particular utility) have consistently been higher than the return produced under a standalone DCF approach. The DCF model's consistent failure to produce returns commensurate with the returns generally established for electric utilities demonstrates that it should not be relied on to the exclusion of other approaches, but instead that a combination of the DCF with tested, market-based models should be used.

A. <u>Discounted Cash Flow Model</u>

11 Q. Please describe the DCF model generally.

A.

The theory underlying the DCF model is that the present value of an expected future stream of net cash flows during the investment holding period can be determined by discounting those cash flows at the cost of capital, or the investors' capitalization rate. DCF theory indicates that an investor buys a stock for an expected total return rate, which is derived from the cash flows received from dividends and market price appreciation. Mathematically, the expected dividend yield on market price plus a growth rate equals the capitalization rate; i.e., the total common equity return rate expected by investors, as shown in Equation [1] below:

1		$K_e = (D_0 (1+g))/P + g$					
2		Where:					
3 4 5 6 7		K_e = the required Return on Common Equity; D_0 = the annualized Dividend Per Share; P = the current stock price; and G = the growth rate.					
8	Q.	Which version of the DCF model did you use?					
9	A.	I used the single-stage Constant Growth DCF model.					
10	Q.	Please describe the dividend yield you used in applying the Constant Growth					
11		DCF model.					
12	A.	The unadjusted dividend yields are based on the proxy companies' dividends as of					
13		October 30, 2020, divided by the average closing market price for the 60 trading					
14		days ended October 30, 2020. ²²					
15	Q.	Please explain your adjustment to the dividend yield.					
16	A.	Because dividends are paid periodically (e.g., quarterly), as opposed to					
17		continuously (daily), an adjustment must be made to the dividend yield. This is					
18		often referred to as the discrete, or the Gordon Periodic, version of the DCF model.					
19		DCF theory calls for using the full growth rate, or D ₁ , in calculating the					
20		model's dividend yield component. Since the companies in the Utility Proxy Group					

²² See, Column 1, page 1 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 3.

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increase their quarterly dividends at various times during the year, a conservative assumption is to reflect one-half the annual dividend growth rate rather than the full growth rate in the dividend yield component, or $D_{1/2}$. Because the dividend should be representative of the next 12-month period, this adjustment is a conservative approach that does not overstate the dividend yield. Therefore, the actual average dividend yields in Column 1, page 1 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 3 have been adjusted upward to reflect one-half the average projected growth rate shown in Column 6. Q. Please explain the basis for the growth rates you apply in your Constant **Growth DCF model.** A. Investors with more limited resources than institutional investors are likely to rely on widely available financial information services, such as Value Line, Zacks, and Yahoo! Finance. Investors realize that analysts have significant insight into the dynamics of the industries and individual companies they analyze, as well as companies' abilities to effectively manage the effects of changing laws and regulations, and ever-changing economic and market conditions. For these reasons, I used analysts' five-year forecasts of EPS growth in my DCF analysis. Over the long run, there can be no growth in DPS without growth in EPS.

Security analysts' earnings expectations have a more significant influence on

- market prices than dividend expectations. Thus, using projected earnings growth rates in a DCF analysis provides a better match between investors' market price appreciation expectations and the growth rate component of the DCF.
- 4 Q. Please summarize the Constant Growth DCF model results.
- 5 A. As shown on page 1 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 3, the application of the 6 Constant Growth DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group results in a wide range of 7 indicated ROEs from 6.22% to 10.97%. The mean of those results is 8.83%, the median result is 8.57%, and the average of the two is 8.70%. In arriving at a 8 9 conclusion of the indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group 10 implied by the Constant Growth DCF model, I relied on an average of the mean and the median results (i.e., 8.70%) of the DCF. By doing so, I have considered 11 12 the DCF results for each company without giving undue weight to outliers on either 13 the high or the low side.
- 14 Q. Did you consider any other Constant Growth DCF model results?
- 15 A. Yes, I did. I recognize that in prior orders, including SPS's most recent 16 fully-litigated order in Case No. 17-00255-UT,²³ the Commission has relied 17 exclusively on a specific form of the Constant Growth DCF approach ("NM DCF").

²³ The Commission issued its Final Order on September 5, 2018, and a *New Final Order on Partial Mandate from the New Mexico Supreme Court* on March 6, 2019.

1		Specifically, that form has recently included a 30-day stock price averaging period
2		and a full dividend yield growth rate adjustment, and determined the ROE at the
3		midpoint of the proxy group mean and mean high DCF results. Consistent with the
4		Commission's prior precedent, I have included a NM DCF analysis incorporating
5		the Commission's preferred inputs, as shown on page 2 of Attachment(DWD-1),
6		Schedule 3.
7	Q.	Please explain how you determined the mean high DCF results for the Utility
8		Proxy Group.
9	A.	For each proxy company, I calculated the high DCF result by applying the highest
10		of the four growth rates to the expected dividend yield. The mean high DCF result
11		for the Utility Proxy Group is the average of the individual company indicated DCF
12		result.
13	Q.	Please summarize the results of the NM DCF.
14	A.	As shown on page 2 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 3, for the Utility Proxy
15		Group, the application of the Commission's DCF model to the Utility Proxy Group
16		resulted in indicated ROEs from 6.31% to 13.22%. The average of the mean and
17		result of applying the Commission's DCF model is 8.76%, the average of the mean
18		and median high result is 9.35%. The average of the two is 9.06%.

B. The Risk Premium Model

A.

Q. Please describe the theoretical basis of the RPM.

The RPM is based on the fundamental financial principle of risk and return; namely, that investors require greater returns for bearing greater risk. The RPM recognizes that common equity capital has greater investment risk than debt capital, as common equity shareholders are behind debt holders in any claim on a company's assets and earnings. As a result, investors require higher returns from common stocks than from bonds to compensate them for bearing the additional risk.

While it is possible to directly observe bond returns and yields, investors' required common equity returns cannot be directly determined or observed. According to RPM theory, one can estimate a common equity risk premium over bonds (either historically or prospectively), and use that premium to derive a cost rate of common equity. The cost of common equity equals the expected cost rate for long-term debt capital, plus a risk premium over that cost rate, to compensate common shareholders for the added risk of being unsecured and last-in-line for any claim on the corporation's assets and earnings upon liquidation.

- 1 Q. Please explain how you derived your indicated cost of common equity based on the RPM.
- A. To derive my indicated cost of common equity under the RPM, I used two risk premium methods. The first method was the PRPM and the second method was a risk premium model using a total market approach. The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, while the total market approach indirectly derives a risk premium by using known metrics as a proxy for risk.

i. Predictive Risk Premium Model

9 **Q.** Please explain the PRPM.

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10 A. The PRPM, published in the *Journal of Regulatory Economics*,²⁴ was developed 11 from the work of Robert F. Engle, who shared the Nobel Prize in Economics in 12 2003 "for methods of analyzing economic time series with time-varying volatility" 13 ("ARCH").²⁵ Engle found that volatility changes over time and is related from one 14 period to the next, especially in financial markets. Engle discovered that volatility 15 of prices and returns clusters over time and is therefore highly predictable and can 16 be used to predict future levels of risk and risk premiums. That is, historical

²⁴ Pauline M. Ahern, Frank J. Hanley and Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D. *A New Approach for Estimating the Equity Risk Premium for Public Utilities*, <u>The Journal of Regulatory Economics</u> (December 2011), 40:261-278.

²⁵ Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; see also, www.nobelprize.org.

volatility can be used to predict future volatility, which then can be translated to a predicted equity risk premium.

The PRPM estimates the risk-return relationship directly, as the predicted equity risk premium is generated by predicting volatility or risk. The PRPM is not based on an <u>estimate</u> of investor behavior, but rather on an evaluation of the results of that behavior (i.e., the variance of historical equity risk premiums).

The inputs to the model are the historical returns on the common shares of each Utility Proxy Group company minus the historical monthly yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities through October 2020. Using a generalized form of ARCH, known as "GARCH", I calculated each Utility Proxy Group company's projected equity risk premium using Eviews[©] statistical software. When the GARCH model is applied to the historical return data, it produces a predicted GARCH variance series²⁶ and a GARCH coefficient.²⁷ Multiplying the predicted monthly variance by the GARCH coefficient and then annualizing it²⁸ produces the predicted annual equity risk premium. I then added the forecasted 30-year U.S.

²⁶ Illustrated on Columns 1 and 2, page 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

²⁷ Illustrated on Column 4, page 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

²⁸ Annualized Return = $(1 + Monthly Return)^{12} - 1$.

Treasury bond yield of 2.16%²⁹ to each company's PRPM-derived equity risk premium to arrive at an indicated cost of common equity. The 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield is a consensus forecast derived from *Blue Chip*. ³⁰ The mean PRPM indicated common equity cost rate for the Utility Proxy Group is 10.38%, the median is 10.20%, and the average of the two is 10.29%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of the median and mean results of the DCF models, I relied on the average of the mean and median results of the Utility Proxy Group PRPM to calculate a cost of common equity rate of 10.29%. Please describe your selection of a risk-free rate of return.

9 Q.

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As shown in Attachment (DWD-1), Schedules 4 and 5, the risk-free rate adopted 10 A. 11 for applications of the RPM and CAPM is 2.16%. This risk-free rate is based on 12 the average of the Blue Chip consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year 13 U.S. Treasury bonds for the six quarters ending with the first calendar quarter of 14 2022, and long-term projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.

15 Why do you use the projected 30-year Treasury yield in your analyses? Q.

16 A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds is almost risk-free and its term is 17 consistent with the long-term cost of capital to public utilities measured by the

²⁹ See, Column 6, page 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

³⁰ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip"), June 1, 2020 at page 14 and October 30, 2020 at 2.

1	yields on Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds; the long-term investment horizon			
2	inherent in utilities' common stocks; and the long-term life of the jurisdictional rate			
3	base to which the allowed fair rate of return (i.e., cost of capital) will be applied.			
4	In contrast, short-term U.S. Treasury yields are more volatile and largely a function			
5	of Federal Reserve monetary policy.			
6	More specifically, the term of the risk-free rate used for cost of capital			
7	purposes should match the life (or duration) of the underlying investment (i.e.,			
8	perpetuity). As noted by Morningstar:			
9	The traditional thinking regarding the time horizon of the chosen			
10	Treasury security is that it should match the time horizon of			
11	whatever is being valued. When valuing a business that is being			
12	treated as a going concern, the appropriate Treasury yield should			
13	be that of a long-term Treasury bond. Note that the horizon is a			
14	function of the investment, not the investor. If an investor plans			
15	to hold stock in a company for only five years, the yield on a			
16	five-year Treasury note would not be appropriate since the			
17	company will continue to exist beyond those five years. ³¹			
18	Morin also confirms this when he states:			
19	[b]ecause common stock is a long-term investment and because			
20	the cash flows to investors in the form of dividends last			
21	indefinitely, the yield on very long-term government bonds,			
22	namely, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds, is the best measure			
23	of the risk-free rate for use in the CAPM (footnote omitted)			

³¹ Morningstar, Inc., <u>2013 Ibbotson Stocks</u>, <u>Bonds</u>, <u>Bills and Inflation Valuation Yearbook</u>, at 44.

The expected common stock return is based on long-term cash flows, regardless of an individual's holding time period.³²

Pratt and Grabowski recommend a similar approach to selecting the risk-free rate: "[i]n theory, when determining the risk-free rate and the matching ERP you should be matching the risk-free security and the ERP with the period in which the investment cash flows are expected." Similarly, a 2004 paper titled *Applying The Capital Asset Pricing Model* by Robert Harris reviews current practices for application of the CAPM and, when summarizing best current practices, concludes "[t]he risk-free rate should match the tenor of the cash flows being valued." ³⁴

As a practical matter, equity securities represent a perpetual claim on cash flows; 30-year Treasury bonds are the longest-maturity securities available to approximate that perpetual claim. The average life of SPS's utility plant is approximately 31 years based on the composite depreciation rate of the components of its utility plant.³⁵ Thus, the use of a 30-year Treasury bond yield is a more appropriate risk-free rate as it more accurately reflects the life of the assets it finances.

³² Roger A. Morin, New Regulatory Finance, Public Utilities Reports, Inc., 2006, at 151. ("Morin").

³³ Shannon Pratt and Roger Grabowski, <u>Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples</u>, 3rd Ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008), at 92. "ERP" is the Equity Risk Premium.

³⁴ Paper cited with permission of author.

³⁵ Average depreciation 3.19%. 1/3.19% = 31.37 years.

ii. Total Market Approach Risk Premium Model

2 Q. Please explain the total market approach RPM.

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- A. The total market approach RPM adds a prospective public utility bond yield to an average of: 1) an equity risk premium that is derived from a beta-adjusted total market equity risk premium; 2) an equity risk premium based on the S&P Utilities Index; and 3) an equity risk premium based on authorized ROEs for electric utilities.
- Q. Please explain how you determined the expected bond yield, applicable to the
 Utility Proxy Group.
 - A. The first step in the total market approach RPM analysis is to determine the expected bond yield. Because both ratemaking and the cost of capital, including the common equity cost rate, are prospective in nature, a prospective yield on similarly-rated long-term debt is essential. Because I am unaware of any publication that provides forecasted public utility bond yields, I relied on a consensus forecast of about 50 economists of the expected yield on Aaa-rated corporate bonds for the six calendar quarters ending with the first calendar quarter of 2022, and *Blue Chip's* long-term projections for 2022 to 2026, and 2027 to 2031. As shown on line 1, page 3 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4, the average expected yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds is 3.01%.

Because that 3.01% estimate represents a corporate bond yield and not a utility specific bond yield, I adjusted the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield to an equivalent A2-rated public utility bond yield. That resulted in an upward adjustment of 0.54%, which represents a recent spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and A2-rated public utility bonds.³⁶ Adding that recent 0.54% spread to the expected Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 3.01% results in an expected A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.55%.

I then reviewed the average credit rating for the Utility Proxy Group from Moody's to determine if an adjustment to the estimated A2-rated public utility bond was necessary. Since the Utility Proxy Group's average Moody's long-term issuer rating is A3, another adjustment to the expected A2-rated public utility bond is needed to reflect the difference in bond ratings. An upward adjustment of 0.11%, which represents one-third of a recent spread between A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yields, is necessary to make the A2 prospective bond yield applicable to an A3-rated public utility bond.³⁷ Adding the 0.11% to the 3.55%

³⁶ As shown on line 2 and explained in note 2, page 3 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

³⁷ As shown on line 4 and explained in note 3, page 3 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2), I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

prospective A2-rated public utility bond yield results in a 3.66% expected bond yield applicable to the Utility Proxy Group.

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Table 3: Summary of the Calculation of the Utility Proxy Group Projected Bond Yield³⁸

Prospective Yield on Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds (<i>Blue Chip</i>)	3.01%
Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Moody's Aaa-Rated Corporate Bonds and Moody's A2-Rated Utility Bonds	0.54%
Adjustment to Reflect the Utility Proxy Group's Average Moody's Bond Rating of A3	0.11%
Prospective Bond Yield Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	3.66%

To develop the total market approach RPM estimate of the appropriate ROE, this prospective bond yield is then added to the average of the three different equity risk premiums, which I now discuss, in turn.

a. Beta Derived Equity Risk Premium

Q. Please explain how the beta-derived equity risk premium is determined.

10 A. The components of the beta-derived risk premium model are: 1) an expected
11 market equity risk premium over corporate bonds, and 2) beta. The derivation of
12 the beta-derived equity risk premium that I applied to the Utility Proxy Group is
13 shown on lines 1 through 9, page 8 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 4. The

³⁸ As shown on page 3 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1 total beta-derived equity risk premium I applied is based on an average of three 2 historical market data-based equity risk premiums, two Value Line-based equity 3 risk premiums, and a Bloomberg-based equity risk premium. Each of these is described below. 4 5 How did you derive a market equity risk premium based on long-term Q. 6 historical data? 7 A. To derive an historical market equity risk premium, I used the most recent holding 8 period returns for the large company common stocks from the Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation ("SBBI") Yearbook 2020 ("SBBI - 2020")³⁹ less the average historical 9 10 yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds for the period 1928 to 2019. 11 Using holding period returns over a very long time is appropriate because it is consistent with the long-term investment horizon presumed by investing in a going 12 13 concern, i.e., a company expected to operate in perpetuity. 14 SBBI's long-term arithmetic mean monthly total return rate on large 15 company common stocks was 11.83% and the long-term arithmetic mean monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds was 6.05%. 40 As shown on 16 line 1, page 8 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4, subtracting the mean 17

³⁹ See, SBBI-2020 Appendix A Tables: Morningstar Stocks, Bonds, Bills, & Inflation 1926-2019.

⁴⁰ As explained in note 1, page 9 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

monthly bond yield from the total return on large company stocks results in a long-term historical equity risk premium of 5.78%.

I used the arithmetic mean monthly total return rates for the large company stocks and yields (income returns) for the Moody's Aaa/Aa corporate bonds, because they are appropriate for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital as noted in SBBI - 2020.⁴¹ Using the arithmetic mean return rates and yields is appropriate because historical total returns and equity risk premiums provide insight into the variance and standard deviation of returns needed by investors in estimating future risk when making a current investment. If investors relied on the geometric mean of historical equity risk premiums, they would have no insight into the potential variance of future returns, because the geometric mean relates the change over many periods to a constant rate of change, thereby obviating the year-to-year fluctuations, or variance, which is critical to risk analysis.

- Q. Please explain the derivation of the regression-based market equity risk premium.
- 16 A. To derive the regression-based market equity risk premium of 9.36% shown on line
 17 2, page 8 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 4, I used the same monthly
 18 annualized total returns on large company common stocks relative to the monthly

⁴¹ See, SBBI - 2020, at 10-22.

annualized yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds as mentioned above. I modeled the relationship between interest rates and the market equity risk premium using the observed monthly market equity risk premium as the dependent variable, and the monthly yield on Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds as the independent variable. I then used a linear Ordinary Least Squares ("OLS") regression, in which the market equity risk premium is expressed as a function of the Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds yield:

 $RP = \alpha + \beta (R_{Aaa/Aa})$

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9 Q. Please explain the derivation of the PRPM equity risk premium.

A. I used the same PRPM approach described above to the PRPM equity risk premium. The inputs to the model are the historical monthly returns on large company common stocks minus the monthly yields on Moody's Aaa/Aa2-rated corporate bonds during the period from January 1928 through October 2020.⁴² Using the previously discussed generalized form of ARCH, known as GARCH, the projected equity risk premium is determined using Eviews[©] statistical software. The resulting PRPM predicted a market equity risk premium of 9.52%.⁴³

 $^{^{42}}$ Data from January 1926 to December 2019 is from <u>SBBI - 2020</u>. Data from January 2020 to October 2020 is from Bloomberg.

⁴³ Shown on line 3, page 8 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Q. Please explain the derivation of a projected equity risk premium based on Value Line data for your RPM analysis.

A.

As noted above, because both ratemaking and the cost of capital are prospective, a prospective market equity risk premium is needed. The derivation of the forecasted or prospective market equity risk premium can be found in note 4, page 9 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 4. Consistent with my calculation of the dividend yield component in my DCF analysis, this prospective market equity risk premium is derived from an average of the three- to five-year median market price appreciation potential by *Value Line* for the 13 weeks ended October 30, 2020, plus an average of the median estimated dividend yield for the common stocks of the 1,700 firms covered in *Value Line* (Standard Edition).⁴⁴

The average median expected price appreciation is 52%, which translates to a 11.04% annual appreciation, and, when added to the average of *Value Line's* median expected dividend yields of 2.26%, equates to a forecasted annual total return rate on the market of 13.30%. The forecasted Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bond yield of 3.01% is deducted from the total market return of 13.30%, resulting in an equity risk premium of 10.29%, as shown on line 4, page 8 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

⁴⁴ As explained in detail in note 1, page 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1	Q.	Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on the S&P 500					
2		companies.					
3	A.	Using data from Value Line, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500					
4		companies using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a					
5		proxy for capital appreciation. The expected total return for the S&P 500 is					
6		13.96%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's Aaa-rated corporate bonds					
7		of 3.01% results in a 10.95% projected equity risk premium.					
8	Q.	Please explain the derivation of an equity risk premium based on Bloomberg					
9		data.					
10	A.	Using data from Bloomberg, I calculated an expected total return on the S&P 500					
11		using expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for					
12		capital appreciation, identical to the method described above. The expected total					
13		return for the S&P 500 is 14.02%. Subtracting the prospective yield on Moody's					
14		Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 3.01% results in a 11.01% projected equity risk					
15		premium.					
16	Q.	What is your conclusion of a beta-derived equity risk premium for use in your					
17		RPM analysis?					
18	A.	I gave equal weight to all six equity risk premiums based on each source -					
19		historical, <i>Value Line</i> , and Bloomberg – in arriving at a 9.48% equity risk premium.					
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Table 4: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using

Total Market Returns⁴⁵

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Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large Stocks and Aaa and Aa2-Rated Corporate Bond	5.78%	
Yields (1928 – 2019)		
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	9.36%	
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	9.52%	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total		
Market Returns from Value Line Summary & Index	10.29%	
less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields		
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of		
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from	10.95%	
Value Line for the S&P 500 less Projected Aaa	10.9370	
Corporate Bond Yields		
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of		
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from	11.01%	
Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500	11.01/0	
less Projected Aaa Corporate Bond Yields		
Average	<u>9.48%</u>	

After calculating the average market equity risk premium of 9.48%, I adjusted it by beta to account for the risk of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed below, beta is a meaningful measure of prospective relative risk to the market as a whole, and is a logical way to allocate a company's, or proxy group's, share of the market's total equity risk premium relative to corporate bond yields. As shown on page 1 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 5, the average of the mean and median beta for the Utility Proxy Group is 0.95. Multiplying the 0.95 average beta

⁴⁵ As shown on page 8 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

by the market equity risk premium of 9.48% results in a beta-adjusted equity risk
 premium for the Utility Proxy Group of 9.01%.

b. <u>S&P Utility Index Derived Equity Risk Premium</u>

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A.

4 Q. How did you derive the equity risk premium based on the S&P Utility Index
 5 and Moody's A2-rated public utility bonds?

I estimated three equity risk premiums based on S&P Utility Index holding period returns, and two equity risk premiums based on the expected returns of the S&P Utilities Index, using *Value Line* and Bloomberg data, respectively. Turning first to the S&P Utility Index holding period returns, I derived a long-term monthly arithmetic mean equity risk premium between the S&P Utility Index total returns of 10.74% and monthly Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yields of 6.53% from 1928 to 2019 to arrive at an equity risk premium of 4.21%. I then used the same historical data to derive an equity risk premium of 6.84% based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums. The final S&P Utility Index holding period equity risk premium involved applying the PRPM using the historical monthly equity risk premiums from January 1928 to October 2020 to arrive at a PRPM-derived equity risk premium of 5.59% for the S&P Utility Index.

⁴⁶ As shown on line 1, page 12 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

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I then derived expected total returns on the S&P Utilities Index of 10.17% and 8.25% using data from *Value Line* and Bloomberg, respectively, and subtracted the prospective Moody's A2-rated public utility bond yield of 3.55%⁴⁷, which resulted in equity risk premiums of 6.62% and 4.70%, respectively. As with the market equity risk premiums, I averaged each risk premium based on each source (i.e., historical, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg) to arrive at my utility-specific equity risk premium of 5.61%.

Table 5: Summary of the Calculation of the Equity Risk Premium Using S&P Utility Index Holding Returns⁴⁸

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of the S&P Utilities Index and A2-Rated Utility Bond Yields	4.21%
(1928 - 2019)	
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	6.84%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	5.59%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from <i>Value Line</i> for the S&P Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	6.62%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P Utilities Index less Projected A2 Utility Bond Yields	<u>4.70%</u>
Average	<u>5.59%</u>

⁴⁷ Derived on line 3, page 3 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

⁴⁸ As shown on page 12 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

c. Authorized Return Derived Equity Risk Premium

2	Q.	How do you derive an equity risk premium of 5.94% based on authorized					
3		ROEs for electric utilities?					
4	A.	The equity risk premium of 5.92% shown on line 3, page 7 of					
5		Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 4 is the result of a regression analysis based on					
6		regulatory awarded ROEs related to the yields on Moody's A2-rated public utility					
7		bonds. That analysis is shown on page 13 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 4.					
8		Page 13 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 4 contains the graphical results of a					
9		regression analysis of 1,169 rate cases for electric utilities which were fully litigated					
10		during the period from January 1, 1980 through October 31, 2020. It shows the					
11		implicit equity risk premium relative to the yields on A2-rated public utility bonds					
12		immediately prior to the issuance of each regulatory decision. That is, the analysis					
13		considers the relationship between authorized returns and prevailing public utility					
14		bond yields at the time of the decision.					
15		It is readily discernible that there is an inverse relationship between the yield					
16		on A2-rated public utility bonds and equity risk premiums. In other words, as					
17		interest rates decline, the equity risk premium rises and vice versa, a result					

consistent with financial literature on the subject.⁴⁹ I used the regression results to 1 estimate the equity risk premium applicable to the projected yield on Moody's A2-2 3 rated public utility bonds. Given the expected A2-rated utility bond yield of 3.55%, 4 it can be calculated that the indicated equity risk premium applicable to that bond 5 yield is 5.92%, which is shown on line 3, page 7 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4. 6 7 What is your conclusion of an equity risk premium for use in your total market Q. 8 approach RPM analysis? 9 A. The equity risk premium I apply to the Utility Proxy Group is 6.84%, which is the 10 average of the beta-adjusted equity risk premium for the Utility Proxy Group, the 11 S&P Utilities Index, and the authorized return utility equity risk premiums of 9.01%, 5.59%, and 5.92%, respectively.⁵⁰ 12

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts*, <u>Journal of Applied Finance</u>, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001, at 11-12; Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity*, <u>Financial Management</u>, Spring 1985, at 33-45.

⁵⁰ As shown on page 7 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

1 Q. What is the indicated RPM common equity cost rate based on the total market

2 approach?

- 3 A. As shown on line 7, page 3 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 4 and shown on
- Table 8, below, I calculated a common equity cost rate of 10.50% for the Utility
- 5 Proxy Group based on the total market approach RPM.

Table 6: Summary of the Total Market Return Risk Premium Model⁵¹

Prospective Moody's A3-Rated Utility Bond Applicable to the Utility Proxy Group	3.66%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium	<u>6.84%</u>
Indicated Cost of Common Equity	<u>10.50%</u>

7 Q. What are the results of your application of the PRPM and the total market

8 **approach RPM?**

- 9 A. As shown on page 1 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 4, the indicated
- 10 RPM-derived common equity cost rate is 10.40%, which gives equal weight to the
- PRPM (10.29%) and the adjusted-market approach results (10.50%).

⁵¹ As shown on page 3 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

C. The Capital Asset Pricing Model

2 Q. Please explain the theoretical basis of the CAPM.

A. CAPM theory defines risk as the co-variability of a security's returns with the market's returns as measured by beta (β). A beta that is less than 1.0 indicates lower variability than the market as a whole, while a beta that is greater than 1.0 indicates greater variability than the market.

The CAPM assumes that all non-market or unsystematic risk can be eliminated through diversification. The risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification is called market, or systematic, risk. In addition, the CAPM presumes that investors only require compensation for systematic risk, which is the result of macroeconomic and other events that affect the returns on all assets. The model is applied by adding a risk-free rate of return to a market risk premium, which is adjusted proportionately to reflect the systematic risk of the individual security relative to the total market as measured by beta. The traditional CAPM model is expressed as:

16		$R_{\rm s}$	=	$R_{\mathrm{f}}+\beta \left(R_{\mathrm{m}}$ - $R_{\mathrm{f}}\right)$
17	Where:			
18		$R_{\rm s}$	=	Return rate on the common stock
19		R_{f}	=	Risk-free rate of return
20		R_{m}	=	Return rate on the market as a whole
21		β	=	Adjusted beta (volatility of the
22				security relative to the market as a whole)

Numerous tests of the traditional CAPM have measured the extent to which security returns and beta are related as predicted by the CAPM, confirming its validity. The empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") reflects the reality that while the results of these tests support the notion that the beta is related to security returns, the empirical Security Market Line ("SML") described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML.⁵²

In their work on the CAPM, Fama and French clearly state regarding Figure 2, below, that "[t]he returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low."⁵³

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
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⁵² Morin, at 175.

⁵³ Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, *The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence*, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3, Summer 2004 at 33 ("Fama & French").

Figure 2 http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/0895330042162430

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



In addition, Morin observes that while the results of these tests support the notion that beta is related to security returns, the empirical SML described by the CAPM formula is not as steeply sloped as the predicted SML. Morin states:

With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that ... lowbeta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted.⁵⁴

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⁵⁴ Morin, at 175.

Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected 2 return on a security is related to its risk by the following 3 approximation: $K = R_F + x (R_M - R_F) + (1-x) \beta(R_M - R_F)$ 4 5 where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of 6 x that best explains the observed relationship [is] Return = 7 $0.0829 + 0.0520 \beta$ is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25, the 8 equation becomes:

$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75 \beta(R_M - R_F)^{55}$$

Fama and French provide similar support for the ECAPM when they state:

The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too 'flat.'... The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate... and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return... This is true in the early tests... as well as in more recent cross-section regressions tests, like Fama and French (1992).⁵⁶

Finally, Fama and French further note:

Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Linter CAPM predicts. The returns on low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return as 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the t beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.⁵⁷

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⁵⁵ Morin, at 190.

⁵⁶ Fama & French, at 32.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*. at 33.

1 Clearly, the justification from Morin, Fama, and French, along with their 2 reviews of other academic research on the CAPM, validate the use of the ECAPM. 3 In view of theory and practical research, I have applied both the traditional CAPM 4 and the ECAPM to the companies in the Utility Proxy Group and averaged the 5 results. 6 Q. What betas did you use in your CAPM analysis? 7 A. For the beta in my CAPM analysis, I considered two sources: Value Line and 8 Bloomberg Professional Services. While both of those services adjust their 9 calculated (or "raw") beta to reflect the tendency of beta to regress to the market 10 mean of 1.00, Value Line calculates betas over a five-year period, while Bloomberg 11 calculates them over a two-year period. 12 Q. Please describe your selection of a risk-free rate of return. 13 A. As discussed previously, the risk-free rate adopted for both applications of the 14 CAPM is 2.16%. This risk-free rate is based on the average of the *Blue Chip* consensus forecast of the expected yields on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds for the 15 16 six quarters ending with the first calendar quarter of 2022, and long-term 17 projections for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031.

Q. Please explain the estimation of the expected risk premium for the market used in your CAPM analyses.

A. The basis of the market risk premium is explained in detail in note 1 on page 2 of Attachment__(DWD-1), Schedule 5. As discussed above, the market risk premium is derived from an average of three historical data-based market risk premiums, two *Value Line* data-based market risk premiums, and one Bloomberg data-based market risk premium.

The long-term income return on U.S. Government securities of 5.09% was deducted from the SBBI - 2020 monthly historical total market return of 12.10%, which results in an historical market equity risk premium of 7.01%. I applied a linear OLS regression to the monthly annualized historical returns on the S&P 500 relative to historical yields on long-term U.S. Government securities from SBBI - 2020. That regression analysis yielded a market equity risk premium of 10.13%. The PRPM market equity risk premium is 10.64%, and is derived using the PRPM relative to the yields on long-term U.S. Treasury securities from January 1926 through October 2020.

⁵⁸ SBBI - 2020, at Appendix A-1 (1) through A-1 (3) and Appendix A-7 (19) through A-7 (21).

The *Value Line*-derived forecasted total market equity risk premium is derived by deducting the forecasted risk-free rate of 2.16%, discussed above, from the *Value Line* projected total annual market return of 13.30%, resulting in a forecasted total market equity risk premium of 11.14%. The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using *Value Line* data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.16% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 13.96%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 11.80%.

The S&P 500 projected market equity risk premium using Bloomberg data is derived by subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 2.16% from the projected total return of the S&P 500 of 14.02%. The resulting market equity risk premium is 11.86%. These six measures, when averaged, result in an average total market equity risk premium of 10.43%.

Table 7: Summary of the Calculation of the Market Risk Premium for Use in the CAPM⁵⁹

Historical Spread Between Total Returns of Large	
Stocks and Long-Term Government Bond Yields	7.01%
(1926 - 2019)	
Regression Analysis on Historical Data	10.13%
PRPM Analysis on Historical Data	10.64%
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Total	
Market Returns from Value Line Summary & Index	11.14%
less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of	
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from	11.80%
Value Line for the S&P 500 less Projected 30-Year	11.6070
Treasury Bond Yields	
Prospective Equity Risk Premium using Measures of	
Capital Appreciation and Income Returns from	11 060/
Bloomberg Professional Services for the S&P 500	<u>11.86%</u>
less Projected 30-Year Treasury Bond Yields	
Average	10.43%

3 Q. What are the results of your application of the traditional and Empirical

4 CAPM to the Utility Proxy Group?

- 5 A. As shown on page 1 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 5, the mean result of
- 6 my CAPM/ECAPM analyses is 12.25%, the median is 11.95%, and the average of
- 7 the two is 12.10%. Consistent with my reliance on the average of mean and median

⁵⁹ As shown on page 2 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 5.

1		DCF results discussed above, the indicated common equity cost rate using the			
2		CAPM/ECAPM is 12.10%.			
3 4 5		D. <u>Common Equity Cost Rates for a Proxy Group of Domestic, Non-Price Regulated Companies Based on the DCF, RPM, and CAPM</u>			
6	Q.	Why do you also consider a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated			
7		companies?			
8	A.	Although I am not an attorney, my interpretation of the Hope and Bluefield cases is			
9		that they did not specify that comparable risk companies had to be utilities. Since			
10		the purpose of rate regulation is to be a substitute for marketplace competition, non-			
11		price regulated firms operating in the competitive marketplace make an excellent			
12		proxy if they are comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group being used to			
13		estimate the cost of common equity. The selection of such domestic, non-price			
14		regulated competitive firms theoretically and empirically results in a proxy group			
15		which is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, since all of these			
16		companies compete for capital in the exact same markets.			
17	Q.	How did you select non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total			
18		risk to the Utility Proxy Group?			
19	A.	In order to select a proxy group of domestic, non-price regulated companies similar			
20		in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group, I relied on the beta and related statistics			

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total investment risk.

derived from Value Line regression analyses of weekly market prices over the most recent 260 weeks (i.e., five years). These selection criteria resulted in a proxy group of 47 domestic, non-price regulated firms comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group. Total risk is the sum of non-diversifiable market risk and diversifiable company-specific risks. The criteria used in selecting the domestic, non-price regulated firms was: (i) they must be covered by Value Line (Standard Edition); (ii) they must be domestic, non-price regulated companies, i.e., not utilities; (iii) their unadjusted betas must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average unadjusted betas of the Utility Proxy Group; and (iv) the residual standard errors of the Value Line regressions which gave rise to the unadjusted beta must lie within plus or minus two standard deviations of the average residual standard error of the Utility Proxy Group. As discussed above, betas measure market, or systematic, risk, which is not diversifiable. The residual standard errors of the regressions measure each firm's company-specific, diversifiable risk. Companies that have similar betas and similar residual standard errors resulting from the same regression analyses have similar

1	Q.	Have you prepared a schedule which shows the data from which you selected	
2		the 47 domestic, non-price regulated companies that are comparable in total	
3		risk to the Utility Proxy Group?	
4	A.	Yes, the basis of my selection and both proxy groups' regression statistics are	
5		shown in Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 6.	
6	Q.	Did you calculate common equity cost rates using the DCF model, RPM, and	
7		CAPM for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group?	
8	A.	Yes. Because the DCF model, RPM, and CAPM have been applied in an identical	
9		manner as described above, I will not repeat the details of the rationale and	
10		application of each model. One exception is in the application of the RPM, where	
11		I did not use public utility-specific equity risk premiums, nor did I apply the PRPM	
12		to the individual non-price regulated companies.	
13		Pages 2 and 3 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 7 applies the Constant	
14		Growth and NM DCF models to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group. As shown,	
15		the indicated common equity cost rates are 12.11% and 13.43%, respectively,	
16		averaging 12.77%.	
17		Pages 4 through 6 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 7 contain the data	
18		and calculations that support the 12.57% RPM common equity cost rate. As shown	
19		on line 1, page 4 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 7, the consensus	

1 prospective yield on Moody's Baa2-rated corporate bonds for the six quarters ending in the first quarter of 2022, and for the years 2022 to 2026 and 2027 to 2031, 2 is 4.13%.60 Since the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group has an average Moody's 3 long-term issuer rating of Baa1, a downward adjustment of 0.19% to the projected 4 5 Baa2 rated corporate bond yield is necessary to reflect the difference in ratings 6 which results in a projected Baa1-rated corporate bond yield of 3.94%. When the beta-adjusted risk premium of 8.63%⁶¹ relative to the Non-Price 7 Regulated Proxy Group is added to the prospective Baa1-rated corporate bond yield 8 9 of 3.94%, the indicated RPM common equity cost rate is 12.57%. 10 Page 7 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 7 contains the inputs and 11 calculations that support my indicated CAPM/ECAPM common equity cost rate of 12 11.79%. 13 Q. How is the cost rate of common equity based on the Non-Price Regulated 14 Proxy Group comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group? 15 As shown on page 1 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 7, the results of the A. 16 common equity models applied to the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group – which

⁶⁰ Blue Chip, June 1, 2020, at page 14 and October 30, 2020, at 2.

⁶¹ Derived on page 6 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 7.

1	is comparable in total risk to the Utility Proxy Group – are as follows: 12.77%
2	(DCF), 12.57% (RPM), and 11.79% (CAPM). The average of the mean and median
3	of these models is 12.48%, which I used as the indicated common equity cost rates
4	for the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group.

1 VII. CONCLUSION OF COMMON EQUITY COST ANALYTICAL 2 RESULTS BEFORE ADJUSTMENTS

Q. Based on your analyses, what is the indicated common equity cost rate before
 adjustments?
 A. By applying multiple cost of common equity models to the Utility Proxy Group and

the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group, the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group before any relative risk adjustments is between 9.92% and 10.96%. I used multiple cost of common equity models as primary tools in arriving at my recommended common equity cost rate, because each of these models is theoretically sound and available to investors and because no single model is so inherently precise that it can be relied on to the exclusion of other theoretically sound models. Using multiple models adds reliability to the estimated common equity cost rate, with the prudence of using multiple cost of common equity models supported in both the financial literature and regulatory precedent.

Based on these common equity cost results, I conclude that a range of common equity cost rates between 9.92% and 10.96% is reasonable and appropriate before any adjustments for relative risk differences between SPS and the Utility

1		Proxy Group are made. I have chosen this indicated range of common equity		
2		cost rates applicable to the Utility Proxy Group as a conservative estimate of the		
3		required ROE.		
4	Q.	Why did you use the midpoint between your average model result and your		
5		lowest model result as the bottom of your indicated reasonable range before		
6		adjustment?		
7	A.	As explained in detail in Section IX below, the COVID-19 pandemic has created		
8		turmoil in the markets. Key takeaways include:		
9 10 11		The full impact and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic are unknown, and outcomes are still highly uncertain; and This are strictly increased at little and the covidence of		
12 13 14		 This uncertainty increases volatility. Volatility increases the chances of investment losses. As a result, investors flee to bonds to limit their investment losses, which is known as "the flight to quality". Increased levels of bond purchases increase their price, 		
16 17 18 19		and drive down their yields, <i>i.e.</i> , interest rates. Because of this, the current low-interest rate environment is due to increased volatility in the market, and not a steady lowering of the cost of debt over time.		
20 21		While the current volatility and uncertainty could justify a higher ROE, my		
22		recommendation to use the lower end of the range of my results for my Utility		

⁶² The 9.92% low end of the range is calculated by averaging: (1) the average model result (10.96%); and (2) the average of my Constant Growth DCF results and the results of the Commission's preferred DCF approach (8.88%). The 10.96% high end of the range is the approximate average of all model results.

- 1 Proxy Group reasonable range is designed to provide a conservative estimate of
- 2 SPS's required return.

VIII. ADJUSTMENTS TO THE COMMON EQUITY COST RATE

Α. Size Adjustment

Q. Does SPS's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies increase

its business risk?

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Yes. As a preliminary matter, because I have developed my cost of common equity recommendation for SPS's New Mexico operations based on market data applied to the Utility Proxy Group of risk-comparable companies, in order to assess SPS's risk associated with its relative small size of its New Mexico operations, it is necessary to compare SPS's New Mexico-jurisdictional size relative to the Utility Proxy Group. SPS's smaller size relative to the Utility Proxy Group companies indicates greater relative business risk for SPS because, all else being equal, size has a material bearing on risk.

Size affects business risk because smaller companies generally are less able to cope with significant events that affect sales, revenues and earnings. For example, smaller companies face more risk exposure to business cycles and economic conditions, both nationally and locally. Additionally, the loss of revenues from a few larger customers would have a greater effect on a small company than on a bigger company with a larger, more diverse, customer base. This is true for utilities, as well as for non-regulated companies.

1 As further evidence that smaller firms are riskier, investors generally 2 demand greater returns from smaller firms to compensate for less marketability and 3 liquidity of their securities. Duff & Phelps' ("D&P") 2020 Valuation Handbook – 4 U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital ("D&P - 2020") discusses the nature of the small-5 size phenomenon, providing an indication of the magnitude of the size premium 6 based on several measures of size. In discussing "Size as a Predictor of Equity 7 Returns," D&P - 2020 states: 8 The size effect is based on the empirical observation that 9 companies of smaller size are associated with greater risk and, therefore, have greater cost of capital [sic]. The "size" of a 10 company is one of the most important risk elements to consider 11 12 when developing cost of equity capital estimates for use in valuing a business simply because size has been shown to be a 13 14 predictor of equity returns. In other words, there is a significant (negative) relationship between size and historical equity returns 15 - as size decreases, returns tend to increase, and vice versa. 16 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)⁶³ 17 18 Furthermore, in "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence," 19 Fama and French note size is indeed a risk factor which must be reflected when 20 estimating the cost of common equity. On page 14, they note:

⁶³ Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of Capital, Wiley 2020, at 4-1.

1 2 3 4	the higher average returns on small stocks and high book- to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns not captured in the market return and are priced separately from market betas. ⁶⁴
5	Based on this evidence, Fama and French proposed their three-factor model
6	which includes a size variable in recognition of the effect size has on the cost of
7	common equity.
8	Also, it is a basic financial principle that the use of funds invested, and not
9	the source of funds, is what gives rise to the risk of any investment. ⁶⁵ Eugene
10	Brigham, a well-known authority, states:
11	A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small-
12	firms (sic) have earned consistently higher average returns than
13	those of large-firm stocks; this is called the "small-firm effect."
14	On the surface, it would seem to be advantageous to the small
15	firms to provide average returns in a stock market that are higher
16	than those of larger firms. In reality, it is bad news for the small
17	firm; what the small-firm effect means is that the capital
18	market demands higher returns on stocks of small firms
19	than on otherwise similar stocks of the large firms.
20	(emphasis added) ⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Fama & French, at 25-43.

⁶⁵ Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, <u>Principles of Corporate Finance</u> (McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1996), at 204-205, 229.

⁶⁶ Eugene F. Brigham, <u>Fundamentals of Financial Management, Fifth Edition</u> (The Dryden Press, 1989), at 623.

1		Consistent with the financial principle of risk and return discussed above,
2		increased relative risk due to small size must be considered in the allowed rate of
3		ROE. Therefore, the Commission's authorization of a cost rate of common equity
4		in this proceeding must appropriately reflect the unique risks of SPS, including its
5		small relative size to the Utility Proxy Group, which is justified and supported
6		above by evidence in the financial literature.
7	Q.	Earlier you explained that credit ratings can act as a proxy for a firm's
8		combined business and financial risks to equity owners. Do rating agencies
9		account for company size in their bond ratings?
10	A.	No. Neither S&P nor Moody's have minimum company size requirements for any
11		given rating level. This means, all else equal, a relative size analysis must be
12		conducted for equity investments in companies with similar bond ratings.
13	Q.	Is there a way to quantify a relative risk adjustment due to SPS's small size
14		when compared to the utility proxy group?
15	A.	Yes. SPS has greater relative risk than the average utility in the Utility Proxy Group
16		because of its smaller size, as measured by an estimated market capitalization of
17		common equity for SPS's New Mexico operations.

Table 8: Size as Measured by Market Capitalization for SPS's Electric Operations and the Utility Proxy Group

	Market Capitalization* (\$ Millions)	Times Greater than The Company
SPS NM Jurisdictional	\$1,837.306	
Utility Proxy Group	\$11,812.423	6.4x
*From page 1 of Attachment(DWD-1), Schedule 8.		

The Company's estimated market capitalization for its New Mexico operations was \$1,837.306 million as of October 30, 2020, compared with the market capitalization of the average company in the Utility Proxy Group of \$11,812.423 million as of October 30, 2020. The average company in the Utility Proxy Group has a market capitalization 6.4 times the size of SPS's estimated New Mexico-based market capitalization.

As a result, it is necessary to upwardly adjust the indicated range of common equity cost rates attributable to the Utility Proxy Group to reflect SPS's greater risk due to their smaller relative size. The determination is based on the size premiums for portfolios of New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ listed companies ranked by deciles for the 1926 to 2019 period.⁶⁷ The

⁶⁷ Source: Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator.

average size premium for the Utility Proxy Group with a market capitalization of \$11,812.423 million falls in the 3rd decile, while SPS's estimated market capitalization of \$1,837,306 million places it in the 6th decile. The size premium spread between the 3rd decile and the 6th decile is 0.61%.⁶⁸ Even though a 0.61% upward size adjustment is indicated, I applied a size premium of 0.15% to SPS's indicated common equity cost rate in order to be conservative.

- Q. Since SPS is part of a larger company, why is the size of Xcel Energy not more appropriate to use when determining the size adjustment?
- A. The return derived in this proceeding will not apply to Xcel Energy's operations as a whole, but only to SPS's New Mexico operations. Xcel Energy is the sum of its constituent parts, including those constituent parts' ROEs. Potential investors in Xcel Energy are aware that it is a combination of operations in each state, and that each state's operations experience the operating risks specific to their jurisdiction. The market's expectation of Xcel Energy's return is commensurate with the realities of its composite operations in each of the states in which it operates.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, See also, Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 8.

B. Credit Risk Adjustment

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2 Q. Please discuss your proposed credit risk adjustment.

SPS's long-term issuer ratings are Baa2 and A-⁶⁹ from Moody's Investors Services and S&P, respectively, which are riskier than the average long-term issuer ratings for the Utility Proxy Group of A3 and BBB+, respectively.⁷⁰ Hence, an upward credit risk adjustment is necessary to reflect the lower credit rating, *i.e.*, Baa2, of SPS's relative to the A3 average Moody's bond rating of the Utility Proxy Group.⁷¹

An indication of the magnitude of the necessary downward adjustment to reflect the higher credit risk inherent in a Baa2 bond rating is one-third of a recent three-month average spread between Moody's Baa2 and A2-rated public utility bond yields of 0.33%, shown on page 4 of Attachment___(DWD-1), Schedule 4, or 0.11%.⁷² This adjustment is conservative because, as noted earlier, equity investors demand higher returns than debt investors for companies with greater financial leverage.

⁶⁹ Company Witness Martin notes SPS's Stand Alone Credit Profile rating from S&P is BBB+.

⁷⁰ Source of Information: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

⁷¹ As shown on page 5 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 4.

 $^{^{72}}$ 0.11% = 0.33% * (1/3). Moody's does not provide public utility bond yields for A3-rated bonds. As such, it was necessary to estimate the difference between A2-rated and A3-rated public utility bonds. Because there are three steps between Baa2 and A2 (Baa2 to Baa1, Baa1 to A3, and A3 to A2) I assumed an adjustment of one-third of the difference between the A2-rated and Baa2-rated public utility bond yield was appropriate.

1 Q. Has the Commission previously recognized SPS's increased risk associated 2 with its lower credit rating relative to its peers? 3 Yes. In NMPRC Case No. 17-00255-UT, the Recommended Decision noted SPS's A. higher risk relative to the proxy group warranted selecting an ROE on the higher 4 end of the reasonable range.⁷³ 5 C. 6 **Flotation Costs** 7 What are flotation costs? Q. 8 Flotation costs are those costs associated with the sale of new issuances of common A. 9 stock. They include market pressure and the mandatory unavoidable costs of 10 issuance (e.g., underwriting fees and out-of-pocket costs for printing, legal, registration, etc.). For every dollar raised through debt or equity offerings, a 11 12 company receives less than one full dollar in financing. 13 Why is it important to recognize flotation costs in the allowed common equity Q. 14 cost rate? 15 A. It is important because there is no other mechanism in the ratemaking paradigm 16 through which such costs can be recognized and recovered. Because these costs

NMPRC Case No. 17-00255-UT, Recommended Decision, at 115-116.

I		are real, necessary, and legitimate, recovery of these costs should be permitted. As
2		noted by Morin:
3 4 5 6		The costs of issuing these securities are just as real as operating and maintenance expenses or costs incurred to build utility plants, and fair regulatory treatment must permit recovery of these costs
7 8 9		The simple fact of the matter is that common equity capital is not free[Flotation costs] must be recovered through a rate of return adjustment. ⁷⁴
10	Q.	Do the common equity cost rate models you have used already reflect
11		investors' anticipation of flotation costs?
12	A.	No. All of these models assume no transaction costs. The literature is quite clear
13		that these costs are not reflected in the market prices paid for common stocks. For
14		example, Brigham and Daves confirm this and provide the methodology utilized to
15		calculate the flotation adjustment. ⁷⁵ In addition, Morin confirms the need for such
16		an adjustment even when no new equity issuance is imminent. ⁷⁶ Consequently, it
17		is proper to include a flotation cost adjustment when using cost of common equity
18		models to estimate the common equity cost rate.

⁷⁴ Morin, at p. 321.

Eugene F. Brigham and Phillip R. Daves, <u>Intermediate Financial Management</u>, 9th Edition, Thomson/Southwestern, at p. 342.

⁷⁶ Morin, at pp. 327-30.

1 Q. How did you calculate the flotation cost allowance?

- 2 A. I modified the DCF calculation to provide a dividend yield that would reimburse 3 investors for issuance costs in accordance with the method cited in literature by 4 Brigham and Daves, as well as by Morin. The flotation cost adjustment recognizes 5 the actual costs of issuing equity that were incurred by Xcel Energy. Based on the 6 issuance costs shown on page 1 of Attachment (DWD-1), Schedule 9, an 7 adjustment of 0.15% is required to reflect the flotation costs applicable to the Utility 8 Proxy Group. 9
- 9 Q. What is the indicated cost of common equity after your company-specific10 adjustments?
- A. Applying the 0.15% size adjustment, the 0.11% credit risk adjustment, and the 0.15% flotation cost adjustment to the indicated range of common equity cost rates between 9.92% and 10.96% results in a Company-specific range of common equity rates between 10.33% and 11.37%. In consideration of both of these indicated ranges, I recommend an ROE of 10.35% for SPS in this proceeding.

1 IX. CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS AND ADDITIONAL 2 CONSIDERATIONS 3 Do economic conditions influence the required cost of capital and required Q. 4 ROE? 5 A. Yes. The models used to estimate the cost of common equity are meant to reflect, 6 and therefore are influenced by, current and expected capital market conditions. 7 Therefore, it is important to assess the reasonableness of any financial model's results in the context of observable market data. 8 9 0. Please summarize the recent capital market environment. 10 A. It is well recognized that there have been dramatic shifts in the capital markets 11 brought about by COVID-19. The Federal Reserve and the U.S. government have implemented multiple policies to address the financial market and economic 12 13 instability. 14 Although government and central bank actions have stabilized the capital 15 markets somewhat, as explained in more detail below, volatility (and, therefore, 16 risk) remain elevated for the utility sector, which has important implications on the ROE. 17 18 Q. How do significant and abrupt increases in volatility affect interest rates? 19 Significant and abrupt increases in volatility tend to be associated with declines in A. 20 Treasury yields. That relationship makes intuitive sense; as volatility (i.e., risk)

increases, investors will seek to avoid a capital loss by investing in Treasury securities in a "flight to safety." Because Treasury yields are inversely related to Treasury bond prices, as investors bid up the prices of bonds, they bid down the yields. As Chart 2 below demonstrates, decreases in the 30-year Treasury yield are coincident with significant increases in the Volatility Index ("VIX").⁷⁷ In those instances, the fall in yields does not reflect a reduction in required returns, it reflects an increase in risk aversion and, therefore, an increase in required equity returns.




Chart 2: 30-Year Treasury Yields vs. VIX⁷⁸

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⁷⁷ The VIX is a calculation designed to produce a measure of constant, 30-day expected volatility of the U.S. stock market, derived from real-time, mid-quote prices of S&P 500 Index call and put options. Source: www.cboe.com/vix.

⁷⁸ Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.

Q. Has market volatility increased in recent months?

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2 A. Yes, it has. A visible and widely reported measure of expected volatility is the 3 VIX. Because volatility is a measure of risk, increases in the VIX, or in its 4 volatility, are a broad indicator of expected increases in market risk. That is, if the 5 level of the VIX was 15.00, it would be interpreted as an expected standard 6 deviation in annual market returns of 15.00% over the coming 30 days. Since 1990, 7 the VIX has averaged about 19.45, which is consistent with the long-term standard deviation on annual market returns as reported by Duff & Phelps.⁷⁹ From March 1, 8 9 2020 to October 30, 2020, the VIX averaged 33.58, or more than 72.67% above its long term average. 80 In other words, since the COVID-19 pandemic began, market 10 11 volatility has been, on average, 72.67% higher than the market's long-term average volatility. 12

Q. Is market volatility expected to remain elevated in the near term?

14 A. Yes. One means of assessing market expectations regarding the future level of
15 volatility is to review Chicago Board Options Exchange's ("CBOE") "Term
16 Structure of Volatility", which is described by CBOE as:

⁷⁹ SBBI-2020, at 6-17.

⁸⁰ Source: Bloomberg Professional Service.

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The implied volatility term structure observed in SPX options markets is analogous to the term structure of interest rates observed in fixed income markets. Similar to the calculation of forward rates of interest, it is possible to observe the option market's expectation of future market volatility through use of the SPX implied volatility term structure.⁸¹

As shown in Table 9, the implied volatility is expected to remain approximately 50% above historical volatility⁸² until at least December 2021. That expected volatility is expected to remain elevated is not surprising given the considerable uncertainty surrounding the eventual scope and duration of the coronavirus pandemic in the near term.

Table 9: CBOE Term Structure of Volatility⁸³

Date	Projected VIX
December 2020	37.65
January 2021	37.10
February 2021	35.59
March 2021	35.75
April 2021	33.96
June 2021	34.99
September 2021	33.74
December 2021	31.81
June 2022	28.72

⁸¹ Source: www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data.

⁸² The long-term average price of VIX is approximately 19.00, which is similar to the long-term standard deviation of market returns.

⁸³ Source: http://www.cboe.com/trading-tools/strategy-planning-tools/term-structure-data, as of October 30, 2020.

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
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As discussed above, investors reacted to the increase in market uncertainty associated with COVID-19 by moving away from equity securities (including utilities) to Treasury securities, pushing down long-term Treasury yields. Both long-term Treasury and utility bond yields have been extremely volatile, as shown on Charts 3 and 4, below, as seen in its Coefficient of Variation ("CoV"):⁸⁴


Chart 3: Coefficient of Variation in 30-Year Treasury Yields⁸⁵



⁸⁴ The coefficient of variation is used by investors and economists to determine volatility.

⁸⁵ Source: Bloomberg Professional. Data through October 30, 2020.

Chart 4: Coefficient of Variation in A2-Rated Public Utility Bonds⁸⁶



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In view of all of the above, current levels of interest rates are the result of a volatility-driven "flight to safety" on the part of investors, which indicates increased risk aversion, and thus, an increased investor-required return.

 $^{^{86}}$ Source: Bloomberg Professional. Data through October 30, 2020.

1		X. <u>CONCLUSION</u>	
2	Q.	What is your recommended ROE for the Company?	
3	A.	Given the discussion above and the results from the analyses, I recommend that an	
4		ROE of 10.35% is appropriate for SPS at this time.	
5	Q.	In your opinion, is your proposed ROE of 10.35% fair and reasonable to SPS	
6		and its customers?	
7	A.	Yes, it is.	
8	Q.	In your opinion, is SPS's proposed capital structure fair and reasonable?	
9	A.	Yes, it is.	
10	Q.	Does this conclude your direct testimony?	
11	A.	Yes, it does.	

BEFORE THE NEW MEXICO PUBLIC REGULATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF SOUTHWESTERN)
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY'S)
APPLICATION FOR: (1) REVISION OF)
ITS RETAIL RATES UNDER ADVICE)
NOTICE NO. 292; (2) AUTHORIZATION) CASE NO. 20-00238-UT
AND APPROVAL TO ABANDON ITS)
PLANT X UNIT 3 GENERATING)
STATION; AND (3) OTHER)
ASSOCIATED RELIEF,)
)
SOUTHWESTERN PUBLIC SERVICE)
COMPANY,)
)
APPLICANT.)
)

VERIFICATION

On this day, December 30, 2020, I, Dylan W. D'Ascendis, swear and affirm under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of New Mexico, that my testimony contained in Direct Testimony of Dylan W. D'Ascendis is true and correct.

/s/ Dylan W. D'Ascendis DYLAN W. D'ASCENDIS

Southwestern Public Service Company Table of Contents to Attachment_(DWD-1)

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Southwestern Public Service Company Brief Summary of Common Equity Cost Rate

Line No.	Principal Methods	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies
Enic ivo.	Timelpai Methodo	
1.	Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	9.06%
2.	Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	10.40%
3.	Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	12.10%
4.	Market Models Applied to Comparable Risk, Non-Price Regulated Companies (4)	12.48%
4.	Regulated Companies (4)	12.46%
5.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates before Adjustment for Company-Specific Risk (5)	9.92% - 10.96%
6.	Size Risk Adjustment (6)	0.15%
7.	Credit Risk Adjustment (7)	0.11%
8.	Flotation Cost Adjustment (8)	0.15%
9.	Indicated Range of Common Equity Cost Rates after Adjustment	10.33% - 11.37%
10.	Recommended Common Equity Cost Rate	10.35%

Notes: (1) Commission preferred DCF result from page 2 of Schedule 3.

- (2) From page 1 of Schedule 4.
- (3) From page 1 of Schedule 5.
- (4) From page 1 of Schedule 7.
- (5) The low end of the indicated range is calculated by using the average of the average DCF results (8.88%) and average model result (10.96%). The high end of the indicated range is the average model result (10.96%).
- (6) Adjustment to reflect the Company's greater business risk due to its smaller size realtive to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (7) Company-specific risk adjustment to reflect SPS's greater credit risk compared to the Utility Proxy Group as detailed in Mr. D'Ascendis' direct testimony.
- (8) From Schedule 9

<u>Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the</u> <u>Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies</u> <u>2015 - 2019, Inclusive</u>

	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
ALLETE, Inc.	44.06.04	40.00	10.00	45.45.07	4606.04	40.07 04
Long-Term Debt	41.96 %	40.80 %	42.09 %	45.15 %	46.86 %	43.37 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	58.04	59.20	57.91	54.85	53.14	56.63
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Alliant Energy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	53.39 %	53.49 %	52.62 %	50.34 %	49.43 %	51.85 %
Preferred Stock	1.72	1.94	2.16	2.33	2.58	2.15
Common Equity	44.89	44.57	45.22	47.33	47.99	46.00
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Ameren Corporation	F2 20 0/	E2.0E 0/	E1 E2 0/	F0.11 0/	F0.6F 0/	F1 F2 0/
Long-Term Debt	53.29 % 0.81	52.05 % 0.88	51.52 % 0.92	50.11 % 0.98	50.65 % 0.99	
Preferred Stock						0.92
Common Equity	45.90 100.00 %	47.07 100.00 %	47.56 100.00 %	48.91 100.00 %	48.36 100.00 %	47.56
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Edison International						
Long-Term Debt	54.21 %	53.76 %	46.65 %	44.02 %	45.68 %	48.86 %
Preferred Stock	6.48	8.02	8.44	8.65	8.20	7.96
Common Equity	39.31	38.22	44.91	47.33	46.12	43.18
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Entergy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	63.12 %	64.08 %	64.80 %	64.16 %	58.19 %	62.87 %
Preferred Stock	0.78	0.87	0.85	0.88	1.39	0.95
Common Equity	36.10	35.05	34.35	34.96	40.42	36.18
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	
•						
Evergy, Inc.	54.55 0/	40.50	10.60.04	***	*** 0/	10.00
Long-Term Debt	51.77 %	42.70 %	49.60 %	NA %	NA %	
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	NA	NA	-
Common Equity	48.23 100.00 %	57.30 100.00 %	50.40 100.00 %	NA - %	<u>NA</u> - %	51.98 100.00 %
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	- 90		100.00 %
IDACORP, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	42.70 %	43.63 %	43.68 %	44.77 %	45.62 %	44.08 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	57.30	56.37	56.32	55.23	54.38	55.92
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
NorthWestern Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	52.27 %	51.98 %	50.26 %	52.05 %	53.08 %	51.93 %
Preferred Stock	- 70	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	47.73	48.02	49.74	47.95	46.92	48.07
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	
•						

<u>Capital Structure Based upon Total Permanent Capital for the</u> <u>Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies</u> <u>2015 - 2019, Inclusive</u>

	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>5 YEAR</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>
OGE Energy Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	43.56 %	44.00 %	43.78 %	43.31 %	45.31 %	43.99 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	56.44	56.00	56.22	56.69	54.69	56.01
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Otter Tail Corporation						
Long-Term Debt	46.88 %	44.74 %	41.31 %	44.56 %	45.17 %	44.53 %
Preferred Stock	40.00 70	44.74 70	41.31 70	44.50 %	45.17 70	-
Common Equity	53.12	55.26	58.69	55.44	54.83	55.47
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Total dapital	100.00 70	100.00	100.00 70	100.00	70	70
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.						
Long-Term Debt	50.91 %	49.59 %	48.68 %	46.33 %	45.45 %	48.19 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	49.09	50.41	51.32	53.67	54.55	51.81
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
	·		·			
Portland General Electric Co.						
Long-Term Debt	50.06 %	49.72 %	50.10 %	50.06 %	49.39 %	49.87 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	49.94	50.28	49.90	49.94	50.61	50.13
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Xcel Energy, Inc.						
Long-Term Debt	57.77 %	57.01 %	56.66 %	56.73 %	55.36 %	56.71 %
Preferred Stock	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Equity	42.23	42.99	43.34	43.27	44.64	43.29
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric						
Companies						
Long-Term Debt	50.91 %	49.81 %	49.37 %	49.30 %	49.18 %	49.71 %
Preferred Stock	0.75	0.90	0.95	1.07	1.10	0.96
Common Equity	48.34	49.29	49.68	49.63	49.72	49.33
Total Capital	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %	100.00 %

Source of Information Annual Forms 10-K

Southwestern Public Service Company Operating Subsidiary Company Capital Structures of the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

2019

	Parent			
	Company	Common	Long-Term	Total
Company Name	Ticker	Equity	Debt	Capital
ALLETE (Minnesota Power)	ALE	59.59%	40.41%	100.00%
Superior Water, Light and Power Company	ALE	58.08%	41.92%	100.00%
Interstate Power and Light Company	LNT	50.23%	49.77%	100.00%
Wisconsin Power and Light Company	LNT	53.78%	46.22%	100.00%
Ameren Illinois Company	AEE	53.00%	47.00%	100.00%
Union Electric Company	AEE	51.90%	48.10%	100.00%
Southern California Edison Company	EIX	50.43%	49.57%	100.00%
Entergy Arkansas, LLC	ETR	47.90%	52.10%	100.00%
Entergy Louisiana, LLC	ETR	47.47%	52.53%	100.00%
Entergy Mississippi, LLC	ETR	48.60%	51.40%	100.00%
Entergy New Orleans, LLC	ETR	49.26%	50.74%	100.00%
Entergy Texas, Inc.	ETR	50.43%	49.57%	100.00%
Evergy Kansas Central, Inc.	EVRG	57.97%	42.03%	100.00%
Evergy Missouri West, Inc.	EVRG	50.34%	49.66%	100.00%
Evergy Metro, Inc.	EVRG	50.31%	49.69%	100.00%
Idaho Power Company	IDA	55.14%	44.86%	100.00%
NorthWestern Corporation	NWE	47.59%	52.41%	100.00%
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company	OGE	55.15%	44.85%	100.00%
Otter Tail Power Company	OTTR	51.12%	48.88%	100.00%
Arizona Public Service Company	PNW	52.80%	47.20%	100.00%
Portland General Electric Company	POR	49.85%	50.15%	100.00%
Northern States Power Company - MN	XEL	52.20%	47.80%	100.00%
Northern States Power Company - WI	XEL	54.23%	45.77%	100.00%
Public Service Company of Colorado	XEL	56.32%	43.68%	100.00%
Southwestern Public Service Company	XEL	54.14%	45.86%	100.00%
	Mean	52.31%	47.69%	100.00%
	Median	51.90%	48.10%	100.00%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence

Southwestern Public Service Company CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

	2019 2018 (MILLI)		2017 2016 IONS OF DOLLARS)				2015			
CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS				(,				
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL SHORT-TERM DEBT TOTAL-CAPITAL EMPLOYED	\$ 5,327.381 - \$ 5,327.381		\$ 4,683.085 42.000 \$ 4,725.085	· -	\$ 3,978.618 - \$ 3,978.618	\$	3,582.061 50.000 3,632.061		\$ 3,358.554 15.000 \$ 3,373.554	
INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) TOTAL DEBT	4.27	%	4.03	%	4.70 %	6	5.31	%	5.50 %	
CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL: LONG-TERM DEBT PREFERRED STOCK	45.86 -		45.83 -	%	46.45 % -	6	46.07 -	%	46.17 % -	5 YEAR AVERAGE 46.08 %
COMMON EQUITY TOTAL	54.14 100.00		54.17 100.00	%	53.55 100.00 9	6 <u> </u>	53.93 100.00	%	53.83 100.00 %	53.92 100.00 %
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL: TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM PREFERRED STOCK	45.86 -	%	46.32	%	46.45 % -	6	46.82	%	46.41 %	46.37 %
COMMON EQUITY TOTAL	54.14 100.00		53.68 100.00	%	53.55 100.00 9	6	53.18 100.00	%	53.59 100.00 %	53.63 100.00 %
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	126.89	%	69.93	%	65.73 %	6	67.96	%	66.99 %	79.50 %
RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY	9.71	%	9.14	%	7.84 %	6	8.14	%	7.56 %	8.48 %
TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)	4.03	x	4.17	x	3.80 x		3.54	x	3.70 x	3.85 x
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)	17.33	%	18.34	%	25.33 %	6	25.33	%	17.58 %	20.78 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	45.86	%	46.32	%	46.45 %	6	46.82	%	46.41 %	46.37 %

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
 (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: Company audited financial statements

Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies CAPITALIZATION AND FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1) 2015 - 2019, Inclusive

CAPITALIZATION STATISTICS	<u>2019</u>	<u>2018</u> (MILI	2017 LIONS OF DOLLARS)	<u>2016</u>	<u>2015</u>	
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL SHORT-TERM DEBT TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED	\$13,685.012 \$384.823 \$14,069.835	\$12,364.206 \$456.703 \$12,820.909	\$10,935.651 \$504.687 \$11,440.338	\$10,734.064 \$307.917 \$11,041.981	\$10,340.857 \$236.191 \$10,577.048	
INDICATED AVERAGE CAPITAL COST RATES (2) TOTAL DEBT PREFERRED STOCK CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS	4.48 % 5.65	4.70 % 5.38	4.65 % 5.46	4.89 % 5.63	4.70 % 5.60	<u>5 YEAR</u> AVERAGE
BASED ON TOTAL PERMANENT CAPITAL: LONG-TERM DEBT PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL	50.91 % 0.75 48.34 100.00 %	49.81 % 0.90 49.29 100.00 %	0.95 49.68	49.30 % 1.07 49.63 100.00 %	1.10 49.72	49.71 % 0.96 49.33 100.00 %
BASED ON TOTAL CAPITAL: TOTAL DEBT, INCLUDING SHORT-TERM PREFERRED STOCK COMMON EQUITY TOTAL	51.70 % 0.74 47.56 100.00 %	50.85 % 0.87 48.29 100.00 %	0.89 47.92	50.67 % 1.02 48.31 100.00 %	1.07 48.66	50.93 % 0.92 48.15 100.00 %
FINANCIAL STATISTICS						
FINANCIAL RATIOS - MARKET BASED EARNINGS / PRICE RATIO MARKET / AVERAGE BOOK RATIO DIVIDEND YIELD DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIO	4.99 % 206.43 3.11 61.53	5.11 % 200.55 3.42 44.30	4.68 % 210.64 3.20 74.31	4.58 % 171.53 3.49 48.26	4.99 % 166.42 3.62 29.35	4.87 % 191.11 3.37 51.55
RATE OF RETURN ON AVERAGE BOOK COMMON EQUITY	10.20 %	8.97 %	9.21 %	8.26 %	8.40 %	9.01 %
TOTAL DEBT / EBITDA (3)	4.25 x	4.83 x	3.83 x	5.25 x	4.09 x	4.45 x
FUNDS FROM OPERATIONS / TOTAL DEBT (4)	15.35 %	21.24 %	20.78 %	19.75 %	24.13 %	20.25 %
TOTAL DEBT / TOTAL CAPITAL	51.70 %	50.85 %	51.19 %	50.67 %	50.27 %	50.94 %

Notes:

- (1) All capitalization and financial statistics for the group are the arithmetic average of the achieved results for each individual company in the group, and are based upon financial statements as originally reported in each year.
- (2) Computed by relating actual total debt interest or preferred stock dividends booked to average of beginning and ending total debt or preferred stock reported to be outstanding.
- (3) Total debt relative to EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Income Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).
- (4) Funds from operations (sum of net income, depreciation, amortization, net deferred income tax and investment tax credits, less total AFUDC) plus interest charges as a percentage of total debt.

Source of Information: Company Annual Forms 10-K

Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the Discounted Cash Flow Model for the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

[8]	Indicated Common d Equity Cost Rate (5)	% 10.69 %	8.57	9.15	8.48	8.59	10.03	6.22	7.98	8:38	10.97	8.30	60'6	8.40	8.83 %	8.57 %
[2]	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	4.72 9	2.91	2.65	4.85	3.85	3.95	3.33	4.69	5.21	3.97	4.38	4.37	2.52	Average	Median
[9]	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	2.97 %	2.66	6.50	3.63	4.74	80.9	2.89	3.29	3.17	7.00	3.92	4.72	5.88		
[2]	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	7.00 %	5.50	00.9	(0.50)	5.40	6.00	2.60	3.78	2.40	9.00	3.38	5.00	5.85		
[4]	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	6.40 %	5.85	7.09	4.16	5.15	7.50	2.88	3.46	3.59	7.00	4.29	4.86	5.87		
[3]	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	NA %	5.80	06.9	3.10	5.40	6.30	2.60	3.40	3.70	NA	3.50	2.00	5.80		
[2]	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	4.50 %	5.50	00.9	NMF	3.00	4.50	3.50	2.50	3.00	5.00	4.50	4.00	00.9		
[1]	Average Dividend Yield (1)	4.58 %	2.83	2.57	4.76	3.76	3.83	3.28	4.61	5.13	3.84	4.30	4.27	2.45		
	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	ALLETE, Inc.	Alliant Energy Corporation	Ameren Corporation	Edison International	Entergy Corporation	Evergy, Inc.	IDACORP, Inc.	NorthWestern Corporation	OGE Energy Corporation	Otter Tail Corporation	Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	Portland General Electric Co.	Xcel Energy, Inc.		

NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Notes:

(1) Indicated dividend at 10/30/2020 divided by the average closing price of the last 60 trading days ending 10/30/2020 for each company.

8.70 %

Average of Mean and Median

(2) From pages 3 through 15 of this Schedule.
(3) Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
(4) This reflects a growth rate component equal to one-half the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, Inc., 4.58% x (1+(1/2 x 5.97%)) = 4.72%.

(5) Column 6 + column 7.

Source of Information:

www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 www.zacks.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services Value Line Investment Survey

Southwestern Public Service Company Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Using the NMPRC's Discounted Cash Flow Model for the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

[6]	High Common Equity Cost Rate (6)	11.96 % 8.85 9.82 9.82 8.99 9.29 11.59 6.94 8.64 9.06 13.22 8.86 9.58 8.86	9.06 %
[8]	Mean Common Equity Cost Rate (5)	10.89 % 8.65 9.22 8.44 8.60 10.11 6.31 8.12 8.50 11.14 8.25 9.29 8.45	% 92.8
[2]	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	4.92 % 2.99 2.72 4.81 3.86 4.03 3.42 4.83 4.14 4.33 4.57 2.57	Median Average of Mean and Median
[9]	Average Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (3)	5.97 % 5.66 6.50 3.63 4.74 6.08 2.89 3.29 3.17 7.00 3.92 4.72 4.72	Average o
[2]	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	7.00 % 5.50 6.00 (0.50) 5.40 6.00 2.60 2.40 9.00 3.38 5.85	
[4]	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	6.40 % 5.85 7.09 4.16 7.15 5.15 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.60 7.60 7.88 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.88	
[3]	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	NA % 5.80 6.90 6.90 5.40 6.30 6.30 2.60 3.70 NA 3.50 5.80	
[2]	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS (2)	4.50 % 5.50 6.00 NMF 3.00 4.50 3.50 2.50 2.50 4.50 4.50 6.00 6.00	
[1]	Average Dividend Yield (1)	4.64 % 2.83 2.55 4.64 3.69 3.80 3.32 4.68 5.17 4.17 4.17	
	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	ALLETE, Inc. Alliant Energy Corporation Ameren Corporation Edison International Entergy Corporation Evergy, Inc. IDACORP, Inc. IDACORP, Inc. NorthWestern Corporation OGE Energy Corporation Otter Tail Corporation	

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure


Notes:

 Indicated dividend at 10/30/2020 divided by the average closing price of the last 30 trading days ending 10/30/2020 for each company.
 From pages 3 through 15 of this Schedule.
 Average of columns 2 through 5 excluding negative growth rates.
 This reflects a growth rate component equal to the conclusion of growth rate (from column 6) x column 1 to reflect the periodic payment of dividends (Gordon Model) as opposed to the continuous payment. Thus, for ALLETE, 4.64% x (1+5.97%) = 4.92%.
 Column 6 + column 7. (5)


[1]*(1+(MAX([2],[3],[4],[5])/100)+(MAX([2],[3],[4],[5]))

Source of Information:


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


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



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






Earnings Predictability























Earnings Predictability

Southwestern Public Service Company Summary of Risk Premium Models for the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

		Proxy Group of Thirteen Electri Companies	
Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) (1)		10.29	%
Risk Premium Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach (2)	-	10.50	_%
	Average	10.40	<u></u> %

Notes:

- (1) From page 2 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 3 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company Indicated ROE Derived by the Predictive Risk Premium Model (1)

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	LT Average Predicted Variance	Spot Predicted Variance	Recommended Variance (2)	GARCH Coefficient	Predicted Risk Premium (3)	Risk-Free Rate (4)	Indicated ROE (5)
ALLETE, Inc.	0.28%	0.44%	0.28%	2.0499	7.23%	2.16%	9.39%
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.27%	0.36%	0.27%	2.6511	8.85%	2.16%	11.01%
Ameren Corporation	0.23%	0.29%	0.23%	1.9777	5.55%	2.16%	7.71%
Edison International	0.43%	0.66%	0.43%	1.4688	7.89%	2.16%	10.05%
Entergy Corporation	0.40%	0.60%	0.40%	2.2194	11.18%	2.16%	13.34%
Evergy, Inc.	0.88%	4.72%	0.88%	NMF	NMF	2.16%	NMF
IDACORP, Inc.	0.29%	0.43%	0.29%	2.1557	7.67%	2.16%	9.83%
NorthWestern Corporation	0.34%	0.43%	0.34%	2.3151	9.76%	2.16%	11.92%
OGE Energy Corporation	0.31%	0.44%	0.31%	2.1304	8.19%	2.16%	10.35%
Otter Tail Corporation	0.37%	0.37%	0.37%	1.5664	7.25%	2.16%	9.41%
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	0.60%	0.72%	0.60%	1.2404	9.33%	2.16%	11.49%
Portland General Electric Co.	0.27%	0.67%	0.27%	1.7952	6.04%	2.16%	8.20%
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.27%	0.24%	0.27%	2.8257	9.67%	2.16%	11.83%
						Average	10.38%
						Median	10.20%
					Average of Mean	n and Median	10.29%

Notes:

- The Predictive Risk Premium Model uses historical data to generate a predicted variance and a GARCH coefficient. The historical data used are the equity risk premiums for the first available trading month as reported by Bloomberg Professional Service.
- Given current market conditions, I recommend using the long-term average predicted variance. (1+(Column [3] * Column [4]) $^{^{12}}$) 1. (2)
- (3)
- From note 2 on page 2 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5. (4)
- Column [5] + Column [6].

Southwestern Public Service Company Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.			Proxy Group Thirteen Elec Companie	ctric
1.		Prospective Yield on Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds (1)	3.01	%
2.		Adjustment to Reflect Yield Spread Between Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds and A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	0.54	(2)
3.		Adjusted Prospective Yield on A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds	3.55	%
4.		Adjustment to Reflect Bond Rating Difference of Proxy Group	0.11	(3)
5.		Adjusted Prospective Bond Yield	3.66	%
6.		Equity Risk Premium (4)	6.84	_
7.		Risk Premium Derived Common Equity Cost Rate	10.50	%
Notes:	(1)	Consensus forecast of Moody's Aaa Rated Corpor Chip Financial Forecasts (see pages 10 and 11 of		Blue
	(2)	The average yield spread of A2 rated public utility rated corporate bonds of 0.54% from page 4 of the		ıa
	(3)	Adjustment to reflect the A3 Moody's LT issuer raproxy Group as shown on page 5 of this Schedule adjustment is derived by taking 1/3 of the spread Baa2 Public Utility Bonds (1/3 * 0.33% = 0.11%) page 4 of this Schedule.	ating of the Utili . The 0.11% up l between A2 an	ward id
	(4)	From page 7 of this Schedule.		

Southwestern Public Service Company Interest Rates and Bond Spreads for Moody's Corporate and Public Utility Bonds

Selected Bond Yields

	Aaa Rated Corporate Bond	A2 Rated Public Utility Bond	Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bond			
Oct-2020	2.35 %	2.95 %	3.27 %			
Sep-2020	2.31	2.84	3.17			
Aug-2020	2.25	2.73	3.06			
Average	2.30 %	2.84 %	3.17 %			

Selected Bond Spreads

A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over Aaa Rated Corporate Bonds:

0.54 % (1)

Baa2 Rated Public Utility Bonds Over A2 Rated Public Utility Bonds:

0.33 % (2)

Notes:

- (1) Column [2] Column [1].
- (2) Column [3] Column [2].

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Service

Southwestern Public Service Company Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Moody's	Standard & Poor's
Long-Term Issuer Rating	Long-Term Issuer Rating
October 2020	October 2020

Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)	Long-Term Issuer Rating (1)	Numerical Weighting (2)
ALLETE, Inc.	A3	7.0	NR	
Alliant Energy Corporation	A3/Baa1	7.5	A/A-	6.5
Ameren Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Edison International	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Entergy Corporation	Baa1/Baa2	8.5	BBB+	8.0
Evergy, Inc.	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
IDACORP, Inc.	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
NorthWestern Corporation	NR		NR	
OGE Energy Corporation	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Otter Tail Corporation	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	A2	6.0	A-	7.0
Portland General Electric Co.	A3	7.0	BBB+	8.0
Xcel Energy, Inc.	A3	7.0	A-	7.0
Average	A3	7.3	BBB+	7.7

Notes:

- (1) Ratings are that of the average of each company's utility operating subsidiaries.
- (2) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Source Information: Moody's Investors Service

Standard & Poor's Global Utilities Rating Service

Numerical Assignment for Moody's and Standard & Poor's Bond Ratings

Moody's Bond Rating	Numerical Bond Weighting	Standard & Poor's Bond Rating
Aaa	1	AAA
Aa1	2	AA+
Aa2	3	AA
Aa3	4	AA-
	_	
A1	5	A+
A2	6	A
A3	7	A-
Baa1	8	BBB+
Baa2	9	BBB
Baa3	10	BBB-
Ba1	11	BB+
Ba2	12	BB
Ва3	13	BB-
D4	1.4	D.
B1	14	B+
B2	15	В
В3	16	B-

Southwestern Public Service Company Judgment of Equity Risk Premium for Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Line No.		Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies
1.	Calculated equity risk premium based on the total market using the beta approach (1)	9.01 %
2.	Mean equity risk premium based on a study using the holding period returns of public utilities with A2 rated bonds (2)	5.59
3.	Predicted Equity Risk Premium Based on Regression Analysis of 1,169 Fully-Litigated Electric Utility Rate Cases	5.92
4.	Average equity risk premium	6.84 %

Notes: (1) From page 8 of this Schedule.

- (2) From page 12 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 13 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies
	Ibbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:	
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	9.36
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.52
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line Summary and Index (4)	10.29
5.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Value Line S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.95
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	11.01
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.48 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.95
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	9.01 %

Notes provided on page 9 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Notes:

- (1) Based on the arithmetic mean historical monthly returns on large company common stocks from Ibbotson® SBBI® 2020 Market Report minus the arithmetic mean monthly yield of Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 corporate bonds from 1928-2019.
- (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of large company common stocks relative to Moody's average Aaa and Aa2 rated corporate bond yields from 1928-2019 referenced in Note 1 above.
- (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is discussed in the accompanying direct testimony. The Ibbotson equity risk premium based on the PRPM is derived by applying the PRPM to the monthly risk premiums between Ibbotson large company common stock monthly returns and average Aaa and Aa2 corporate monthly bond yields, from January 1928 through October 2020.
- (4) The equity risk premium based on the Value Line Summary and Index is derived by subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.01% (from page 3 of this Schedule) from the projected 3-5 year total annual market return of 13.30% (described fully in note 1 on page 2 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5).
- (5) Using data from Value Line for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 13.96% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.01% results in an expected equity risk premium of 10.95%.
- (6) Using data from the Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P 500, an expected total return of 14.02% was derived based upon expected dividend yields and long-term earnings growth estimates as a proxy for capital appreciation. Subtracting the average consensus forecast of Aaa corporate bonds of 3.01% results in an expected equity risk premium of 11.01%.
- (7) Average of mean and median beta from Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.


Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Industrial Manual and Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update.
Value Line Summary and Index
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020
Bloomberg Professional Service

Consensus Forecasts of U.S. Interest Rates and Key Assumptions

	History						Cons	ensus l	Forecas	sts-Qu	arterly	Avg.		
	Av	erage For	Week End	ding	Ave	erage For	Month	Latest Qtr	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q
Interest Rates	Oct 23	Oct 16	Oct 9	Oct 2	Sep	Aug	<u>Jul</u>	3Q 2020	<u>2020</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2022</u>
Federal Funds Rate	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Prime Rate	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
LIBOR, 3-mo.	0.21	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Commercial Paper, 1-mo.	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 3-mo.	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.11	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 6-mo.	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Treasury bill, 1 yr.	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Treasury note, 2 yr.	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Treasury note, 5 yr.	0.36	0.31	0.33	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7
Treasury note, 10 yr.	0.83	0.74	0.78	0.68	0.68	0.65	0.62	0.65	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.2
Treasury note, 30 yr.	1.62	1.52	1.58	1.44	1.42	1.36	1.31	1.36	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.0
Corporate Aaa bond	2.67	2.60	2.66	2.61	2.56	2.48	2.43	2.49	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8
Corporate Baa bond	3.28	3.22	3.30	3.27	3.20	3.09	3.12	3.14	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.9
State & Local bonds	2.93	2.93	2.94	2.92	2.92	2.88	2.99	2.93	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.7
Home mortgage rate	2.80	2.81	2.87	2.88	2.89	2.94	3.02	2.95	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.2
				Histor	y				Co	nsenst	ıs Fore	casts-(Quarte:	rly
	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q
Key Assumptions	2018	2019	2019	2019	2019	2020	2020	2020	2020	2021	2021	2021	2021	2022
Fed's AFE \$ Index	109.4	109.4	110.3	110.5	110.3	111.2	112.4	107.2	106.8	107.0	106.7	106.2	106.1	106.4
Real GDP	1.3	2.9	1.5	2.6	2.4	-5.0	-31.4	33.1	3.9	4.0	3.8	3.3	3.2	2.9
GDP Price Index	1.8	1.2	2.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	-1.8	3.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.8
Consumer Price Index	1.3	0.9	3.0	1.8	2.4	1.2	-3.5	5.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.0

Forecasts for interest rates and the Federal Reserve's Major Currency Index represent averages for the quarter. Forecasts for Real GDP, GDP Price Index and Consumer Price Index are seasonally-adjusted annual rates of change (saar). Individual panel members' forecasts are on pages 4 through 9. Historical data: Treasury rates from the Federal Reserve Board's H.15; AAA-AA and A-BBB corporate bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and are 15+ years, yield to maturity; State and local bond yields from Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, A-rated, yield to maturity; Mortgage rates from Freddie Mac, 30-year, fixed; LIBOR quotes from Intercontinental Exchange. All interest rate data are sourced from Haver Analytics. Historical data for Fed's Major Currency Index are from FRSR H.10. Historical data for Real GDP and GDP Chained Price Index are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Consumer Price Index (CPI) history is from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).



Long-Range Survey:

The table below contains the results of our twice-annual long-range CONSENSUS survey. There are also Top 10 and Bottom 10 averages for each variable. Shown are consensus estimates for the years 2021 through 2026 and averages for the five-year periods 2022-2026 and 2027-2031. Apply these projections cautiously. Few if any economic, demographic and political forces can be evaluated accurately over such long time spans.


				Average For The Year			Five-Year Averages		
		2021			2024		 2026	2022-2026	_
1. Federal Funds Rate	CONSENSUS	0.2	2022 0.4	2023 1.0	1.6	2025 1.9	2.1	1.4	2.3
1. I ederal I unds Rate	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.8	1.6	2.2	2.5	2.7	1.9	2.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.1	0.1	0.4	1.0	1.3	1.5	0.9	1.7
2. Prime Rate	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.0	5.2	4.5	5.4
2. I Time Rate	Top 10 Average	3.5	3.9	4.6	5.3	5.5	5.7	5.0	5.9
	Bottom 10 Average	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.1	4.9
3. LIBOR, 3-Mo.	CONSENSUS	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.3	2.4	1.8	2.6
3. Elberg 3 Me.	Top 10 Average	0.8	1.3	1.9	2.5	2.7	3.0	2.3	3.1
	Bottom 10 Average	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.1
4. Commercial Paper, 1-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.2	2.3	1.7	2.6
4. Commercial Laper, 1-Mo	Top 10 Average	0.7	1.2	1.8	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.1	3.0
	Bottom 10 Average	0.7	0.5	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.0	1.4	2.2
5. Treasury Bill Yield, 3-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.3	0.5	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	2.3
3. Heastily Bill Tield, 3-Mo	Top 10 Average	0.4	0.9	1.6	2.2	2.4	2.6	1.9	2.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.4	0.9	0.5	1.1	1.4	1.6	0.9	1.8
6. Treasury Bill Yield, 6-Mo	CONSENSUS	0.1	0.6	1.1		2.0	2.2	1.5	2.5
o. Heastily Bill Held, o-Mo		0.3	0.9	1.7	1.7 2.3	2.6	2.7	2.0	3.0
	Top 10 Average	0.4						1.1	1.9
7. Treasury Bill Yield, 1-Yr	Bottom 10 Average		0.2	0.6	1.2	1.5	1.7		
7. Heastiry Bill Heid, 1-11	CONSENSUS Top 10 Average	0.4	0.7	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.7	2.6
	Top 10 Average	0.5	1.1	1.8	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.2	3.1
9 T N-4- V:-14 2 V-	Bottom 10 Average	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.1	2.0
8. Treasury Note Yield, 2-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.5	0.9	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5	1.8	2.7
	Top 10 Average	0.8	1.3	2.0	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.4	3.3
O T N	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	0.4	0.9	1.4	1.7	2.0	1.3	2.2
9. Treasury Note Yield, 5-Yr	CONSENSUS	0.7	1.1	1.7	2.2	2.5	2.7	2.0	2.9
	Top 10 Average	1.1	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.1	3.3	2.6	3.5
10 T N 1 T 11 10 X	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	0.7	1.2	1.6	1.8	2.1	1.5	2.3
10. Treasury Note Yield, 10-Yr		1.2	1.5	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.3	3.1
	Top 10 Average	1.5	2.0	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.5	2.9	3.8
	Bottom 10 Average	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.2	1.8	2.5
11. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Yr		1.8	2.2	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.0	3.8
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.7	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.1	3.5	4.4
	Bottom 10 Average	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.4	3.1
12. Corporate Aaa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	2.8	3.2	3.6	4.0	4.2	4.3	3.9	4.6
	Top 10 Average	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.4	5.1
	Bottom 10 Average	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.4	4.2
13. Corporate Baa Bond Yield	CONSENSUS	4.1	4.5	4.9	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.0	5.7
	Top 10 Average	4.6	5.0	5.4	5.7	5.8	6.0	5.6	6.2
	Bottom 10 Average	3.6	3.9	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.4	5.2
14. State & Local Bonds Yield		2.6	3.0	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.6	4.1
	Top 10 Average	3.0	3.3	3.9	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.0	4.6
	Bottom 10 Average	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.7
15. Home Mortgage Rate	CONSENSUS	3.4	3.6	4.0	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.2	4.9
	Top 10 Average	3.8	4.0	4.5	4.8	5.0	5.2	4.7	5.5
	Bottom 10 Average	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.1	4.1	3.7	4.4
A. Fed's AFE Nominal \$ Index	CONSENSUS	112.8	112.6	112.5	111.8	111.4	111.0	111.9	110.6
	Top 10 Average	114.1	114.5	114.1	113.8	113.5	113.4	113.9	113.9
	Bottom 10 Average	111.7	110.7	110.7	110.2	109.5	108.7	110.0	107.6
					ar, % Change				Averages
D. D. J. CDD		2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2022-2026	2027-2031
B. Real GDP	CONSENSUS	3.2	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.1
	Top 10 Average	5.7	4.3	2.9	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.4
a app at the first	Bottom 10 Average	0.5	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8
C. GDP Chained Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.1	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.0
	Top 10 Average	1.8	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2
D.C	Bottom 10 Average	0.3	1.3	1.6	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.9
D. Consumer Price Index	CONSENSUS	1.3	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
	Top 10 Average	2.2	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4
	Bottom 10 Average	0.4	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.0

Southwestern Public Service Company Derivation of Mean Equity Risk Premium Based Studies Using Holding Period Returns and Projected Market Appreciation of the S&P Utility Index

Line No.		Implied Equity Risk Premium
	Equity Risk Premium based on S&P Utility Index Holding Period Returns (1):	
1.	Historical Equity Risk Premium	4.21 %
2.	Regression of Historical Equity Risk Premium (2)	6.84
3.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium Based on PRPM (3)	5.59
4.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Value Line Data) (4)	6.62
5.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium based on Projected Total Return on the S&P Utilities Index (Bloomberg Data) (5)	4.70
6.	Average Equity Risk Premium (6)	5.59 %

- Notes: (1) Based on S&P Public Utility Index monthly total returns and Moody's Public Utility Bond average monthly yields from 1928-2019. Holding period returns are calculated based upon income received (dividends and interest) plus the relative change in the market value of a security over a one-year holding period.
 - (2) This equity risk premium is based on a regression of the monthly equity risk premiums of the S&P Utility Index relative to Moody's A2 rated public utility bond yields from 1928 2019 referenced in note 1 above.
 - (3) The Predictive Risk Premium Model (PRPM) is applied to the risk premium of the monthly total returns of the S&P Utility Index and the monthly yields on Moody's A2 rated public utility bonds from January 1928 October 2020.
 - (4) Using data from Value Line for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 10.17% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 3.52%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 6.65%. (10.17% 3.52% = 6.65%)
 - (5) Using data from Bloomberg Professional Service for the S&P Utilities Index, an expected return of 8.25% was derived based on expected dividend yields and long-term growth estimates as a proxy for market appreciation. Subtracting the expected A2 rated public utility bond yield of 3.52%, calculated on line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule results in an equity risk premium of 4.73%. (8.25% 3.52% = 4.73%)
 - (6) Average of lines 1 through 5.

Southwestern Public Service Company Prediction of Equity Risk Premiums Relative to Moody's A2 Rated Utility Bond Yields



ty Equity Risk	
Premium	
.55 % 5.92 %	6
	Premium

Notes:

(1) From line 3 of page 3 of this Schedule.

Source of Information: Regulatory Research Associates

Southwestern Public Service Company
Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use
of the Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM) and Empirical Capital Asset Pricing Model (ECAPM).

[8]	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (3)	11.95 % 11.95 11.40 12.32 12.86 12.77 11.68 13.05 13.68 11.95 11.95 11.95	12.25 %	11.95 %	12.10 %
[2]	ECAPM Cost Rate	12.04 % 12.04 11.57 12.35 12.35 12.98 13.53 12.04 12.28 11.65	12.30 %	12.04 %	12.17 %
[9]	Traditional CAPM Cost Rate	11.86 % 11.86 11.23 12.28 12.90 12.80 11.55 13.11 13.84 11.86 12.17 11.86	12.20 %	11.86 %	12.03 %
[5]	Risk-Free Rate (2)	2.16 % 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16			
[4]	Market Risk Premium (1)	10.43 % 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43 10.43			
[3]	Average Beta	0.93 0.93 0.87 0.97 1.02 0.90 1.05 1.12 0.93 0.96 0.93	96:0	0.93	0.95
[2]	Bloomberg Adjusted Beta	1.01 1.01 0.93 1.05 1.11 1.01 1.21 1.19 1.01 1.06 1.01			
[1]	Value Line Adjusted Beta	0.85 0.80 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85			
	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	ALLETE, Inc. Alliant Energy Corporation Ameren Corporation Edison International Entergy Corporation Evergy, Inc. IDACORP, Inc. NorthWestern Corporation OGE Energy Corporation Otter Tail Corporation Pinnacle West Capital Corp. Portland General Electric Co. Xcel Energy, Inc.	Mean	Median	Average of Mean and Median

Notes on page 2 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company Notes to Accompany the Application of the CAPM and ECAPM

Notes:

(1) The market risk premium (MRP) is derived by using six different measures from three sources: Ibbotson, Value Line, and Bloomberg as illustrated below:

Historical Data MRP Estimates:

Measure 1: Ibbotson Arithmetic Mean MRP (1926-2019)

Arithmetic Mean Monthly Returns for Large Stocks 1926-2019:	12.10 %
Arithmetic Mean Income Returns on Long-Term Government Bonds:	5.09
MRP based on Ibbotson Historical Data:	7.01 %
And based on isoscion inscribed.	
Measure 2: Application of a Regression Analysis to Ibbotson Historical Data	
	10.12 0/
(1926-2019)	10.13 %
Marrie 2 And Continue (the BBDM) Hills and Without Date	
Measure 3: Application of the PRPM to Ibbotson Historical Data:	40.64.07
(January 1926 - October 2020)	10.64 %
Value Line MRP Estimates:	
M 4 W. L L D	
Measure 4: Value Line Projected MRP (Thirteen weeks ending October 30, 2020)	
Total projected return on the market 3-5 years hence*:	13.30 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.16
MRP based on Value Line Summary & Index:	<u>11.14</u> %
*Forcasted 3-5 year capital appreciation plus expected dividend yield	
M F.V.L. IV. D. C. ID. C. I. M. L. I. CODEO	
Measure 5: Value Line Projected Return on the Market based on the S&P 500	
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	13.96 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.16
MRP based on Value Line data	11.80 %
MKF based on value line data	11.00 70
Measure 6: Bloomberg Projected MRP	
Measure of Dioditiber & Li diecter Mike	
Total return on the Market based on the S&P 500:	14.02 %
Projected Risk-Free Rate (see note 2):	2.16
MRP based on Bloomberg data	11.86 %
MKF based on bloomberg data	11.00 70
Average of Value Line, Ibbotson, and Bloomberg MRP:	10.43 %
Average of value Line, foodson, and bloomberg MKP:	10.43 %

(2) For reasons explained in the direct testimony, the appropriate risk-free rate for cost of capital purposes is the average forecast of 30 year Treasury Bonds per the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts. (See pages 10 and 11 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.) The projection of the risk-free rate is illustrated below:

Fourth Quarter 2020	1.50 %
First Quarter 2021	1.60
Second Quarter 2021	1.70
Third Quarter 2021	1.80
Fourth Quarter 2021	1.90
First Quarter 2022	2.00
2022-2026	3.00
2027-2031	3.80
	2.16 %

(3) Average of Column 6 and Column 7.

Sources of Information:

Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020 Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Public Service Company Basis of Selection of the Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Utility Proxy Group

The criteria for selection of the Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group was that the non-price regulated companies be domestic and reported in <u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition).

The Non-Price Regulated Proxy Group companies were then selected based on the unadjusted beta range of 0.64 – 0.92 and residual standard error of the regression range of 2.5179 – 3.0031 of the Utility Proxy Group.

These ranges are based upon plus or minus two standard deviations of the unadjusted beta and standard error of the regression. Plus or minus two standard deviations captures 95.50% of the distribution of unadjusted betas and residual standard errors of the regression.

The standard deviation of the Gas Utility Proxy Group's residual standard error of the regression is 0.1213. The standard deviation of the standard error of the regression is calculated as follows:

Standard Deviation of the Std. Err. of the Regr. = Standard Error of the Regression $\sqrt{2N}$

where: N = number of observations. Since Value Line betas are derived from weekly price change observations over a period of five years, N = 259

Thus,
$$0.1213 = \frac{2.7605}{\sqrt{518}} = \frac{2.7605}{22.7596}$$

Source of Information: Value Line, Inc., September 2020

<u>Value Line Investment Survey</u> (Standard Edition)

Southwestern Public Service Company Basis of Selection of Comparable Risk Domestic Non-Price Regulated Companies

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric	Value Line Adjusted	Unadjusted	Residual Standard Error of the	Standard Deviation
Companies	Beta	Beta	Regression	of Beta
ALLETE, Inc.	0.85 0.85	0.75 0.71	2.6950 2.7451	0.0650 0.0662
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.85	0.71		
Ameren Corporation Edison International	0.80	0.67	2.6415 3.3008	0.0637 0.0796
	0.95	0.83	2.6048	0.0796
Entergy Corporation Evergy, Inc.	1.00	0.96	3.3926	0.0028
IDACORP, Inc.	0.80	0.65	2.5574	0.0544
NorthWestern Corporation	0.90	0.81	2.7617	0.0666
OGE Energy Corporation	1.05	1.06	2.6320	0.0635
Otter Tail Corporation	0.85	0.73	2.4700	0.0596
Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	0.85	0.76	2.7037	0.0652
Portland General Electric Co.	0.85	0.74	2.6955	0.0650
Xcel Energy, Inc.	0.80	0.62	2.6858	0.0648
Average	0.88	0.78	2.7605	0.0675
Beta Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of Beta) 2 std. Devs. of Beta	0.64 0.14	0.92		
Residual Std. Err. Range (+/- 2 std. Devs. of the Residual Std. Err.)	2.5179	3.0031		
Std. dev. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.1213			
2 std. devs. of the Res. Std. Err.	0.2426			

Source of Information: Valueline Proprietary Database, September 2020

Southwestern Public Service Company Proxy Group of Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

[1] [2] [3] [4]

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	VL Adjusted Beta	Unadjusted Beta	Residual Standard Error of the Regression	Standard Deviation of Beta
A 1 7	0.00	0.02	2.0204	0.0707
Apple, Inc.	0.90	0.82	2.9301	0.0707
Analog Devices	0.95	0.90	2.7378	0.0660
Assurant Inc.	0.90	0.83	2.8328	0.0683
Amgen	0.85	0.71	2.7710	0.0668
Amer. Tower 'A'	0.90	0.82	2.9258	0.0706
ANSYS, Inc.	0.90	0.78	2.7817	0.0671
Smith (A.O.)	0.95	0.90	2.7403	0.0661
Booz Allen Hamilton	0.90	0.83	2.9779	0.0718
Becton, Dickinson	0.80	0.68	2.7571	0.0665
Brown-Forman	0.85	0.77	2.6358	0.0636
Black Knight, Inc.	0.85	0.70	2.6360	0.0636
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.72	2.7607	0.0666
Cadence Design Sys.	0.95	0.86	2.9525	0.0712
Cerner Corp.	0.95	0.86	2.8908	0.0697
Chemed Corp.	0.85	0.74	2.6626	0.0642
Cooper Cos.	0.95	0.91	2.7758	0.0669
CSW Industrials	0.85	0.75	2.7722	0.0704
Quest Diagnostics	0.95	0.87	2.5322	0.0611
Dolby Labs.	0.90	0.85	2.6390	0.0636
Estee Lauder	0.90	0.82	2.7685	0.0668
ESCO Technologies	0.95	0.90	2.5552	0.0616
Exponent, Inc.	0.85	0.74	2.8830	0.0695
Forward Air	0.95	0.91	2.7386	0.0660
Gentex Corporation	0.95	0.89	2.7515	0.0664
Alphabet Inc.	0.90	0.78	2.5770	0.0621
Hershey Co.	0.85	0.70	2.7360	0.0660
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.81	2.8462	0.0686
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.87	2.7881	0.0672
J & J Snack Foods Corp.	0.90	0.80	2.7601	0.0666
St. Joe Corp	0.85	0.72	2.9838	0.0720
McCormick and Co.	0.85	0.70	2.7767	0.0670
Altria Group	0.85	0.74	2.8919	0.0697
MSCI Inc.	0.95	0.90	2.8992	0.0699
Motorola Solutions, Inc.	0.90	0.81	2.8385	0.0685
Northrop Grumman	0.85	0.73	2.8790	0.0694
Progressive Corp.	0.80	0.66	2.5793	0.0622
Pool Corp.	0.90	0.80	2.8410	0.0685
Rollins, Inc.	0.85	0.76	2.8905	0.0697
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.72	2.7828	0.0671
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	0.91	2.7016	0.0652
Tetra Tech	0.90	0.81	2.8814	0.0695
Texas Instruments	0.90	0.79	2.6711	0.0644
AMERCO	0.90	0.83	2.6726	0.0645
Verisign	0.95	0.85	2.5785	0.0622
Waters Corp.	0.95	0.87	2.7023	0.0652
Watsco, Inc.	0.90	0.78	2.5227	0.0608
Western Union	0.85	0.72	2.6612	0.0642
Average	0.89	0.80	2.7600	0.0700
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	0.88	0.78	2.7605	0.0675

Southwestern Public Service Company Summary of Cost of Equity Models Applied to Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

	Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated			
Principal Methods	Companies			
Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF) (1)	12.77 %			
Risk Premium Model (RPM) (2)	12.57			
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (3)	11.79			
	12.38 %			
	12.57 %			
	12.48 %			

Notes:

- (1) From pages 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
- (2) From page 4 of this Schedule.
- (3) From page 7 of this Schedule.

$\frac{Southwestern\ Public\ Service\ Company}{DCF\ Results\ for\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Non-Price-Regulated\ Companies\ Comparable\ in\ Total\ Risk\ to\ the\ Proxy\ Group\ of\ Thirteen\ Electric\ Companies\ Comp$

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield	Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate (1)
Apple, Inc.	0.70 %	15.50 %	11.00 %	9.30 %	12.44 %	12.06 %	0.74 %	12.80 %
Analog Devices	2.10	7.00	10.00	9.05	8.44	8.62	2.19	10.81
Assurant Inc.	2.06	6.50	NA	36.60	19.40	20.83	2.27	23.10
Amgen	2.65	6.50	7.20	7.59	6.84	7.03	2.74	9.77
Amer. Tower 'A'	1.86	7.50	14.80	16.45	15.18	13.48	1.99	15.47
ANSYS, Inc.	-	10.00	NA	10.90	7.10	9.33	-	NA
Smith (A.O.)	2.01	5.00	8.00	10.00	8.00	7.75	2.09	9.84
Booz Allen Hamilton	1.48	10.50	10.60	NA	11.83	10.98	1.56	12.54
Becton, Dickinson	1.32	9.00	8.00	8.73	6.40	8.03	1.37	9.40
Brown-Forman	0.93	11.00	NA	5.02	6.85	7.62	0.97	8.59
Black Knight, Inc.	-	11.00	7.30	8.21	8.32	8.71	-	NA
Broadridge Fin'l	1.67	9.00	NA	7.40	10.00	8.80	1.74	10.54
Cadence Design Sys.	-	10.00	15.40	11.18	15.40	13.00	-	NA
Cerner Corp.	1.00	9.00	10.90	11.86	10.50	10.56	1.05	11.61
Chemed Corp.	0.28	12.00	9.60	10.10	9.65	10.34	0.29	10.63
Cooper Cos.	0.04 0.69	14.50	10.00 NA	8.80 NA	10.00 12.00	10.83 10.25	0.04 0.73	10.87 10.98
CSW Industrials Quest Diagnostics	1.92	8.50 9.00	9.00	8.91	9.72	9.16	2.01	11.17
Dolby Labs.	1.29	9.50	13.00	10.00	16.00	12.13	1.37	13.50
Estee Lauder	0.88	12.00	11.90	14.95	14.19	13.26	0.94	14.20
ESCO Technologies	0.37	11.00	NA	16.00	15.00	14.00	0.40	14.40
Exponent, Inc.	0.99	11.50	NA	15.00	15.00	13.83	1.06	14.89
Forward Air	1.42	12.00	NA	NA	13.16	12.58	1.51	14.09
Gentex Corporation	1.77	7.00	NA	7.54	15.00	9.85	1.86	11.71
Alphabet Inc.	-	14.50	16.30	17.57	4.81	13.30	-	NA
Hershey Co.	2.22	5.00	8.50	7.40	6.78	6.92	2.30	9.22
Ingredion Inc.	3.27	6.00	NA	8.60	1.90	5.50	3.36	8.86
Hunt (J.B.)	0.81	6.50	15.00	11.67	11.65	11.20	0.86	12.06
J & J Snack Foods Corp.	1.73	6.00	NA	NA	6.00	6.00	1.78	7.78
St. Joe Corp	1.21	15.00	NA	NA	(28.10)	15.00	1.30	16.30
McCormick and Co.	1.26	6.50	5.50	10.04	4.80	6.71	1.30	8.01
Altria Group	8.40	6.00	4.00	4.45	6.10	5.14	8.62	13.76
MSCI Inc.	0.88	17.00	NA	12.15	13.10	14.08	0.94	15.02
Motorola Solutions, Inc.	1.63	8.00	9.00	11.10	10.32	9.61	1.71	11.32
Northrop Grumman	1.77	11.00	NA	20.07	7.62	12.90	1.88	14.78
Progressive Corp.	0.43	9.50	6.40	6.72	1.42	6.01	0.44	6.45
Pool Corp.	0.70	14.50	NA	17.00	17.00	16.17	0.76	16.93
Rollins, Inc.	0.57	12.00	NA	NA	8.20	10.10	0.60	10.70
Selective Ins. Group Sirius XM Holdings	1.83 1.03	6.50 24.50	NA 14.70	NA 14.09	(2.19) 15.38	6.50 17.17	1.89 1.12	8.39 18.29
Tetra Tech	0.70	11.00	15.00	15.50	15.00	14.13	0.75	14.88
Texas Instruments	2.86	4.00	9.30	10.30	10.00	8.40	2.98	11.38
AMERCO	0.56	7.50	NA	NA	15.00	11.25	0.59	11.84
Verisign	5.37	9.50	NA	10.30	8.00	9.27	5.62	14.89
Waters Corp.	-	6.00	5.00	5.23	4.90	5.28	-	NA
Watsco, Inc.	3.01	7.50	NA	NA	15.00	11.25	3.18	14.43
Western Union	4.01	6.00	25.80	5.45	8.51	11.44	4.24	15.68
							Mean	12.43 %
							Median	11.78 %
						Average of Mear	and Median	<u>12.11</u> %

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

⁽¹⁾ The application of the DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group.

The dividend yield is derived by using the 60 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of October 30, 2020. The dividend yield is then adjusted by 1/2 the average projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, Bloomberg

Professional Services, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and then adding that growth rate to the adjusted dividend yield.

[8]

[7]

Southwestern Public Service Company NM DCF Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

[5]

[6]

Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies	Average Dividend Yield	Value Line Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Zack's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Bloomberg's Five Year Projected Growth Rate in EPS	Yahoo! Finance Projected Five Year Growth in EPS	Average Projected Five Year Growth Rate in EPS	Adjusted Dividend Yield (4)	Mean Common Equity Cost Rate (5)	High Common Equity Cost Rate (6)
	0.74 0/	4550 0/	44.00 0/	0.20 0/	42.44 0/	10.06 0/	0.00 0/	12.06.07	46.00.00
Apple, Inc.	0.71 %	15.50 %	11.00 %	9.30 %	12.44 %	12.06 %	0.80 %	12.86 %	16.32 %
Analog Devices	2.08	7.00	10.00	9.05	8.44	8.62	2.26	10.88	12.29
Assurant Inc.	2.06	6.50	NA	36.60	19.40	20.83	2.49	23.32	39.41
Amgen	2.69	6.50	7.20	7.59	6.84	7.03	2.88	9.91	10.49
Amer. Tower 'A'	1.90	7.50	14.80	16.45	15.18	13.48	2.16	15.64	18.66
ANSYS, Inc.	-	10.00	NA	10.90	7.10	9.33	-	9.33	10.90
Smith (A.O.)	1.92	5.00	8.00	10.00	8.00	7.75	2.07	9.82	12.11
Booz Allen Hamilton	1.52	10.50	10.60	NA	11.83	10.98	1.69	12.67	13.53
Becton, Dickinson	1.35	9.00	8.00	8.73	6.40	8.03	1.46	9.49	10.47
Brown-Forman	0.93	11.00	NA	5.02	6.85	7.62	1.00	8.62	12.03
Black Knight, Inc.	-	11.00	7.30	8.21	8.32	8.71	-	8.71	11.00
Broadridge Fin'l	1.67	9.00	NA	7.40	10.00	8.80	1.82	10.62	11.84
Cadence Design Sys.	•	10.00	15.40	11.18	15.40	13.00	-	13.00	15.40
Cerner Corp.	1.00	9.00	10.90	11.86	10.50	10.56	1.11	11.67	12.97
Chemed Corp.	0.28	12.00	9.60	10.10	9.65	10.34	0.31	10.65	12.31
Cooper Cos.	0.03	14.50	10.00	8.80	10.00	10.83	0.03	10.86	14.53
CSW Industrials	0.66	8.50	NA	NA	12.00	10.25	0.73	10.98	12.74
Quest Diagnostics	1.89	9.00	9.00	8.91	9.72	9.16	2.06	11.22	11.79
Dolby Labs.	1.29	9.50	13.00	10.00	16.00	12.13	1.45	13.58	17.50
Estee Lauder	0.87	12.00	11.90	14.95	14.19	13.26	0.99	14.25	15.95
ESCO Technologies	0.38	11.00	NA	16.00	15.00	14.00	0.43	14.43	16.44
Exponent, Inc.	1.04	11.50	NA	15.00	15.00	13.83	1.18	15.01	16.20
Forward Air	1.40	12.00	NA	NA	13.16	12.58	1.58	14.16	14.74
Gentex Corporation	1.78	7.00	NA	7.54	15.00	9.85	1.96	11.81	17.05
Alphabet Inc.	-	14.50	16.30	17.57	4.81	13.30	-	13.30	17.57
Hershey Co.	2.25	5.00	8.50	7.40	6.78	6.92	2.41	9.33	10.94
Ingredion Inc.	3.35	6.00	NA	8.60	1.90	5.50	3.53	9.03	12.24
Hunt (J.B.)	0.83	6.50	15.00	11.67	11.65	11.20	0.92	12.12	15.95
J & J Snack Foods Corp.	1.74	6.00	NA	NA	6.00	6.00	1.84	7.84	7.84
St. Joe Corp	1.16	15.00	NA	NA	(28.10)	15.00	1.33	16.33	16.33
McCormick and Co.	1.28	6.50	5.50	10.04	4.80	6.71	1.37	8.08	11.45
Altria Group	8.86	6.00	4.00	4.45	6.10	5.14	9.32	14.46	15.50
MSCI Inc.	0.89	17.00	NA	12.15	13.10	14.08	1.02	15.10	18.04
Motorola Solutions, Inc.	1.57	8.00	9.00	11.10	10.32	9.61	1.72	11.33	12.84
Northrop Grumman	1.85	11.00	NA	20.07	7.62	12.90	2.09	14.99	22.29
Progressive Corp.	0.42	9.50	6.40	6.72	1.42	6.01	0.45	6.46	9.96
Pool Corp.	0.68	14.50	NA	17.00	17.00	16.17	0.79	16.96	17.80
Rollins, Inc.	0.56	12.00	NA	NA	8.20	10.10	0.62	10.72	12.63
Selective Ins. Group	1.91	6.50	NA	NA	(2.19)	6.50	2.03	8.53	8.53
Sirius XM Holdings	1.04	24.50	14.70	14.09	15.38	17.17	1.22	18.39	25.79
Tetra Tech	0.68	11.00	15.00	15.50	15.00	14.13	0.78	14.91	16.29
Texas Instruments	2.80	4.00	9.30	10.30	10.00	8.40	3.04	11.44	13.39
AMERCO	0.56	7.50	NA	NA	15.00	11.25	0.62	11.87	15.64
Verisign	5.40	9.50	NA	10.30	8.00	9.27	5.90	15.17	16.26
Waters Corp.	-	6.00	5.00	5.23	4.90	5.28	-	5.28	6.00
Watsco, Inc.	3.06	7.50	NA	NA	15.00	11.25	3.40	14.65	18.52
Western Union	4.16	6.00	25.80	5.45	8.51	11.44	4.64	16.08	31.03
							Mean	12.25 %	15.10 %
							Median	11.81_%	14.53 %
						Average of Mean	and Median	12.03 %	14.82 %

NA= Not Available NMF= Not Meaningful Figure

[1]

[2]

[3]

(1) The application of the NM DCF model to the domestic, non-price regluated comparable risk companies is identical to the application of the DCF to the Utility Proxy Group. The dividend yield is derived by using the 30 day average price and the spot indicated dividend as of October 30, 2020. The dividend yield is then adjusted by the projected growth rate in EPS, which is calculated by (1) averaging the 5 year projected growth in EPS provided by Value Line, www.zacks.com, Bloomet Professional Services, and www.yahoo.com (excluding any negative growth rates) and (2) the maximum growth rate. The indicated mean and maximum DCF cost rate is calculated by adding the average and maximium growth rate to their respective adjusted dividend yield.

Indicated DCF Cost Rate

13.43 %

Source of Information:

Value Line Investment Survey www.zacks.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 www.yahoo.com Downloaded on 10/30/2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

Southwestern Public Service Company Indicated Common Equity Cost Rate Through Use of a Risk Premium Model Using an Adjusted Total Market Approach

Line No.		Proxy Group of Forty- Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies
1.	Prospective Yield on Baa2 Rated	442.04
	Corporate Bonds (1)	4.13 %
2.	Adjustment to Reflect Proxy Group	(0.40)
	Bond Rating (2)	(0.19)
3.	Prospective Bond Rating	3.94
4.	Equity Risk Premium (3)	8.63
5	Risk Premium Derived Common	
ວ	Equity Cost Rate	12.57 %
		

Notes: (1) Average forecast of Baa2 corporate bonds based upon the consensus of nearly 50 economists reported in Blue Chip Financial Forecasts dated June 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020 (see pages 10 and 11 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4). The estimates are detailed below.

Fourth Quarter 2020	3.60 %
First Quarter 2021	3.60
Second Quarter 2021	3.70
Third Quarter 2021	3.70
Fourth Quarter 2021	3.80
First Quarter 2022	3.90
2022-2026	5.00
2027-2031	5.70
Average	4.13 %

(2) To reflect the Baa1 average rating of the non-utility proxy group, the prosepctive yield on Baa corporate bonds must be adjusted downward by 1/3 of the spread between A2 and Baa2 corporate bond yields as shown below:

	A2 Corp.		Baa2 Corp.				
	Bond Yield		Bond Yield			Spread	
Oct-2020	2.88	%	3.44	%		0.56	%
Sep-2020	2.79		3.36			0.57	
Aug-2020	2.68		3.27			0.59	
	Avera	age y	ield spread			0.57	%
							=
		1/	'3 of spread			0.19	%

(3) From page 6 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company Comparison of Long-Term Issuer Ratings for the Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Moody's Long-Term Issuer Rating October 2020

Standard & Poor's Long-Term Issuer Rating October 2020

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated Companies	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)	Long-Term Issuer Rating	Numerical Weighting (1)
Apple, Inc.	Aa1	2.0	AA+	2.0
Analog Devices	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Assurant Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB	9.0
Amgen	Baa1	8.0	A-	7.0
Amer. Tower 'A'	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
ANSYS, Inc.	NA		NA	
Smith (A.O.)	NA		NA	
Booz Allen Hamilton	NA NA	 	NA NA	
Becton, Dickinson	Ba1	11.0	BBB	9.0
Brown-Forman	A1	5.0	A-	7.0
Black Knight, Inc.	Ba3	13.0	BB	12.0
5 /	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
Broadridge Fin'l				
Cadence Design Sys.	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Cerner Corp.	NA		NA ND	
Chemed Corp.	WR		NR	
Cooper Cos.	WR		NR	
CSW Industrials	NA		NA	
Quest Diagnostics	Baa2	9.0	BBB+	8.0
Dolby Labs.	NA		NA	
Estee Lauder	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
ESCO Technologies	NA		NA	
Exponent, Inc.	NA		NA	
Forward Air	NA		NA	
Gentex Corporation	NA		NA	
Alphabet Inc.	Aa2	3.0	AA+	2.0
Hershey Co.	A1	5.0	A	6.0
Ingredion Inc.	Baa1	8.0	BBB	9.0
Hunt (J.B.)	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	8.0
J & J Snack Foods Corp.	NA		NA	
St. Joe Corp	NA		NA	
McCormick and Co.	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Altria Group	A3	7.0	BBB	9.0
MSCI Inc.	Ba2	12.0	BB+	11.0
Motorola Solutions, Inc.	Baa3	10.0	BBB-	10.0
Northrop Grumman	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Progressive Corp.	A2	6.0	A	6.0
Pool Corp.	NA		NA	
Rollins, Inc.	NA		NA	
Selective Ins. Group	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Sirius XM Holdings	NA		NA	
Tetra Tech	NA		NA	
Texas Instruments	A1	5.0	A+	5.0
AMERCO	WR		NR	
Verisign	Ba1	11.0	BBB-	10.0
Waters Corp.	NA		NA	10.0
Watsco, Inc.	NA NA		NA NA	
Western Union	Baa2	9.0	BBB	9.0
Western Onion	Daaz			
Average	Baa1	8.0	BBB+	7.9

Notes:

Source of Information:

Bloomberg Professional Services

⁽¹⁾ From page 6 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.

Southwestern Public Service Company Derivation of Equity Risk Premium Based on the Total Market Approach Using the Beta for

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated Companies of Comparable risk to the Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies

Line No.	Equity Risk Premium Measure	Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non- Price Regulated Companies
<u>I</u>	bbotson-Based Equity Risk Premiums:	
1.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium (1)	5.78 %
2.	Regression on Ibbotson Risk Premium Data (2)	9.36
3.	Ibbotson Equity Risk Premium based on PRPM (3)	9.52
4.	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> Summary and Index (4)	10.29
5	Equity Risk Premium Based on <u>Value Line</u> S&P 500 Companies (5)	10.95
6.	Equity Risk Premium Based on Bloomberg S&P 500 Companies (6)	11.01
7.	Conclusion of Equity Risk Premium	9.48 %
8.	Adjusted Beta (7)	0.91
9.	Forecasted Equity Risk Premium	8.63 %
(1) From note 1 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. 2) From note 2 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. 3) From note 3 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4. 4) From note 4 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.	

Sources of Information:

Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation - 2020 SBBI Yearbook, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Value Line Summary and Index Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, June 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020 Bloomberg Professional Services

(5) From note 5 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(6) From note 6 of page 9 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 4.
(7) Average of mean and median beta from page 7 of this Schedule.

Southwestern Public Service Company

Traditional CAPM and ECAPM Results for the Proxy Group of Non-Price-Regulated Companies Comparable in Total Risk to the <u>Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies</u>

[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]

Proxy Group of Forty-Seven Non-Price Regulated	Value Line Adjusted	Bloomberg	Average	Market Risk	Risk-Free Rate	Traditional CAPM Cost		Indicated Common Equity
Companies	Beta	Beta	Beta	Premium (1)	(2)	Rate	ECAPM Cost Rate	Cost Rate (3)
Apple, Inc.	0.90	1.03	0.97	10.43 %	2.16 %	12.28 %	12.35 %	12.32 %
Analog Devices	0.95	1.02	0.99	10.43	2.16	12.48	12.51	12.50
Assurant Inc.	0.90	1.05	0.97	10.43	2.16	12.28	12.35	12.32
Amgen	0.85	0.77	0.81	10.43	2.16	10.61	11.10	10.86
Amer. Tower 'A'	0.90	0.89	0.89	10.43	2.16	11.44	11.73	11.59
ANSYS, Inc.	0.90	0.94	0.92	10.43	2.16	11.75	11.96	11.86
Smith (A.O.)	0.95	1.00	0.97	10.43	2.16	12.28	12.35	12.32
Booz Allen Hamilton	0.90	0.91	0.90	10.43	2.16	11.55	11.81	11.68
Becton, Dickinson	0.80	0.67	0.73	10.43	2.16	9.77	10.48	10.13
Brown-Forman	0.85	0.92	0.89	10.43	2.16	11.44	11.73	11.59
Black Knight, Inc.	0.85	0.85	0.85	10.43	2.16	11.02	11.42	11.22
Broadridge Fin'l	0.85	0.83	0.84	10.43	2.16	10.92	11.34	11.13
Cadence Design Sys.	0.95	0.98	0.97	10.43	2.16	12.28	12.35	12.32
Cerner Corp.	0.95	0.94	0.94	10.43	2.16	11.96	12.12	12.04
Chemed Corp.	0.85	0.95	0.90	10.43	2.16	11.55	11.81	11.68
Cooper Cos.	0.95	0.93	0.94	10.43	2.16	11.96	12.12	12.04
CSW Industrials	0.85	0.99	0.92	10.43	2.16	11.75	11.96	11.86
Quest Diagnostics	0.95	0.98	0.97	10.43	2.16	12.28	12.35	12.32
Dolby Labs.	0.90	0.96	0.93	10.43	2.16	11.86	12.04	11.95
Estee Lauder	0.90	0.93	0.92	10.43	2.16	11.75	11.96	11.86
ESCO Technologies	0.95	0.94	0.95	10.43	2.16	12.07	12.20	12.13
Exponent, Inc.	0.85	0.94	0.88	10.43	2.16	11.34	11.65	11.49
Forward Air	0.95	1.10	1.02	10.43	2.16	12.80	12.75	12.77
Gentex Corporation	0.95	0.99	0.97	10.43	2.16	12.28	12.75	12.77
Alphabet Inc.	0.90	0.89	0.89	10.43	2.16	11.44	11.73	11.59
Hershey Co.	0.90	0.89	0.89	10.43	2.16	10.61	11.73	10.86
Ingredion Inc.	0.90	0.77	0.81	10.43	2.16	11.65	11.10	11.77
Hunt (J.B.)	0.95	0.93	0.91	10.43	2.16	11.86	12.04	11.77
J & J Snack Foods Corp.	0.95	0.92	0.93	10.43	2.16	10.92	11.34	11.13
	0.90	1.01	0.64	10.43	2.16		12.04	11.13
St. Joe Corp McCormick and Co.	0.85	0.70	0.77	10.43	2.16	11.86 10.19	10.79	10.49
	0.85	0.70	0.86	10.43	2.16	11.13	11.49	11.31
Altria Group MSCI Inc.	0.85	0.87	0.86	10.43	2.16	11.13	11.49	11.31
Motorola Solutions, Inc.	0.95	0.91	0.93	10.43	2.16	11.75	11.96	11.95
	0.90	0.94	0.83			10.82		
Northrop Grumman				10.43	2.16		11.26	11.04
Progressive Corp. Pool Corp.	0.80 0.90	0.82 0.94	0.81 0.92	10.43	2.16 2.16	10.61	11.10 11.96	10.86 11.86
Rollins, Inc.	0.90	0.94	0.92	10.43 10.43	2.16	11.75 10.19	10.79	10.49
Selective Ins. Group	0.85	0.95	0.90	10.43	2.16	11.55	11.81	11.68
Sirius XM Holdings	0.95	1.15	1.05	10.43	2.16	13.11	12.98	13.05
Tetra Tech	0.90	1.02	0.96	10.43	2.16	12.17	12.28	12.22
Texas Instruments AMERCO	0.90 0.90	0.90 1.01	0.90	10.43	2.16 2.16	11.55	11.81 12.28	11.68
			0.96	10.43		12.17		12.22
Verisign	0.95	0.81	0.88	10.43	2.16	11.34	11.65	11.49
Waters Corp.	0.95	0.88	0.92	10.43	2.16	11.75	11.96	11.86
Watsco, Inc.	0.90	0.79	0.84	10.43	2.16	10.92	11.34	11.13
Western Union	0.80	1.01	0.90	10.43	2.16	11.55	11.81	11.68
Mean			0.90			11.58 %	11.84 %	11.71 %
Median			0.92			11.75 %	11.96 %	11.86 %
Average of Mean and Median			0.91			11.67 %	11.90 %	11.79 %

Notes

- (1) From note 1 of page 2 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
- (2) From note 2 of page 2 of Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5.
- (3) Average of CAPM and ECAPM cost rates.

Ibbotson Associates' Size Premia for the Decile Portfolios of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ Derivation of Investment Risk Adjustment Based upon Southwestern Public Service Company

Line No.

	[1]		[2]	[3]	[4]
	Market Capitalization on October 30, 2020 (1) (millions) (times larger)	(1) (times larger)	Applicable Decile of the NYSE/AMEX/ NASDAQ (2)	Applicable Size Premium (3)	Spread from Applicable Size Premium (4)
Southwestern Public Service Company	\$ 1,837.306		9	1.34%	
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	\$ 11,812.423	6.4 x	8	0.73%	0.61%
		[A]	[B]	[c]	[a]
			Market	Market	Size Premium (Return in
		Decile	Capitalization of	Capitalization of	Excess of
		Decile	(millions)	(millions)	CALINI
	Largest	1	\$ 31,090.379	\$ 1,061,355.011	-0.28%
		2	13,142.606	30,542.936	0.50%
		3	6,618.604	13,100.225	0.73%
		4	4,312.546	6,614.962	0.79%
		N	2,688.889	4,311.252	1.10%
		9	1,669.856	2,685.865	1.34%
		7	993.855	1,668.282	1.47%
		8	515.621	993.847	1.59%
		6	230.024	515.603	2.22%
	Smallest	10	1.973	229.748	4.99%
		* F	*From 2020 Duff & Phelps Cost of Capital Navigator	ost of Capital Navigator	
Notes:					
	(1) From nage 2 of this Schodinle	chediile			

- From page 2 of this Schedule.
 Gleaned from Columns [B] and [C] on the bottom of this page. The appropriate decile (Column [A]) corresponds to the market capitalization of the proxy group, which is found in Column [1].
 Corresponding risk premium to the decile is provided in Column [D] on the bottom of this page.
 Line No. 1 Column [3] Line No. 2 Column [3]. For example, the 0.61% in Column [4], Line No. 2 is derived as follows 0.61%
- = 1.34% 0.73%.

Market Capitalization of Southwestern Public Service Company and the <u>Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies</u> Southwestern Public Service Company

[9]	Market Capitalization on October 30, 2020 (3) (millions)		\$ 1,837.306 (6)		\$ 2.666.505	_	19,974.316	20,285.647	20,216.340	12,510.608	4,422.461	2,814.978	6,159.457	1,540.044	9,179.898	3,512.914	36,733.466	\$ 11,812.423
[5]	Market-to- Book Ratio on October 30, 2020 (2)		182.2 (5)		119.5 %		247.9	152.5	197.7	146.0	179.4	138.0	148.8	197.1	169.0	135.6	277.5	182.2 %
[4]	Closing Stock Market Price on October 30, 2020	NA	"		\$ 51.580		81.120	56.040	101.220	55.200	87.730	52.130	30.770	38.350	81.570	39.300	70.030	\$ 61.563
[3]	Total Common Equity at Fiscal Year End 2019 (millions)	1,008.401 (4)			2.231.900	5,205.100	8,059.000	13,303.000	10,223.675	8,571.900	2,464.628	2,039.094	4,139.500	781.482	5,430.648	2,591.000	13,239.000	6,021.533
[2]	Book Value per Share at Fiscal Year End 2019 Total (1) at Fiss	NA			43.173		32.729	36.750	51.188	37.821	48.892	37.762	20.679	19.460	48.255	28.986	25.239	34.783 \$
					6 9	,												€5
Ξ	Common Stock Shares Outstanding at Fiscal Year End 2019 (millions)	NA			51.696	245.023	246.232	361.985	199.727	226.641	50.410	53.999	200.177	40.158	112.540	89.387	524.539	184.809
	Exchange				NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ	NYSE	NYSE	NASDAQ	
	Company	Southwestern Public Service Company	Based upon Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	ALETE. Inc.	Alliant Energy Corporation	Ameren Corporation	Edison International	Entergy Corporation	Evergy, Inc.	IDACORP, Inc.	NorthWestern Corporation	OGE Energy Corporation	Otter Tail Corporation	Pinnacle West Capital Corp.	Portland General Electric Co.	Xcel Energy, Inc.	Average

NA= Not Available

Notes: (1) Column 3 / Column 1.

(2) Column 4 / Column 2.
(3) Column 4 / Column 2.
(4) Average rate base multiplied by the requested common equity ratio.
(5) The market-to-book ratio of Southwestern Public Service Company on October 30, 2020 is assumed to be equal to the market-to-book ratio of Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies on October 30, 2020 as appropriate.
(6) Column [3] multiplied by Column [5].

Source of Information: 2019 Annual Forms 10K yahoo.finance.com Bloomberg Professional

$\underline{Southwestern\ Public\ Service\ Company}$ Derivation of the Flotation Cost Adjustment to the Cost of Common Equity

				<u>B</u>	Equity Issuances (Company Provided)	pany Provided)					
		[Column 1]	[Column 2]	[Column 3]	[Column 4]	[Column 5]	[Column 6]	[Column 7]	[Column 8]	[Column 9]	[Column 10]
Date	Issuing Company	Shares Issued (1)	Market Price per Share (1)	Average Offering Price per Share (1)	Underwriting Discount (1)	Total Offering Expense per Share (1)	Net Proceeds per Share (2)	Total Flotation Costs (3)	Gross Equity Issue before Costs (4)	Net Proceeds (5)	Flotation Cost Percentage (6)
11/16/1949	Northern States Power	1.584.238	\$ 10.750	\$ 10.250	\$ 0.124	\$ 0.137	686'6	\$ 1.205.605	\$ 17,030,559	\$ 15.824.953	7.079%
6/4/1952	Northern States Dower	1108966									2 476%
4/14/1954	Northern States Power	1.219.856	15.250	14.000	0.060	0.124	13.816	1.749.274	18.602.804	16.853.530	9.403%
2/29/1956	Northern States Power	670.920	17.825	16.750	0.050	0.221	16.479	903,058	11,959,149	11.056.091	7.551%
7/22/1959	Northern States Power	952,033	23.375	22.000	0.069	0.191	21.740	1,556,574	22,253,771	20,697,197	6.995%
7/28/1965	Northern States Power	772,008	35.250	33.000	0.092	0.225	32.683	1,981,745	27,213,282	25,231,537	7.282%
1/22/1969	Northern States Power	1,080,811	29.000	27.000	0.119	0.187	26.694	2,492,350	31,343,519	28,851,169	7.952%
10/21/1970	Northern States Power	1,729,298	23.125	21.500	0.175	0.149	21.176	3,370,402	39,990,016	36,619,614	8.428%
7/26/1972	Northern States Power	1,902,228	25.000	23.500	0.129	0.166	23.205	3,414,499	47,555,700	44,141,201	7.180%
10/10/1973	Northern States Power	2,092,451	25.825	24.500	0.128	0.153	24.219	3,360,476	54,037,547	50,677,071	6.219%
11/20/1974	Northern States Power	2,300,000	17.625	17.500	0.910	690.0	16.521	2,539,200	40,537,500	37,998,300	6.264%
8/14/1975	Northern States Power	1,750,000	23.000	23.000	0.740	0.077	22.183	1,429,750	40,250,000	38,820,250	3.552%
6/3/1976	Northern States Power	2,000,000	24.000	24.000	0.720	0.064	23.216	1,568,000	48,000,000	46,432,000	3.267%
5/31/1993	Northern States Power	3,041,955	44.125	43.625	1.200	0.048	42.377	5,317,337	134,226,264	128,908,927	3.961%
9/23/1997	Northern States Power	4,500,000	49.938	49.563	1.230	0.133	48.200	7,821,000	224,721,000	216,900,000	3.480%
9/29/1997	Northern States Power	400,000	20.500	49.563	1.230	0.133	48.200	920,000	20,200,000	19,280,000	4.554%
2/25/2002	Xcel Energy, Inc.	20,000,000	22.950	22.500	0.730	0.015	21.755	23,900,000	459,000,000	435,100,000	2.207%
9/9/2008	Xcel Energy, Inc.	17,250,000	20.860	20.200	0.100	9000	20.094	13,218,352	329,835,000	346,616,648	3.673%
8/3/2010	Xcel Energy, Inc.	21,850,000	22.100	21.500	0.645	0.013	20.571	33,407,927	482,885,000	449,477,073	6.918%
3/1/2013	Xcel Energy, Inc.	7,757,449	29.057	29.057	0.291	0.052	28.714	2,657,558	225,407,642	222,750,085	1.179%
6/1/2014	Xcel Energy, Inc.	5,693,946	30.663	30.663	0.307	0.030	30.326	1,915,210	174,592,340	172,677,130	1.097%
9/1/2018	Xcel Energy, Inc.	4,733,435	47.885	47.885	0.407	0.073	47.405	2,271,040	226,661,287	224,390,247	1.002%
8/29/2019	Xcel Energy, Inc.	9,359,103	48.416	48.416	0.173	0:030	48.213	1,901,526	453,132,797	451,231,271	0.420%
	Total Public Issuances							\$ 119,189,213	\$ 3,171,079,321	\$ 3,051,890,108	3.759%
			Flotation Cost	Cost Adjustment							
	[Column 11]	[Column 12]	[Column 13]	[Column 14]	[Column 15]	[Column 16]					
		Average Projected	Adjusted Dividend Vield	Average DCF Cost Rate	DCF Cost Rate	Flotation Cost					
	Average Dividend Yield (7)	(7)	(8)	Flotation (9)	Flotation (10)	Adjustment (11)					
Proxy Group of Thirteen Electric Companies	3.86 %	4.88 %	3.95 %	8.83 %	8:98	0.15 %	%				

Notes:

(2) Con.pany provided (2) Col. 3 - Col. 4 - Col. 5 (3) Col. 2 - Col. 6) x Col. 1 (4) Col. 1 x Col. 2 (5) Col. 1 x Col. 6 (6) Col. 7 / Col. 8 (7) Attachment_(DWD-1), Schedule 5 (8) Col. 11 x (1 + 0.5 x Col. 12) (9) Col. 12 + Col. 13 (10) (Col. 13 / (1 - Col. 10)) + Col. 12 (11) Col. 15 - Col. 14



Appendix A – Resume & Testimony Listing of: Dylan W. D'Ascendis, CRRA, CVA Director

Summary

Dylan is an experienced consultant and a Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) and Certified Valuation Analyst (CVA). He has served as a consultant for investor-owned and municipal utilities and authorities for 12 years. Dylan has extensive experience in rate of return analyses, class cost of service, rate design, and valuation for regulated public utilities. He has testified as an expert witness in the subjects of rate of return. cost of service, rate design, and valuation before 23 regulatory commissions in the U.S., one Canadian province, and an American Arbitration Association panel.

He also maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured.

Areas of Specialization

Regulation and Rates

Utilities

Mutual Fund Benchmarking

Capital Market Risk

Financial Modeling

Valuation

Regulatory Strategy

Rate Case Support

Rate of Return

Cost of Service

Rate Design

Recent Expert Testimony Submission/Appearances

Jurisdiction

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities

New Jersey Board of Public Utilities

Hawaii Public Utilities Commission

South Carolina Public Service Commission

American Arbitration Association

Topic

Rate of Return Rate of Return

Cost of Service, Rate Design Return on Common Equity

Valuation

Recent Assignments

- Provided expert testimony on the cost of capital for ratemaking purposes before numerous state utility regulatory agencies
- Maintains the benchmark index against which the Hennessy Gas Utility Mutual Fund performance is measured
- Sponsored valuation testimony for a large municipal water company in front of an American Arbitration Association Board to justify the reasonability of their lease payments to the City
- Co-authored a valuation report on behalf of a large investor-owned utility company in response to a new state regulation which allowed the appraised value of acquired assets into rate base

Recent Publications and Speeches

- Co-Author of: "Decoupling, Risk Impacts and the Cost of Capital", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. The Electricity Journal, March, 2020.
- Co-Author of: "Decoupling Impact and Public Utility Conservation Investment", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University and Pauline M. Ahern. Energy Policy Journal, 130 (2019), 311-319.
- "Establishing Alternative Proxy Groups", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 51st Financial Forum, April 4, 2019, New Orleans, LA.
- "Past is Prologue: Future Test Year", Presentation before the National Association of Water Companies 2017 Southeast Water Infrastructure Summit, May 2, 2017, Savannah, GA.
- Co-author of: "Comparative Evaluation of the Predictive Risk Premium ModelTM, the Discounted Cash Flow Model and the Capital Asset Pricing Model", co-authored with Richard A. Michelfelder, Ph.D., Rutgers University, Pauline M. Ahern, and Frank J. Hanley. The Electricity Journal, May, 2013.
- "Decoupling: Impact on the Risk and Cost of Common Equity of Public Utility Stocks", before the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts: 45th Financial Forum, April 17-18, 2013, Indianapolis, IN.



Sponsor	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT
Regulatory Commission of Al	aska			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Alaska Power Company; Goat Lake	Tariff Nos. TA886-2; TA6-521;	
Alaska Power Company	09/20	Hydro, Inc.; BBL Hydro, Inc.	TA4-573	Capital Structure
Alaska Power Company	07/16	Alaska Power Company	Docket No. TA857-2	Rate of Return
Alberta Utilities Commission				
AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR				
Distribution & Transmission,	0.4/00	AltaLink, L.P., and EPCOR	2021 Generic Cost of Capital,	D
Inc.	01/20	Distribution & Transmission, Inc.	Proceeding ID. 24110	Rate of Return
Arizona Corporation Commis	sion		D	
EDCOD Water Arizona Inc	06/20	EDCOR Water Arizona Inc	Docket No. WS-01303A-20- 0177	Rate of Return
EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.	00/20	EPCOR Water Arizona, Inc.		Rate of Return
Arizona Water Company	12/19	Arizona Water Company – Western Group	Docket No. W-01445A-19- 0278	Rate of Return
7 inzona Water Company	12/10	Arizona Water Company – Northern	Docket No. W-01445A-18-	rate of retain
Arizona Water Company	08/18	Group	0164	Rate of Return
Colorado Public Utilities Com	l			
Summit Utilities, Inc.	04/18	Colorado Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 18AL-0305G	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	06/17	Atmos Energy Corporation	Docket No. 17AL-0429G	Rate of Return
Delaware Public Service Com	L	y amou zine.gy corporation	200.000.000	
Delmarva Power & Light Co.	10/20	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	Docket No. 20-0150	Rate of Return
Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	11/13	Tidewater Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 13-466	Capital Structure
Public Service Commission of	of the Distr	<u>'</u>		<u> </u>
Washington Gas Light				
Company	09/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Formal Case No. 1162	Rate of Return
Federal Energy Regulatory C	ommissio	1		
LS Power Grid California, LLC	10/20	LS Power Grid California, LLC	Docket No. ER21-195-000	Rate of Return
Florida Public Service Comm	ission			
Peoples Gas System	09/20	Peoples Gas System	Docket No. 20200051-GU	Rate of Return
Utilities, Inc. of Florida	06/20	Utilities, Inc. of Florida	Docket No. 20200139-WS	Rate of Return
Hawaii Public Utilities Commi	ission			
				Cost of Service / Rate
Lanai Water Company, Inc.	12/19	Lanai Water Company, Inc.	Docket No. 2019-0386	Design
Manele Water Resources,	00/40	Marrala Water Deservines 110	DI+N 0040 0044	Cost of Service / Rate
LLC Water Carrier	08/19	Manele Water Resources, LLC	Docket No. 2019-0311	Design Determine
Kaupulehu Water Company	02/18	Kaupulehu Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0363	Rate of Return
Aqua Engineers, LLC	05/17	Puhi Sewer & Water Company	Docket No. 2017-0118	Cost of Service / Rate Design
Aqua Enginocia, ELO	00/17	1 am oower a water company	DOGROCINO. 2017-0110	Cost of Service / Rate
Hawaii Resources, Inc.	09/16	Laie Water Company	Docket No. 2016-0229	Design
Illinois Commerce Commission	L	. ,		
Ameren Illinois Company		Ameren Illinois Company d/b/a		
d/b/a Ameren Illinois	07/20	Ameren Illinois	Docket No. 20-0308	Return on Equity
				Cost of Service / Rate
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	11/17	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-1106	Design
Aqua Illinois, Inc.	04/17	Aqua Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 17-0259	Rate of Return



Sponsor	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT				
Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	04/15	Utility Services of Illinois, Inc.	Docket No. 14-0741	Rate of Return				
Indiana Utility Regulatory Cor	nmission							
		Aqua Indiana, Inc. Aboite						
Aqua Indiana, Inc.	03/16	Wastewater Division	Docket No. 44752	Rate of Return				
Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	08/13	Twin Lakes, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. 44388	Rate of Return				
Kansas Corporation Commis	sion							
Atmos Energy	07/19	Atmos Energy	19-ATMG-525-RTS	Rate of Return				
Louisiana Public Service Con	nmission							
Atmos Energy	04/20	Atmos Energy	Docket No. U-35535	Rate of Return				
Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	06/13	Louisiana Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. U-32848	Rate of Return				
Maryland Public Service Com	mission							
Washington Gas Light								
Company	08/20	Washington Gas Light Company	Case No. 9651	Rate of Return				
FirstEnergy, Inc.	08/18	Potomac Edison Company	Case No. 9490	Rate of Return				
Massachusetts Department o	f Public U	tilities						
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Elec.)	D.P.U. 19-130	Rate of Return				
Unitil Corporation	12/19	Fitchburg Gas & Electric Co. (Gas)	D.P.U. 19-131	Rate of Return				
		Liberty Utilities d/b/a New England						
Liberty Utilities	07/15	Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 15-75	Rate of Return				
Mississippi Public Service Commission								
Atmos Energy	03/19	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure				
Atmos Energy	07/18	Atmos Energy	Docket No. 2015-UN-049	Capital Structure				
Missouri Public Service Commission								
Indian Hills Utility Operating	40/47	Indian Hills Utility Operating	0 11 05 0047 0050					
Company, Inc.	10/17	Company, Inc.	Case No. SR-2017-0259	Rate of Return				
Raccoon Creek Utility	09/16	Raccoon Creek Utility Operating	Dookst No. CD 2016 0202	Data of Datum				
Operating Company, Inc. Public Utilities Commission of		Company, Inc.	Docket No. SR-2016-0202	Rate of Return				
	08/20	Southwest Gas Corporation	Docket No. 20-02023	Poturn on Equity				
Southwest Gas Corporation		Southwest Gas Corporation	DOCKEL NO. 20-02023	Return on Equity				
New Jersey Board of Public L	1	Jaragy Control Dawar 9 Light Co	Dooket No. ED20020146	Data of Datum				
FirstEnergy	02/20 12/18	Jersey Central Power & Light Co.	Docket No. ER20020146 Docket No. WR18121351	Rate of Return Rate of Return				
Aqua New Jersey, Inc.		Aqua New Jersey, Inc.	Docket No. WR17101049					
Middlesex Water Company	10/17 03/15	Middlesex Water Company Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR17101049 Docket No. WR15030391	Rate of Return Rate of Return				
Middlesex Water Company	03/15	' '	Docket No. WR 15030391	-				
The Atlantic City Sewerage Company	10/14	The Atlantic City Sewerage Company	Docket No. WR14101263	Cost of Service / Rate Design				
Middlesex Water Company	11/13	Middlesex Water Company	Docket No. WR1311059	Capital Structure				
North Carolina Utilities Comm	nission			•				
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC	Docket No. E-7, Sub 1214	Return on Equity				
Duke Energy Progress, LLC	07/20	Duke Energy Progress, LLC	Docket No. E-2, Sub 1219	Return on Equity				
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	12/19	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 526	Rate of Return				
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/19	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 364	Rate of Return				
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	09/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. W-354 Sub 360	Rate of Return				



Sponsor	DATE	CASE/APPLICANT	DOCKET NO.	SUBJECT
Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	07/18	Aqua North Carolina, Inc.	Docket No. W-218 Sub 497	Rate of Return
Public Utilities Commission o	f Ohio			
Aqua Ohio, Inc.	05/16	Aqua Ohio, Inc.	Docket No. 16-0907-WW-AIR	Rate of Return
Pennsylvania Public Utility Co	ommissio	1		
Valley Energy, Inc.	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008209	Rate of Return
Wellsboro Electric Company	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008208	Rate of Return
Citizens' Electric Company of				
Lewisburg	07/19	C&T Enterprises	Docket No. R-2019-3008212	Rate of Return
Steelton Borough Authority	01/19	Steelton Borough Authority	Docket No. A-2019-3006880	Valuation
Mahoning Township, PA	08/18	Mahoning Township, PA	Docket No. A-2018-3003519	Valuation
SUEZ Water Pennsylvania				
Inc.	04/18	SUEZ Water Pennsylvania Inc.	Docket No. R-2018-000834	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	09/17	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2017-2598203	Rate of Return
Veolia Energy Philadelphia,	06/47	Vaclia Energy Dhiladalahia In-	Docket No. D 2017 0502440	Date of Deturn
Inc.	06/17	Veolia Energy Philadelphia, Inc.	Docket No. R-2017-2593142	Rate of Return
Emporium Water Company	07/14	Emporium Water Company	Docket No. R-2014-2402324	Rate of Return
Columbia Water Company	07/13	Columbia Water Company	Docket No. R-2013-2360798	Rate of Return
				Capital Structure / Long-Term Debt Cost
Penn Estates Utilities, Inc.	12/11	Penn Estates, Utilities, Inc.	Docket No. R-2011-2255159	Rate
South Carolina Public Service			B 001.01.11.2011.2200.100	11010
Blue Granite Water Co.	12/19	Blue Granite Water Company	Docket No. 2019-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	02/18	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2017-292-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	06/15	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2015-199-WS	Rate of Return
Carolina Water Service, Inc.	11/13	Carolina Water Service, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-275-WS	Rate of Return
United Utility Companies, Inc.	09/13	United Utility Companies, Inc.	Docket No. 2013-199-WS	Rate of Return
Utility Services of South	00/10	Utility Services of South Carolina,	20000110.2010 100 110	Trate of Fredam
Carolina, Inc.	09/13	Inc.	Docket No. 2013-201-WS	Rate of Return
Tega Cay Water Services,				
Inc.	11/12	Tega Cay Water Services, Inc.	Docket No. 2012-177-WS	Capital Structure
Tennessee Public Utility Com	mission			
Piedmont Natural Gas				
Company	07/20	Piedmont Natural Gas Company	Docket No. 20-00086	Return on Equity
Public Utility Commission of	Texas			
Southwestern Electric Power	40/00	Southwestern Electric Power	5	
Company	10/20	Company	Docket No. 51415	Rate of Return
Virginia State Corporation Co			T =	1
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/20	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2020-00106	Rate of Return
WGL Holdings, Inc.	07/18	Washington Gas Light Company	PUR-2018-00080	Rate of Return
Atmos Energy Corporation	05/18	Atmos Energy Corporation	PUR-2018-00014	Rate of Return
Aqua Virginia, Inc.	07/17	Aqua Virginia, Inc.	PUR-2017-00082	Rate of Return
Massanutten Public Service Corp.	08/14	Massanutten Public Service Corp.	PUE-2014-00035	Rate of Return / Rate Design